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Summary  
 
The dissertation considers the tenure rights of urban residential tenants in the post-
1994 constitutional dispensation. The 1996 Constitution mandates tenure reform in 
two instances. Firstly, section 25(6) (read with section 25(9)) mandates the 
legislature to enact legislation that would provide legally secure tenure rights for a 
person or community whose tenure of land is insecure as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices. This form of tenure reform is race-based. Secondly, 
section 26(3) mandates the courts to consider all relevant circumstances during 
eviction proceedings. In terms of this provision the court can refuse to grant the 
eviction order on the basis of the occupier‟s socio-economic weakness, which is a 
more general form of class-related tenure reform. 
The Constitution also ensures the right to have access to adequate housing, 
while the legislature must introduce measures that would give effect to this right 
(sections 26(1) and 26(2)). 
To determine whether the current landlord-tenant regime in South Africa is 
able to provide tenants with secure occupation rights and access to rental housing, it 
is compared to landlord-tenant regimes in pre-1994 South Africa, the United 
Kingdom, New York State and Germany. The landlord-tenant regimes are 
considered in light of changing socio-economic circumstances where the state had to 
assist households during housing shortages. The dissertation assesses the 
efficiency of landlord-tenant law, combined with regulatory measures that ensure 
substantive tenure rights and rent restrictions, as a form of tenure that could help 
alleviate housing shortages and initiate a new landlord-tenant regime for South 
Africa that would give effect to the Constitution. 
The dissertation concludes that the current substantive tenure rights of urban 
residential tenants are largely based on the common law, which is associated with 
weak tenure security. The landlord-tenant laws, namely the Rental Housing Act 50 of 
1999 and the Social Housing Act 16 of 2008, fail to provide urban residential tenants 
with substantive tenure rights. The legislature has failed to enact a law that gives 
effect to section 25(6) in the landlord-tenant framework. The legislature did enact the 
Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 
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(PIE) in order to give effect to section 26(3). Recently the courts interpreted PIE to 
provide marginalised tenants with substantive tenure protection during eviction 
proceedings. However, to give effect to section 25(6) legislation should grant 
residential tenants substantive tenure rights that are legally secure prior to eviction. 
The legislature enacted the Rental Housing Act and the Social Housing Act to 
give effect to the right to housing (section 26 of the Constitution) in the landlord-
tenant framework. These laws fail to promote access to rental housing as a form of 
tenure that could help alleviate housing shortages. 
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Opsomming 
 
Die proefskrif oorweeg die okkupasieregte van stedelike residensiële huurders in die 
post-1994 konstitusionele bedeling. Die 1996 Grondwet bepaal dat okkupasieregte 
in twee gevalle hervorm moet word. Eerstens gee artikel 25(6) (gelees met artikel 
25(9)) opdrag aan die wetgewer om wetgewing te verorden wat okkupasieregte met 
verblyfsekerheid aan „n person of gemeenskap sal verleen indien so „n person of 
gemeenskap tans grond okkupeer met okkupasieregte wat onseker is as gevolg van 
vorige rasgebaseerde wetgewing. Hierdie tipe hervorming is rasgebaseer. Tweedens 
gee artikel 26(3) opdrag aan die howe om alle relevante faktore te oorweeg as deel 
van enige uitsettingsprosedure. In terme van hierdie bepaling is die howe gemagtig 
om „n uitsettingsbevel te weier op die basis van die okkupeerder se sosio-
ekonomiese kwesbaarheid. Hierdie tipe hervorming is „n meer algemene 
klasgebaseerde hervorming.  
Artikel 26(1) (gelees met artikel 26(2)) van die Grondwet bepaal dat elkeen 
die reg op toegang tot geskikte behuising het, terwyl die staat redelike wetgewende 
en ander maatreëls moet tref om hierdie reg te verwesenlik. 
Ten einde te bepaal of die huidige huurbehuisingstelsel in Suid-Afrika 
voldoende is, met inagneming van die stelsel se vermoë om huurders te voorsien 
van okkupasieregte met verblyfsekerheid en van toegang tot huurbehuising, word dit 
vergelyk met die huurbehuisingstelsels in Suid Afrika voor 1994, die Verenigde 
Koninkryk, New York Staat en Duitsland. Hierdie huurbehuisingstelsels word 
bespreek met inagneming van veranderinge in die sosio-ekonomiese 
omstandighede waartydens die staat gedurende behuisingstekorte huishoudings 
moes ondersteun. Die doeltreffendheid van huurbehuising word beoordeel met 
verwysing na regulasies wat substantiewe okkupasieregte verseker en beperkings 
plaas op huurpryse om „n vorm van verblyfreg daar te stel wat die behuisingstekort 
kan verminder ten einde „n nuwe huurbehuisingstelsel vir Suid-Afrika te inisieër wat 
gevolg aan die Grondwet sal gee. 
Die proefskrif lei tot die gevolgtrekking dat die huidige substantiewe 
okkupasieregte van stedelike residensiële huurders grotendeels op die gemenereg 
gebaseer is. Die gemenereg maak nie voorsiening vir sterk substantiewe 
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okkupasieregte nie. Die huidige huurbehuisingswetgewing, naamlik die Wet op 
Huurbehuising 50 van 1999 en die Wet op Maatskaplike Behuising 16 van 2008, 
slaag nie daarin om substantiewe okkupasieregte vir stedelike residensiële huurders 
te voorsien nie. Die wetgewer het nie daarin geslaag om „n wet te promulgeer wat in 
die huurbehuisingsraamwerk aan artikel 25(6) effek gee nie. Die wetgewer het wel 
die Wet op die Voorkoming van Onwettige Uitsetting en Onregmatige Besetting van 
Grond 19 van 1998 verorden om effek te gee aan artikel 26(3) van die Grondwet. 
Hierdie Wet is onlangs so deur die howe geïnterpreteer dat dit kwesbare huurders 
tydens uitsettingsprosedures met substantiewe okkupasieregte beskerm. Om aan 
artikel 25(6) te voldoen moet wetgewing egter substantiewe okkupasieregte met 
verblyfsekerheid aan residensiële huurders verskaf voordat hulle uitgesit word.  
Die wetgewer het die Wet op Huurbehuising en die Wet op Maatskaplike 
Behuising verorden ten einde effek aan die reg op behuising (artikel 26 van die 
Grondwet) in die gebied van huurbehuising te gee. Geeneen van hierdie wette slaag 
daarin om toegang tot behuising, en veral huurbehuising as „n vorm van okkupasie, 
te bevorder ten einde die behuisingtekort te verminder nie.  
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1.1 Research questions 
1.1.1 Weak tenure rights: The constitutional obligation of tenure reform 
 
The following section is a description of the main questions that underlie the entire 
dissertation. These questions are explained with reference to two recent cases, 
which are discussed in some detail because they highlight the extent of the 
uncertainty that result from the legal issues, which could also be defined as 
problems. 
In the recent case of The Occupiers, Shulana Court, 11 Hendon Road, 
Yeoville, Johannesburg v Steele1 the South African Supreme Court of Appeal had to 
decide whether to dismiss an application for rescission of an eviction order granted 
by default against the appellants.2 The appellants occupied the respondent‟s 
residential property in terms of an oral periodic tenancy and the rent was paid on a 
monthly basis. The respondent allegedly decided to renovate the building, because it 
had become dilapidated and overcrowded.3 The respondent terminated all the 
leases and gave the appellants notice of termination of their leases. According to the 
notice the appellants had to vacate the premises within three months, but they failed 
to do so. The respondent instituted eviction proceedings and the high court granted 
the eviction, even though the appellants failed to oppose the proceedings. The 
appellants applied for rescission of the eviction order.4 
In order to succeed in the application for rescission at common law the 
appellants had to show good cause for their default, which can usually be 
established with a reasonable explanation, and “a bona fide defence to the plaintiff‟s 
claim which prima facie has some prospect of success.”5 In support of the rescission 
application one of the appellants explained the personal circumstances of the 
appellants. Most of the appellants have resided in the property for a number of years 
                                                          
1
 [2010] ZASCA 28 (SCA). 
2
 The Occupiers, Shulana Court, 11 Hendon Road, Yeoville, Johannesburg v Steele [2010] ZASCA 28 
(SCA) para 1. 
3
 The Occupiers, Shulana Court, 11 Hendon Road, Yeoville, Johannesburg v Steele [2010] ZASCA 28 
(SCA) para 2. 
4
 The Occupiers, Shulana Court, 11 Hendon Road, Yeoville, Johannesburg v Steele [2010] ZASCA 28 
(SCA) para 3. 
5
 The Occupiers, Shulana Court, 11 Hendon Road, Yeoville, Johannesburg v Steele [2010] ZASCA 28 
(SCA) para 4.The Court referred to Chetty v Law Society, Transvaal 1985 (2) SA 756 (A) at 765B-C; 
Colyn v Tiger Food Industries Ltd t/a Meadow Feed Mills (Cape) 2003 (6) SA 1 (SCA) para 11. 
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in overcrowded conditions. The appellants include children, disabled persons and 
households headed by women, but all the occupiers were poor and unable to find 
affordable alternative accommodation in the inner city.6 The appellants explained 
that they had, unsuccessfully, taken steps to secure legal assistance to oppose the 
eviction application and the Court found that their explanation was reasonable.7 
In order to succeed the appellants had to show that they had a bona fide 
defence to the plaintiff‟s claim. The appellants contended that the eviction order 
would render them homeless and in terms of sections 4(6) and 4(7) of the Prevention 
of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act8 (PIE) the court may 
only grant an eviction order if it would be just and equitable to do so. They alleged 
that they were entitled to protection in terms of sections 26(1) and 26(3) of the 
Constitution. Section 26(1) guarantees the right to have access to adequate housing, 
while section 26(3) ensures at least due process in eviction proceedings as the court 
must consider all relevant circumstances before granting an eviction order.9 As part 
of the eviction proceedings, the courts can interpret section 26(3) to grant the 
occupier substantive tenure protection if the court finds that the eviction order would 
be unjust as a result of the occupier‟s weak socio-economic circumstances. The 
court would usually base its decision to grant substantive tenure protection on the 
occupier‟s personal circumstances. 
Important to note at this stage, substantive tenure protection is different from 
procedural protection. The essence of substantive tenure security is generally to 
allow the tenant (or any occupier) to continue occupying the leased premises as a 
lawful occupier. Procedural protection is aimed at providing tenants with due process 
during eviction proceedings. Substantive tenure security entails that the tenant is 
protected from the possibility of eviction for consecutive periods. Procedural 
protection ensures that evictions take place in a just and equitable fashion. However, 
if the circumstances of tenant justify more stringent protection during eviction 
proceedings, then the courts can refuse to order eviction and allow the tenant to 
                                                          
6
 The Occupiers, Shulana Court, 11 Hendon Road, Yeoville, Johannesburg v Steele [2010] ZASCA 28 
(SCA) para 5. 
7
 The Occupiers, Shulana Court, 11 Hendon Road, Yeoville, Johannesburg v Steele [2010] ZASCA 28 
(SCA) paras 6-8. 
8
 Act 19 of 1998. 
9
 The Occupiers, Shulana Court, 11 Hendon Road, Yeoville, Johannesburg v Steele [2010] ZASCA 28 
(SCA) para 9. 
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remain in the premises as an unlawful occupier. In such a case the court can use 
due process measures to grant the tenant additional substantive tenure protection. If 
a marginalised tenant has limited substantive tenure rights and faces eviction, the 
court can use the section 26(3) due process measures (the procedural safeguards) 
to grant the tenant substantive tenure security, usually by refusing to grant the 
eviction order. 
The Court considered the constitutional duty of the state in light of the housing 
provision (section 26) and highlighted the importance of PIE as a mechanism that 
strives to give effect to section 26(3).10 The Court emphasised the duty of the courts 
to consider all relevant circumstances before granting an eviction order and held that 
the high court failed to discharge its statutory and constitutional obligations. Although 
the high court was not informed of all relevant facts in order to make a just and 
equitable decision, it should have taken steps to obtain the necessary information.11 
In light of the appellants‟ personal circumstances, and specifically the fact that the 
eviction order might render the households homeless, the Court found that the 
appellants had established a bona fide defence with some prospect of success and 
therefore also succeeded to show good cause for a rescission order in terms of the 
common law.12 The default eviction order was rescinded and the appellants were 
granted leave to oppose the eviction application.13 
From the case it is evident that the substantive tenure rights of urban tenants 
are restricted by the common law, which provides them with weak tenure security. In 
terms of the common law the landowner in the case discussed above was entitled to 
unilaterally terminate the periodic tenancy at any point, for any reason, and the effect 
                                                          
10
 The Occupiers, Shulana Court, 11 Hendon Road, Yeoville, Johannesburg v Steele [2010] ZASCA 
(SCA) 28 para 10. 
11
 The Occupiers, Shulana Court, 11 Hendon Road, Yeoville, Johannesburg v Steele [2010] ZASCA 
(SCA) 28 paras 11-15. In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) the 
Constitutional Court held that the courts should ensure that they have the necessary information to 
adjudicate eviction cases. At para 32 Sachs J found that “[t]he obligation on the court is to 'have 
regard to' the circumstances, that is, to give them due weight in making its judgment as to what is just 
and equitable. The court cannot fulfil its responsibilities in this respect if it does not have the requisite 
information at its disposal … Indeed, when the evidence submitted by the parties leaves important 
questions of fact obscure, contested or uncertain, the court might be obliged to procure ways of 
establishing the true state of affairs, so as to enable it properly to „have regard‟ to relevant 
circumstances.” 
12
 The Occupiers, Shulana Court, 11 Hendon Road, Yeoville, Johannesburg v Steele [2010] ZASCA 
(SCA) 28 paras 16-17. 
13
 The Occupiers, Shulana Court, 11 Hendon Road, Yeoville, Johannesburg v Steele [2010] ZASCA 
(SCA) 28 para 18. 
5 
 
was that the appellants had to vacate the premises within three months, without any 
chance of having the justifiability of the eviction being considered on the basis of 
their personal circumstances or the effect that eviction would have on their lives.  
The case illustrates the problem of insufficient substantive tenure security in 
the current South African landlord-tenant regime. As a result of the appellants‟ weak 
substantive tenure rights, the private landowner could effortlessly terminate the 
periodic tenancy and demand that the appellants vacate the residential property 
within a couple of months. When the respondent served the notice to terminate the 
lease the appellants‟ right to continue occupying their home immediately ceased to 
exist. The appellants occupied the premises in terms of a common law periodic 
tenancy, which provides weak substantive tenure security as the landlord is at liberty 
to decide when to terminate the lease, without consulting the tenants and without 
taking their circumstances into account. The appellants had no legal means to 
oppose termination of the tenancy. Once the lease ended the appellants became 
unlawful occupiers and as such their protection was restricted to due process in 
terms of PIE and section 26(3) of the Constitution.  
Section 25(6) (read with section 25(9)) of the Constitution mandates the 
legislature to enact legislation that would provide legally secure tenure rights for a 
person or community whose tenure of land is insecure as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices. To date, the legislation promulgated as a result of 
these sections predominantly makes provision for tenure security in rural areas or for 
unlawful occupiers. The law is currently not providing any effective substantive 
tenure protection for urban black14 tenants against termination of the tenancy, 
thereby restricting the protection they do enjoy to due process during the process of 
eviction, once the tenancy has been terminated. The question is whether the 
legislature has failed in its constitutional duty to enact legislation that would provide 
strengthened substantive tenure rights for urban black tenants. 
In terms of the common law the landowner was entitled to an eviction order, 
but the Supreme Court of Appeal refused to approve the default eviction order, 
because it was not just and equitable in light of the occupiers‟ personal 
circumstances. The most important consideration was the fact that the eviction order 
                                                          
14
 The term “black” is used throughout the dissertation and refers to all racial groups other than white 
persons.   
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might have rendered the households homeless. The Court refused to approve the 
eviction order in consequence of the occupiers‟ socio-economic weakness. The 
Court provided the appellants with an opportunity to oppose application for their 
eviction, but the only basis for their opposition would be their personal circumstances 
and the fact that the eviction order might result in their homelessness. The 
procedural safeguards enshrined in PIE (and section 26(3) of the Constitution) 
ensure due process in eviction proceedings and the Court‟s interpretation of PIE 
temporarily protected the appellants (who form part of the group of most vulnerable 
occupiers in South Africa) from becoming homeless. The Court interpreted PIE, 
which gives effect to section 26(3), to grant the occupiers substantive tenure 
protection, because an eviction order would not have been just and equitable, based 
on the occupiers personal circumstances. 
The Court had to prevent an unjust eviction, but was unable to provide the 
occupiers with a new tenancy. The occupiers‟ status changed from being lawful 
tenants to becoming unlawful occupiers and the Court was unable to delay or 
prevent this result, but the Court did grant the occupiers a certain level of temporary 
substantive tenure protection in their capacity as unlawful occupiers. This result was 
justified in light of the occupiers‟ socio-economic weakness rather than their race. 
The Court therefore interpreted PIE (and section 26(3)) to afford substantive tenure 
protection for marginalised occupiers, which is a form of class-related tenure 
protection afforded particularly to socially and economically marginalised occupiers 
of residential property. The appellants‟ lack of substantive tenure protection is 
evident in light of the decision, because the Court had to construe strengthened 
tenure protection as part of the procedural safeguards in order to suspend the 
eviction order. The circumstances of the appellants necessitated more stringent 
substantive tenure security, but this form of protection was unavailable. 
The question is whether these occupiers should fight eviction in court, and the 
very real possibility of becoming homeless, whereafter the courts must decide how to 
accommodate such households (because they have a right of access to adequate 
housing (section 26(1) of the Constitution) during a period when South Africa is 
facing a housing crisis, or whether the legislature is not obliged to provide these 
occupiers with substantive tenure security. Should vulnerable households be 
afforded temporary tenure protection, based on overburdened due process 
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measures, or should such households occupy land with substantive tenure security? 
Importantly, procedural safeguards are not aimed at providing occupiers with 
substantive tenure security, substantive tenure rights should grant legally secure 
tenure by means of legislation.  
If the legislature can strengthen the substantive tenure rights of urban 
tenants, specifically the more vulnerable tenants, then the possibility of eviction 
would diminish. If the tenancy could continue for consecutive periods and the urban 
tenant had the means to oppose termination of the tenancy, the tenant would enjoy 
substantive tenure security, because she would be protected against the possibility 
of eviction. The result would be to give effect to section 25(6), as strengthened 
occupation rights for all urban tenants would include previously disadvantaged 
households. It follows that if the tenant can oppose termination of the tenancy 
(instead of eviction), she would be able to continue living in the same dwelling and 
the right to have access to adequate housing (section 26(1) of the Constitution) 
would be given effect to. Section 26(1) of the Constitution is the housing provision 
and it states that “[e]veryone has the right to have access to adequate housing.” 
Strengthened occupation rights for marginalised tenants would give effect to section 
26(1) of the Constitution and it would also combat the housing shortage. Rental 
housing is a form of tenure that could help alleviate housing shortages, because the 
right to have access to adequate housing does not equate homeownership. The 
question is what the role of rental housing should be in light of the housing shortage 
and whether the government should use rental housing as a form of tenure that 
could alleviate housing shortages. 
In order to ensure tenure security for tenants, the rights of property owners 
have to be restricted in accordance with the Constitution. A certain tension will 
evolve between the strengthened rights of tenants and the constitutionally 
guaranteed rights of owners (section 25(1) of the Constitution).  The issue is how this 
tension can be solved within the constitutional framework.  
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1.1.2 The housing crisis: The role of landlord-tenant law 
 
In the recent case of Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga 
Avenue & Another15 the applicant was the owner of commercial property. The 
respondents had occupied the property for a number of years and paid rent.16 The 
applicant served the occupiers with notices to vacate the premises and upon their 
failure to comply claimed an eviction order. The occupiers were living in extreme 
poverty, as the average household income was R790 per month and it was apparent 
that they would not be able to acquire affordable alternative accommodation in the 
Johannesburg Central Business District, where they were living and working at that 
time.17 The occupiers contended that the effect of the eviction order would be to 
render them homeless and argued that the City must provide them with alternative 
accommodation. They relied on their constitutional right to have access to adequate 
housing and the state‟s duty to introduce measures to give effect to this right 
(sections 26(1) and 26(2)); the National Housing Legislation (the National Housing 
Act 107 of 1997 and Chapter 12 of the National Housing Code); and the Prevention 
of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land 19 of 1998 (PIE).18 The City 
claimed that it does not make available accommodation to persons evicted from 
privately owned land, because emergency housing is only made available to persons 
evicted from government land, and that it does not have the financial resources to 
provide housing to the respondents.19 In response, the applicant introduced a new 
notice of motion seeking an alternative form of relief against the City, which 
consisted of an order that the City should pay “an amount equivalent to the fair and 
reasonable monthly rental for the premises should an eviction order not be 
granted.”20 
                                                          
15
 [2010] JOL 25031 (GSJ). 
16
 Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue & Another [2010] JOL 
25031 (GSJ) paras 10-13. 
17
 Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue & Another [2010] JOL 
25031 (GSJ) paras 14-15. 
18
 Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue & Another [2010] JOL 
25031 (GSJ) paras 22-24. 
19
 Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue & Another [2010] JOL 
25031 (GSJ) para 4. 
20
 Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue & Another [2010] JOL 
25031 (GSJ) para 6. 
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The question the court had to decide was whether private landowners could 
be compelled to provide housing for unlawful occupiers who are unable to acquire 
affordable alternative accommodation, or whether the state should be burdened with 
this duty.21 The court discussed the state‟s duty to accommodate vulnerable 
occupiers (and thereby give effect to section 26 of the Constitution) in depth and 
concluded that in this case the City had breached its constitutional and statutory 
obligations. The court also emphasised private landowners‟ constitutional right not to 
be arbitrarily deprived of property without compensation22 and concluded that the 
right to have access to adequate housing should not impose an obligation on private 
landowners to make their property available for this purpose.23 The court took into 
consideration previous rent control legislation that restricted landlords‟ right to evict 
tenants from certain buildings without receiving any compensation. The court also 
referred to a common law principle according to which the courts can allow an 
occupier (after termination of the lease) “a period of grace within which to find 
alternative accommodation … [that] seems to have its foundation in the application 
of the court‟s entitlement to ensure real and substantial justice.”24 
In light of the importance of the right of access to adequate housing and its 
direct relationship with the right to human dignity;25 the lack of urban housing stock 
for African people as a consequence of apartheid land laws, which forced African 
people to occupy dilapidated buildings in the inner city of Johannesburg;26 and the 
responsibility of the state, and not private landowners, to introduce measures that 
would give effect to the right of access to adequate housing,27  the court fashioned 
an order that provided relief for the unlawful tenants whose constitutional rights have 
                                                          
21
 Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue & Another [2010] JOL 
25031 (GSJ) para 6. 
22
 Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue & Another [2010] JOL 
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been breached.28 The court held that the private landowner was entitled to an 
eviction order, although the eviction order was suspended until the respondents 
could find alternative accommodation, and the state was ordered to pay the applicant 
an amount equivalent to the fair and reasonable monthly rental of the premises until 
the occupiers vacated the premises.29 The order follows the logic of the 
Constitutional Court in President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v 
Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and Others, Amici Curiae),30 where the Court 
confirmed the decision in the Supreme Court of Appeal31 that unlawful occupiers 
could remain on private land, until the state made alternative accommodation 
available, provided that the state pay compensation to the landowner for the period 
during which he was denied use of his land. 
Similar to the previous case, the decision highlights the effect of vulnerable 
urban tenants‟ insufficient substantive tenure rights. The occupiers‟ personal 
circumstances and history of insecure tenure necessitated legally secure tenure, but 
in fact they occupied the land with insufficient substantive tenure security. The 
decision also highlights another problem, namely the South African housing crisis. In 
this case the private landowner was entitled to an eviction order in terms of PIE, but 
the court refused to grant the order, because it would have rendered the occupiers 
homeless. The court underlined the duty of the state to introduce measures that 
would give effect to the right of access to housing. Despite the City‟s duty to 
accommodate vulnerable occupiers who are facing homelessness, the obvious 
problem remained that the City did not have alternative accommodation available. 
The court was unwilling to grant the eviction order, because it would have resulted in 
vulnerable households becoming homeless and would therefore not have been just 
and equitable. Similar to the previous decision, the court refused to grant the eviction 
order based on the socio-economic weakness of the occupiers. Consequently, the 
court was forced to burden the private landowner with the temporary duty to make 
housing available for the occupiers, provided that the state had to pay compensation 
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in the form of rental payments. The court had to balance the rights of both parties 
and therefore decided to construe some form of payment for the private landowner in 
return for allowing the unlawful occupiers to remain on the property on a temporary 
basis. 
South Africa is facing a housing crisis and the state is obliged to introduce 
measures that would alleviate housing shortages. Section 26(2) of the Constitution 
mandates the state to introduce measures that would give effect to the right to have 
access to adequate housing. The state can introduce different forms of housing, 
including rental housing, for a range of households with diverse needs, to comply 
with this constitutional obligation. The case illustrates the problem of the housing 
shortage and the state‟s inability to make adequate housing available for homeless 
persons. As a result of the lack of housing options that are available and the state‟s 
inefficient policy to provide all homeless persons with homeownership, marginalised 
households are forced to live in informal settlements or are in fact homeless. 
Consequently, the role of private landowners is overemphasised. The case also 
illustrates this uncertainty regarding the obligation of private landowners to become 
involved in the provision of housing in future. The case furthermore highlights the 
undeveloped role of rental housing in the post-1994 dispensation. The question is 
what the role of landlord-tenant law should be in light of the housing crisis and 
whether private landowners should be encouraged, or compelled, to provide rental 
housing. Rental housing could help alleviate housing shortages, but the role of 
private landowners in the provision of rental housing is unclear. The role of the state 
in the provision of rental housing, or in encouraging the private sector to make 
available rental housing, is also unclear in light of the decision, although it is 
apparent that landlord-tenant law should play a role in the alleviation of housing 
shortages. The rental housing market in South Africa is diverse and all urban tenants 
are not entitled to the same level of tenure security. In terms of section 25(6) black 
urban tenants are entitled to legally secure tenure, while marginalised tenants could 
be afforded substantive tenure protection by the courts on the basis of their socio-
economic weakness in terms of section 26 and PIE. The extent of substantive, and 
procedural, protection for different urban tenants is therefore also undeveloped and 
unclear. The detail regarding landlord-tenant law as a form of housing requires 
comprehensive consideration. 
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In order to formulate some answers to these questions and develop possible 
solutions to the identified problems in the current South African landlord-tenant 
regime, the methodology I use consists of three analyses, in three sections of the 
dissertation, namely a historical survey of tenure security in South African landlord-
tenant law (Chapter 2); a post-1994 constitutional analysis of tenure reform in South 
African landlord-tenant law (Chapter 3); and a comparative study, including English, 
American and German landlord-tenant law (Chapters 4-7). 
 
1.2 Demarcation of research field 
1.2.1 Historical survey: The common law, rent control and apartheid 
 
Chapter 2 provides a historical background of landlord-tenant law in South Africa 
since the beginning of the twentieth century, focusing on tenure security (and to 
some extent rent control) afforded to tenants by means of the common law and 
legislation. The Chapter is divided into three main sections, which respectively 
illustrate the initial common law position, subsequent legislative amendments and 
the eventual resurfacing of the common law position. 
In consequence of housing shortages caused by the First and Second World 
War, the legislature promulgated anti-eviction legislation that restricted the common 
law rights of landowners to end the lease and claim eviction upon termination of the 
contractual tenancy. Urban white tenants were afforded substantive tenure security 
by these legislative interventions. Private landowners were deprived of their right to 
evict the tenant upon termination of the lease, because the lease continued by force 
of law with the aim to provide white tenants with substantive tenure security. In order 
to understand the impact of these measures, reference to the common law position 
is imperative, because the common law afforded insufficient substantive tenure 
rights. The common law mainly provided tenure security for tenants in three different 
situations, namely upon the death of either party; when the landlord became 
insolvent; and upon alienation of the leased premises. Post-war legislation extended 
this protection to other situations. The pre-1994 regulatory measures that imposed 
substantive tenure rights for white tenants were not aimed at promoting access to 
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rental housing. It ensured substantive occupation rights for tenants who were already 
occupying rental housing in the private market. 
Racially discriminatory legislation was introduced by successive white 
minority governments since the beginning of the twentieth century. The occupation 
rights of black persons were regulated in terms of the racially discriminatory 
apartheid laws, which excluded them from the landlord-tenant legislation that 
afforded secure occupation rights, and some form of rent control, for white tenants. 
The racially discriminatory legislation made provision for the identification of certain 
racially defined areas for exclusive occupation by different racial groups. The 
occupation rights of black households in urban areas were weak and insecure, 
because they were only allowed in the urban areas on a temporary basis. This 
formed part of the government‟s policy to restrict the presence of black persons in 
the urban areas.   
At the end of the 1980s the government decided to deregulate the private 
rental market, because the housing shortage for the white minority ceased to exist. 
When the Rents Acts were abolished, the common law position with regard to the 
termination of urban tenancies resurfaced, which was associated with weak tenure 
security for all urban tenants, irrespective of their race or socio-economic 
background. In terms of the common law the court does not have a discretion to 
refuse the eviction order on the basis of the tenant‟s personal circumstances. The 
Chapter concludes with the resurfacing of the common law at the beginning of the 
1990s. The Chapter therefore explains the development of landlord-tenant law in 
South Africa, but it places emphasis on the different tenure rights of diverse 
categories of tenants during changing socio-economic circumstances. The 
substantive tenure rights of the white minority group are important to consider in light 
of the current absence of substantive tenure security for all urban tenants. 
 
1.2.2 The Constitution: Tenure reform and access to housing 
 
In the late 1980s the pre-1994 government was pressurised to introduce political and 
social transformation, which included land reform. The entire political, social, 
economic and legal field was re-evaluated and restructured in order to rectify the 
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imbalances of apartheid. The new government was adamant in its undertaking to 
rectify and transform the apartheid-type laws and this transformative goal is evident 
from the Constitution, especially with regard to the new values introduced in land 
law. Chapter 3 is a constitutional analysis of tenure reform, which forms part of the 
land reform programme, in the post-1994 landlord-tenant regime. 
Section 25(6) of the Constitution makes provision for tenure reform and it 
states that a person whose tenure is legally insecure as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws is entitled to tenure that is legally secure. Parliament must enact 
legislation in order to give effect to this right (section 25(9)). The focus of the 
legislature has been to provide black rural occupiers with legally secure tenure 
rights. PIE (read in terms of section 26(3)) can be interpreted by the courts to grant 
substantive tenure rights for unlawful occupiers, including unlawful black occupiers, 
but the basis for granting substantive tenure rights is the socio-economic weakness 
of the occupier. The legislature has not enacted a law that affords substantive tenure 
protection for lawful black occupiers in urban areas. The current landlord-tenant 
laws, including the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 and the Social Housing Act 16 of 
2008, are also not aimed at providing previously disadvantaged tenants with 
substantive tenure security, even though these households are entitled to legally 
secure tenure. The constitutional failure of the current landlord-tenant laws, 
especially with regard to previously disadvantaged individuals‟ right to occupy land 
with legally secure tenure (section 25(6)), is illustrated throughout this Chapter. 
Section 26(3) of the Constitution is an important procedural safeguard for all 
persons facing eviction as it states that no person may be evicted from his home 
without an order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. 
Section 26(3) ensures due process during eviction proceedings, although it can also 
be interpreted by the court to grant strengthened tenure protection to occupiers. The 
interpretation of section 26(3) by the courts is discussed at length in Chapter 3 in 
order to determine in what circumstances the court would provide a tenant with 
increased tenure protection. The potential of this section in analysed through a case 
law discussion. The courts can interpret section 26(3) to grant the tenant substantive 
tenure rights, based on the personal circumstances of the tenant. One could argue 
that this section therefore amended the common law position, because at common 
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law the courts cannot refuse to grant the eviction order on the basis of the tenant‟s 
personal circumstances. 
Sections 26(1) and 26(2) of the Constitution is the housing provision and it 
states that everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing and that the 
state must take measures to achieve the realisation of this right. An important 
consideration in the landlord-tenant framework is the success of the laws enacted to 
give effect to the housing provision and whether these laws afford adequate housing. 
The current landlord-tenant laws are not aimed at promoting increased access to 
rental housing that could help alleviate the housing shortage. The government has 
apparently not seriously considered the potential of rental housing as a form of 
tenure that could accommodate low income households. Nevertheless, Chapter 3 
considers rental housing as a form of housing that could help alleviate housing 
shortages, although it follows from the analysis in Chapter 3 that it is doubtful 
whether rental housing would be able to provide marginalised households with 
adequate housing as long as it is associated with insufficient substantive tenure 
security. 
The effect of the landlord-tenant legislation promulgated in terms of section 26 
is analysed in Chapter 3 and the general conclusion is that the effect of the Rental 
Housing Act and Social Housing Act is insubstantial, because these statutes merely 
reinforce the common law, which is associated with weak tenure rights. The post-
1994 landlord-tenant laws do afford some procedural protection, although one of the 
questions in Chapter 3 is whether these procedural amendments are sufficient in 
light of the constitutional goals and whether more radical changes regarding 
substantive tenure security are not necessary. The common law remains significant 
in the area of landlord-tenant law. The result is that urban tenants continue to occupy 
land with weak tenure rights, which is problematic in light of the new constitutional 
dispensation. The tension between the common law, Constitution and legislation is 
highlighted through a case law discussion, while the subsidiarity32 approach is used 
to understand and apply the relationship between these bodies of law. However, 
application of the subsidiarity approach also identifies certain areas in the landlord-
tenant framework that fail to give effect to the constitutional obligations. The most 
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problematic area of law is the weak tenure rights of black and marginalised tenants. 
Black and vulnerable urban tenants still occupy land with insufficient tenure rights, 
because their occupation rights are primarily based on the common law and the 
current landlord-tenant laws (the Rental Housing Act and the Social Housing Act) 
merely entrenched the weak common law tenure rights. It is doubtful whether these 
areas of law could be developed in order to give effect to the constitutional 
obligations, because the essence of these laws is to provide tenants with weak 
tenure security, while the aim of the Constitution is to provide black and marginalised 
occupiers with substantive tenure security. 
The pre-1994 legislature afforded tenants substantive protection in the form of 
continued occupation rights, while the current legislation focuses on ensuring due 
process in the event of eviction. The current landlord-tenant framework is therefore 
insufficient because it is not providing substantive tenure security. There is a need to 
create a secure form of tenure for the urban poor in order to adhere to the 
constitutional obligations. The questions are firstly, whether the legislature would be 
able to give effect to section 25(6) of the Constitution if it could provide legally secure 
occupation rights for urban black tenants who were previously denied any security of 
tenure and secondly, whether the government would be able to fulfil its constitutional 
obligation in section 26(1) if it made affordable rental housing available as a form of 
tenure for marginalised occupiers. These questions are further analysed and 
discussed in Chapter 3 with reference to the current landlord-tenant laws and case 
law. 
 
1.2.3 Comparative analysis 
 
The aim of Chapter 4 is to investigate and examine the English landlord-tenant 
system, especially in relation to tenants‟ tenure security, because it provides 
answers to numerous questions regarding the failure of the current landlord-tenant 
laws in South Africa to make available adequate housing and afford tenure security 
in accordance with the post-apartheid constitutional obligations. 
The pre-1994 position in South Africa with regard to the reasons for regulation 
of the landlord-tenant relationship is comparable to the English position after the 
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Second World War. Housing shortages that developed in Europe as a result of the 
First and Second World War motivated the English legislature to enact legislation in 
order to grant substantive tenure rights for tenants, thereby statutorily interfering in 
the relationship between landlord and tenant. The aim of the pre-1994 South African 
statutes was also to grant continued occupation rights for tenants upon expiration of 
the lease, combined with rent control, although the position in the two jurisdictions 
were different. The Rents Acts in South Africa only afforded tenure security for white 
tenants, while the English landlord-tenant legislation applied (and still applies) to 
tenants according to the type of landlord, being either a social or private landlord. 
The security principles underlying the English landlord-tenant statutes 
remained on the statute book for most of the twentieth century (during which period 
Britain also experienced economic prosperity) and some of these principles are 
currently still enshrined in the landlord-tenant regulatory framework, which is also 
different from the South African position. A significant difference between the two 
regulatory systems is that the English landlord-tenant system is differentiated in 
terms of different sectors that provide diverse levels of tenure security for various 
tenants.  
Through the operation of these statutes, depending on the relevant sector, 
some urban tenants are practically enabled to enjoy a tenancy for life at reasonable 
rents, as some of the statutes also restrict the rent. All eviction proceedings are 
subjected to procedural controls that ensure due process and fairness. In some 
instances the court has a wide discretion to consider various circumstances, mostly 
related to the personal circumstances of the tenant and the impact that the eviction 
order might have on the tenant and his family.  
The substantive tenure rights of English tenants and the procedural 
safeguards during eviction proceedings are analysed in Chapter 4 as a comparative 
jurisdiction, because the result of the English landlord-tenant laws is to allow certain 
tenants to continue occupying residential property for consecutive periods and enjoy 
tenure security. Throughout Chapter 4 the context-sensitivity of the English landlord-
tenant scheme is emphasised, as it caters for most members of society while 
continually adapting the aim of the various statutes to respond to changes in the 
housing policy that reflect the socio-economic circumstances.  
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Chapter 4 is divided into five broad sections to a) explain the fundamental 
English leasehold concepts; b) describe the nature of a tenancy in English law, since 
the English land law system differs substantially from the South African one; c) clarify 
the importance of housing policy with regard to the extent of statutory intervention 
through legislation (this relationship has not received enough consideration by the 
South African legislature); d) discuss some of the policies that were introduced in 
English law and their effect on previous legislation and the rental housing market in 
general; and e) provide an in-depth discussion of the current statutes regulating 
landlord-tenant law in England and Wales, focusing on the level of tenure security 
afforded and, to a lesser extent, the limited use of rent control.  
From Chapter 4 it appears that the English parliament has consistently 
adapted and developed an extensive landlord-tenant legislative scheme in line with 
changing socio-economic circumstances. Within this scheme, certain tenants enjoy 
strong tenure security associated with continued occupation rights, while others 
occupy residential property with hardly any security of tenure. One could argue that 
weak domestic occupation rights of tenants, in terms of the legislation, are not 
incidental, but rather the result of a conscious policy decision of parliament, because 
the extent of statutory tenant protection is a central aspect of housing policy and 
landlord-tenant law.  
The English parliament has solely been responsible for formulating correct 
housing policies that reflect the housing needs of society and until 2000, when the 
Human Rights Act 1998 came into force, parliament could introduce housing policies 
and enact legislation that regulates the occupation rights of residential tenants, 
without restraint or approval by any other body of law. This position changed when 
the Human Rights came into force and made the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (ECHR) applicable to 
English law. 
The role of the Convention is similar to the South African Constitution 1996, 
as all law (common law and legislation) must be in line with the Convention. In terms 
of the Human Rights Act 1998 all “primary legislation and subordinate legislation 
must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention 
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rights”,33 while “[i]t is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is 
incompatible with a Convention right”.34 Where a landlord is a “public authority”, it 
has to exercise his duties in compliance with the Convention, although where a 
landlord is a registered social landlord, the position is unclear. A “public authority” 
also includes a court or tribunal and any person whose functions are of a public 
nature.35 The Convention right that has the most profound impact on the termination 
of lease relationships and therefore also the most profound impact on tenants‟ tenure 
security is article 8(1), which provides that “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his 
private and family life, his home and his correspondence”. Importantly, the right 
enshrined in article 8(1) is not absolute but qualified by article 8(2), which states that 
“[t]here shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of the … economic well-being of the country … or for the 
protection of the rights of and freedoms of others”.36 Apart from the complex 
statutory landlord-tenant scheme developed by the English parliament, various 
tenants have relied on article 8(1) for protection against eviction.  
Chapter 5 considers English case law where the courts had to reconsider the 
domestic occupation rights of certain occupiers, including tenants, in light of article 
8(1) of the Convention. From the case law discussion it is clear that the courts (in 
South Africa and the UK) are sometimes uncomfortable with establishing and 
upholding the hierarchy of laws and the case law discussed in Chapter 5 is therefore 
a useful comparative source if one considers different laws that address a legal 
issue, such as the tenure rights of tenants. 
Judging from the case law, the relationship between the English common law, 
the domestic legislative scheme and article 8 of the ECHR, with regard to the 
protection of existing occupation rights (or interests) for tenants and unlawful 
occupiers, is complicated and fraught with uncertainty. The tension between these 
three bodies of law is similar to the position in South Africa, primarily because the 
English courts are also uncertain about the impact of the Convention (similar to the 
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South African Constitution) on domestic law. The role of the Convention in the area 
of landlord-tenant law, and more specifically the occupation rights of tenants, is 
therefore to test whether the legislative scheme (rather than the common law) that 
was developed by parliament is in line with the rights enshrined in the Convention. 
The role of the South African Constitution is also to test the constitutional validity of 
the common law and legislation, but – as explained in Chapters 2 and 3 – the South 
African common law is more significant with regard to the eviction of tenants.  
However, the South African Constitution also mandates the state to give 
effect to certain constitutional rights, including legally secure occupation rights for the 
previously disadvantaged majority group (section 25(6)), and the right to have 
access to adequate housing (section 26(1)). The aim of these provisions is to 
address the South African housing shortage, which is currently affecting numerous 
marginalised households who either live in informal housing or are homeless. It was 
previously mentioned that in order to give effect to these constitutional obligations in 
the landlord-tenant framework, the rights of private landowners must in some 
instances be restricted. All property restrictions must be in compliance with the 
property clause (section 25(1) of the Constitution), which guarantees that “[n]o one 
may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law 
may permit arbitrary deprivation of property.” The imposition of strengthened tenure 
rights for tenants must therefore be justified and in compliance with the Constitution. 
An important question is when the imposition of rent control (consisting of 
continued occupation rights for tenants and restrictions on rent increases) would be 
justified. The aim of Chapter 6 is to consider the justification for rent control in 
American landlord-tenant law. The law of New York State, and more specifically New 
York City, is used as a comparative jurisdiction, because New York State is one of 
the few US states where the courts have acknowledged a right to shelter and New 
York City has extensive rent control measures that provide tenure security for 
tenants. The United States Constitution protects private property, similar to section 
25(1) of the South African Constitution, which also justifies American law as a useful 
comparative source. 
The initial justification for regulating the private landlord-tenant relationship in 
the United States of America was similar to the pre-1994 South African position (and 
the initial English position) as it was based on extreme housing shortages that 
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resulted from the First and Second World War, which led to landlords exploiting the 
dire socio-economic circumstances by increasing rents. The United States Supreme 
Court repeatedly upheld the restriction on the right of landowners to evict tenants 
upon expiration of the lease as a constitutional regulation (and not a taking of 
property), because rent control was justified in light of the socio-economic 
circumstances. In due course, the majority of states abolished rent regulation, 
whereafter landlord-tenant law on evictions returned to the common law position, 
according to which the landlord could rely on summary eviction proceedings to evict 
the tenant once the lease had terminated. Generally, state intervention in the private 
landlord-tenant market is justified in the presence of a housing crisis, although rent 
regulation could also be justified where it is in the public interest for some other 
reason.  
The State of New York, and more specifically New York City, initially 
introduced rent regulation measures in response to the extreme housing shortages 
that resulted from the war. The nature of the regulations changed throughout the 
post-war decades and transformed from being a broad-spectrum form of protection 
for countless New Yorkers towards being a form of social protection for a specific 
group of individuals in a specified area. The residential landlord-tenant system in 
New York City could be categorized into different sectors with different levels of 
tenure security. The private landlord-tenant relationship is currently still regulated 
quite extensively, with the aim to place restrictions on rent increases while providing 
security of tenure for a various group of tenants. Public rental housing is aimed at 
providing affordable, secure housing for households through the provision of either 
government housing or rental subsidies. The aim of public rental housing is therefore 
to increase access to affordable secure rental housing for marginalised occupiers. In 
New York City, funds are made available to not-for-profit companies to construct and 
in due course provide rental housing for low-income households. The cooperation 
between the government and private actors in the provision of low-cost rental 
housing is an important mechanism to help alleviate housing shortages. 
The residential landlord-tenant system in New York City has developed and 
become increasingly complex over decades, since it is regulated by various laws that 
function on different government levels. Collectively, the laws make available secure 
homes to different members of society, although the laws that regulate the private 
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rental market are applied generally. These laws are therefore not context-sensitive in 
protecting only the vulnerable members of society, but apply to all households that 
occupy certain buildings in the private rental market. If landlord-tenant laws could 
grant secure occupation rights for tenants in certain dwellings, but the dwellings are 
accessible to all persons, then it follows that vulnerable households would be 
accommodated. In the South African context previously disadvantaged households 
are entitled to legally secure occupation rights (section 25(6) of the Constitution). If 
landlord-tenant laws could provide increased access to rental housing with 
substantive tenure rights for all persons, then previously disadvantaged households 
would be able to occupy rental housing with legally secure tenure.   
The landlord-tenant system in New York City is indispensable as a 
comparable jurisdiction for a number of reasons. Collectively, the laws protect 
different households with diverse income levels, although the underlying aim could 
be to address the high percentage of homelessness in New York City, especially in 
comparison to other major cities. The continued imposition of rent regulation in the 
private rental market could therefore be justified in light of this socio-economic 
problem. The Supreme Court and other courts have found that the rent regulation 
laws are constitutionally justifiable. The courts have held that the restrictions placed 
on the common law rights of landowners must be considered within the specific 
socio-economic circumstances. These restrictions serve a legitimate public purpose 
in protecting tenants while balancing the interests of the parties. The regulatory 
systems in the private and public sector aim to provide protection for weak tenants, 
which form part of the public welfare. The courts have found that the public interest 
justifies some degree of public control in the sphere of rental housing. 
Rent control is justified during emergency housing shortages, although it is 
also justified in New York City for other reasons, namely to prevent an increase in 
homelessness, which forms part of the public interest. Chapter 6 aims to explain the 
continued justification for rent control in New York City. From the Chapter it is 
evident that rent control is currently justified, because it affords substantive tenure 
protection for vulnerable tenants. The socio-economic weakness of some of the 
tenants in New York City justifies the imposition of rent control even though the rent 
control measures are applied generally.  
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In American law (and pre-1994 South African law) rent regulations are 
perceived as temporary measures that interfere with the strong common law rights of 
landowners with the aim to provide strengthened tenure rights for marginalised 
occupiers in times of extreme need or hardship.  
In German law the justification for rent regulations is based on the importance 
of tenure security that enables tenants to participate in society, make their own 
decisions and achieve personal autonomy, which is a general rather than a 
temporary, emergency justification. Chapter 7 considers the role of landlord-tenant 
law in Germany since the beginning of the twentieth century. It highlights the 
German approach to the function of property and the importance of tenure security 
for tenants, which is different from the other comparative sources. German landlord-
tenant law is an important comparative jurisdiction because it provides a different 
perspective in consideration of tenants‟ occupation rights as an essential human 
right. The exact balance between the constitutional rights of private landowners and 
tenants is analysed in Chapter 7 with reference to the German Civil Code, the 
German Basic Law and a case law discussion. 
The German private rental housing market was subjected to state intervention 
since the outbreak of the First and Second World Wars in order to accommodate 
households in dire need of affordable housing. The initial introduction of tenant 
protection measures and rent control had detrimental consequences for landowners 
and the housing market in general, because it was disproportionate in relation to 
building costs and inflation. After the Second World War new rental housing 
measures were introduced that restricted the rights of landowners with the aim to 
accommodate tenants, but these measures were combined with state assistance in 
the form of public funds. These funds attracted private investment in the rental 
housing market, which resulted in an increase in residential property stock, while 
allowing rent control and tenant protection measures to continue. The aim of 
landlord-tenant laws in Germany was to provide tenants with substantive tenure 
security, while making available public funds that encouraged private actors to 
develop rental housing stock. Increased rental housing stock was as important as 
the strengthened occupation rights of tenants. The South African government has 
not introduced measures that encourage private actors to become involved in the 
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provision of affordable secure housing. This is problematic in light of the housing 
backlog. 
Social housing made provision for affordable, secure rental housing combined 
with access control, in order to accommodate the more vulnerable and marginalised 
group of households. Currently, this form of housing is being phased out, because of 
the government‟s financing system.37  
Landlord-tenant law in Germany is presently regulated in the Civil Code.38 
The Civil Code makes provision for tenant protection and restricts rent increases, 
although rent control as such has been phased out. The market is presently being 
deregulated, but security of tenure for tenants is upheld. These provisions apply to 
all tenants, irrespective of their income. However, where cancellation of the lease 
could cause a hardship for the tenant or a member of the tenant‟s household, the 
tenant can resist eviction on that basis. This provision indirectly ensures that 
vulnerable tenants are protected against unjustifiably harsh circumstances that result 
from eviction. The Civil Code specifically includes the example where a tenant would 
become homeless after cancellation as a form of hardship. The tenure protection 
measures for tenants in Germany is significant for the South African context, 
because it shows how all tenants could lease property with substantive tenure 
security, while providing additional tenure protection for some tenants who are in 
special need thereof. In the South African context not all tenants are necessarily in 
need of stringent tenure protection, although some tenants are entitled to legally 
secure occupation rights. The preferred landlord-tenant regime in South Africa 
should be context-sensitive to tenants‟ needs and therefore also flexible to the extent 
that it should be able to provide better tenure protection for some tenants than for 
others. 
Throughout the twentieth century the provision of housing, and more 
specifically the protection of tenants‟ occupation interests in Germany, has 
developed from being a “public concern” towards becoming an interest that forms 
part of the general public interest. The public interest is protected in the German 
Basic Law to such an extent that it has to be weighed against the interests of 
                                                          
37
 Droste C & Knorr-Siedow T “Social Housing in Germany” in Whitehead C & Scanlon K (eds) Social 
Housing in Europe (2007) 90-140 at 93-95. 
38
 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB). Landlord-tenant law is regulated in Book 2, Title 5 of the BGB. 
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property owners. In the landlord-tenant context the property rights of landowners are 
therefore constitutionally balanced with the socially protected interests of residential 
tenants.  
In the American courts, including the United States Supreme Court, it has 
been argued that rent regulations amount to an unconstitutional taking of property, 
but in most cases these regulations have been upheld as constitutionally valid 
regulatory law because they are in the public interest. The German Federal 
Constitutional Court has also considered landlord-tenant disputes regarding rent 
regulations, although the German disputes have always concerned the extent of the 
regulations rather than the constitutional justifiability of these laws.  
The German courts therefore have to consider whether the legislature 
correctly weighed up the interests of the parties when it regulates and determines 
the contents of property rights. The nature of residential property, and more 
specifically leased residential property, justifies strict regulation by the legislature 
because it serves a social function in the provision of housing. The social importance 
of the property providing housing to society might then outweigh the private property 
rights of landowners. However, the restrictions placed on the rights of landowners 
are not perceived as exceptional or emergency statutory interventions or 
interferences, as the tenant protection measures are included in the German Civil 
Code and therefore form part of the private law on a permanent basis.  
 
1.3 A preliminary proposition 
The social importance of residential property is recognised in most jurisdictions, 
especially when facing housing shortages, but the tension between the rights of 
landowners and tenants is perceived and analysed from different perspectives, 
which results in different landlord-tenant regimes. It is also clear that the role of 
landlord-tenant law, combined with better tenure security for tenants, is amplified 
during housing shortages, because the government can use rental housing as a form 
of housing to accommodate vulnerable occupiers, while regulating the occupation 
rights of such tenants. All the comparative jurisdictions highlight the relationship 
between increased housing shortages and the importance of the rental housing 
market as a form of housing that could help alleviate housing shortages. However, 
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substantive tenure security is mostly combined with measures that aim to increase 
access to rental housing. 
In South Africa the current landlord-tenant regime has not transformed in line 
with the constitutional obligations as stated in sections 25(6) and 26 of the 
Constitution. The existing landlord-tenant laws, specifically the Rental Housing Act 
and Social Housing Act, are insufficient because the laws fail to provide substantive 
tenure protection for black and marginalised tenants. The current landlord-tenant 
laws also fail to promote access to rental housing as a form of tenure that could 
assist the alleviation of housing shortages. The existing landlord-tenant regime 
requires some well-considered changes in order to comply with the state‟s 
constitutional obligations and mandates. The substantive tenure rights of urban 
residential tenants should be strengthened, while the government should make 
available rental housing in order to give effect to the right of access to adequate 
housing. 
My hypothesis is that the legislature should promulgate new landlord-tenant 
legislation that would provide substantive tenure rights for tenants, while placing 
restrictions on rent increases. However, the legislation must be context-sensitive to 
the extent that it should not necessarily grant equal tenure protection for all urban 
tenants, as all tenants are not entitled to the same level of legally secure occupation 
rights. Substantive tenure security could be improved by affording the tenant certain 
rights to continue the leasehold relationship after termination of the lease, while 
placing restrictions on the rights which the landlord normally would have had at 
common law to end the relationship. In order to alleviate housing shortages the 
government must become actively involved in the provision of public rental housing. 
This form of housing must accommodate low-income households. However, the 
government must also encourage private actors to become involved in the provision 
of housing by making available public funds. This form of housing should function as 
social housing and the government must be involved in the provision of social 
housing. Social housing should generally be associated with substantive tenure 
rights, which would result in restrictions placed on private landowners‟ right to evict 
tenants. Landlord-tenant law must be differentiated in terms of housing sectors that 
afford different levels of tenure security to various households. These sectors should 
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be regulated in order to give effect to the constitutional obligations, while responding 
to changing socio-economic circumstances. 
The constitutionally guaranteed rights of property owners have to be restricted 
if the tenure rights of tenants are strengthened, which will result in a tension between 
the improved rights of tenants and the well established rights of land owners. Such a 
tension can successfully be dealt with by introducing new legislation that balances 
the rights of property owners and tenants within the constitutional framework.  
In order to efficiently promulgate new landlord-tenant legislation it is essential 
that consideration be given to previous South African legislation, which awarded 
tenure security for tenants in urban areas during housing shortages. English, 
American and German landlord-tenant legislation afforded similar tenure protection 
for tenants during housing shortages. An important consideration from English law is 
the context-sensitivity of the entire landlord-tenant regime, as it provides different 
levels of tenure security to different households with diverse needs. The imposition 
of strengthened occupation rights for tenants has to be justified, which is explained 
by analysing the American, and more specifically New York City, landlord-tenant 
laws and rent control jurisprudence. The German courts have also upheld rent 
control as constitutionally valid, although the courts‟ perception of tenants‟ interests 
and the function of property is an important consideration to determine how to 
balance the rights of tenants and private landowners. The German approach 
regarding the alleviation of housing shortages is also important to consider in light of 
South Africa‟s housing crisis.  
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2.1  Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a historical background of landlord-tenant 
law in South Africa since the beginning of the twentieth century, focusing on tenure 
security (and to some extent rent control) provided for tenants by means of the 
common law and legislation. In consequence of socio-economic developments that 
encouraged policy changes, the legislature at various times promulgated anti-
eviction legislation that restricted the common law rights of landowners. These 
statutory amendments were initially inspired by housing shortages caused by the 
First and Second World War. The legislation restricted landlords‟ common law 
grounds for termination of tenancy and in some cases forced landlords to adhere to 
the lease when the contract had already expired. The effect of the legislation was to 
afford tenants substantive tenure security. 
1 Landlords were in fact deprived of their right to evict the tenant upon termination of 
the lease. The result was that eviction became impossible because the lease 
continued by force of law. In order to understand the impact of these measures, 
reference to the common law position at various points in time is imperative. The 
socio-economic conditions constantly changed from 1920 until 1990 and the 
legislature adapted landlord-tenant legislation accordingly.  
The political conditions also changed during this period. Successive white 
minority governments introduced racially discriminatory legislation since the 
beginning of the twentieth century. The legislation made provision for the 
identification of certain racially defined areas for exclusive occupation by different 
racial groups. In due course, black persons were compelled to occupy dwellings in 
the defined locations. Their occupation rights in urban areas were weak and 
insecure, because black persons were only allowed in the urban areas on a 
                                                          
1
Substantive tenure protection is different from procedural protection, because the essence of 
substantive tenure security is generally to allow the tenant to continue occupying the leased premises 
as a lawful tenant, while procedural protection is aimed at providing tenants with due process during 
eviction proceedings. Substantive tenure security entails that the tenant is protected from the 
possibility of eviction for consecutive periods. Procedural protection ensures that evictions take place 
in a just and equitable fashion. However, if the circumstances of the tenant justify more stringent 
protection during eviction proceedings, then the courts can refuse to order eviction and allow the 
tenant to remain in the premises as an unlawful occupier. In such a case the court can use due 
process measures to grant the tenant additional substantive tenure protection. 
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temporary basis. The group areas legislation identified parcels of land for the 
occupation of members of specified racial groups. The black (and to a certain extent 
also the coloured) population group was obliged to occupy the identified parcels of 
land set aside for them. Their occupation rights were also regulated under these 
laws, which excluded them from the landlord-tenant legislation that afforded secure 
occupation rights and some form of rent control for white tenants. This formed part of 
the government‟s policy to control the occupation rights of non-white2 persons in 
order to restrict their presence in the urban areas. The racially discriminatory 
legislation and the impact it had on the occupation rights of non-white persons is 
referred to in various sections of the chapter, because the majority of the statutes 
made provision for public sector tenancies. 
The chapter is divided into three main sections which respectively illustrate 
the initial common law position, subsequent legislative amendments and the 
resurfacing of the common law position. The common law mainly provided tenure 
security for tenants in three different situations, namely upon the death of either 
party; when the landlord became insolvent; and upon alienation of the leased 
premises. Although these events seemed quite unrelated they all occurred during the 
lease. The common law thus focused on keeping the relationship between the 
parties intact as long as the lease still existed, assuming that the relationship 
between the parties ceased to exist when the lease ended.  
In contrast with the common law, the various statutory amendments overrode 
the contract in order to provide security of tenure for tenants upon termination of the 
lease. The legislative amendments fitted uneasily with the common law rights of 
landowners because ownership was still perceived as inherently unrestricted. The 
anti-eviction legislation restricted the institutional domination of landownership3 over 
tenants‟ interests in residential and commercial property. Landowners found it 
difficult to accept these legislative changes and assumed that the measures were 
exceptional, expecting that the common law position would resurface once the 
                                                          
2
 The term “non-white” is used throughout the chapter and refers to all racial groups other than white 
persons. The reason for the use of this term is to simplify the explanation of the tenure position of the 
racial group in question, as the group of persons referred to as non-white includes all race groups 
other than white persons. This term was used in the apartheid statutes, although the legislature later 
defined the rights of different racial groups in relation to their skin colour, such as black and coloured. 
The term “black” is used in the other chapters and refers to all racial groups other than white persons.   
3
 Van der Walt AJ Property in the Margins (2009) 78. 
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housing shortages came to an end. Judges also found it difficult to respond to these 
socio-economic changes, as appears from their unwillingness to restrict the rights of 
landowners any further than the applicable legislation clearly required. The chapter 
concludes with the resurfacing of the common law at the beginning of the 1990s, 
associated with weak tenure security for tenants and dominant rights of landowners.      
 
2.2 Common law 
2.2.1  Lease and ownership 
 
A contract which entails that one party agrees to grant another the use of his 
immovable property, while the other party agrees to pay a price in return, is known 
as a lease. This term, originally borrowed from English law, was in common use in 
South Africa since the beginning of the twentieth century. The parties, known as 
landlord and tenant (terms also adopted form English law), had to agree on at least 
the object of the contract, the identified property as well as the fixed rent in order to 
constitute a valid lease.4 The parties acquired contractual rights5 against each other, 
but they also became subject to certain duties.6  
The validity of the lease was not subject to an agreed period of time, although 
the duration of the lease usually took one of five forms, namely that the lease would 
(a) continue for a definite period of time; (b) continue until a certain event took place; 
(c) run from period to period; (d) expire at the will of the landlord, or (e) expire at the 
will of the tenant.7 In the case of a lease for a definite period (later known as a fixed-
                                                          
4
 Wille G Landlord and Tenant in South Africa (2
nd
 ed 1927) 1-2. 
5
 In the case of a short term lease the lessee would acquire a personal right. However, if the parties 
entered into a long-term lease, the lease could be registered and the lessee would then acquire a real 
right. Short term residential leases therefore provide the lessee with a contractual right. For a more 
detailed discussion on the rights of tenants, especially in relation to impact of registration and the huur 
gaat voor koop rule, see section 2.2.2 below. 
6
 Wille G Landlord and Tenant in South Africa (2
nd
 ed 1927) 7. The duties of the lessor would 
generally include the duty to deliver the thing to the lessee that would enable the lessee of immovable 
property to take occupation, to maintain the premises and to ensure the lessee‟s undisturbed 
possession. The lessee is obliged to pay the rent, to take proper care of the thing and to restore the 
property to the landowner upon termination of the lease: Kahn E, Havenga M, Havenga P & Lotz J 
Principles of the Law of Sale and Lease (1998) 53-74. 
7
 Wille G Landlord and Tenant in South Africa (2
nd
 ed 1927) 36. For present purposes only two forms 
will be discussed, namely (a) the lease for a definite period and (c) the lease that ran from period to 
period, because the impact of the relevant legislation which provided security of tenure could be best 
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term tenancy), the lease terminated, under common law, ipso jure upon expiration of 
the agreed period.8 A lease that ran from one period until another, also known as a 
periodic lease, continued, under common law, for consecutive periods until it was 
terminated by notice given by either party.9 
The initial position stated by Wille was that the tenant had a duty to vacate the 
leased property upon termination of the lease. Once the temporary use right of the 
tenant ceased to exist, the landlord‟s strong right to exclusive possession entitled 
him to reclaim his property. If the tenant refused to vacate the property, the landlord 
was not entitled to take the law into his own hands and forcefully remove the tenant. 
If the landlord took the law into his own hands and illicitly ejected10 the tenant he not 
only committed an act of spoliation but the tenant could also claim damages for loss 
caused to his personal property.11 If the tenant remained in occupation after the 
lease terminated, he was said to hold over and could be ejected by means of a court 
order in addition to being held liable in damages if the landlord sued in delict for 
violation of his ownership rights.12 During this period ownership was regarded as 
being inherently unrestricted,13 which could have assisted the owner in the case of a 
tenant holding over, providing the owner with a strong right to reclaim his property. 
At the end of the nineteenth century, academic writers such as Savigny and 
Windscheid described private ownership as the “unrestricted and exclusive domain 
over property”, although it could “tolerate” restrictions.14 This concept of ownership 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
explained with reference to these two positions. The foreign landlord-tenant law chapters primarily 
refer to these two forms.  
8
 Wille G Landlord and Tenant in South Africa (2
nd
 ed 1927) 36. 
9
 Wille G Landlord and Tenant in South Africa (2
nd
 ed 1927) 37.  
10
 The term “eject” is used throughout this chapter, because it was mostly used in the pre-1994 
legislation and literature. The meaning of “eject” is analogous to “evict”. 
11
 Wille G Landlord and Tenant in South Africa: A Treatise on the Law of Lease, or Letting and Hiring 
of Immovable Property in the Cape Colony, the Transvaal, Natal and Orange Free State (1910) 474-
476. 
12
 Wille G Landlord and Tenant in South Africa (2
nd
 ed 1927) 248. 
13
 Visser DP “The Absoluteness of Ownership: The South African Common Law in Perspective” 1985 
Acta Juridica 39-52 at 47. 
14
 Visser DP “The Absoluteness of Ownership: The South African Common Law in Perspective” 1985 
Acta Juridica 39-52 at 47. This view was to a certain extent adopted by Wessels J in Johannesburg 
Municipal Council v Rand Townships Registrar and Others 1910 TS 1314 at 1319 and confirmed by 
Steyn CJ in Regal v African Superslate (Pty) Ltd 1963 (1) SA 102 (A) 106. In the later case of Gien v 
Gien 1979 (2) SA 1113 (T) 1120C Spoelstra AJ confirmed that ownership is the most complete right 
that an individual can have in relation to a thing and that the starting point in any dispute relating to 
the right of the owner is that the owner of land can do on his property whatever he likes. However, the 
court also acknowledged that this definition is a misnomer, as the owner must exercise his rights in 
accordance with the law. Ownership is the most complete right that an individual can have in relation 
to a thing, even though it is not absolutely unrestricted. See also Van der Walt AJ “Gedagtes oor die 
33 
 
as an absolute right found its way into South African law during the twentieth 
century.15 However, in reality civil-law private ownership has always been affected by 
the changing needs and perceptions of society and by social, economical, political 
and cultural factors.16 The economy does not only influence society‟s perception of 
private ownership but also justifies restrictions resulting from state action such as the 
allocation of housing, in that economic and other policies inevitably affect the 
regulation of private property.17  
A market-orientated economy would idealise private ownership for all citizens, 
but economic realities reveal the impossibility of such a model. In order to provide 
housing for all citizens, the law introduces institutions that separate legal title from 
the beneficial/enjoyment components of ownership, the contract of lease being one 
of these institutions. The rent agreed upon would be the result of the relation of 
tension between supply and demand,18 although state interference has become an 
ever present reality in market economies. State interference takes place when it 
becomes apparent that the public interest demands intervention in the process of 
supply and demand. Excess demand for rental housing in relation to insufficient 
supply will result in an increase in rent. By means of legislation, the state can 
intervene in the market and place restrictions on rent (known as rent control) and on 
the right of landlords to evict tenants. Rent control “usually originates when war or 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Herkoms en Ontwikkeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse Eiendomsbegrip” (1988) 21 De Jure 16-35, 306-
325 at 17; Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 169; Van der Merwe CG & De Waal MJ The 
Law of Things & Servitudes (1993) para 104; Milton JRL “Ownership” in Zimmermann R & Visser DP 
(eds) Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 657-699 at 695-696. 
15
 Visser DP “The Absoluteness of Ownership: The South African Common Law in Perspective” 1985 
Acta Juridica 39-52 at 46-47. 
16
 Visser DP “The Absoluteness of Ownership: The South African Common Law in Perspective” 1985 
Acta Juridica 39-52 at 47. 
17
 See Chapters 4, 6 and 7 for examples in England and Wales, America and Germany where 
housing shortages justified (and in some countries still justifies) the regulation of private property. 
18
 According to Hirsch WZ Law and Economics: An Introductory Analysis (1979) 44-45 rent is different 
from the price per unit of goods. Instead of speaking about the price per unit, economists use the 
abstract term “housing service units” and the rent would be the price of such a unit.  A dwelling, being 
housing stock, is defined as an ever-changing concept which represents the flow of housing services. 
The flow of housing services is difficult to define because it is a heterogeneous concept, which is why 
it is even more difficult to measure the quantity of housing services delivered by one dwelling during a 
certain period of time. The particular features of a certain dwelling, such as size and location, are 
seen as distinct economic commodities. By combining all these commodities within the dwelling, we 
arrive at the concept of housing services. When these commodities change, the goods consumed by 
the occupier (or consumer) also change. One can conclude that a better allocated, larger dwelling 
would in effect deliver more housing service units, offering higher quality to the occupier (or 
consumer). The outcome would be higher rent paid by the consumer for the higher quality housing 
service. See Hirsch WZ Law and Economics: An Introductory Analysis (1979) 45-59 for detail on the 
interaction between supply and demand in the rental housing sector. 
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emergency conditions suspend the normal operation of market forces.”19 One can 
thus conclude that, regardless of the domination of ownership over other interests in 
land and its resistance against statutory intervention, “governments routinely use 
(and have always used) legislation to amend or regulate the hierarchical domination 
of property ownership in response to social, economic and political circumstances 
and requirements. One significant example of such intervention is the embodiment of 
anti-eviction policies in legislation”.20 In the landlord-tenant framework, these 
interventions usually take the form of rent control and increased tenure security. 
Over the years, various South African governments enacted a range of 
statutes to protect insecure tenure rights of tenants and to place restrictions on 
rent,21 although the common law still applied where a tenant did not comply with the 
statutes.22 The common law did provide tenure security for tenants, although the 
extent of protection was limited. The common law focused on the enforcement of the 
lease in order to preserve the relationship between the parties for the duration of the 
lease. The common law also allowed substitution of parties in certain circumstances 
in order for the lease to continue. The essence of the common law was to give effect 
to the full period of the lease.23 The common law did not make provision for 
continued occupation rights upon termination of the lease; such protection was 
provided for by the legislature.24 
                                                          
19
 Visser C “Rent Control” 1985 Acta Juridica 349-368 at 349. Visser mentions how different countries 
impose restrictions on rent but the general effect of rent control is that the state can limit the freedom 
of a lessor to set rent levels. Hirsch WZ Law and Economics: An Introductory Analysis (1979) 64 is of 
the same opinion where he states that rent-control ordinances can take various forms in order to 
assist low income tenants, although the general effect of these measures is to reduce the landlord‟s 
freedom to set rent levels. According to Penny P “Rent Control” (1966) 83 SALJ 493-502 at 494 only 
abnormal economic conditions can justify the implementation of rent control by the state. The author 
mentions how these abnormal economic circumstances could interfere with the law of supply and 
demand with regard to space, implying market failure. Radin MJ “Residential Rent Control” (1986) 15 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 350-380 at 352-353 argues that justification for state intervention by 
means of rent control is context sensitive, stating that in some circumstances justification could be 
more acceptable that in others. Market failure is therefore justification for state interference, although 
Radin introduces morality considerations in a context-sensitive background. This concept will be 
discussed in future Chapters.   
20
 Van der Walt AJ Property in the Margins (2009) 78. 
21
 The South African rent legislation is discussed in section 2.3 of this chapter.  
22
 The following discussion provides an overview of the common law in relation to landlord-tenant law 
for the greatest part of the twentieth century. The discussion therefore covers the initial common law 
position and later amendments. 
23
 See sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 later in this chapter for an explanation of these common law 
measures. 
24
 See section 2.3 of this chapter for a discussion of South African rent legislation. 
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Where the lease expired and the tenant did not comply with the legislation 
(which ensured for continued occupation rights upon termination of the lease), the 
owner could rely on his right of ownership and make use of the rei vindicatio to 
reclaim possession.25 The rei vindicatio is to date generally available to an owner 
and could be instituted against any person who is in possession of the owner‟s 
property. If the owner institutes the rei vindicatio to reclaim immovable property, the 
owner would generally apply for an eviction order. The owner must prove that he is 
the owner; that the property still exists and is identifiable; and that the defendant is in 
possession of the property at the time when the action is instituted. The defendant 
can raise three defences, namely that a third party is the owner; that the property is 
destroyed; or that he has a right to possession.26 Where the landlord proves the 
above-mentioned requirements and institutes the rei vindicatio against the tenant, 
the onus would be on the tenant to prove that he had a right of occupation.27 If the 
tenant is unable to allege and prove a right of occupation, he is in breach of contract 
because the tenant‟s right to use and occupy the property ended upon termination28 
of the lease, whereafter he is required to restore the property to the landlord. Apart 
from demanding return of the property, the lessor could claim damages for the value 
of the use and enjoyment of the property for the period the lessee unlawfully 
occupied the premises.29 The amount of damages was initially determined by the 
primary residual rule, formulated by Corbett JA in the case of Holmdene Brickworks 
(Pty) Ltd v Roberts Construction Co Ltd,30 where he stated that “the fundamental rule 
in regard to the award of damages for breach of contract is that the sufferer should 
be placed in the position he would have occupied had the contract been properly 
                                                          
25
 According to Kerr AJ The Law of Sale and Lease (1984) 269 the lessor could reclaim the property 
and rely on his rights as possessor if he was not the owner. Kerr relied on Pretoria Stadsraad v 
Ebrahim 1979 (4) SA 193 (T) 195G-196D, where Spoelstra AJ found that the landlord, who was not 
the owner of the leased property but rather the lessee, had possession and a possessory right. The 
lessee sublet the property and temporarily gave his right of possession to the sublessee. When the 
sublease terminated, the limitation that the sublease placed on the lessee‟s possessory right 
disappeared and the lessee once again had a right to possession. According to Spoelstra AJ this 
justified cause of action for an ejectment order, except if the sublessee had a stronger right which he 
could prove in court. This position was initially introduced by English law and its feasibility is 
debatable in the South African context.  
26
 Van der Merwe CG & De Waal MJ The Law of Things & Servitudes (1993) par 183. 
27
 Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) 20.  
28
 The lease automatically terminated by effluxion of time in the case of a fixed-term tenancy. A 
periodic tenancy could be terminated by either party by serving reasonable notice to the other party. 
Reasonable notice depended on the discretion of the judge or local custom. See Kerr AJ The Law of 
Sale and Lease (1984) 181-182, 310-311. 
29
 Kerr AJ The Law of Sale and Lease (1984) 268-270. The claim was based on breach of contract. 
30
 1977 (3) SA 670 (A) 687C. 
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performed, so far as this can be done by the payment of money and without undue 
hardship to the defaulting party”.31  
In the later case of Sandown Park (Pty) Ltd v Hunter Your Wine & Spirit 
Merchant (Pty) Ltd32 Nestadt J found that, in the case of holding over, the landlord 
would be entitled to an amount of damages which represented the difference 
between the current position of the landlord and the position had there been no 
breach. Apart from that, the court found that any court must consider both the 
detrimental and beneficial consequences the landlord experienced from the 
breach.33 Cooper mentions that a tenant who wilfully holds over commits an injuria 
and could be held liable for exemplary damages.34 The landlord is not allowed to 
charge rent instead of damages for the holding over period, because the contract 
came to an end and therefore the obligation to pay rent also ceases to exist.35  
Apart from the strong right of the landowner to reclaim his property upon 
termination of the lease, the common law did provide short term tenants with security 
of tenure throughout the twentieth century. However, the extent of tenure security 
was limited, because it occurred in one of three incidences,36 namely where the 
landlord sold the property to a third party, where the landlord became insolvent and 
where the tenant died during the lease. 
 
  
                                                          
31
 According to Kerr AJ The Law of Sale and Lease (1984) 272 the general rule was that the lessor 
could rather claim damages than rent for unlawful occupation. 
32
 1985 (1) SA 248 (W). 
33
 Sandown Park (Pty) Ltd v Hunter Your Wine & Spirit Merchant (Pty) Ltd 1985 (1) SA 248 (W) 253A-
C. Kerr AJ The Law of Sale and Lease (2
nd
 ed 1996) 374 mentions that the landlord‟s claim for 
damages could consist of the value of the use and enjoyment for the holding over period, what the 
landlord had to disburse and his loss of profits. See Kerr AJ & Harker JR “Damages for Holding Over. 
The Rule on Mitigation of Loss” (1986) 103 SALJ 176-184 for a discussion on the Sandown case. At 
177 the authors point out that the “normal” measure for damages is the market rental value for the 
premises during the period the tenant held over.  
34
 Cooper WE Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1994) 234. 
35
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2.2.2 Huur gaat voor koop 
 
In cases where the landlord sold the property, the common law protects the tenant 
by way of the the huur gaat voor koop rule,37 which was adopted in South Africa at 
the end of the eighteenth century.38 The rule literary means “lease takes precedence 
over sale”, which implies that the tenant can continue to occupy the leased premises 
upon alienation of the property if he continues to pay the rent. It is therefore required 
that the tenant is in occupation of the premises at the time when the landlord 
alienates the property. The purchaser is prohibited from terminating the tenancy and 
evicting the tenant other than on the terms of the lease between the tenant and the 
original owner.39 The purchaser in fact replaces the existing owner and acquires all 
the rights and obligations of the original lessor. The purchaser therefore entirely 
substituted the previous owner with regard to the contractual relationship with the 
tenant.40  
In the case of Mignoel Properties v (Pty) Ltd v Kneebone41 Friedman AJA 
found that the previous owner would ex lege be replaced by the purchaser. 
Accordingly, no cession of rights or assignment of obligations was necessary, which 
meant that the original contract continued.42 The purchaser accordingly stepped into 
the shoes of the previous owner and obtained the rights and obligations of the 
lessor.43 In consequence of this rule, tenure security was afforded to tenants in 
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general and not by means of legislation applicable at the time.44 It is also important 
to note at this stage that the huur gaat voor koop rule enabled the lessee to continue 
occupying the leased premises upon sale of the property and that this right was only 
enforceable against the purchaser. The rule therefore made an exception to the 
general rule that a tenant with a personal right could only enforce his right of 
occupation against the landlord. The rule was an exception, because the tenant 
could enforce his right of occupation against a third party, although limited to one 
party, namely the purchaser. The only requirement for the rule to apply was that the 
tenant had to occupy the premises, but mere occupation did not grant the tenant with 
a real right. 
The common law differentiated between long and short leases in order to 
determine whether a purchaser would be bound by the lease.45 In the case of a short 
lease, the initial opinion raised by Wille was that a purchaser would be bound by an 
oral short lease if he either had notice of the lease or if the tenant was in occupation 
of the property. Where the tenant of a short lease did not occupy the leased property 
and the purchaser did not have notice of the lease, but the lease was in writing, the 
law was uncertain. According to Wille, Grotius stated that the lease conferred a real 
right upon the tenant, which might have led to the conclusion that due to the fact that 
the short lease was never registered, possession by itself could confer this real right 
on the tenant.46 At a later stage, Kerr47 argued that a lessee occupying leased 
property under a short term tenancy was protected from ejectment upon the sale of 
the property by means of the huur gaat voor koop rule, if such a lessee was in 
occupation of the property. If the lessee was not in occupation and the purchaser 
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had knowledge of the lease, the purchaser or gratuitous successor (a successor who 
gave no value for the item)48 of the lessor would be bound by the lease.49 
Uncertainty with regard to the position of the short-term tenant in the case 
where the property is sold to a third party developed from the unresolved question 
regarding the rights of tenants. According to Kerr (and various other authorities) a 
short-term tenant had to occupy the premises in order to acquire a real right.50 The 
principle with regard to the acquisition of a real right by a tenant was introduced in 
the early case of Green v Griffiths,51 where the court found that the lessee of 
immovable property acquired a real right through occupation or by means of 
registration.52 The court referred to English law, although the relevant section 
discusses the position relating to the transfer of rights and obligations. The court 
could therefore have been influenced by the English position, where a lessee 
acquires a real right without registration; in English land law this is possible as a 
result of the system of estates in land.53 Van der Merwe mentions that the mere 
contractual agreement between landlord and tenant is not sufficient to grant the 
tenant a real right, although once the tenant takes occupation (besitsverkryging), he 
acquires a real right in terms of the huur gaat voor koop rule.54 If this argument was 
accurate it would follow that the tenant would be able to enforce her real right against 
third parties, including purchasers. The question whether the purchaser had 
knowledge of the tenancy would also become irrelevant. 
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A couple of authors55 disagree with the argument that mere occupation 
granted the short-term tenant a real right and contend that registration is necessary 
to afford the tenant a real right, even though registration is unlikely in the case of 
short term tenancies. Lewis argues that if the tenant acquires a real right through 
occupation, section 16 of the Deeds Registries Act 4 of 1937 would be pointless 
because it provides that no real right may be conveyed from one person to the other 
without registration.56 Sonnekus raises the question regarding the position of the 
tenant where he occupied the property and attained a real right but thereafter left the 
property. The question then is whether the real right, which he acquired through 
occupation, changed back to a personal right which he had before occupation.57 One 
can conclude that Sonnekus and Lewis agree on this point, namely that a short term 
lessee cannot acquire a real right purely on the basis of occupation, even though he 
is protected by the huur gaat voor koop rule. 
The purpose of the huur gaat voor koop rule would be questionable if one 
agreed with Kerr and Van der Merwe. If tenants acquired limited real rights through 
occupation and could consequently enforce the lease against third parties, what 
would the use of the huur gaat voor koop rule be?58 Occupation is an important 
requirement for the application of the huur gaat voor koop rule, but it does not afford 
the tenant with a real right. Tenants who occupy property under short leases are 
protected by the huur gaat voor koop rule exactly because these leases are usually 
not registered and therefore do not afford them real rights.59 The essence of the huur 
gaat voor koop rule is to provide tenure security for tenants against purchasers, 
because the right that tenants usually acquire, being a personal right, would not 
enable them to enforce the lease against a purchaser (third party). The huur gaat 
voor koop rule was developed as an exception to protect tenants and it is therefore 
doubtful whether this rule could provide a tenant with a real right that would be 
enforceable against all third parties. The logic of the rule is similar to legislation that 
aims to protect weaker parties by suspending the workings of the common law at a 
                                                          
55
 Lewis C “Real Rights in Land: A New Look at an Old Subject” (1987) 104 SALJ 599-615; Sonnekus 
JC “Herklassifisering van die Aard van die Huurder se Reg” 1987 TSAR 223-236. 
56
 Lewis C “Real Rights in Land: A New Look at an Old Subject” (1987) 104 SALJ 599-615 at 600. 
57
 Sonnekus JC “Herklasifisering van die Aard van die Huurder se Reg” 1987 TSAR 223-236 at 228. 
58
 See fn 38 above concerning the implementation of the huur gaat voor koop rule and the initial 
purpose thereof.  
59
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 431-432. See also Van der Walt AJ Property in the Margins (2009) 116. 
41 
 
specific period in time and for a particular situation. The remaining question is 
whether this suspension of the common law is justified. 
The common law rule is that a short-term lease creates creditor‟s rights 
(personal rights) and that the tenant can only enforce this right against purchasers in 
two cases, namely where the new owner was aware of the lease (in terms of the 
doctrine of notice) and on the basis of the huur gaat voor koop rule.60 The huur gaat 
voor koop rule is therefore applicable in cases where the purchaser was unaware of 
the lease. If tenants did acquire real rights through occupation, there would be no 
use for the huur gaat voor koop rule because a real right can be enforced against 
third parties, including a purchaser. If tenants did acquire real rights through mere 
occupation, section 16 of the Deeds Registries Act would also be futile.  
To consider the rights of long-term tenants it is important to distinguish 
between registered long-term leases and unregistered long-term leases. In the case 
of a registered long lease, the initial opinion provided by Wille61 was that the lease 
would be binding on both onerous successors (a successor who gave value for the 
item)62 and gratuitous successors (a successor who gave no value for the item).63 
The later opinion formulated by Kerr contended that the lease had to be registered in 
order to give effect to the huur gaat voor koop rule, which granted tenure security for 
the tenant.64 Cooper disagrees and correctly points out that when the lessee 
acquires a real right by means of registration, the lease would be enforceable 
against third parties regardless of whether the purchaser had knowledge of the 
lease, how he acquired the property and whether the huur gaat voor koop rule 
applies.65 Registered long-term leases create limited real rights, which are 
enforceable against all third parties, including new owners. The doctrine of 
knowledge and the huur gaat voor koop rule are irrelevant in these cases. 
In the case of unregistered long-term leases the early opinions raised by Wille 
and Kerr were rather confusing. Wille argued that unregistered long-term leases 
would bind only the gratuitous successors (a successor who gave no value for the 
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item)66 of the landlord. If an onerous successor had notice (actual or constructive) of 
the unregistered lease, the lease would be binding.67 Kerr68 later contended that if 
the lease was not registered, the lessee could still enjoy protection if the purchaser 
or gratuitous successor of the lessor had knowledge thereof.69 The lessee‟s right 
was described as “effective” if it was not a real right but enforceable against 
successors as a consequence of their knowledge. If the tenant‟s right was neither 
real nor “effective”, the successor could eject the tenant by means of the rei 
vindicatio.70   
Section 1 of the Formalities in Respect of Leases of Land Act71 now provides 
that unregistered long-term leases are enforceable against new owners in two cases. 
Firstly, in terms of the huur gaat voor koop rule the tenant will be able to enforce the 
lease for the first ten years of its existence. It is required, similar to short-term 
tenancies, that the lessee must be in occupation of the property in order for this rule 
to apply. The unregistered long-term lease will also be enforced against a new 
owner, on the basis of the doctrine of notice, where the new owner had prior 
knowledge of the lease. However, in this case the lease will be enforced for its whole 
term and not only for ten years.72 The Formalities Act re-established the position as it 
existed before the General Law Amendment Act,73 eliminating the uncertainties 
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brought about by section 274 of the Act. (Section 2 in effect extinguished the rule that 
registration was unnecessary against a successor who had knowledge of the long 
lease. It also implied that “third parties” included gratuitous successors.75) When the 
legislature repealed the General Law Amendment Act it restored the common law 
position that the gratuitous successor was “bound by an unregistered long lease 
even though he did not know of its existence.”76 Cooper correctly mentions that in 
the absence of registration, the successor could still be bound by the lease, 
depending on whether the huur gaat voor koop rule applied or whether he had 
knowledge of the lease.77 
In conclusion, the position is that in the case of a long-term lease, tenants are 
protected in terms of the Formalities in Respect of Leases of Land Act,78 which 
clarifies the function of the doctrine of knowledge and the huur gaat voor koop rule. 
Unregistered long leases are enforceable against third parties for the first ten years 
by operation of the huur gaat voor koop rule, although the tenant must be in 
occupation of the premises for the rule to apply. If the purchaser had knowledge of 
the unregistered long lease, the protection would extend beyond the first ten years.79  
However, the position was still uncertain where the purchaser obtained 
knowledge of the lease after the date of purchase, but before transfer took place. In 
his minority judgement in Kessoopersadh v Essop80 Ogilvie Thompson JA relied on 
Wille and found that the purchaser who obtained knowledge of the lease after 
purchase was not bound by the lease. Shortly thereafter, in the case of Total South 
Africa (Pty) Ltd v Xypteras81 Cillie JP relied on the minority decision in 
Kessoopersadh and found that the second respondent (the purchaser) was “not in 
law bound to recognise the lease entered into between appellant [the lessee] and 
first respondent [the lessor].” The court concluded that the “second respondent [was] 
entitled to transfer of the property free from the burden of the lease, and that 
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appellant [was] accordingly not entitled to the relief claimed by it.”82 According to 
Cooper this view was not based on credible authority.83  
In Genna-Wae Properties (Pty) Ltd v Medio-Tronics (Natal) (Pty) Ltd84 the 
question was whether the lessee was at liberty to decide whether he wanted to 
continue with the lease upon alienation of the leased premises. In the court a quo85 
Squires J found that the tenant had a right to decide whether he wanted to remain in 
occupation, based on the fact that it was a “personal obligation”. Squires J relied on 
the common law, placing emphasis on the choice of the lessee to pay rent, which 
would, only upon payment, require the new owner to recognise the lease.86   
On appeal Corbett CJ criticized this contention, stating that in such an event 
the lessee would be in breach of contract, whereafter the new owner could claim 
damages. Accordingly this couldn‟t have been regarded as an election.87 Corbett CJ 
concluded that the new owner was obliged to recognise the lease, which meant that 
he couldn‟t evict the lessee, provided that the lessee complied with the original lease 
and continued to pay the rent. If the new owner recognised the rights of the lessee, 
the lessee was prohibited from cancelling the lease other than in accordance with 
the contract.88    
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The huur gaat voor koop rule developed as part of South African landlord-
tenant law, although from the discussion it is clear that it has caused some confusion 
regarding the rights of tenants. At common law, and in terms of the Deeds Registries 
Act, the rule is that a tenant can only acquire a limited real right in land through 
registration. This rule applies to both short-term and long-term tenants, but long-term 
leases are usually registered whereas short-term leases are rarely registered. Once 
the lease is registered the lessee acquires a real right and this right can be enforced 
against the whole world, including purchasers. It is therefore clear that the huur gaat 
voor koop rule has no relevance in such a case. If the purchaser was aware of the 
lease before the sale took place, the doctrine of notice applies and the tenant (of 
either a short-term or long-term lease) will be able to enforce the lease for its entire 
period. In such a case it is again clear that the huur gaat voor koop rule has no 
relevance. The huur gaat voor koop rule is a mechanism that was developed to 
protect the tenant‟s mere personal right of occupation in the case where the property 
was sold to a third party. The rule does therefore not provide the tenant with a real 
right, but rather aims at ensuring that the lease stays intact for the period of the lease 
in the absence of a limited real right. It affords tenure security, although limited to the 
original period of the lease. In this regard the rule is similar to the other common law 
forms of tenure protection. The essence of the huur gaat voor koop rule is to provide 
tenure security for the tenant where the original landlord alienates the property 
during the term of the lease. The original owner as landlord is substituted with the 
new owner in order to give effect to the full term of the lease and provide tenure 
security for the tenant. 
 
2.2.3 Additional tenure security 
 
In addition to the huur gaat voor koop rule the common law provides tenure security 
for tenants upon death of either party and if the landlord becomes insolvent.89  
Sources ranging from the beginning of the twentieth century indicate that the 
death of a party did not end a fixed-term tenancy because the estate of the 
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deceased was bound by the lease.90 The exception to the rule was where the 
landlord‟s title to the property was one for his life. A lease at the will of either party 
and a lease for the life of either party terminated upon death of that party. A tenant 
could specify in the lease that the lease would terminate upon the occurrence of his 
death (or that of his successor in title). This provision would be binding on his 
executor or his successor‟s executor.91 Kerr agreed that in accordance with a 
general rule of contract, the lease did not dissolve upon the death of either party, but 
rather automatically passed to the heirs of the tenant if he died during the term of the 
lease.92 This position was changed in the later case of Lorentz v Melle,93 where the 
court found that contractual duties (and rights) could be transmitted by operation of 
law on the death of a contracting party to his executor and administrator. A lease 
could therefore not automatically pass to an heir; he would first have to accept the 
inheritance.94 Upon acceptance of the lease the descendants of the tenant would be 
able to continue occupying the leased premises.  
Early twentieth century sources also indicate that tenure security was granted 
in the case where the landlord became insolvent,95 because the lease could only 
terminate in exceptional cases. The trustee had a duty to sell the leased property 
although, if the lease complied with the necessary formalities and the landlord had 
sufficient title to grant the lease, the purchaser would be bound by the lease. Wille 
argued that a purchaser was bound by a short lease if the tenant was in occupation 
of the premises while registration of a long lease bound the purchaser in all cases.96 
The later view of Kerr‟s with regard to the rights of occupying tenants was that a 
short term tenant would acquire a real right through occupation, while a long-term 
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tenant would acquire a real right by means of registration.97 The established real 
right of the tenant would trump the rights of the purchaser in the event of a sale. If 
the tenant merely had a personal right, the purchaser would be bound by the lease if 
he had notice thereof. If the property was sold in order to abide by a prior real right, 
such as a mortgage,98 and the holder of the real right did not consent to the lease, 
the property would be “put up for sale first subject to the lease and thereafter, if the 
amount bid on the first occasion was not sufficient to cover the bond, free of the 
lease.”99 The lease would therefore automatically terminate in the case of a sale free 
of the lease, whereafter the trustee could cancel the lease and claim ejectment of the 
tenant. Kerr mentioned that if the tenant‟s real right was prior to the mortgage, such 
a right would appear incontrovertible.100 
In the case of Velcich v Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa101 the 
owner of a farm mortgaged it to the Land Bank, whereafter the farm was let to 
lessees. During the lease the owner‟s estate was sequestrated and the bank 
proceeded to sell the farm by public auction. The sale was advertised free of the 
lease and the auction was conducted accordingly. Eventually the farm was “bought 
in” by the bank due to the deficiency of the highest bid made.102 The procedure 
required by law was that the farm should first be put up for sale, subject to the lease. 
If the highest bid was enough to realise the debts secured by the mortgage, the farm 
must be sold subject to the lease. If the highest bid was insufficient, the farm could 
be sold free of the lease at the instance of the mortgagee.103 According to this 
principle the appellants (lessees) argued that the lease survived the public auction 
because the required procedure was not followed. Joubert JA upheld the decision in 
the court a quo and found that the lease did not survive the sale in execution of the 
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farm. The court based its decision on a certain “assumption” which entailed that in 
the event of a sale in execution of immovable property, the price that would be 
realized on a sale free of the lease would obviously be higher than the price that 
would be realized if the property was sold subject to the lease.104 
 
2.2.4 Conclusion 
 
One can conclude that the common law made provision for tenure security for 
tenants at the beginning of the twentieth century, and to a certain extent throughout 
the century. The essence of the common law was to keep the contractual 
relationship intact, which granted some protection for both parties. Security of tenure 
is primarily provided for tenants through the operation of the huur gaat voor koop rule 
and the doctrine of knowledge in the case where the property is alienated during the 
term of the lease. Where either party dies during the lease, or where the landlord 
becomes insolvent, the lease continues despite the substitution of one of the parties. 
The lease therefore continues for the remainder of the lease period even though the 
original parties are no longer involved in the agreement. 
Termination of the lease has always been left to the will of the contracting 
parties, especially to the will of the landlord. Initially ownership granted the landlord a 
unilateral freedom of choice in relation to his object. Ownership was distinguished 
from other rights by the scope of its exclusivity. The owner was therefore entitled to 
exclusive possession and any limitations (such as a lease) on the rights of owners 
were perceived as exceptional and temporary.105  
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When the lease terminates the landlord is entitled to eject the tenant by 
means of a court order. If the tenant is holding over, the landlord is not allowed to 
forcefully eject the tenant.106 If the parties included a stipulation in the lease which 
stated that the landlord could eject the tenant without resource to legal process, the 
stipulation is illegal and the court can order the landlord to restore occupation to the 
lessee.107 Where a court, without hearing argument on its competence to do so, 
gave the defendant-lessee a certain time to vacate the premises, an Appellate 
Division decision could suspend implementation of such a decision. This position has 
been queried because the legal right of the landowner is delayed without the 
necessary statutory authorization.108 Kerr agreed that in certain circumstances a 
period of suspension could be justified if such suspension could avoid “undue 
hardship for the lessee and not cause such hardship to the lessor”.109  
At common law, tenure security has been afforded to tenants upon the 
occurrence of three events, namely sale of the leased property, insolvency of the 
landlord and death of the landlord. However, these forms of tenure protection are 
limited as they are contract-based with the aim to give effect to the lease. Once the 
lease expires, the landlord is generally entitled to reclaim his property. The common 
law applied to all tenants, irrespective of their race, in the absence of statutory 
interference. 
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2.3 Statutory intervention in landlord-tenant law (1920-1980) 
2.3.1 Introduction of statutory tenancy 
 
After the First World War South Africa experienced a housing shortage that led to the 
potential exploitation of tenants. In 1920 the Tenants Protection (Temporary) Act110 
was enacted to prevent such exploitation by restricting the landlord‟s right to eject 
the tenant of a dwelling upon expiration of the lease.111 The legislation created a 
statutory lease at the end of a fixed-term tenancy by converting the contractual lease 
into a periodic lease. If the tenant continued to pay the rent upon expiration of the 
lease, while complying with the other conditions of the tenancy, the landlord could 
not eject the tenant except on certain grounds, as stated in the Act.112 According to 
section 1(1) the court could order ejectment of the tenant if he damaged the property 
or if the landlord reasonably required the property for his own use.113 These 
provisions could be described as the core around which all the subsequent 
legislation developed.114  
The Act drastically amended the original lease by overriding the terms of the 
agreement. The landowner‟s ownership rights were restricted by preventing the 
owner from ejecting the tenant upon contractual termination of the lease. In terms of 
the common law the tenant had a duty to vacate the property upon expiration of the 
lease, but this position was amended by affording the tenant a statutory right to 
continue occupation upon expiration of his contractual right. The Act restricted the 
common law rights of private landowners in order to ensure substantive tenure 
security for tenants during an acute housing shortage. 
Initially the Tenants Protection (Temporary) Act was intended as a 
temporary115 measure to address the exploitation of lessees, but in the same year 
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the Rents Act of 1920116 was passed,117 hardly a month after the Tenants Protection 
(Temporary) Act. This indicates that parliament had underestimated the housing 
shortage when the Tenants Protection (Temporary) Act was enacted.118 The Rents 
Act commenced on 21 June 1920 and was intended to be in force until 30 June 
1921.119 Various acts120 extended the application of the Rents Act until the Rents Act 
Extension Act 1924121 provided that it should continue in operation until repealed by 
an act of parliament.122 The Tenants Protection (Temporary) Act had no information 
with regard to the nature of the dwellings or the nature of the tenant it applied to. The 
Rents Act 13 of 1920 made provision for the establishment of rent boards123 and 
stated that the Act would only apply to dwellings situated in an area where a rent 
board was constituted,124 although this hardly indicated the nature of the tenant to 
whom the Act applied. The Housing Act 35 of 1920 enabled the local authority to 
borrow money in order to construct dwellings and carry out approved schemes.125 
The local authority could also let some of the dwellings on conditions prescribed by 
the administrator.126 One can question whether these local authority lettings were 
included under the protection of the Rents Act. The nature of the tenant occupying 
local authority housing is also uncertain.  
The Rents Act 13 of 1920, similar to the Tenants Protection (Temporary) Act, 
placed a restriction on the landlord‟s right to approach the court and eject the tenant 
upon termination of the lease but made provision for additional grounds on which a 
tenant could be ejected. According to section 11 the court could also eject the tenant 
if the premises were reasonably required by an employee of the landlord or if the 
tenant had been guilty of creating a nuisance for neighbouring occupiers.   
The difference between the Tenants Protection (Temporary) Act and the 
Rents Act was that the Rents Act mandated the Governor-General to constitute rent 
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boards.127 The function of the rent boards was to receive and investigate complaints, 
reduce fixed rent, fix reasonable rents128 for dwellings and order a refund of excess 
rent.129 The Rents Act also differed from the Tenants Protection (Temporary) Act as 
certain dwellings130 were excluded from the Rents Act. The Rents Act did not apply 
to dwellings situated in an area for which no rent board had been constituted, nor did 
it apply to dwellings completed after the first day of April 1920.131 The primary 
function of the Rents Act was to control rent, while the Tenants Protection 
(Temporary) Act did not differentiate between different classes of rent; the tenant 
was protected as long as he paid the rent, focusing on strengthened tenure rights for 
tenants.132  
The Rents Act Extension and Amendment Act 1921133 reduced the rent 
boards‟ powers, because the Act repealed sections 4, 5 and 6, which empowered 
the boards to obtain returns from landlords of rent paid and to investigate the 
reasonableness thereof.134 The Act also made provision for an offence if the landlord 
(or his employee) failed to occupy the dwelling within one month after recovery under 
the Act and failed to continue to occupy the dwelling for three consecutive months. In 
such a case the landlord would be liable to pay a fine as well as compensation for 
any loss sustained by the tenant by reason of his removal.135  
Section 3(a) of the Rents Act Extension and Further Amendment Act 1922136 
added an additional ground for ejectment, namely that if the premises were 
reasonably required for the purpose of a reconstruction or rebuilding scheme, the 
tenant could be ejected. The Rents Extension Act 1923137 also introduced a new 
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ground, namely that if the landlord‟s major or married child reasonably required the 
property upon termination, the tenant could be ejected.138  
The Rents Acts139 transformed the weak common law occupation rights of 
tenants in occupation of dwellings to strengthened tenure rights. The landowner 
could not claim ejectment of the tenant, based on the occurrence of the lease having 
expired either by effluxion of time (in the case of a fixed-term tenancy), or in 
consequence of notice duly given (in the case of a periodic tenancy), as long as the 
tenant complied with the requirements set out in the different acts.140 The acts 
consequently applied to two types of lease, the one being a lease for a fixed period 
which would run from one fixed date to another fixed date or from one fixed date for 
a definite period of time or even from no specific date of commencement for a 
definite period of time. The other type of lease was known as a “lease to be from 
period to period”, which would continue on a periodic basis (for instance from week 
to week, month to month, year to year) until either party terminated the lease by 
giving notice to the other party.141     
The provisions of the acts, specifically the sections aimed at providing 
substantive tenure security, did not only apply to the immediate parties who entered 
into any of the abovementioned leases, but also to a purchaser. If a third party would 
purchase the leased property from the landlord and accept rent from the tenant, he 
would be bound by the lease and by the statutory requirements.142  
Apart from the protection provided for by the legislation, the common law 
principle huur gaat voor koop was still applicable.143 The common law also protected 
tenure rights of tenants upon death of either party or where the landlord became 
insolvent.144 Where the tenant did not enjoy the statutory substantive tenure 
protection in terms of the anti-eviction laws and the tenant was holding over, the 
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landlord was entitled to an ejectment order and could claim damages.145 The 
common law placed no limitations on rent and the landlord could easily evict a tenant 
holding over by means of legal process.146  
The purpose of the acts was to protect tenants occupying residential property, 
although certain non-residential premises147 were held to constitute dwellings.148 The 
rationale behind the Rents Act of 1920 was to strengthen tenure rights and control 
rents, although these objectives became partly unsubstantiated due to section 13, 
which excluded certain dwellings from statutory protection. It would seem that the 
Act was in fact “kept on ice” until a housing shortage made its reinforcement 
necessary. Rosenow and Diemont argued that in order to afford tenants some form 
of protection through the imposition of rent control, including rent restrictions and 
tenure protection measures, the act had to apply to all dwellings.149 
 
2.3.2 Introduction of non-white150 statutory regulation 
 
In terms of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act 21 of 1923,151 any urban local authority 
may identify land152 for the occupation of “natives”.153 The land with the necessary 
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dwellings constructed on it was known as a location. The local authority could by 
regulation prescribe that black persons can lease lots in the location and construct 
huts or houses for their own occupation.154 The local authority could also provide the 
buildings or huts within the location for the accommodation of black families on such 
terms and conditions the urban local authority may by regulation prescribe.155 The 
rent charged by the urban local authority for the occupation of any lot, house, hut or 
building in the location was determined by the Minister. The Minister had to consider 
the rent fair and reasonable.156 Sections 4 and 5 of the Act stated that the identified 
locations could only be occupied by black households, and to a certain extent 
coloured persons,157 and that all black persons within the limits of any urban area 
had to reside in a location.158  
One can assume that the occupation rights of the coloured individuals who 
occupied land in the locations were similar to that of the black individuals who 
occupied property within the locations. The Coloured Persons Settlement Areas 
(Cape) Act 3 of 1930 made provision for the establishment of certain areas that 
coloured individuals could occupy. Section 1 of the Act allowed the governor-general 
to declare any area of Crown land in the Province of the Cape of Good Hope to be a 
coloured persons settlement area. Section 5 of the Act stated that the occupation 
rights granted in terms of the Act would be personal and therefore not capable of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
23 De Jure 1-45 at 16; Olivier N “Urbanisation: Policy/Strategy with Particular Reference to 
Urbanisation and the Law” (1988) 53 Koers 580-599 at 588-589.  
153
 Section 29 of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act 21 of 1923 defines a “native” as “any person who is a 
member of an aboriginal race or tribe of Africa.” This definition refers to black persons and the term 
“black” is used throughout this dissertation.  
154
 Section 1(b) of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act 21 of 1923. 
155
 Section 1(d) of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act 21 of 1923. The provision of housing for black 
individuals was traditionally considered as the responsibility of the central authority: Granelli R Urban 
Black Housing: A Review of Existing Conditions in the Cape Peninsula with some Guidelines for 
Change (1977) 32. The legislation that regulated the occupation rights of black individuals in the black 
urban areas differed from the other population groups as a result of the government‟s policy that black 
individuals were “deemed to be present in those areas on a temporary basis only”: Olivier N “Property 
Rights in Urban Areas” (1988) 3 SA Public Law 23-33 at 25. 
156
 Section 9 of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act 21 of 1923. The terms of the lease were not stipulated 
in the legislation, although according to Olivier a system of unregistered 30-year leasehold was 
permitted in the black urban residential areas until 1967: Olivier N “Urbanisation: Policy/strategy with 
Particular Reference to Urbanisation and the Law” (1988) 53 Koers 580-599 at 582. 
157
 Section 29 of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act 21 of 1923 defined a “coloured person” as “any 
person of mixed European and native descent and shall include any person belonging to the class 
called Cape Malays”. During this period housing was provided by the state out of the National 
Housing Fund for some of the coloured population: Republic of South Africa Official Yearbook of the 
Republic of South Africa (1976) 330. 
158
 See section 5(2) of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act 21 of 1923 for the classes of black persons 
exempted from the operation of section 5(1). 
56 
 
transfer. The occupation right could be transferred if the occupier applied for a 
transfer and the board approved the application. The right could only be transferred 
to another coloured person. In the event of insolvency, the right would cease to exist, 
while in the event of death the board could grant the right to the occupier‟s widow. 
Section 6 stated that upon termination or surrender of any right of occupation, the 
possession of the land “shall revert to and the ownership of all improvements made 
thereon and material annexed thereto shall vest in the Government and … no 
compensation shall be payable to the occupier”. The Act also made provision for the 
constitution of local committees for any coloured persons settlement area. The 
committee would be elected by the coloured community within the settlement area 
and be responsible for matters concerning management, health and welfare of the 
community (section 9). Section 11 of the Act stated that the Minister could regulate 
the qualifications of coloured persons that applied for the allotment of a right of 
occupation within one of these areas. The Minister could also determine the period 
and conditions for which occupation rights was granted and the rental (or any other 
charges) paid in respect thereof. In terms of this section the Minister could also 
prescribe the circumstances under which rights of occupation could be cancelled. 
It is doubtful whether the land allocated by the urban local authorities for the 
development of a location would have fallen within the jurisdiction of rent boards as 
regulated under the Rents Act because the aim of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act 
was to segregate residential areas for black and white persons in urban areas. The 
identified coloured settlement areas were also regulated by legislation, uniquely 
enacted for the regulation of coloured individuals‟ occupation rights. One can 
therefore assume that the Rents Act did not apply to black (or coloured) individuals 
who occupied dwellings in the locations (or the identified coloured areas) because 
the Native (Urban Areas) Act and the Coloured Persons Settlement Areas (Cape) 
Act regulated the occupation rights of these non-white households. As a result of 
section 5 one can also assume that the Rents Act did not apply to any black 
individuals because they were prohibited from occupying dwellings in the 
metropolitan areas, which fell outside of the identified locations. However, the 
position of coloured persons was unclear because they could occupy property in the 
identified coloured areas, the locations (primarily allocated for black persons) or any 
other area. 
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2.3.3 Landlord-tenant regulation from 1940 to 1976 
2.3.3.1 White rental housing 
 
In 1940, sixteen years after the last amendments to the Rents Act, the Rents 
Amendment Act 1940159 extended and amended the Rents Act due to the new 
housing shortage that resulted from the Second World War.160 The housing shortage 
was more severe than the one brought about by the First World War, putting 
pressure on the legislature to address the problem. The Rents Amendment Act 1940 
provided that all dwellings should fall under the ambit of the Act. The 1940 Rents Act 
therefore gave effect to the original objective of the 1920 Rents Act. Parliament 
realised that sufficient tenure security for tenants could only be ensured by means of 
efficient legislation, applicable to all dwellings161 occupied by white (and some 
coloured) tenants. One should note that the Natives (Urban Areas) Act 21 of 1923 
was still applicable during this period and that it regulated the position between the 
urban local authorities and black (and some coloured) occupiers in identified 
locations. As mentioned previously in this chapter, one can assume that the Rents 
Acts did not apply to dwellings occupied in these locations because they were 
regulated under the Natives (Urban Areas) Act.162 The Rents Amendment Act 
temporarily extended application of the Rents Act to business premises until 31 
August 1942.163 The amendments between 1940 and 1942 also tried to identify the 
functions of rent boards with regard to the definition of reasonable rents and the 
investigation thereof.164 During this period War Measure 42 of 1941165 made 
provision for the establishment of rent control boards.166   
                                                          
159
 Act 26 of 1940. 
160
 Cooper WE The Rent Control Act (A Supplement to the South African Law of Landlord and 
Tenant) (1977) 4; Rosenow REG & Diemont MA The Rents Act in South Africa (1945) 4. 
161
 Rosenow REG & Diemont MA The Rents Act in South Africa (1945) 4. 
162
 Section 3(d) of the Natives (Urban Areas) Amendment Act 25 of 1923 provided that where any 
black persons resided outside a location he could be found guilty of an offence, although he must 
have been served with the required notice and one month must have passed after the notice was 
served. 
163
 Rosenow REG & Diemont MA The Rents Act in South Africa (1945) 4. 
164
 Cooper WE The Rent Control Act (A Supplement to the South African Law of Landlord and 
Tenant) (1977) 4-5. 
165
 Proc 195 of 1941 (Government Gazette 2952 p127 13 October 1941). 
166
 These boards were empowered to give advice to the various rent boards and review their 
decisions. The rent control boards also served as a court of appeal from the decisions of rent boards. 
58 
 
Section 23(1) of the new Rents Act167 repealed previous rents legislation,168 
consolidating and amending landlord-tenant law with regard to dwellings.169 The Act 
was applicable to dwellings situated in areas for which rent boards were 
constituted.170 Rent boards were set up in all the principal cities and towns in South 
Africa.171 According to case law172 prior to 1942, a tenant would only be protected by 
the Rents Act173 if the tenant paid a reasonable rent174 as declared by a rent board. 
In Clark v Findlay175 the Court (Appellate Division) found that a tenant would be 
protected upon termination of the lease under the 1942 Rents Act, even if a rent 
board had not declared the rent reasonable. The landlord‟s right to claim ejectment 
of the tenant upon expiration of the lease was restricted even more severely by War 
Measure 37 of 1943,176 which afforded special protection for soldiers.177 The families 
of soldiers were also provided greater tenure security by means of War Measures.178 
The Act applied to dwellings, defined as “a place occupied as a human 
habitation”, although the meaning of “dwelling” gave rise to extensive case law and 
uncertainty.179 The rent boards had jurisdiction over the control of rents for 
residential leases, while the National Supplies Control Board had jurisdiction over 
business premises. Difficulties arose when property was used partly for business 
purposes and partly as a dwelling, which gave rise to War Measure 59 of 1946.180 
This Measure declared business premises subject to the provisions of the Act.181  
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The Act‟s main purpose was to prevent “rack-renting”, which meant that 
where an order of a rent board was not in force rent was frozen,182 subject to such 
an order.183 The Act was described as a “drastic piece of legislation”, aimed at 
providing the tenant with continued occupation rights upon termination of the 
lease.184 When the contractual relationship between the parties terminated, the 
tenant became a “statutory tenant”185 and ceased to be a common law tenant. Due 
to the Rents Act, and not the lease, the tenant could continue to occupy the dwelling 
upon termination of the lease.186 It was submitted that the landlord‟s common law 
right to cancel the tenancy where the tenant seriously damaged the property, was 
not affected by the Act.187  
In terms of section 14(2) of the Act, the landlord could not claim ejectment of 
the tenant upon termination of the lease by effluxion of time or in consequence of 
notice duly given,188 if the tenant continued to pay the rent within seven days of the 
due date and continued to perform the other conditions of the tenancy, except if 
additional grounds189 existed. If none of these grounds were present, the tenant 
automatically became a statutory tenant and the tenancy converted into a lease at 
the will of the lessee. The tenant could cancel the lease by merely leaving the 
premises without even giving notice to the landlord. The court could only eject the 
statutory tenant if he lost the statutory protection in terms of the anti-eviction 
legislation as a result of his failure to pay the rent or non-compliance with the 
conditions of the tenancy. The nature of the lessee‟s obligations was derived from 
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the contract, although the contract was no longer in force. The landlord had no 
equivalent obligation to perform any duties under the lease. The effect of statutory 
tenancy, with regard to duties performed under the original lease, could thus have 
been described as “one-sided”.190  
In the case of John Orr & Company v Eagar,191 the appellants (the landlord) 
gave notice to terminate the lease on 31 August 1928 but the respondents remained 
in occupation. The respondents‟ status converted into statutory tenants in terms of 
the Rents Act of 1920.192 The initial agreement provided that the tenants were 
entitled to free electricity, hot water and also free attendance to clean the leased 
property, which consisted of two rooms and the use of a bathroom. After 31 August 
the landlord did not supply an attendant, electricity or hot water. In consequence 
thereof the respondents sued the appellant for damages for breach of contract.193 
The court found that section 11 of the Act imposed specific obligations on the 
statutory tenant but not necessarily on the landlord. According to Gey Van Pittius J, 
the Act already curtailed the common law rights of the landowner and there was no 
reason why the rights of the landowner should be limited any further.194 The court 
concluded that the landlord‟s obligation to supply the statutory tenant with hot water, 
electric power and an attendant came to an end with the termination of the lease. 
The decision made it clear that the contractual relationship was not preserved.  
In Aggouras v Macfarlane195 the respondent let to the applicant property 
which consisted of three living rooms, a kitchenette, a combined bathroom and a 
lavatory containing a gas meter. The respondent gave notice to the applicant to 
vacate the premises but the applicant refused to do so, whereafter the respondent 
instituted action in the magistrate‟s court for ejectment. While that claim was 
pending, the respondent disconnected the electric current and locked the bathroom 
door. The lavatory was inside the bathroom, as was the gas meter.196 The applicant 
continued to pay the rent and to perform the other conditions of the tenancy and 
therefore acquired the right to remain in possession and occupation of what had 
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been let to him, as stated in section 14(2) of the Rents Act of 1942. The court found 
that the landlord could not deprive the tenant of some of the essentials to continued 
occupation, thereby forcing him to vacate the leased property. The bathroom, 
lavatory and gas meter formed part of the premises and were essential for suitable 
occupation of the premises. Judge Jones acknowledged that the Rents Act curtailed 
the common law rights of the landlord, thus requiring strict interpretation, although 
the courts were “also required to avoid interpreting a statute so as to bring about an 
absurdity”.197 The court therefore found that the statutory tenant was entitled to 
remain in possession and occupation of what had been let to him and that the 
landlord acted unlawfully.198  
A similar approach was followed in Fernandes v Dawood,199 where the court 
found that certain fixtures and equipment were incidental to the tenancy and the 
statutory lessor was not allowed to deprive the tenant of such furnishings. The court 
concluded that the legislature intended to protect the tenant, not only in bare 
occupation of the premises, but in “the beneficial exercise and enjoyment of all rights 
flowing from the lease”.200  
The position was resolved by means of War Measure 97 of 1944,201 which 
provided that the statutory tenant was entitled to all the benefits of the original lease 
as if the said lease was still in force, as long as he remained in occupation of the 
premises.202 
The courts were initially under the impression that the landlord simply had to 
put up with the tenant occupying his property, without consensus between the 
parties, because the landlord was in effect statutorily deprived of his right of 
ejectment.203 According to Cooper, this deprivation was imposed by “placing a clog 
upon the court‟s power to grant an order for ejectment”.204 If one agrees with Cooper, 
one can conclude that the deprivation was initiated by the legislature, an act of state 
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interference with the rights of owners, although the effect was rather seen in the 
courts because the courts‟ powers were limited where a landlord applied for an 
ejectment order. One can also conclude that some courts were reluctant to give 
effect to statutory interference with the rights of landowners (and contractual 
relationships) and accordingly limited their interpretation of the legislation to what the 
legislature explicitly strived to accomplish. The legislature was therefore forced to 
continually intervene, clarifying the objective of the statutes by means of 
proclamations and war measures. However, the duty of the courts is to apply the law 
and the powers of the courts in a given case are outlined by the laws, including the 
legislation. A different view would be that the courts merely applied the landlord-
tenant laws and the effect of these statutory interventions was apparent in 
consideration of the weakened common law power of landowners to evict tenants 
upon expiration of the lease. 
The Rents Amendment Act 1947205 made provision for the protection of 
lessees of business premises, although the extent of the protection was not as 
substantial as for lessees of residential property. Section 2(i) of the Act provided that 
a lessee (of business or residential property) could be ejected upon termination of 
the lease if the lessor reasonably required the property for his own use and if 
“suitable alternative accommodation has been offered to the lessee … and has been 
refused by him for reasons which to the court seem inadequate”. In section 2(j) the 
legislature relaxed the provisions of the principal Act in favour of the lessor206 and 
granted the lessor a right to claim ejectment of the lessee (of business premises) 
upon termination of the lease, if the premises were “reasonably required in the public 
interest (having due regard to any hardship or damage that may be suffered by a 
lessee as a result of such ejectment) for the purpose of a reconstruction or rebuilding 
scheme”.207    
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In 1950 the new Rents Act208 repealed previous rents legislation209 as well as 
applicable war measures.210 The effect of the 1950 Rents Act was to (again) amend 
and integrate landlord-tenant law.211 The Act applied to dwellings and business 
premises,212 although the Act did not apply to (a) properties controlled by the 
state,213 (b) properties with spacious grounds and farms, (c) new premises,214 or 
state-owned premises.215 The Act did not apply to premises which were being dealt 
with by a local authority under the provisions of the Slums Act 53 of 1934 either.216 
Section 33(1)(d) of the Act excluded all dwellings of which the rent was being 
controlled or determined under the provisions of another law.217  
During this period the Housing Act 35 of 1920 was still applicable. In terms of 
section 5, the local authority may borrow money in order to construct dwellings and 
carry out approved schemes within its jurisdiction. These dwellings could be sold or 
let by the local authority on conditions prescribed by the administrator. The Act does 
not provide any information with regard to the amount of the rent or the level of 
tenure security afforded to these tenants. The nature of the tenant occupying local 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Gordon 1947 (1) SA 92 (W) 96; Rose’s Car Hire Co Pty Ltd v Harris & Co 1944 WLD 159; Cooper WE 
The Rent Control Act (A Supplement to the South African Law of Landlord and Tenant) (1977) 139. 
208
 Act 43 of 1950. 
209
 Rents Act 33 of 1942, Rents Amendment Act 53 of 1947 and the Rents Amendment Act 7 of 1948. 
210
 Section 34. 
211
 Cooper WE The Rent Control Act (A Supplement to the South African Law of Landlord and 
Tenant) (1977) 8. 
212
 The definition of dwellings and business premises still gave rise to uncertainty. See Rosenow REG 
& Diemont MA The Rents Act in South Africa (2
nd
 ed 1950) 17-30. 
213
 Properties that fell under this division included premises erected and let by the National Housing 
and Planning Commission, a local authority in terms of the Housing Act 35 of 1920, or a company or 
society in terms of section 6 of the Housing Act (with the approval of the National Housing and 
Planning Commission). See Rosenow REG & Diemont MA The Rents Act in South Africa (2
nd
 ed 
1950) 11-12. 
214
 The effect of section 33 (1)(f) of the Act was to exclude all new buildings or new units (added to 
existing buildings), because the section provided that the Act did not apply to dwellings or business 
premises unoccupied before 21 October 1949.  
215
 The state is not bound by a statutory enactment unless the legislature clearly intended to do so. 
The Rents Act gave no such indication and state-owned properties were therefore excluded from the 
provisions of the Act: Rosenow REG & Diemont MA The Rents Act in South Africa (2
nd
 ed 1950) 14.  
216
 Section 33(1)(d). The aim of the Slums Act was to identify slum areas in order to direct the owner 
to remove the nuisance or to demolish the dwelling. The local authority could declare any premises a 
slum. Once the building was declared a slum, the town clerk would serve a notice on the owner of the 
slum directing him to remove the nuisance or directing him to demolish the dwelling without 
compensation being paid by the local authority. The local authority could also notify the owner that it 
intended to acquire the property by expropriation. The local authority had to notify any occupier of the 
slum of the intended demolition. The Act provided that no person may enter the slum after the date 
was fixed for commencement of demolition. The owner was prohibited from allowing any person to 
occupy the slum on or after the said date.  
217
 The effect of this provision is evident in consideration of the racially discriminatory laws. Where the 
apartheid laws determined the rent of non-white persons in the identified areas, application of the 
Rents Acts was excluded. 
64 
 
authority lettings is also uncertain. One can assume that the Rents Act did not apply 
to local authority lettings because the Housing Act stated that the conditions of the 
lettings, including the determination of the rent, would be prescribed by the 
administrator. 
The central principles of the 1950 Rents Act were similar to previous rents 
legislation, focusing specifically on the right of the owner to claim ejectment of the 
tenant upon expiration of the lease where the owner reasonably required the 
property for his own use.218 The Act additionally forced landlords to charge 
reasonable rents in accordance with the 1942 Rents Act. As a result of section 2 of 
the Act, landlords were forbidden to charge rents higher than the rate charged on the 
first day of April 1949.219 The essential object of the Act was to provide tenants with 
reasonable rentals, although substantive tenure rights were a “necessary corollary” 
of the Act.220  
Section 21 of the 1950 Rents Act made provision for substantive tenure 
protection for lessees of residential premises. The court could not eject the tenant 
when the lease expired by effluxion of time or in consequence of notice duly given, 
as long as the lessee complied with the provisions under the Act.221 In the case of 
non-compliance, according to common law principles, the tenancy would 
automatically terminate upon effluxion of the fixed term, which meant that not only 
did the contract terminate but “with it the relationship of lessor and lessee 
cease[d].”222 The position was similar in the case of a periodic tenancy, where either 
party could end the periodic lease by giving notice, which ran parallel with a period of 
the lease.223  
Section 23 incorporated War Measure 97 of 1944 as it stated that the 
statutory tenant would observe all the conditions of the original contract of lease, as 
if it was still in force. The juristic relationship between the parties changed to the 
extent that their relationship now originated in statute law and not in agreement, 
although their responsibilities still derived from the original contract. The relationship 
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resembled a quasi contract, a term used in Roman law to describe a contractual 
relationship lacking consensus. This term was contextualised by Kerr in landlord-
tenant law, which resulted in a new definition of the contract, the quasi lease.224  
According to section 23(1) the statutory tenant could end the quasi lease by 
giving notice, as required under the original lease or at least one month‟s notice if the 
contract did not specify any notice. The Act made provision for numerous grounds 
upon which the lessor could end the statutory tenancy. Kerr225 divided these grounds 
into five classes, namely (a) the conduct of the lessee;226 (b) the needs of the 
lessor;227 (c) previous landlord occupation and the lessee‟s agreement;228 (d) 
reconstruction, rebuilding and town planning229 and (e) a saving clause.230 The 
“needs of the lessor” were interpreted by the legislature in such a way that it had 
preference. This was illustrated in the case of Johannesburg Board of Executors & 
Trust Co Ltd v Gordon,231 where the court found that the landlord merely had to 
show that he reasonably required the leased premises for his own use. Whether the 
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hardship to be suffered by the lessee upon ejectment exceeded the hardship to be 
suffered by the landlord if he couldn‟t get possession and occupation of the 
premises,232 was a question the court found unnecessary to answer due to the 
lessor‟s preference.233 The reasoning of the court seems counter-intuitive as the 
landlord only had to show that she reasonably required the property for her own use. 
However, the aim of the Act was to provide substantive tenure rights for tenants 
upon expiration of the lease and not to give some preference to the landlord during 
eviction proceedings. 
In the subsequent twenty-five years the Act was amended by twelve different 
amendment acts234 that led to important developments, such as the abolition of rent 
control of business premises and the extension of the provisions of the Act.235 In 
1966 the State President made the provisions of the Act applicable to all dwellings 
(as well as garages and parking spaces) used for residential purposes for the first 
time after 20 October 1949 and before 1 June 1966, situated in an area for which a 
rent board had been constituted.236 The Rents Amendment Act 1975237 amended 21 
sections of the Rents Act. Certain grounds on which the lessor could claim ejectment 
of the lessee were amended,238 while a new form of protection for the lessee was 
adopted, namely that the lessee could not be ejected as long as he performed 
certain conditions of the tenancy which in the courts‟ opinion were not trivial.239 
One should note that even though the range of Rents Acts enacted during this 
period applied to a large number of dwellings, some dwellings fell outside the scope 
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of these statutes. The tenure rights of these white households240 fell under the ambit 
of the common law, as discussed earlier in this chapter. The common law provided 
some tenure security for tenants in order to maintain the contractual relationship 
between the parties. Tenure security was granted in the case where either party died 
during the term of the lease; where the landlord became insolvent; or where the 
landlord sold the property to a third party during the term of the lease.  
Where either of the parties died during the lease Kerr stated that the lease 
survived and automatically passed to the heirs of the tenant if the tenant passed 
away.241 This position was adapted in Lorentz v Melle,242 where it was decided that 
the contractual duties of a party would pass to his executor and administrator. If the 
landlord became insolvent during the period of the lease, the common law ensured 
protection for tenants occupying such premises.243 The real right of the tenant who 
held a registered long lease would trump the rights of the purchaser in the event of a 
sale, while if the tenant merely had a personal right, the purchaser would be bound if 
he had knowledge of the lease or if the huur gaat voor koop rule applied. If the 
property was sold in order to abide by a prior real right, such as a mortgage, the 
amount of the bid could influence the rights of the tenant to the extent that the 
property would be “put up for sale first subject to the lease and thereafter, if the 
amount bid on the first occasion was not sufficient to cover the bond, free of the 
lease.”244 Apart from the legislation, security of tenure was primarily provided for 
tenants by means of the huur gaat voor koop rule. The tenure rights of the tenant 
would rely on the type of successor he was, the period of the lease and whether the 
tenant had a real or personal right.245 
In the 1946 case of Clark v Findlay246 the Court found that the statutory tenant 
would be protected under the common law rule, huur gaat voor koop. Judge 
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Watermeyer CJ made specific reference to section 14(2)247 of the 1942 Rents Act, 
which was applicable at the time, and found that:  
“[section] 14(2) was intended to protect a statutory tenant from ejectment, not 
only at the suit of the original lessor but also at the suit of anyone else, whose 
application for ejectment could successfully have been resisted under Common 
Law by a tenant, on the ground that he was in occupation under a valid lease at 
the time when application for his ejectment was made.”248  
 
According to Cooper this authority was never departed from, which led to the 
presumption that the legislature was aware of this when Act 43 of 1950 as well as 
the Rent Control Act249 were enacted. If the lessor sold the leased property, the 
purchaser would, by means of the common law rule and the Rent Control Act (or any 
other Rents legislation), step into the shoes of the previous owner as the new lessor 
and be prohibited from claiming ejectment of the statutory tenant.250  
From the discussion it is clear that the Rents Acts drastically amended the 
relationship between the landlord and tenant. The aim of these laws was to provide 
the white minority group with substantive tenure rights. In order to give effect to this 
aim the laws trumped the weak common law rights of urban residential tenants, while 
also disregarding the contractual nature of a lease. Instead of reinforcing the 
contractual agreement between the parties, the Rents Acts allowed the tenant to 
continue occupying the leased premises upon expiration of the lease without having 
any right to do so contractually or at common law. The common law forms of tenure 
security were different, because it was aimed at keeping the contract intact. 
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2.3.3.2 Non-white urban housing 
 
As mentioned previously, the Rents Act 43 of 1950 did not apply to dwellings of 
which the rent was determined under the provisions of another law.251 The Natives 
(Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945252 was similar to the Natives (Urban 
Areas) Act 21 of 1923. Section 2 of the Act provided that the local authority may 
define areas of land for the occupation of black households253 and may by regulation 
lease lots for the erection of buildings. The local authority could also provide 
buildings for the accommodation of black persons. The terms and conditions of these 
arrangements were regulated by the urban local authority with the approval of the 
Administrator and the Minister.254 Section 20(1) of the Act stated that the rent 
charged for the occupation of any lot, house, hut or building let for residential 
purposes would be determined by the Minister. The Minister had to consider all the 
circumstances in order to ascertain a fair and reasonable rent. Where a black tenant 
failed to pay the rent, the magistrate of the district in which the location was situated 
could warrant an execution against the movable property of that tenant.255 The effect 
of section 5 of the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act was that only black 
individuals could acquire land in locations and section 6 restricted the right of such 
households to acquire land outside the locations. Section 9 made provision for the 
segregation of the black population group in urban areas. In terms of this section the 
Governor-General could declare that all black persons within the limits of any urban 
area must reside in a location. The effect of the Act was that all black individuals had 
to reside in the locations and their occupation rights, including the rent they had to 
pay for either the lots or the premises, were regulated under the Act. This meant that 
the Rents Act 43 of 1950 did not apply to black tenants. Rosenow and Diemont state 
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that the Rents Act did not intend “to interfere with the rents charged by local 
authorities for location sites in terms of the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 
1945”.256  
The Coloured Persons Settlement Act 7 of 1946 was similar to the Coloured 
Persons Settlement Areas (Cape) Act 3 of 1930 as it made provision for the 
establishment of certain areas that could be occupied by coloured persons. In terms 
of section 6 of the Act, no person other than the state or a coloured person could 
acquire or hold any right or interest in land allocated for coloured persons. Section 7 
of the Act stated that the only persons who could reside in a coloured persons 
settlement were lessees, probationary lessees or owners of the land.257 Similar to its 
predecessor, the Act did not oblige coloured persons to reside in the identified areas. 
One can assume from the terminology of the Act that coloured persons could also 
occupy land in other parts of South Africa. If a coloured person occupied a dwelling, 
regulated under the provisions of the Rents Acts, one would have to assume that the 
relevant statute also regulated her tenancy. 
In 1950 the legislature introduced group areas legislation. The initial act was 
the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950, followed by the Group Areas Act 77 of 1957 and the 
Group Areas Act 36 of 1966. The legislation made provision for the allocation of 
certain parcels of land for the exclusive occupation (and /or exclusive ownership) by 
a specified racial group. Members of other racial groups were prohibited from owning 
land, acquiring land for occupation or using land (or premises) within such an 
area.258 The initial act made provision for the white group, the coloured group259 and 
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the black group.260 The group areas legislation affected the coloured and Indian 
population to the extent that the legislation served as a form of influx control. The 
legislation contributed to the housing shortages experienced by these groups and 
one can therefore argue that the legislation acted “as a de facto influx control 
measure”.261 However, the group areas legislation did not have such a profound 
impact on the occupation rights of black individuals as it had on the occupation rights 
of coloured households. The territorial segregation of black persons was regulated 
under a different statutory regime. The Black Land Act 27 of 1913 regulated 
occupation and ownership of land for black individuals in rural areas (also known as 
the “homelands”), while the Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945 
regulated the allocation of land in urban areas for occupation by black persons. The 
black urban areas identified and regulated under the Native (Urban Areas) 
Consolidation Act 25 of 1945 were excluded from the ambit of the group areas 
legislation.262 
The rights acquired under the group areas legislation included ownership 
(also conceptualised as the acquisition of immovable property); a right to occupy 
land and premises; and a right to use land and premises. Individuals of a specified 
race group could acquire immovable land in the allocated areas and could acquire a 
permit “authorizing - (i) the acquisition or holding of immovable property in a group 
area or in the controlled area; or (ii) the occupation of or the granting of permission to 
occupy any land or premises in a group area, in the controlled area or in a specified 
area”.263 The right to occupy land in the allocated areas was usually through the 
acquisition of a permit, which constituted a weak, insecure personal right.264 The 
ownership that could be acquired in terms of the legislation could be described as a 
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“„weak model of ownership” because the right was inherently limited. In order to give 
effect to certain government policies and political aspirations, ownership could be 
extinguished through executive decision-making.265 The discretion to terminate 
ownership and other rights in land was exercised on a de facto basis and therefore 
created uncertainty, especially because procedural controls were also absent. The 
legislation undermined the absolute notion of ownership and the extent of security 
usually associated with this right, although this “weakening” of ownership did not 
affect all South Africans equally. The white minority group was not affected by the 
group areas legislation because (white) ownership remained the most secure form of 
tenure as it was traditionally perceived.266 
In 1968 the Regulations Concerning the Administration and Control of Land in 
Black Urban Areas of 14 June 1968267 was introduced and applied to black urban 
residential land. The regulations provided that black individuals could occupy urban 
land under three different forms of tenure, namely “(i) a permit to erect a private 
dwelling; (ii) a resident‟s permit to rent a house from the Local Government; and (iii) 
a certificate of occupation of a house”.268 The rights allocated to black individuals 
were all personal rights. The rights derived from the contractual relationship between 
the local authority and the specific individual. The occupier could therefore only 
enforce his personal right against the local authority, because he did not obtain a 
real right.269 
One can conclude that the occupation rights of non-white households were 
weak, because the government‟s policy was aimed at establishing racial 
segregation. In order to sufficiently segregate different racial groups the legislature 
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had to regulate the occupation rights of non-white households. To facilitate 
straightforward eviction and relocation of these racial groups, their occupation rights 
had to be insecure and a mere permit, license or personal right was granted through 
the statutes. The common law did not apply to non-white households, because the 
nexus of apartheid laws regulated the occupation rights of all racial groups other 
than the white minority. The changing socio-economic circumstances that influenced 
housing policy and landlord-tenant legislation in South Africa during this period did 
not affect the occupation rights of non-white members of South Africa, because the 
apartheid laws and policies trumped any possible correlation between housing 
shortages in general and increased tenure rights for all households in South Africa. 
 
2.3.4 Rent Control Act 1976 
 
In 1976 the Rent Control Act repealed the 1950 Rents Act and its amending 
legislation. The Rent Control Act once again amended and consolidated landlord-
tenant law, although the difference between the acts mainly related to form and not 
substance.270 The scope of the protection offered to tenants under the Rent Control 
Act seemed quite far-reaching due to the broad definition of “controlled premises”.271 
Looking at these definitions and section 28 of the Act, it seems as if the Act applied 
to roughly all residential and business premises, which would have provided wide-
ranging substantive tenure security for tenants in the whole of the rental sphere. 
However, similar to previous rents legislation, application of the Act was restricted by 
section 51.  
The Act was not applicable to controlled premises situated in an area for 
which a rent board had not been established.272 Residential or business premises 
built under the provisions of the Housing Act273 that were being let by the National 
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Housing Commission or the local authority were exempted from the provisions of the 
Act.274  
In terms of section 61 of the Housing Act, the local authority could borrow 
money and construct approved dwellings and carry out approved schemes. The local 
authority could also sell or let any of the dwellings constructed by it. Section 65 of the 
Housing Act stated that where a local authority tenant failed to pay his rent the local 
authority could institute action in court with the aim to recover the rent. The local 
authority could also enter upon and take possession of the dwelling without having 
obtained judgement. However, a notice must have been delivered to the tenant and 
seven days must have passed.  
The Rent Control Act did not apply to any property dealt with under the 
provisions of the Slums Act275 or premises of which the rent was determined under 
the provisions of another law.276 The Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 
1945, the Group Areas Act 36 of 1966 and the Regulations Concerning the 
Administration and Control of Land in Black Urban Areas of 14 June 1968277 were 
still applicable during this period278 and the relevant legislation and regulations 
regulated the relationship between black (and coloured) tenants and the local 
authority. The Rents Act did therefore not apply to black and coloured tenants 
because the Natives (Urban Areas) Act and Group Areas Act regulated these 
tenancies.279  
Section 51(f) of the Rent Control Act provided that premises used or occupied 
for the first time after 21 October 1949 were exempted from the provisions of the Act, 
which meant that all new buildings fell outside the ambit of the Act. The result was 
that a large number of tenants were excluded from the Act and only occupying 
tenants were protected. This affirms what Van den Heever found in Josuub Ltd v 
Ismail,280 namely that only a section of the community was protected under the Act. 
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Application of the Act was further limited by section 51(g), which exempted 
old buildings.281 Dwellings ordinarily occupied by the owner or lessee which were let 
by the owner or sublet by its lessee for a period not exceeding six months, were also 
excluded from the provisions of the Act.282 State property was exempted from the 
Act, which meant that any property let by a State Department would fall outside the 
ambit of the Act. According to Cooper283 section 28(d)(i) of the Act was not 
applicable to a sectional title section if that section fell under the ambit of the 
Sectional Titles Act.284  
The State President was entitled, upon recommendation of the Minister, to 
extend application of the Act by means of proclamation in the Government 
Gazette,285 while according to section 51(g), the Minister was also entitled to exempt 
premises from rent control by means of notice in the Government Gazette. 
Thereafter the effect of the notice could still be amended or withdrawn by means of 
similar procedure.286   
The biggest imperfection of the Act, and more specifically the system of rent 
control in conjunction with statutory tenancy, was that only a small sector of the 
population could reap the benefits of the system because they occupied controlled 
premises. The Act and its predecessors were supposed to provide substantive 
tenure rights for tenants occupying residential property in order to protect vulnerable 
tenants against exploitation by landowners.287 Paradoxically, the Native (Urban 
Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945, the Group Areas Act 36 of 1966 and the 
relevant regulations excluded black (and coloured) people, the vast majority of the 
population and of marginalised people, from access to the rent control system in 
urban areas because it regulated the relationship between these tenants and the 
local authority. The extent of tenure security provided for urban non-white occupiers 
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under these statutes was decisively limited in order to give effect to the government‟s 
policy of the temporariness of black occupiers in urban areas. With regard to 
coloured persons, the rights acquired under the Group Areas Act were also insecure 
in order to make relocation possible in future. 
 The aim of the Rent Control Act was to control the rent of “controlled 
premises”288 and to provide substantive tenure security for tenants occupying such 
premises. The effect of the Act was to disallow the courts to grant eviction orders in 
certain circumstances. In order to control rentals, the Act froze the rent at the rate 
charged on the first day of April 1949, although Proclamation 317 of 1966289 
provided that rentals of controlled residential premises, occupied or used for the first 
time between 21 October 1949 and 31 May 1966, were frozen on 31 May 1966. The 
legislature introduced certain factors (such as values and services) that the rent 
control boards had to take into account in order to determine the rent.  
The rent control boards could therefore resolve an issue with regard to the 
amount of the rent and disregard the predetermined “frozen rent”. 290 
Similar to section 21 of the 1950 Rents Act, the Rent Control Act placed a 
restriction on the ejectment of tenants. When a lease of controlled premises expired 
in consequence of notice given (in the case of a periodic tenancy) or effluxion of time 
(in the case of a fixed-term tenancy) and the lessee continued to pay the rent within 
seven days after due date while performing the other conditions of the tenancy, the 
court could not eject the lessee from the premises except on certain grounds.291  
Again, one should note that not all tenants were protected under the Rent 
Control Act and a number of urban residential tenants leased housing in terms of the 
common law. The common law did not make provision for continued occupation 
rights for tenants upon termination of the lease. If the tenant did not comply with the 
requirements set out in the acts and the tenant continued to occupy the property 
after expiration of the lease, the tenant was holding over and could be evicted by the 
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landlord. The landlord would rely on his rights as owner to institute the rei vindicatio 
and reclaim the property. The landlord could also claim damages.292 
If the tenant did comply with the provisions of the Rent Control Act, a new 
relationship emerged between the statutory lessee and statutory lessor upon 
expiration of the lease. Cooper described the relationship as a “statutory relocation”, 
akin to a tacit relocation because “those provisions of the lease incident to the 
relation of lessor and lessee [were] renewed but the provisions that [were] collateral, 
independent and not incidental to the relation of lessor and lessee [were] not 
incorporated in the new letting.”293  
The Rent Control Act granted lessees a continued occupation right. The 
lessor could only claim ejectment of the lessee if he complied with one of the 
grounds stipulated in section 28. The lessor also had to give written notice in 
accordance with section 27(1).294 Section 27(1) was applicable where the landlord 
wanted to evict the tenant. It was not a notice to terminate a periodic lease. The 
lessee became a statutory tenant by means of section 28 and the landlord could 
consequently only obtain an ejectment order if he complied with section 27(1) and 
could prove one of the grounds stipulated in section 28. Section 27(1) required that 
landlords had to notify the rent boards of their intention to claim ejectment of the 
lessee, which protected uninformed lessees. The lessor was required to clearly state 
the statutory ground he was relying on in the notice in order to sufficiently inform the 
rent board of his objective. If the lessee forfeited the tenure protection in terms of the 
Act, either by breach of contract or as a result of non-compliance with the provisions 
of section 28,295 the lessor was exempted from section 27(1).296     
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A statutory lessee of controlled premises could face an ejectment order if he 
caused material damage to the leased property or was found guilty of conduct which 
amounted to nuisance.297 A statutory lessee of a dwelling, garage or parking space 
could be ejected on additional grounds.298 If the lessor reasonably required the entire 
premises for his own use and the lessee was given three months notice, the court 
could order ejectment of the tenant.299 In order to determine whether the needs of 
the lessor were reasonable, the courts applied an objective test, which consisted of 
an examination of the lessor‟s needs and circumstances.300 In the case of Rose’s 
Car Hire Co Pty Ltd v Harris & Co301 the court found that the hardship suffered by the 
lessee, in such a case of eviction, was not a factor to be taken into consideration 
when the court had to decide whether the lessor should have occupation to which he 
was otherwise legally entitled. 
The statutory lessee of a dwelling, garage or parking space could also be 
ejected if he was formerly employed by the lessor and the lessor required the 
premises for the occupation of a person in his employ.302 The third additional ground 
made provision for the ejectment of the lessee if he agreed in writing to vacate the 
premises upon a specified date and such date has arrived.303 The lessor could only 
make use of this section if he could prove that he previously personally occupied or 
used the premises and that the agreement was undertaken in writing at the 
commencement of the lease.304  
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Section 28(d)(iv) provided that the lessor of a dwelling, garage or parking 
space could claim ejectment of the statutory lessee if the premises were reasonably 
required for the purpose of a reconstruction, rebuilding scheme, repairs, restoration 
or conversion for which vacation of such premises was essential.305 In order to 
decide whether the lessor reasonably required the premises, the court applied the 
test of the reasonable man and considered whether the reasonable man would for 
instance wish to reconstruct his property. The lessor had to prove that reconstruction 
would convert his property from unprofitable into profitable. Any inconvenience or 
hardship suffered by the lessee was, once again, not taken into consideration by the 
court.306 If the premises were reasonably required for a reconstruction, rebuilding 
scheme or conversion, the lessee was not at liberty to reoccupy the premises upon 
completion. If the lessee was ejected for the purpose of repairs or restoration, the 
lease was merely pendant and the lessee could return to the premises as a statutory 
lessee.307 If the premises were reasonably required in connection with any scheme 
of town improvement or any other public work, which the local authority was by law 
entitled to undertake, the landlord could claim ejectment of the lessee from such a 
dwelling, garage or parking space.308  
Section 28(d)(v) was similar to section 21(1) of the 1950 Rents Act in that it 
could have been described as the saving clause of the Rent Control Act. This section 
granted the courts a discretion to allow an application by a lessor who wished to 
eject a lessee of a dwelling, garage or parking space upon termination of the lease, 
even though he failed to comply with any of the grounds in section 28. The court 
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could eject the lessee if it found any other sufficient reason to do so, regard being 
had to all the circumstances.309  
In the early case of Paul v Youley310 the court found that section 11 of the 
Rents Act 13 of 1920 made provision for three circumstances in terms of which the 
court could eject a tenant. One of these grounds was where the landlord reasonably 
required the property for his own use or for the use of his employee. The section also 
contained a saving clause, similar to section 28(d)(v) of the Rent Control Act. The 
plaintiff required the premises for the occupation of her son and daughter. The court 
found that where the Act specifically defined the occupation which it preferred, such 
as personal occupation by the landlord or his employee, it was not permissible to 
thereafter enable the court to make an order for ejectment to provide occupation for 
anybody else, other than the two persons favoured by the legislature.311    
The courts did not easily eject a lessee by means of the saving clause, 
although in the few cases where the courts did exercise their discretion in favour of 
the lessor, factors such as the age and condition of the leased premises,312 the 
amount of time granted to the lessee to find alternative accommodation and the 
personal use of the premises by the lessee were taken into account.313 
In consideration of these provisions and their effect on the rights of the 
parties, one can conclude that the Act severely interfered with the common law rights 
of landlords and was therefore interpreted in a strict manner.314 In Josuub Ltd v 
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Ismail315 Van den Heever JA relied on English case law and found that “where a 
statute deprives a landlord of a part of his common law right to distrain „the words 
must not be strained so as further to restrict his rights‟”.316 Restrictions on the 
common law rights of landlords were therefore predetermined by the legislature. 
Courts were not at liberty to weaken these rights any further and were compelled to 
interpret the Act “so as to minimize diminution.”317  
From the discussion it is clear that anti-eviction legislation drastically 
interfered with the rights of landowners to the extent that the landlord couldn‟t evict 
the tenant when the lease expired. The legislation did not place limitations on a 
landowner‟s right to cancel the lease where the tenant was in breach; the contractual 
lease converted into a statutory lease where the tenant complied with the original 
lease and with the requirements as set out in the acts. The legislation did therefore 
not protect “unlawful mala fide” tenants but rather a certain class of tenants who 
abided by the contract and the legislation. Apart from the abiding character of the 
tenant, the landlord could still apply for an ejectment order on certain grounds 
stipulated in the acts. If the tenant did breach the contract or did not comply with the 
legislation or where the landlord successfully relied on one of the grounds set out in 
the acts, the landlord was entitled to an ejectment order. Where the tenant for 
instance breached the contract and the landlord wished to eject the tenant in terms 
of the common law, the landlord still had to have recourse to legal process. Section 
27(1) of the Rent Control Act318 introduced a new requirement that ensured due 
process if the tenant enjoyed protection under the Act. According to section 27(1) the 
landlord could only obtain an ejectment order if he complied with section 27(1) and 
one of the grounds stipulated in section 28 of the Act. 
Where the tenant did not comply with the requirements in the acts he was still 
afforded some tenure security by means of the common law. The common law 
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differed from the anti-eviction legislation as it did not restrict the right of landowners 
to evict tenants upon expiration of the lease. When the lease expired, according to 
contract law principles, the landlord was entitled to claim an eviction order. The 
courts were not at liberty to extend occupation rights of tenants if they were not 
protected in terms of the anti-eviction legislation. The common law focused on 
keeping the contract between the parties intact, which is why the tenure security 
provided for by the common law was aimed at fulfilling the lease, not overriding it.319 
The common law also upheld the rent agreed upon between the parties. The parties 
were at liberty to agree on the rent, while the anti-eviction legislation differed as it 
placed restrictions on rent increases. In terms of the anti-eviction legislation, security 
of tenure was in due course subsidiary to rent control.   
 
2.3.5 Conclusion 
 
The initial enactment of the Rents Acts was inspired by the housing shortage that 
resulted from the First World War and the aim of the legislature was to intervene in 
the relationship of private landlord and tenant in order to protect tenants from 
exploitation. The legislation extended urban white tenants‟ occupation rights upon 
termination of the lease, although rent control was also imposed. The core of these 
anti-eviction measures was to restrict the strong common law rights of landowners to 
reclaim their property when the lease expired.  
It is interesting to mention Visser‟s attempts at defining the legal nature of 
statutory tenancy, although his view is speculative and does not correspond with the 
majority of modern authors or case law. Visser argued that the statutory tenant 
enjoyed a new type of real right because his right of occupation was enforceable 
against descendants in title to the landlord under the original lease.320 Another 
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contention made by Visser, aimed at defining the legal nature of the right of the 
statutory tenant, was to describe this right as a new form of ownership.321 As a result 
of the mid-nineteenth century shift from individual towards society it was asserted 
that, during this period, the notion of ownership, or rather the rights derived from 
ownership, altered into a right to revenue.322 In this context revenue meant 
“immaterial revenue” rather than material revenue. The rent received by the landlord, 
as a mere return on his investment, was seen as a material revenue while the 
statutory tenant‟s right to continued occupation was typified as ownership, the right 
to “revenue of enjoyment of the quality of life”.323 The attenuation of the rights of the 
legal owner was evident in landlord-tenant law as a result of the economic shift 
towards the statutory tenant.324 Visser‟s ideal with regard to the occupation rights of 
tenants in conjunction with the weakened rights of landowners typifies the purpose of 
the legislature to a certain extent, although the courts resisted this shift towards 
inherently stronger rights for tenants. The courts refused to take into account the 
personal circumstances of the tenant and explicitly stated that the hardship suffered 
by the tenant as a result of eviction is a factor the courts refuse to consider. The 
attitude of the courts was therefore contrary to Visser‟s view, because morality 
related issues, especially in relation to the position of tenants, were never considered 
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by the courts. The landlord was at liberty to institute an ejectment order and could 
rely on the grounds set out in the acts. The impact of the rents legislation and the 
effect it had on landowners‟ rights could be seen in the courts due to the fact that 
owners‟ common law power to claim eviction upon expiration of their leases was 
restricted through the application of the legislation. The courts applied the acts, 
which limited the rights of landowners, although the courts‟ point of departure was to 
apply the legislation in a strict manner. The courts didn‟t feel at liberty to restrict the 
rights of landowners any further than the legislation allowed, which is why the 
personal circumstances of tenants were never considered.325 
The statutory interventions in landlord-tenant law throughout the twentieth 
century were in favour of the minority group of weak, poor, white tenants. The 
government attempted to provide tenure protection for tenants during a housing 
shortage. This aim of the South African government is important to consider in the 
upcoming chapters that discuss foreign landlord-tenant laws.  The Rents Acts were 
not intended to address the housing shortage as the application of these laws were 
restricted to existing private rental housing. The aim of the laws was not to increase 
access to rental housing. Before the outbreak of the Second World War, the 
legislature restricted application of the Act. While the anti-eviction laws provided 
secure occupation rights for the minority group of white residential tenants, the 
discriminatory apartheid-type laws applied to the non-white majority. These 
households were forced to occupy land with weak tenure security, as the racially 
discriminatory laws made segregation possible. The correlation between continued 
housing shortages and government involvement through the creation of policy and 
enactment of legislation to improve security of tenure for tenants existed in the white 
private landlord-tenant framework. (The extent of the laws was however limited, 
because it primarily provided substantive tenure protection for tenants who already 
had lease agreements and were in occupation of rental housing.) However, it is also 
apparent that the apartheid policy did not allow this association to form in the 
development of non-white landlord-tenant legislation, as the tenure rights of these 
households remained insecure, irrespective of housing shortages or economic 
misfortune. 
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A second housing shortage resulted from the Second World War. The 
legislature responded and increased tenure security for the white minority. The 
legislation was drastic to the extent that it restricted the common law rights of 
landowners to evict tenants upon termination of their lease, while it also placed 
restrictions on rent increases. Initially these laws applied to the majority of urban 
dwellings (and even commercial properties at some point), but in due course its 
application was restricted to a few dwellings occupied by white households. The 
success of the Rents Acts could be analysed as a legislative measure that was 
imposed by the legislature with the single aim to provide white tenants, in the private 
rental market, with secure tenure during housing shortages. In consideration of this 
specific context one can conclude that these laws were successful. However, in light 
of foreign landlord-tenant laws that were enacted during housing shortages it 
becomes clear that the government was not actively involved in solving the housing 
shortage, because it only focussed on the existing private, white rental market. The 
Rents Acts granted white tenants in the private rental market with secure occupation 
rights, but failed to accommodate white households without housing, as these laws 
did not address access to housing. From the discussion it is also clear that as a 
result of the government‟s apartheid policy the legislature was not aimed at ensuring 
any tenure security for the non-white majority. 
 
2.4 Phasing out statutory tenancy (1980-1990) 
 
Application of the 1976 Act was restricted explicitly when the government started to 
phase out rent control. The Fouche Commission was appointed by the government 
in 1976 to investigate and report on the need to sustain rent control. The 
Commission recommended that rent control be phased out over a period of time.326 
These recommendations were made in 1978, a period known for its economic 
depression, which led to thousands of apartments being unoccupied. The 
Commission specifically evaluated the position from 1974-1978 and based their 
recommendations on that period. It also seemed as though the South African 
Property Owners Association had an impact on the Commission‟s recommendations 
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because of the pressure they placed on the Commission to phase out rent control.327 
“Vigorous campaigns by landlord‟s representatives who had considerable support in 
the apartheid parliament”328 led to the phasing out of numerous dwellings from rent 
control between 1978 and 1980.  
The government approved the Commission‟s recommendations and by 
means of Proclamation 83 of 1978329 started to phase out rent control over 
residential property. According to this Proclamation, the Rent Control Act applied to 
residential property, occupied or used for the first time after 20 October 1949 and 
before 1 January 1960, provided that the property had to fall within an area for which 
a rent board had been constituted. Apart from that, residential property occupied for 
the first time after 31 December 1959 and before 1 June 1966, situated in an area for 
which a rent board had been constituted and which were occupied on the date of 
issue of the Proclamation by a tenant, fell within the ambit of the Act. Tenants who 
occupied the mentioned premises could only enjoy tenure protection in terms of the 
Act if they fell within the income category as determined in section 19(1)(a) of the 
Housing Act.330 The tenant had to remain in occupation of the leased premises on 
the date of issue of the Proclamation. 
Proclamation 87 of 1979331 amended the situation to the extent that only 
residential property occupied or used for the first time after 20 October 1949 and 
before 1 January 1955 would fall under the ambit of the Act. Tenants who occupied 
residential property for the first time after 31 December 1954 and before 1 June 1966 
could also fall under the ambit of the Act although they had to comply with the 
income requirement and continue to occupy the premises on the date of issue. 
Proclamation 91 of 1980332 withdrew Proclamation 87 of 1979 and restricted 
the number of tenants protected under the Act quite considerably. It stated that the 
Rent Control Act would afford protection to tenants who occupied residential property 
for the first time after 20 October 1949 and before 1 June 1966, situated in an area 
for which a rent board had been constituted. The property had to be occupied on the 
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date of issue of the Proclamation by a tenant who fell within the income category as 
determined by the Housing Act and the tenant had to remain in the property.  
The government and the Fouche Commission tried to establish a balance 
between the interests of landowners and tenants. The government realised that the 
residential rental market, with reference to the law of supply and demand, was no 
longer “normal” and that it had a duty to intervene in order to rectify the imbalance in 
the market.333 This imbalance was evident especially when the economy 
strengthened at the end of 1980. During this period there was a shortage of housing 
instead of a surplus, as was the case at the end of the 1970s.334 Paradoxically, 
Proclamation 32 of 1983335 withdrew Proclamation 91 of 1980 and stated that the 
Rent Control Act would apply to residential property occupied for the first time after 
20 October 1949 and before 1 June 1966, situated in an area for which a rent board 
had been established. The Proclamation also required that the dwelling had to be 
occupied on 23 May 1980. Such a tenant‟s income couldn‟t exceed the amount of 
R300 per month in the case of a tenant who was a single person and R540 per 
month in the case of a tenant with dependants.336  
The elderly were given additional protection when the Proclamation included 
that tenants who were 70 years or older (on the date mentioned in the Proclamation) 
would be protected under the Rent Control Act regardless of their income, as long as 
they otherwise complied with the provisions of the Proclamation. The Proclamation 
explicitly emphasized that the provisions of the Act would be amended by the 
Proclamation “in so far as it [applied] in any area declared by or under any general 
law as an area for the use of the White population group.” Proclamation 51 of 
1991337 substituted the date of 1 February 1987 with that of 1 June 1991 and 
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increased the amounts to R1200 per month in the case of a tenant without 
dependants and R2000 per month in the case of a tenant with dependants. 
The impact of the phasing out of statutory tenancy was seen in numerous 
pleas addressed to the government, signed by thousands of South Africans who 
urged the government to re-impose the provisions of the Rent Control Act on their 
premises. Tenants were given notice to vacate premises shortly after their building or 
apartment was phased out of rent control, leaving them in fear of eviction with hardly 
any tenure security.338 A large number of tenants lost rent control protection as well 
as tenure security within merely three years.339 It was contended that the effect of 
rent control was to restrain rental housing development, but the phasing out of rent 
control did not result in any improvement in the private sector rental market.340 
The proclamations systematically phased out the old Rents Acts and 
eventually only properties built before October 1949 (or surviving tenants who were 
either over 70 years of age or with incomes under R1500 a month) were still subject 
to rent control.341 Rent control and statutory tenancy was phased out because “there 
was an adequate supply of housing for Whites in most metropolitan areas”.342 By 
1990 rent control was phased out in all white residential areas.343 The Rent Control 
Act was still applicable during this period, but the Act became irrelevant due to the 
effect of the proclamations.  
It is important to note that important apartheid legislation was also abolished 
during this period. The Black Local Authorities Act 102 of 1982 empowered the 
Minister and the local authority to make by-laws. Section 23(1)(l) provided that the 
local authority could make by-laws with regard to the allocation and administration of 
the letting of dwellings under the control of the local authority.344 The Native (Urban 
Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945 was replaced by the Black Communities 
Development Act 4 of 1984. The Black Communities Development Act, as amended 
by the Black Communities Development Amendment Act 74 of 1986, was the first 
legislation to make provision for the registration of leasehold and the acquisition of 
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ownership.345 The Act obliged the local authority to award certain sites to competent 
persons in order for them to occupy urban residential land as owners or registered 
leaseholders.346 The Regulations Concerning the Administration and Control of Land 
in Urban Areas of 14 June 1968347 was repealed by the Conversion of Certain Rights 
into Leasehold or Ownership Act 81 of 1988,348  although the regulations remained in 
operation for some period after the enactment of the Conversion Act because the 
permits could only be upgraded to leasehold after the provincial secretary had 
investigated the dwelling.349  
Rent control and substantive tenure protection was phased out, because the 
housing demand had changed from excessive to moderate. During the economic 
depression apartments were vacated and left empty. The need for extensive rent 
control and security of tenure lessened, although through the creation of 
proclamations the focus shifted from providing rent control and tenure security for the 
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majority of white tenants to the poor and elderly. During the final stages of these 
interventions the government‟s focus was therefore to protect the white marginalised, 
although the government‟s apartheid policy also transformed as the discriminatory 
laws were abolished and non-white households were beginning to occupy land with 
secure forms of tenure. 
 
2.5 Position after 1990 
 
Rent control, and statutory tenancy, served as an example of direct state control, or 
restrictions on ownership, when certain conditions compelled the government to 
suspend the normal operation of market forces.350 Taking this into account one can 
conclude that these restrictions on ownership were generally perceived as 
exceptions to the view, still popular during this period, that ownership was absolute 
and unrestricted in principle.351 However, Van der Walt argues that some limitations, 
especially social legislation with regard to land, had become so extensive that they 
could no longer be seen as mere exceptions. The concept of ownership could also 
no longer be described as inherently unrestricted and a new formulation or 
redefinition of ownership was in fact taking place.352  
The government‟s mandate and the variety of proclamations between 1920 
and 1980 resulted in the phasing out of rent control and statutory tenancy because of 
the changes that were taking place in the economy at the end of the 1970s. State 
intervention was no longer considered necessary and owners could enjoy the entire 
range of entitlements they associated with ownership.353 Once rent control was 
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phased out, the strong common law position of the landlord resurfaced, as appears 
from the strengthened rights of landowners and the weakened rights of tenants.  
During this period important apartheid legislation was also abolished. Black and 
coloured persons‟ freedom of movement was no longer suppressed through influx 
control and they could therefore freely occupy land and dwellings in the urban areas. 
The common law that resurfaced during this period was therefore not specifically 
race-related and applied to all tenants. In the case where a black or coloured person 
leased a dwelling, the terms of the tenancy, including the rent and extent of tenure 
security, would be subject to the common law. 
In terms of the common law the landowner could again, at any point in time, 
initiate ejectment proceedings in terms of the rei vindicatio; merely alleging that he is 
the owner and that the defendant is in occupation of his property. The onus would 
then be on the tenant to allege and prove a right to continue occupation. In the event 
of a dispute, the tenant had to prove the disputed term in order to oppose the 
landlord‟s claim for ejectment.354 
A fixed-term tenancy (also known as “a lease for a definite period”) terminated 
upon the expiration of the agreed period, while a periodic lease terminated where 
either party served notice to terminate the lease to the other party.355 According to 
Kerr, a lease that ended by effluxion of time could only truly terminate if neither party 
was in default and if all the obligations in terms of the contract were complete. In that 
case, the lease automatically terminated through effluxion of time.356 The tenant‟s 
right to use and enjoy the premises automatically ceased upon expiration of the 
lease (whether it was through effluxion of time or by notice), obliging him to 
immediately restore the property to the landlord.357 If the tenant failed to return the 
property he would be guilty of holding over, which meant that he committed not only 
breach of contract but a delict. By means of legal process, the landlord could obtain 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
pointed out the difficulty with regard to defining the concept ownership although he found that one of 
the distinct entitlements an owner possessed was the “right of exclusive possession of the res”. 
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an ejectment order along with a claim for damages ex contractu.358 The amount of 
damages would represent the difference between the current position of the landlord 
and the position had there been no breach.359 
During this period common law tenure security for tenants was primarily 
provided for in terms of the huur gaat voor koop rule. The point of departure was that 
the lease in itself couldn‟t constitute a real right for a tenant, who held a personal 
right, which meant that the lease was unenforceable against third parties. The tenure 
rights of the tenant depended on the type of successor, the period of the lease and 
whether the tenant had a real or personal right. The right of the tenant would also 
influence the impact of the doctrine of notice. Where the doctrine of notice was 
relevant Kessoopersadh v Essop360 and Total South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Xypteras361 
were applied with regard to the time when the purchaser became aware of the 
lease.362 In Genna-Wae Properties (Pty) Ltd v Medio-Tronics (Natal) (Pty) Ltd363 
Corbett CJ decided the issue whether the lessee was at liberty to decide whether he 
wanted to continue with the lease upon alienation of the property. Corbett found that 
if the new owner recognised the rights of the lessee, the lessee was prohibited from 
merely cancelling the lease.364 The common law granted tenure security for tenants 
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(and tenants‟ families) upon death of either party as the lease vested in the estate of 
the deceased party. Insolvency of the landlord could not bring the lease to an end 
either. Where a prior real right, such as a mortgage, vested in the property the 
amount of the bid could affect the occupation rights of tenants.365 Apart from the 
common law tenure protection, the only protection afforded to tenants against 
landlords before 1994 was that the landlord couldn‟t evict the tenant without recourse 
to legal process.366 The extent of tenure protection for tenants in terms of the 
common law was (and currently still is) limited to these three incidents, namely 
where the landlord alienated the property during the lease, where the landlord dies 
during the term of the lease or where the landlord became insolvent. The common 
law is therefore aimed at giving effect to the lease to the extent that it agreed to 
between the original parties, even if this requires substituting one of the parties. The 
common law is not aimed at providing substantive tenure rights for tenants and one 
can conclude that the common law rights of urban residential tenants is currently 
insubstantial and weak. The personal circumstances of the tenant and the effect that 
eviction will have on her and her family play no role in the granting of the eviction 
order, since the common law does not grant the courts any discretion in deciding 
whether to allow eviction once the landowner has proved the formal requirements for 
an eviction order.  
The tenure rights of tenants are currently influenced by the Constitution367 and 
more specifically the Bill of Rights. Tenure reform was introduced by section 25(6) 
(read with section 25(9)) to secure rights on land where these rights were previously 
insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws.368 Section 26 of the 
Constitution corroborates this obligation as section 26(1) (read together with section 
26(2)) mandates government to increase access to adequate housing. Section 26(3) 
provides that no person may be evicted from their home without an order of court, 
made after considering all the relevant circumstances and no legislation may permit 
arbitrary evictions. The impact, and potential impact, of these constitutional 
provisions on the tenure rights of tenants are discussed at length in Chapter 3, 
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although it is important to note at this stage that urban residential tenants‟ tenure 
rights are currently defined in terms of the common law as discussed in the 
preceding paragraphs. The uncertainty with regard to this issue and the reasons 
provided for in land reform literature is discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
The initial Rents Acts were introduced by the legislature as a result of housing 
shortages experienced by the white minority population group of South Africa and 
the aim of the statutes was to protect these tenants against exploitation by private 
landlords. The public interest required interference with the law of supply and 
demand and the initial legislation focused on the provision of substantive tenure 
rights. In order to provide tenants with secure occupation rights the landlord-tenant 
statutes drastically interfered with the common law rights of landowners. In terms of 
the common law the landlord could easily evict the tenant upon expiration of the 
lease if he acquired an order of court. The common law protected the tenant‟s 
occupation rights in the event of sale, insolvency of the landlord or death. The effect 
of the Rents Acts was to suspend expiration of the lease to such an extent that the 
landlord had to prove certain grounds in order to terminate the lease and evict the 
tenant, while placing restrictions on rent increases. 
The legislation afforded the tenant continued occupation rights upon 
termination of the lease, even though none of the acts focused on the needs or 
personal circumstances of tenants. The hardship suffered by the lessee was a factor 
the courts deliberately ignored. However, eventually by means of certain 
proclamations, the income category of the tenant and the question whether he was 
elderly became relevant factors. The legislature‟s focus thus shifted from general 
tenure protection for the majority of (predominantly) white tenants towards tenure 
security for the white marginalised. The nature of the protection therefore changed 
towards a welfare-based form of protection to the extent that the laws ensured 
substantive tenure protection where the tenant was poor or elderly. The impact of the 
Rents Acts on the common law rights of private landowners was therefore initially 
justified by the general housing shortage that affected the majority of the white 
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minority group, because tenants were protected from private landlords who exploited 
the housing shortage. Through the statutory landlord-tenant measures the legislature 
could provide households with security of tenure in private rental housing during 
periods of housing shortages even though the government did not directly provide 
the housing. 
Throughout the century, the Rents Acts did not apply to black tenants 
because the occupation rights of black individuals were strictly regulated in terms of 
the racially discriminatory apartheid statutes. Black persons who wished to reside in 
the urban areas could only do so as public sector tenants, associated with limited 
security of tenure. These tenancies were strictly regulated and permitted black 
occupiers in the metropolitan areas on a temporary basis. The legislation that 
regulated black urban tenancies did not provide any form of tenure security or rent 
control, because the apartheid government had to reserve the opportunity to evict 
any black occupier at will. If black occupiers‟ tenure security was similar to that of the 
white minority group, as regulated under the Rents Acts, the government would not 
have been able to orchestrate racial segregation successfully. The initial position of 
coloured persons was different from that of black persons, because these 
households could choose to reside in the black locations, coloured areas or in 
dwellings that were regulated in terms of the Rents Acts. The area in which these 
persons chose to live determined the relevant legislation and therefore also their 
occupation rights. In due course, coloured persons could no longer choose the area 
in which they wanted to reside, nor the form of tenure. In some cases coloured 
persons became landowners, although the legislation restricted the registration of 
these rights. The occupation rights of black and coloured tenants formed part of the 
apartheid government‟s racial segregation policy throughout the twentieth century 
and did therefore not reflect any correlation with the changes in the socio-economic 
circumstances, because apartheid land laws were politically inspired and served a 
political purpose. 
At the end of the twentieth century the Rents Acts were abolished and the 
common law position with regard to the termination of tenancies resurfaced. The 
rights of tenants no longer depended on the area in which they resided or the 
population group to which they belonged. In terms of the common law the landlord 
could evict the tenant upon termination of the lease if he obtained an eviction order. 
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When the lease terminated, the landlord was entitled to evict the tenant and claim 
damages for holding over. The tenant‟s aspiration of continued occupation rights 
ceased to exist and the landlord could no longer be forced to adhere to the lease that 
had expired. Tenure security was merely provided for in three forms; huur gaat voor 
koop, upon death of either party or where the landlord became insolvent. The Rent 
Control Act was still applicable, although its operation became futile due to the 
enactment of the various proclamations. The weak (common law) tenure rights of 
urban residential tenants therefore resurfaced after the legislature abolished the 
Rents Acts. The common law again provided landlords with strong rights to reclaim 
their property upon expiration of the lease and at the end of the twentieth century the 
common law applied to all racial groups. It could be argued that the resurfacing of 
the common law in the private rental sector was suitable for the white minority, 
because the previous severe housing shortages no longer existed and the market 
was functioning efficiently for this minority group. This assumption is speculative, 
although one could conclude that the resurfacing of the common law must have had 
a detrimental impact on the majority of non-white households who were (and 
currently is) in need of secure rental housing, especially in urban areas.369 The 
common law does not provide substantive tenure protection for tenants as it merely 
ensures that the term of the contract (and the terms of the contract) is given effect to. 
The common law does not provide continued occupation rights for tenants upon 
expiration of the lease, because it enables the landlord to evict the tenant as soon as 
the lease terminates. 
The underlying purpose of the anti-eviction measures introduced after 1994 
was very different from the Rents Acts that regulated white private sector tenancies 
during the twentieth century. Black (and to some extent coloured) land interests were 
weak as a result of the pre-1994 apartheid land laws, which denied these occupiers 
legal recognition of their rights in land. The post-1994 land reform process requires a 
redefinition of the occupation rights of these occupiers, together with a process to 
strengthen these rights and provide substantive tenure security.370 The necessary 
level of tenure security should therefore be ensured for all tenants within this 
transformative constitutional context, especially since a large percentage of the 
population was previously denied any tenure security. The current housing shortage 
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 See section 3.5 in Chapter 3 for more detail in this regard. 
370
 Van der Walt AJ Property in the Margins (2009) 117-118. 
97 
 
experienced by a large number of marginalised households is to some extent a relic 
of apartheid landlord-tenant law. The question is whether a new landlord-tenant 
framework could be developed to rectify the imbalances that stemmed from racially 
discriminatory laws. One should also consider the role of the newly elected 
government in the provision of housing and the various forms of tenure that are 
available. Against this background it is clear that substantive tenure rights for 
especially non-white households is required in the landlord-tenant sphere, because 
these individuals were denied any form of tenure security during the apartheid era. 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
In the late 1980s the pre-1994 government was pressurised to introduce political and 
social transformation, which included land reform. The post-apartheid political era 
commenced in 1994 when the newly elected ANC government came into power. The 
entire political, social, economic and legal field was re-evaluated and restructured in 
order to rectify the imbalances of apartheid. This transformative goal is evident from 
the 1993 and the 1996 Constitution, drafted by the Constitutional Assembly, 
especially with regard to the new values introduced in land law. The new government 
was adamant in its undertaking to rectify and transform these apartheid-type laws, 
which included legislation and the common law, because of the impact it had on the 
socio-economic rights of black1 South Africans. The previous racially discriminatory 
apartheid land laws assisted the government in its aim to accomplish racial 
segregation, which was the cornerstone of apartheid. These laws were uniquely 
drafted with the aim to deprive black individuals of secure occupation rights. The lack 
of tenure security afforded to black users of land enabled the apartheid government, 
and white landowners, to effortlessly evict black occupiers of land in South Africa. A 
significant number of these occupiers were tenants of urban residential housing.  
Part of the 1996 Constitution‟s goal is to promote and enforce socio-economic 
rights such as access to housing. Sections 26(1) and 26(2) of the Constitution states 
that everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing and that the state 
must take measures to achieve the realisation of this right The legislature has 
enacted laws to provide access to adequate housing in terms of the housing 
provision. The state‟s obligation and the laws enacted to give effect to this right is 
discussed and analysed in 3.4. An important consideration in the landlord-tenant 
framework is the success of the laws enacted to give effect to the housing provision 
and whether these laws afford adequate housing. 
Another part of the Constitution‟s focus is on providing better land and 
housing rights for black occupiers, which includes better tenure security. However, 
the new constitutional values and policies in the area of land law apply to all 
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landowners and occupiers, except where the Constitution and legislation specify that 
particular occupiers should be privileged by reconstruction or affirmative action. An 
occupier cannot be evicted without a court order made after considering all the 
relevant circumstances.2 The general constitutional property provisions are 
discussed in 3.2. Better tenure security for various occupiers, including black 
occupiers, has been granted through the enactment of various statutes that strive to 
give effect to the transformative purpose of the Constitution. Some of these statutes 
are applicable to rental housing, but the level of tenure security is problematic. The 
Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 is the principal Act that regulates rental housing in 
urban areas and is discussed in 3.6. The Act grants some procedural protection for 
tenants, although it fails to afford substantive occupation rights for urban residential 
tenants. The legislature has introduced security of tenure for occupiers in rural areas 
in terms of section 25(6) of the Constitution, while the tenure rights of urban 
occupiers is based largely on the common law. Section 25(6) and the legislation 
promulgated under this section are discussed in 3.3.  
The focus of the Rental Housing Act and other anti-eviction legislation 
applicable in urban areas has been on ensuring due process in the event of eviction 
proceedings instead of transforming the substantive rights of weak occupiers. 
Section 26(3) of the Constitution, discussed in 3.7, is an important procedural 
safeguard for all persons facing eviction as it states that no person may be evicted 
from his home without an order of court made after considering all the relevant 
circumstances. However, it can also be interpreted by the court to provide 
substantive protection to occupiers. From the case law discussion in 3.8 it follows 
that the courts are reluctant to directly give effect to this provision as the level of 
tenure security enjoyed by unlawful residential occupiers (including tenants) are 
limited. However, in recent case law the courts granted substantive tenure rights for 
tenants holding over, but the basis for the courts‟ decision was Prevention of Illegal 
Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE), which gives 
effect to section 26(3). The courts interpreted PIE to afford marginalised tenants 
holding over substantive tenure protection. The courts applied PIE in order to give 
effect to section 26(3). This method is in accordance with the subsidiarity approach, 
which is discussed in 3.9, although by applying this approach it becomes apparent 
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that there are certain areas in the landlord-tenant framework that fail to give effect to 
the housing provision. 
According to case law on administrative law there is only one legal system 
and the Constitution, not the common law, is the primary source of law.3 This 
approach takes into account the purpose, spirit and objects of the Constitution, which 
ensures that transformation will take place. The Constitution will therefore override 
the common law where the common law comes into conflict with the Constitution.4 
Apart from the fact that the Constitution takes precedence over any law and that 
section 26(3) of the Constitution amended the common law with regard to eviction by 
requiring that no person may be evicted without an order of court made after 
considering all the relevant circumstances, the majority of landlord-tenant evictions 
still function within the principles of the common law. The reason for this state of 
affairs is that the primary landlord-tenant legislation that was enacted to give effect to 
section 26 reinforced the common law. The effect of the primary landlord-tenant 
legislation promulgated in terms of section 26 is insubstantial, although it does grant 
some procedural protection. The question is whether these procedural amendments 
are efficient in light of the constitutional goals and whether substantive changes in 
the area of secure tenure are not necessary. 
The constitutional protection ensured for occupiers in the event of eviction is 
undermined as a result of the strong common law rights of landowners. The common 
law principles focus on the contractual and property rights of the stronger party, the 
landowner (or landlord in landlord-tenant disputes). The significance attached to the 
common law has generally not been departed from in the area of landlord-tenant law 
and still endures in the new constitutional dispensation. The tension between the 
common law, Constitution and legislation is highlighted through a case law 
discussion in 3.8, while a possible approach to understanding and applying these 
bodies of law is discussed in 3.9, namely the subsidiarity approach. 
The pre-1994 government enacted legislation as a result of housing 
shortages to ensure better tenure rights for white tenants by depriving landowners of 
                                                          
3
 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re: ex parte President of the RSA 2000 (2) SA 
674 (CC). Section 2 of the Constitution states that the “Constitution is the supreme law of the 
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their right to evict unlawful tenants and thereby providing tenants with continued 
occupation rights upon termination of their leases.5 The post-1994 government‟s 
goal is similar to the pre-1994 legislature‟s goal with regard to providing better tenure 
security for residential occupiers, although the current aim is to ensure the necessary 
level of tenure protection for all occupiers and especially black occupiers. However, 
the pre-1994 legislature afforded tenants substantive protection in the form of 
continued occupation rights, while the current legislation focuses on ensuring due 
process in the event of eviction. The current landlord-tenant framework is therefore 
inefficient because it is not providing substantive tenure rights for urban tenants. The 
post-1994 government created various forms of tenure for the rural poor to occupy 
land with enhanced tenure security, but failed to afford similar secure occupation 
rights in the urban areas. There is a need to create a secure form of tenure for the 
urban poor in order to adhere to the constitutional obligations.  
The courts have recently turned their focus to the socio-economic 
circumstances of tenants during eviction proceedings. However, the economic 
repercussions of weak tenure security in urban housing have not been sufficiently 
appreciated by the government. The effect of insecure tenure rights, especially for 
urban residential tenants, is explored in 3.5.  
 
3.2 Constitutional dispensation 
3.2.1 Introduction: Historical background 
 
Prior to 1993 much of the debate about constitutional property was whether the Bill 
of Rights should contain a property clause.6 During this period some also feared that 
including a property clause would frustrate land reform.7 In these early debates 
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 See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of the pre-1994 Rents Acts. 
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 Van der Walt AJ “Towards the Development of Post-apartheid Land Law: An Exploratory Survey” 
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about the 1993 and 1996 constitutions the legality of land reform was also a matter 
of discussion, although land reform was always seen as part of the transformation 
process because of the injustices of apartheid with regard to land distribution and 
insecure tenure rights8 of black occupiers.9 During the late 1980s pressure for 
political and social transformation forced the pre-1994 government to introduce land 
reform measures. The White Paper on Land Reform, introduced in March 1991,10 
upgraded tenure rights of certain black occupiers while it also provided for restitution 
of land and made provision for the establishment of new townships for black 
individuals in need of land.11  
The initial land reforms focused on three areas, namely restitution of land; 
improved tenure security; and redistribution.12 In terms of the restitution process 
individuals who were dispossessed of land as a result of apartheid laws and 
practices could apply for the restitution of land and reclaim their land, be given other 
land or receive compensation. Better tenure security was provided for individuals 
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of South Africa White Paper on Land Reform (1991) 18-24. According to Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM 
& Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 588, the Abolition of Racially 
Based Land Measures Act 108 of 1991 repealed most racially discriminatory statutes. Shortly 
thereafter the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act 112 of 1991 was introduced to make it possible to 
upgrade certain rights to ownership. The Act could be described as the first step towards better 
protection of tenure rights. 
12
 The mere abolition of racially discriminatory laws was insufficient to address the inequalities created 
by apartheid. The land reform programme was thus described as the “next logical step”, although it 
could only be made successful by the post-apartheid government: Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & 
Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 590. 
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whose land rights were weakened by apartheid land laws and practices, while 
redistribution entailed that certain measures were introduced to increase access to 
land and housing for individuals deprived of it during apartheid.13 The division 
between these three areas is still reflected in the new government‟s land reform 
programme, as stated in the White Paper on South African Land Policy 1997.14 The 
aim of the new government‟s land reform programme could be better understood by 
referring to the ANC‟s Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).15 The 
RDP, read with the White Paper on Reconstruction and Development 1994,16 strives 
to address access to urban infrastructure and access to land and housing that 
resulted from apartheid. Land reform was one of the key areas of concern which 
urgently had to be addressed.17 According to the RDP, tenure reform is aimed at 
providing security of tenure for all citizens, regardless of their current system of land-
holding.18 Apart from the post-1994 government‟s policy framework, the local 
administration was obliged to redress the consequences of apartheid in urban and 
rural areas.19 The RDP distinguished between the three areas, as introduced by the 
pre-1994 government, and confirmed the three elements of land reform.      
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 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 285-287. 
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 Republic of South Africa, Department of Land Affairs White Paper on South African Land Policy 
(1997) 9 specifically states that the land reform programme consists of three elements. The White 
Paper defines the purpose of land tenure reform as to “improve the tenure security of all South 
Africans and to accommodate diverse forms of land tenure, including types of communal tenure.” This 
definition of land tenure reform is much wider than section 25(6) of the Constitution 1996 because the 
White Paper does not limit the scope of occupiers included under tenure reform by adding the 
requirement that their land tenure should be legally insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory 
laws. Republic of South Africa, Department of Land Affairs White Paper on South African Land Policy 
(1997) 64 provides examples of tenure reforms, such as securing lease agreements, protection 
against eviction and the award of independent land rights.  
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 African National Congress The Reconstruction and Development Programme: A Policy Framework 
(1994).  
16
 Republic of South Africa White Paper on Reconstruction and Development (1994). 
17
 Van der Walt AJ The Constitutional Property Clause: A Comparative Analysis of Section 25 of the 
South African Constitution of 1996 (1997) 152.  
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 African National Congress The Reconstruction and Development Programme: A Policy Framework 
(1994) 2.4.4 Land Reform. 
19
 Donaldson R & Marais L “Preface: Transforming Rural and Urban Spaces” in Donaldson R & 
Marais L (eds) Transforming Rural and Urban Spaces in South Africa during the 1990s – Reform, 
Restitution, Restructuring (2002) 1-10 at 1. 
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3.2.2 The property clause 
 
Section 25 of the 1996 Constitution, known as the property clause, provides for the 
protection of existing property rights together with provision for land reform.20 
Sections 25(1)-(3) legalizes the state power with regard to regulation (deprivation) 
and expropriation of property, while sections 25(4)-(9) regulates land reform and 
mandates the government to promote land reform in various forms.21 These forms of 
land reform are similar to the areas defined in the above-mentioned white papers. 
Section 25(5) makes provision for better access to land;22 section 25(6) for improved 
tenure security in conjunction with section 25(9), which mandates the government to 
enact legislation to give effect to section 25(6); and section 25(7) ensures 
restitution.23 The most difficult feature of the property clause is the relationship 
between sections 25(1)-(3), which protects existing property rights, and sections 
25(5)-(9), which reflects the obligation towards land reform and gives effect to the 
public interest. Part of the public interest is to improve the current maldistribution of 
land. Section 25 generally requires an equitable balance between the public interest 
                                                          
20
 The 1993 Constitution differed from its successor to the extent that the provision that protected 
existing property rights was separate from the land reform provision. The land reform provision was 
not included in the Bill of Rights, while the provision protecting property rights was. This created an 
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 In order to acquire the best result from the programme, association between the programmes are 
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provides for the establishment of a Commission on Restitution of Land Rights to investigate claims 
lodged by previously deprived parties. The Act also instituted the land claims court for the adjudication 
of such claims: Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of 
Property (5
th
 ed 2006) 629-651. See also Carey Miller DL (with Pope A) Land Title in South Africa 
(2000) 313-397; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 289-307. 
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and the interests of existing property holders.24 Van der Walt proposes that such 
balancing should be achieved by protecting the established rights of landowners with 
regard to the “public interest in control over the use of the property and the 
distribution and exploitation of property.”25 Such balancing is of great importance in 
the context of tenure reform26 that involves anti-eviction measures, which limit the 
normal entitlements of landowners.27 Sections 26(1) and 26(2) of the 1996 
Constitution forms part of the socio-economic rights and is aimed at reinforcing the 
right of access to housing. A certain tension will evolve between existing property 
rights and the realisation of this socio-economic right.28 Section 26(3) forms part of 
the anti-eviction measures and at least ensure due process in eviction proceedings, 
although the courts can interpret section 26(3) to provide substantive tenure 
protection for occupiers facing eviction. 
 
3.2.3 The common law 
 
Sections 25(9) and 26(2) of the Constitution mandate the government to enact 
legislation that would give effect to tenure reform and the progressive realisation of 
the right of more equitable access to adequate housing. The transformative nature of 
land-based reform statutes can be seen in light of the impact they have on the 
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 The tension between the rights of landowners and tenants is briefly referred to in 3.8 of this chapter 
and further analysed in Chapter 8. Balancing the landowner and tenant‟s interests is similar in 
German landlord-tenant law, which is discussed in section 7.4.2 in Chapter 7. 
25
 Van der Walt AJ The Constitutional Property Clause: A Comparative Analysis of Section 25 of the 
South African Constitution of 1996 (1997) 163. 
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 Van der Walt AJ The Constitutional Property Clause: A Comparative Analysis of Section 25 of the 
South African Constitution of 1996 (1997) 161. 
28
 Pienaar JM & Muller A “The Impact of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 on Homelessness and Unlawful Occupation within the Present 
Statutory Framework” (1999) 10 Stell LR 370-396 at 375. 
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common law rights of landowners. The strong common law right of landowners to 
evict occupiers is rooted in the “normality” assumption29 that landowners are entitled 
to the exclusive possession of their property. This would seem to be the “normal 
state of affairs” and any contrary position is regarded as exceptional.30 The 
“normality” assumption therefore presupposes that landowners should normally be in 
possession of their property although, if an occupier can raise and prove a right to 
occupy the premises, the right of the landowner is restricted temporarily. This was 
also the position in Roman-Dutch law and still forms part of the South African private 
law. The strong common law right of landowners to use the rei vindicatio to evict 
occupiers was confirmed in Chetty v Naidoo.31 One of the issues the Court 
considered was the onus of proof where the landowner wanted to evict an occupier. 
Jansen JA found that one of the incidents of ownership is the right to exclusive 
possession, which meant that the owner could reclaim his property from any person 
at any time. The Court confirmed that the property should “normally” be with the 
owner.32 When the owner wants to reclaim his property, he can institute the rei 
vindicatio by merely proving ownership and that the defendant is in possession of his 
property. The onus would be on the defendant to prove a right of occupation.33 If the 
occupier succeeds or if the landowner admits that the occupier has or had a right of 
occupation, the landowner has to prove that the occupier‟s right to possession has 
terminated. This would for instance be the case where a lease expired and the 
tenant is holding over. The strong right of the landowner is evident, although the 
landowner is not allowed to evict the tenant without recourse to legal process.34 In 
terms of the common law, the personal circumstances of the tenant and the effect 
that eviction will have on her and her family play no role in the granting of the 
eviction order, since the common law does not grant the courts any discretion in 
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 Coombe RJ “„Same as it ever was‟: Rethinking the Politics of Legal Interpretation” (1989) 34 McGill 
LJ 603-652. 
30
 Van der Walt AJ “Exclusivity of Ownership, Security of Tenure, and Eviction Orders: A Model to 
Evaluate South African Land-Reform Legislation” 2002 TSAR 254-289 at 257-258. 
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 1974 (3) 13 (A). 
32
 One can clearly see a connection with legislation discussed in Chapter 2 where the courts were 
hesitant to restrict the rights of landowners in the event of eviction proceedings, even though the 
legislation specifically limited these rights. 
33
 Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) 13 (A) 20A. 
34
 Van der Walt AJ “Exclusivity of Ownership, Security of Tenure, and Eviction Orders: A Model to 
Evaluate South African Land-Reform Legislation” 2002 TSAR 254-289 at 257.  
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deciding whether to allow eviction once the landowner has proved the formal 
requirements for an eviction order.35 
The strong common law right of landowners, rooted in Roman-Dutch law, 
assisted the apartheid government to enforce their objective of race-based 
segregation of land. The state power of eviction was also used to realise this political 
objective.36 The landowner‟s right of vindication, being the most prominent common 
law right that assisted landowners and the government to evict unlawful occupiers, 
has been restricted as a result of the post-1994 statutory development and 
strengthening of weaker rights. This transformation was achieved as a result of a 
reconsideration of the preconceived idea that the strong right of landowners to 
vindicate their property should not be challenged. The revised method “seeks to 
determine the balance in accordance with policy reflecting the relevant priorities of 
the Constitution.”37 The fact that ownership is no longer perceived as an absolute 
right is evident from the current restrictions on an owner‟s right to vindicate his 
property, although one should keep in mind that the new system of property is still 
“working within the basic principles of the common law.”38  
 
3.2.4 Conclusion 
 
Despite the superiority of the Constitution, the new land law has to function and 
develop within the framework of the common law. This does not mean that the 
                                                          
35
 Liebenberg S Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 
343. 
36
 See further Van der Walt AJ “Exclusivity of Ownership, Security of Tenure, and Eviction Orders: A 
Model to Evaluate South African Land-Reform Legislation” 2002 TSAR 254-289 at 259-263 for a 
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 Carey Miller DL & Pope A “South African Land Reform” (2000) 44 JAL 167-194 at 191-192. 
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common law is superior law, but rather that one should take the common law into 
consideration when developing land law. In some instances common law principles 
can assist constitutional objectives, while in other cases these principles might 
require trivial amendments in order to give effect to constitutional obligations.39 
However, in the area of land law, and especially the right to housing, one has to be 
careful in developing the common law, because the pre-1994 apartheid government 
used the common law principles with regard to land to accomplish racial segregation. 
The common law was infused with apartheid objectives and therefore to a certain 
extent reflects the legacy of apartheid. 
There is therefore a tension between the constitutionally guaranteed property 
rights of landowners, the land reform objectives and the right of access to housing, 
just as there is a tension between the common law rights of landowners and the 
transformative constitutional objectives in the land reform programme. It is 
imperative to take into account the strong common law rights of landowners in 
relation to the development of the land reform objectives, because the continued 
strength of the common law is an important measure in determining the efficiency of 
the land reform statutes. Land reform, and specifically tenure reform, can only 
succeed through the accurate enactment and consistent enforcement of 
transformative legislation.40 In some instances the common law rights of landowners 
would have to be overruled or restricted by the legislation in order to give effect to 
the constitutional objectives. However, this will not always be the case, as in some 
instances the common law can continue to co-exist with land reform statutes.  
 
3.3 Section 25(6) 
 
One of the aims of this chapter is to determine the efficiency of tenure reform, 
specifically with reference to section 25(6), which states that any person whose 
tenure is legally insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws is entitled to 
tenure which is legally secure. Section 25(9) must be read with section 25(6); it 
states that parliament must enact legislation in order to give effect to the 
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 See the discussion in section 3.9 below. 
40
 See justification for new legislation in section 3.9 below and Chapter 8 for more detail regarding the 
proposed legislation. 
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constitutional commitment in section 25(6). This section‟s application could seem 
quite restricted due to the fact that only insecure tenure of land, which is insecure 
because of past discriminatory laws, falls to be reformed under this section. 
However, this section applies to the majority of black persons who currently occupy 
land with insecure tenure, because it has been accepted41 that these households‟ 
insecure tenure is either a direct or indirect consequence of apartheid land laws. It is 
irrelevant whether their insecure tenure is a direct or indirect consequence of 
apartheid laws.  
One could argue that tenure rights (of specifically white occupiers) that are 
currently insecure as a result of inadequate protection, provided for by either 
legislation or the common law, but not related to past discriminatory laws or 
practices, will not necessarily justify protection under section 25(6). Tenure reform 
rather plays an important transformative role for black occupiers who occupy land 
with insecure tenure. Tenure reform aims to rectify and abolish some of the effects of 
apartheid as it strengthens existing tenure forms weakened by apartheid land law 
and introduces new forms of tenure that revise the common law. However, tenure 
reform is also central in all eviction cases, because anti-eviction measures 
strengthen tenure rights.  
The tenure reform process therefore consists of two strategies, namely the 
transformation of weak tenure forms by implementing individual structural reforms; 
and general anti-eviction provisions that prevent forced removals, which are 
associated with apartheid.42 The first-mentioned strategy is provided for in section 
25(6). Section 25(6) is aimed at adapting and amending existing weak forms of 
tenure and introducing new forms of tenure to replace weak tenure that cannot be 
reinforced. In both instances the focus is on providing better, secure tenure rights for 
previously disadvantaged black occupiers. The emphasis is on the development of 
continued occupation rights for these individuals who previously occupied land with 
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 Alexander GS The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 291; Budlender G “The Constitutional Protection of Property Rights” in 
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 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 309-310.  The Republic of South Africa, 
Department of Land Affairs White Paper on South African Land Policy (1997) 64 affirms this 
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insecure tenure.43 The aim is to ensure that black occupiers occupy land with 
substantive tenure rights. Tenure reform in terms of section 25(6) could be defined 
as a race-related form of tenure protection. The lack of secure tenure made evictions 
possible or easier for the government, and for white property owners, during the 
apartheid era.  
Tenure reform is aimed at strengthening weak tenure rights and abolishing 
apartheid-type threats of eviction. This includes the introduction of substantive tenure 
protection and strict due-process controls in eviction proceedings. However, the 
statutes introduced by the legislature to give effect to the mandate set out in section 
25(6), read with section 25(9) of the Constitution, differ quite drastically with regard 
to the level of protection afforded to different categories of occupiers. Van der Walt 
mentions that the time-frame in which the statutes were promulgated and the 
different aims of the statutes might influence the extent of tenure security they 
provide.44 
The legislation promulgated in order to give effect to the tenure reform 
programme, based on the authority of sections 25(6) and 25(9), includes the 
Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997, the Interim Protection of Informal 
Land Rights Act 31 of 1996, the Communal Property Associations Act 28 of 1996, 
the Communal Land Rights Act 11 of 2004, the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 
of 1996 and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land 
Act 19 of 1998.  
The Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA) aims to grant lawful rural 
occupiers better tenure security by protecting them from unfair eviction. The Act 
applies to lawful occupiers who have permission to occupy the property of the 
landowner.45 The purpose of the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act is to 
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protect “informal land rights”, which could be defined as a wide-ranging collection of 
legally unrecognized and therefore insecure rights and interests in land, in the same 
manner that legally recognized property rights are protected. Even though these 
rights were never registered, they receive protection as if they are property rights 
because of the low status they enjoyed during the apartheid era. The protection of 
these rights is not permanent; application of the Act was initially meant to last until 31 
December 1997, but its validity has been extended repeatedly and the Act is 
currently still in operation. The Act applies to a range of land holdings and provides 
that such occupiers may not be deprived of their land rights without their consent, 
although they may be deprived of their “right in communal land in accordance with 
the customs of the particular community”.46  
By means of the Communal Property Associations Act individuals, acting as 
part of a community, can acquire, hold and manage property within their community 
by means of a written constitution. The communities can acquire newly created 
secure tenure within a legal framework.47 The Communal Land Rights Act‟s main 
purpose was to transform “old order rights” into “new order rights”,48 but the Act was 
declared unconstitutional in Tongoane and Others v Minister of Agriculture and Land 
Affairs and Others.49  
The Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act‟s aim is to strengthen labour tenants‟ 
land rights and to increase access to agricultural land. Application of the Act is 
limited as it only applies to labour tenants. Labour tenants are different from farm 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Keightley R “The Impact of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act on an Owner‟s Right to Vindicate 
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workers because they acquire occupation rights on landowners‟ farms in exchange 
for providing labour.50  
In light of the new tenure forms introduced in the above-mentioned statutes 
one can applaud the legislature for creating and developing a transformative land 
tenure system in rural areas, because the majority of the statutes succeeded in 
amending the common law and consequently improving the security of land holding. 
However, the statutes promulgated under sections 25(6) and 25(9) of the 
Constitution mostly focus on rural tenure security.51 The tenure reform programme 
places emphasis on securing tenure in rural areas by focusing on labour tenants and 
farm workers.52 This could be the result of the approach in the White Paper on Land 
Policy, which states that one of the “key areas of concern” is the “rights in land of the 
people living in rural areas”.53 Another reason could be that the Department of 
Human Settlements54 is responsible for the urban housing programme, while the 
Department of Rural Development and Land Reform55 is responsible for the land 
reform programme and therefore also for tenure reform. Urban tenure reform has 
been neglected from policy and implementation due to its uncomfortable position 
between and within these two departments.56 In the urban sphere, tenure security is 
predominantly provided through formal housing delivery because it is seen as part of 
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the housing package.57 It has been argued that tenure security in urban areas is not 
as much of a politicized issue as it is in rural areas, although during the apartheid era 
influx control in especially urban areas was made possible through weak occupation 
rights of black persons. The laws that regulate security of tenure in urban areas have 
always been tied to influx control and segregation because it forms part of planning 
laws for land development.58 These laws favour individual ownership.59  
Tenure security for previously disadvantaged occupiers in urban areas has 
not been addressed under the tenure reform programme. The Prevention of Illegal 
Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE) does provide 
some form of protection for unlawful occupiers in urban areas. The aim of the Act is 
not to improve the weak tenure rights of black occupiers who occupy land with 
insecure tenure as a result of previously discriminatory laws, but rather to ensure 
that evictions take place in a certain fashion. The courts can interpret PIE, during 
eviction proceedings, to grant substantive tenure protection for marginalised 
occupiers who occupy land without any rights at all (unlawfully). This form of tenure 
protection is based on the socio-economic weakness of the occupier. As defined 
earlier, tenure reform consists of two strategies, namely the transformation of weak 
tenure forms (race-based tenure protection under section 25(6)) and anti-eviction 
provisions that are based on the socio-economic weakness of the occupier (welfare-
based tenure protection under section 26(3)). PIE forms part of the anti-eviction 
measures under section 26(3) of the Constitution, while tenure reform under section 
25(6) seems to be focused mainly on rural land. 
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 Donaldson R & Marais L “Preface: Transforming Rural and Urban Spaces” in Donaldson R & 
Marais L (eds) Transforming Rural and Urban Spaces in South Africa during the 1990s – Reform, 
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 Royston L “Security of Urban Tenure in South Africa: Overview of Policy and Practice” in Durand-
Lasserve A & Royston L (eds) Holding their Ground, Secure Land Tenure for the Urban Poor in 
Developing Countries (2002) 165-181 at 173-174. 
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As yet, the legislature has not enacted legislation with the aim to provide a 
form of tenure that would secure substantive occupation rights for marginalised, 
lawful occupiers of residential property in urban areas. The absence of such a 
development, especially in light of the transformative goal of section 25(6), is 
problematic in light of the tenure rights of urban occupiers in general, and specifically 
urban residential tenants. The weak occupation rights of black urban occupiers 
during the apartheid era also emphasise the required tenure reform in urban areas, 
especially for tenants, because black households were afforded the weakest forms 
of tenure in urban areas. 
 
3.4 Sections 26(1) and 26(2) 
3.4.1 Obligation of the state 
 
Section 26 of the Constitution is known as the housing provision. Section 26(1), read 
with section 26(2), provides that everyone has the right to have access to adequate 
housing and that the state must take reasonable measures to achieve the realisation 
of this right.60 In Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v 
Grootboom and Others61 the Constitutional Court held that sections 26(1) and 26(2) 
must be read together and that section 26(1) places, at least, a negative obligation 
on the state (and all other entities and individuals) to desist from action that would 
impair the right of access to adequate housing.62 The Court also found that in terms 
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 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 356 states that the constitutional obligation to 
give effect to the right of access to adequate housing often exists within policy frameworks, legislation 
and executive action. A range of programmes and legislation, such as the Housing Act 107 of 1997 
and Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999, were introduced in order to give effect to the right to housing. See 
Van Wyk J “The Relationship (or not) between Rights of Access to Land and Housing: De-linking 
Land from its Components” (2005) 16 Stell LR 466-487 for a discussion on the relationship between 
sections 26(1) and 25(5) of the Constitution. 
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 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) para 34 per Yacoob J. 
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 In Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 
(CC) para 33 the Court rejected the contention that section 26(1) imposed a minimum core obligation 
on the state. The Court found that individuals‟ needs are too diverse to determine a minimum core 
threshold for all homeless members of society and that the court is unable to create such a threshold 
without the necessary information. See also Liebenberg S Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under 
a Transformative Constitution (2010) 163-173; Russell S “Introduction – Minimum State Obligations: 
International Dimensions” in Brand D & Russell S (eds) Exploring the Core Content of Socio-
economic Rights: South Africa and International Perspectives (2002) 11-21; De Vos P “The Essential 
Components of the Human Right to Adequate Housing – A South African Perspective” in Brand D & 
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of section 26, the government must create a public housing programme aimed at 
realising the right of access to adequate housing. The government must attempt to 
realise this right within its available means.63 In Jaftha v Schoeman and Others; Van 
Rooyen v Stoltz and Others64 the Constitutional Court confirmed its decision in 
Grootboom and held that the right of access to adequate housing (part of the socio-
economic rights) does contain a negative element, which means that “any measure 
which permits a person to be deprived of existing access to adequate housing, limits 
the rights protected in section 26(1)”.65 Shortly after the Jaftha decision, in President 
of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA 
and Others, Amici Curiae),66 the Constitutional Court postponed the eviction of 
unlawful occupiers from private land until alternative accommodation could be 
provided by the state.67 Van der Walt argues that the decision indirectly implies that 
the state has a positive obligation in certain circumstances to make available 
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Perspectives (2002) 23-33. 
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 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 
(CC) para 41 per Yacoob J. This contention was affirmed in Residents of Joe Slovo Community, 
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 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC). 
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 Jaftha v Scoeman and Others; Van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) para 34 per 
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decision. See also Liebenberg S Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative 
Constitution (2010) 215-218. 
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 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC). See Liebenberg S Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a 
Transformative Constitution (2010) 281-286 for a discussion of the case. 
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 The same logic was followed in Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga 
Avenue & Another [2010] JOL 25031 (GSJ) and The Occupiers, Shulana Court, 11 Hendon Road, 
Yeoville, Johannesburg v Steele [2010] ZASCA 28 (SCA). 
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housing to homeless individuals in terms of sections 7(2),68 26(1) and 26(2) of the 
Constitution. The state was liable to compensate the owner of the affected land in 
this case because it failed to supply the necessary housing.69 In Residents of Joe 
Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others (Centre on 
Housing rights and Evictions and Another, Amici Curiae)70 Ngcobo J stated that the 
government does have a constitutional duty to “facilitate the progressive realisation 
of the right of access to adequate housing imposed by section 26(2) of the 
Constitution”.71 At this stage one can confirm that the state does not have a positive 
duty to provide homeless persons with access to adequate housing, although the 
government is responsible for ensuring that the correct laws (generally taking the 
form of legislation), policies and incentives are developed and sufficient to give effect 
to the duty enshrined in section 26 of the Constitution.72  
A variety of tenure forms should have been created under the housing 
subsidy policy in order to provide access to adequate housing, but at the moment 
individual ownership is the main form of tenure that is delivered in terms of existing 
legislation.73 Tenure security in South African urban areas could be defined as 
“formalizing land rights through full formal private tenure.”74 The most complete form 
of such tenure is private ownership, which is why this is the main form of tenure 
delivered.75 The perception that ownership is the most important and valuable 
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 Royston L “Security of Urban Tenure in South Africa: Overview of Policy and Practice” in Durand-
Lasserve A & Royston L (eds) Holding their Ground, Secure Land Tenure for the Urban Poor in 
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property right (as a right and a question of redress) has prevented a variety of tenure 
options from being developed and delivered. This perception has its roots in the 
apartheid era when most South Africans were denied ownership. Apart from this, 
some legislation makes provision for individual and group ownership as well as lease 
in order to introduce different forms of tenure.76 
The post-1994 government promised “houses for all” and intended to build 
“one million houses” within the first five years. The rate of delivery was very slow as 
only 123 000 houses were built in the first two years. However, by December 2008, 
government had built 2.8 million houses.77 At the moment, the government‟s prime 
target is to eradicate or upgrade all informal settlements by 2014/2015 through 
housing delivery, including the development of low-cost housing, medium density 
accommodation and rental housing.78 Apart from the fact that the government does 
not have a direct positive obligation to provide access to adequate housing for all 
homeless individuals, one can be certain that the government must facilitate the 
realisation of this right through the enactment of transformative land law legislation, 
policies and development programmes.  
Part of the initial housing policy was to develop a variety of tenure forms that 
would grant secure tenure, but individual ownership has been the main form of 
tenure delivered.79 Currently government is again emphasising the need to develop 
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2009)). The Department of Housing launched the Breaking New Ground policy in September 2004, 
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 Royston L “Security of Urban Tenure in South Africa: Overview of Policy and Practice” in Durand-
Lasserve A & Royston L (eds) Holding their Ground, Secure Land Tenure for the Urban Poor in 
Developing Countries (2002) 165-181 at 176.  
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different forms of tenure, especially in the area of rental housing through the 
development of differentiated public and social housing sectors.80 There has 
therefore been a change in policy, because one could argue that government 
realised that private home ownership is not possible for all South Africans and that in 
light of the immense percentage of homelessness a new form of housing must be 
afforded to those in need of housing. The continued involvement of the state in the 
provision of housing in the form of social (or public) rental housing, especially during 
acute housing shortages, is evident from the United States of America and 
Germany.81 In the England and Wales social rental housing is a key form of housing 
for low-income households, but this form of housing is associated with strong tenure 
security.82 
 
3.4.2 Housing legislation 
 
Since 1994 the legislature has enacted a limited number of statutes in terms of its 
mandate as stated in section 26(2) of the Constitution in order to give effect to the 
right of access to adequate housing in urban areas. The Housing Act,83 Rental 
Housing Act84 and Social Housing Act85 are the most important statutes.86 
The Social Housing Act is a direct result of the government‟s social housing 
policy.87 The preamble of the Act refers to sections 26(1) and 26(2) of the 
Constitution and states that “there is a dire need for affordable rental housing for low 
to medium income households which cannot access rental housing in the open 
market”.88 Section 2(1)(i)(xv) of the Act makes provision for the creation of social 
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housing institutions,89 responsible for the provision and management of social 
housing stock,90 while section 1 defines a “lease agreement” as “a standard lease 
agreement utilised by a social housing institution”. In terms of section 3(1)(e) the 
national government must fund the social housing programme in order to promote 
the supply of social housing stock for low to medium income persons.91 One can 
applaud the Act for introducing measures that strive to promote access to rental 
housing, while increasing rental housing stock.  
At this stage one can assume that the aim of the Act is to introduce a social 
housing sector that can provide rental housing through the creation of social housing 
institutions, acting as social landlords. The aim of the Act is to make available rental 
housing for low to medium income households and not for the most vulnerable in 
society. Section 2(1)(h) states that government and social housing institutions must 
ensure secure tenure for residents in social housing stock. The extent of tenure 
security must be based on the general principles as stated in the Rental Housing Act 
50 of 1999. In section 3.6.2 below it is argued that the Rental Housing Act does not 
give adequate security of tenure for urban residential tenants and one can 
consequently infer that the Social Housing Act does not provide sufficient security of 
tenure either. 
The Rental Housing Act can also be included under the list of statutes 
promulgated to give effect to sections 26(1) and 26(2) of the Constitution, as the Act 
forms part of the government‟s aim to deliver housing for the urban poor.92 Sections 
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 Sections 13(1) and 13(5) define a social housing institution as a institution that has already 
undertaken housing developments with the benefit of an institutional subsidy; a company registered 
under the Companies Act 61 of 1973, or a co-operative registered under the Co-operatives Act 14 of 
2005, or any institution acceptable to the Regulatory Authority; or a municipality wishing to participate 
in social housing. However, section 13(3) provides that such an institution must apply to the 
Regulatory Authority in the prescribed format for accreditation. 
90
 Where there is a demand for social housing stock within a municipality‟s area, the municipality must 
take measures to facilitate the delivery of social housing within that area and encourage development 
of social housing through the conversion of existing non-residential stock and upgrading of existing 
stock: sections 5(a) and 5(b). In terms of section 5(c) the municipality is obliged to provide access to 
land and buildings for social development and to provide access for social housing institutions to 
municipal rental stock. 
91
 In terms of sections 6(1)(c) and 6(1)(d) the National Housing Finance Corporation must, subject to 
directives issued by the Minister in the Government Gazette, facilitate (or provide access to) 
guarantees for loan funding from financial institutions and explore “mechanisms aimed at facilitating 
public funding for social housing”. One of the functions of the Regulatory Authority is to provide 
financial assistance to social housing institutions through the provision of grants to service providers. 
This would develop institutional capacity: section 11(3)(a). 
92
 Republic of South Africa Housing (http://www.info.gov.za/aboutsa/housing.htm (accessed 6 August 
2009)). Thomas PJ “Rental Housing” in Joubert WA, Faris JA & Harms LTC (eds) The Law of South 
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26(1) and 26(2) are also mentioned in the preamble of the Act. The Act affords some 
tenure security for lawful tenants in rural and urban housing.93 The Act aims to 
introduce stability in the rental housing market and also to encourage investment in 
the market. Both growth and stability are intended to benefit the previously 
disadvantaged. The Act mandates the government to address apartheid-type 
patterns in residential areas while a general improvement of conditions in the rental 
market is also important.94 The Act reaffirms the common law position of the parties 
with regard to some of their rights and duties, although in some instances these 
rights and duties are changed and adapted in order to balance the rights of landlord 
and tenant.95 The Rental Housing Act does not provide substantive tenure security 
for tenants as it reinforces the strong common law right of landowners to evict 
tenants upon expiration of the lease.96 The detail of the Rental Housing Act and its 
relation to the common law is discussed in section 3.6 of this chapter. However, at 
this stage one can conclude that the Rental Housing Act does not promote access to 
rental housing and does therefore not give effect to sections 26(1) and 26(2) of the 
Constitution sufficiently. The Act also fails to encourage an increase in rental housing 
stock. 
The Housing Act 107 of 1997 aims to give effect to sections 26(1) and 26(2) 
of the Constitution. The Act reflects the government‟s aim in promoting “housing 
development”, which is a key phrase in the Act. Section 1(a) of the Act generally 
defines “housing development” as the establishment of residential environments in 
which citizens will have access to residential structures with secure tenure. One can 
infer from the phraseology of the Act that housing development is vital in giving effect 
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to sections 26(1) and 26(2), but the mere supply of residential structures to homeless 
individuals is inadequate as this will not necessarily afford occupiers with secure 
tenure. In Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and 
Others97 the Constitutional Court decided that section 26(1) recognises that housing 
requires more than a residential structure. The Court does not mention security of 
tenure, although considering the basis upon which the pre-1994 government, and 
private landowners, could evict occupiers occupying land without tenure security one 
can infer that security of tenure must form part of the provision of adequate housing.  
The Social Housing Act and the Housing Act aim to give effect to the right of 
access to housing, because the Social Housing Act mandates the government to 
fund the social housing programme in order to promote the supply of housing while 
the Housing Act aims to promote housing development. Both these laws are 
therefore concerned with the promotion of increased housing stock that would 
provide housing. The Rental Housing Act forms part of the housing laws, but it does 
not promote an increase in rental housing stock. One could argue that the Rental 
Housing Act is defective in this regard, because the legislature could have 
introduced certain incentives for private developers to invest in the provision of rental 
housing and thereby increase private rental housing stock.98 The correlation between 
increased housing stock and the provision of tenure security for occupiers has also 
been neglected by the legislature, which has implications concerning the right of 
access to adequate housing. 
 
3.4.3 Adequate housing 
 
The meaning of “adequate housing” as stated in section 26(1) is not defined in the 
Constitution; neither could it be derived from the case law. In order to construe some 
definition for “adequate housing” reference to international law is justifiable as 
section 39(1) of the Constitution states that a court, tribunal or forum must consider 
international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights.  
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The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR)99 was signed by South Africa on 4 October 1994, although it has not been 
ratified yet.100 The ICESCR is an important international instrument to consider when 
construing a definition for adequate housing in terms of section 26(1) of the 
Constitution, because Article 11(1) of the ICESCR recognises a right to an adequate 
standard of living, including housing. The right to adequate housing as ensured in 
Article 11(1) is defined in General Comment 4 of the ICESCR.101 In General 
Comment 4, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)102 
states that the right to adequate housing should not be interpreted narrowly as 
merely a “roof over one‟s head”,103 but that it should rather be seen as the right to 
occupy property with security.104 The CESCR also states that the “adequacy” of a 
housing condition depends on various factors, although there are “certain aspects of 
the right that must be taken into account … in any particular context”.105 One of 
these aspects is legal security of tenure, stipulated in paragraph 8(a) of General 
Comment 4. This paragraph states that any type of tenure, including public and 
private rental accommodation, should ensure a degree of security of tenure. The 
extent of tenure security is not defined except that the CESCR refers to the 
guarantee against forced evictions.106 
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If the aim of the government is to provide housing in the form of rental 
housing in order to give effect to section 26 of the Constitution, the question is how 
such housing would equate “adequate housing” as defined in section 26(1). The 
Constitution does not define “adequate housing”, neither have the courts construed a 
fixed meaning for this term, except that government must refrain from depriving 
occupiers of existing housing and that government must enact legislation in order to 
give effect to this right. According to General Comment 4 of the ICESCR, security of 
tenure is a key component of the right to adequate housing. The question is whether 
the current housing legislation, and specifically rental housing legislation, gives effect 
to the constitutional obligation as stated in section 26(2). The fact that the legislation 
does not make provision for tenure security is problematic considering its importance 
in international law and the repercussions that insecure tenure had for vulnerable 
occupiers during the apartheid era.107 The effect of insecure tenure rights for 
vulnerable urban tenants is important to take into account, considering the growth in 
urbanisation and the increasing demand for urban rental housing. It is doubtful 
whether the provision of urban rental housing would comply with section 26 if the 
tenure rights of tenants are insecure. 
 
3.5 Urban rental housing 
 
In 1995 the Urban Development Strategy108 estimated that by 2020 at least 75 
percent of the population would be living in urban areas and that these areas deliver 
80 percent of the country‟s gross domestic product (GDP). Urban housing has 
become a major concern because of the correlation between the limited space 
available in the metropolitan areas and increasing urbanisation. Individuals move to 
metropolitan areas to look for better job opportunities, which is not necessarily 
problematic because urbanisation is associated with economic growth. There is a 
connection between increased urbanisation and higher GDP per capita. Urbanisation 
has been associated with high rates of economic growth and “[t]he statistical 
correlation internationally between levels of urbanisation and GDP per capita is very 
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strong”.109 Currently one can see that a shift has taken place in the area of tenure 
reform, specifically in relation to the meaning of tenure security. The focus should no 
longer be on providing better tenure security in rural areas exclusively, but also in 
urban areas because of increased urbanisation. This shift is economically beneficial 
and should be supported and encouraged by the government. The government 
should introduce measures that would improve tenure security in urban housing, 
especially through the enactment of legislation. Tenure security for all South Africans 
can only be successful if it is provided in urban areas, because the majority of 
occupiers (white and black) are not interested in living in rural areas as they are not 
interested in farming. The concept of “land” for especially black occupiers has 
changed to the extent that it is now defined as “a place to stay” instead of “a place to 
farm”.110  
There is also a definite link between urban poverty and tenure status, 
because tenure status is one of the core elements in the poverty cycle. Weak tenure 
security therefore reinforces poverty.111 Weak tenure rights create problems such as 
unstable communities and it discourages investment, which has an effect on socio-
economic factors such as poverty, social exclusion and limited access to urban 
services.112 Secure tenure affords occupiers better investment opportunities, which 
encourage economic activity and combat poverty.113 Secure occupation rights have 
been described as the “main component of the right to housing”.114 The government 
realised the importance of secure tenure when it proclaimed that security of tenure is 
a cornerstone in its approach to provide housing for homeless persons.115 The 
government formulated a vision for its strategy to alleviate poverty and subsequently 
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identified certain objectives. One of these objectives was to ensure better tenure 
security for urban residents.116 However, the importance of urbanisation and the 
connection thereof with better tenure security has been neglected by the South 
African development policy.117  
Two of the post-1994 government‟s challenges with regard to tenure security 
in urban housing were to provide better protection against eviction and to address 
tenure security in public rental stock,118 although tenure insecurity in urban areas is 
an increasing problem which has not been addressed by the government 
sufficiently.119 One of the challenges in urban land reform is to create statutory forms 
of tenure that would include substantive tenure security, although such protection 
should not be limited to existing tenure forms but should be extended and applied to 
a diverse variety of tenure options.120 An improved approach to land reform requires 
better tenure security in urban areas and increased housing delivery in specifically 
metropolitan areas.121  
The state has not been successful in delivering housing to the urban poor and 
research has shown that ownership is not the ideal form of tenure occupiers 
necessarily prefer. The primary focus of providing all homeless persons with 
ownership does not necessarily suit the needs of poor urban occupiers.122  There is 
a preference amongst at least some of the urban poor to rent accommodation 
instead of acquiring ownership, because by renting accommodation individuals do 
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not have to take on all the responsibilities of ownership.123 Marginalised occupiers 
who hold land under private tenure could easily be surprised by hidden costs which 
could lead to distress sales.124 An estimated one third125 of South African households 
live in rented accommodation, while one third of these households live in backyard 
shacks or flats.126 Home ownership is not possible for most South Africans due to a 
lack of financial resources. Rental housing is thus a key component of the housing 
sector.127 Cape Town has a large rental housing market that consists of private and 
public housing stock. This provides housing for a large number of black households. 
The occupiers have secure leases that afford them security of tenure.128 Despite the 
preference of urban occupiers to rent housing one could also argue that rental 
housing is a better form of tenure (in comparison to owner-occupation) for poor and 
vulnerable occupiers, because the state can regulate, assess and control the market 
to the extent that it is involved in the provision thereof. If the state is directly involved 
in the provision of rental housing, as a social landlord, the state would be able to 
provide marginalised occupiers with secure (adequate) housing without having to 
place any unwanted financial burdens on these tenants. The success of such a form 
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of housing depends on the enactment of efficient legislation that affords tenure 
security, while also being context-sensitive to the personal needs of the individual 
households.129 
The Constitution ensures a right to have access to adequate housing, which 
means that the state is not obliged to make available housing for all homeless 
members of the public, although the state must take reasonable measures to 
facilitate the realisation of this right. De Vos identified three stages through which the 
state can realise this obligation.130 The tertiary obligation of the state to promote and 
fulfil human rights could be carried out in the area of housing by assisting people in 
acquiring housing in the form of rental housing.131 The pre-1994 government realised 
that the private sector had to be involved in the provision of housing for all 
citizens,132 while the post-1994 government has failed to include the private sector in 
its pursuit of providing housing, especially in the area of rental housing.133 The 
government‟s previous policy with regard to the provision of housing was to control 
and exploit the private sector‟s capacity, which was suitable at the time, but currently 
a new approach is necessary to the extent that more emphasis should be placed on 
the “public-private partnership”.134 There is a need to improve the extent of urban 
rental housing delivered by the private sector.135 One could argue that the legislature 
failed to develop incentives for private developers to invest in the provision of private 
rental stock.136 
Urban poverty could be lessened if the legislature granted substantive tenure 
security for the urban poor. If measures are introduced with the aim to improve 
tenure security in urban rental housing, the right to have access to adequate housing 
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could be given effect to. Better tenure security in urban rental housing would 
contribute to alleviation of poverty and enhance better economic growth. As yet, the 
legislature has enacted the Rental Housing Act and the Social Housing Act in order 
to regulate the urban rental market and give effect to section 26(1) of the 
Constitution, but these laws fail to afford sufficient tenure rights for urban tenants.137 
 
3.6 Rental Housing Act 
3.6.1 Introduction 
 
The Rental Housing Act138 is the most important statute with regard to the protection 
of tenant‟s tenure rights in urban housing. Section 18 of the Act repealed the Rent 
Control Act 80 of 1976, although certain provisions, such as section 28 which 
provided for continued occupation rights upon termination of the lease, were still 
applicable until 1 August 2000. On 31 July 2003 all protection in terms of the 
previous rent control legislation ended.139 During the three years following 
commencement of the Act the Minister of Housing had to monitor and assess the 
impact of the phasing out of both rent control and substantive tenure rights on poor 
and vulnerable tenants. The Minister also had to respond to suffering tenants and 
alleviate their hardship by means of a newly introduced special national housing 
programme to assist such tenants. Vulnerable tenants could be categorised on the 
basis of their age, income or any other form of vulnerability.140 According to the 
Western Cape Rental Housing Tribunal Annual Report (April 2002 to March 2003), 
no official steps had been taken to comply with this obligation and no steps were 
taken by the Minister to monitor or assess the impact of the repeal of rent control on 
tenants. No action has been taken to alleviate any hardship suffered by vulnerable 
tenants because the government did not assess the rental housing sector while 
phasing out rent control and the security of tenure it provided for tenants.141  
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Judging from the preamble of the Act it clearly strives to give effect to section 
26 of the Constitution.142 The Act regulates access to rental housing in a manner 
which is fair to both parties.143 The balancing of rights of landlord and tenant is 
mentioned in the preamble, which indicates that the legislature was aware of the 
need to restrict the rights of landowners in order to strengthen tenure rights of 
tenants.144 The preamble also mentions that rental housing is a key component of 
the housing sector, from which one can infer that the state acknowledges the 
importance of rental housing. Rental housing is a key component of the housing 
sector because home ownership is not possible for most South Africans due to 
financial constraints. The government accepted this reality when it enacted the 
Rental Housing Act.145 In the white paper titled A New Housing Policy and Strategy 
for South Africa146 the government stated that a key consideration in the process of 
providing adequate housing was the low incomes earned by numerous South 
Africans. The government also recognised the impossibility of providing housing for 
all South Africans (especially to the weak and marginalised) on its own because of 
insufficient resource. Investment from the private sector is therefore necessary.147 
 
3.6.2 Security of tenure 
 
Apart from these realities the Rental Housing Act provides limited tenure protection 
because it does not override the landlord‟s common law right to evict the tenant upon 
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termination of the lease.148 In terms of section 4(5)(d) the landlord is entitled to 
reclaim his property upon termination of the lease by means of a court order.149 
Where the tenant fails to redeliver the property upon termination of the lease the 
landlord has his usual remedies for breach of contract, because the tenant is holding 
over.150 The lease terminates on one of the grounds stipulated in the lease, provided 
the stipulation does not constitute an unfair practice as defined in the Act.151 The Act 
consequently introduces preliminary requirements that landlords are compelled to 
comply with before the lease can be terminated. Once the lease is terminated in 
accordance with the Act, the landlord can approach the court for an eviction order.152 
The common law rules with regard to cancellation are amended as the lease must 
contain a lex commissoria, which means that the landlord will not be able to cancel 
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the lease, in the case of mora, by giving notice of rescission to the tenant.153 The 
common-law right of landlords with regard to the termination of the lease is 
accordingly amended by the Rental Housing Act.154  
However, where the parties enter into a fixed-term tenancy and the period of 
the lease ends through effluxion of time the lease automatically terminates, provided 
that neither party was in default.155 In these circumstances the position is unchanged 
to the extent that “[t]he contract expires by effluxion of time and with it the 
relationship of lessor and lessee ceases.”156 In the case of a periodic lease, the 
lease continues until terminated by due notice.157 The lease will only continue upon 
expiration of the contract if the tenant remains in the dwelling with the express or 
tacit consent of the landlord. In these circumstances the parties are deemed to have 
entered into a periodic lease on the same terms and conditions as the expired lease. 
The periodic lease could be terminated by either party by giving one month‟s 
notice.158 The point of departure is that the landowner must consent to the renewed 
lease. The landlord is entitled to terminate the lease on the expiration date without 
good reason. The renewal is voluntary and neither party could be forced to continue 
with the periodic lease.159  
The Rental Housing Act supports a free-market approach to rental housing. 
The Act protects the rights of the parties in light of their contractual rights and duties, 
as it reinforces the terms of the contract. The legislature therefore assumes that the 
parties have equal bargaining power when entering into the lease and that this would 
remain their position throughout the term of the lease. The Act does not make 
provision for continued occupation rights for tenants upon expiration of the lease. 
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The extent of tenure security granted to the tenant depends on the contract and 
therefore the will of both parties. The Act does not intervene in the relationship 
between the parties in order to provide substantive tenure rights for tenants, but 
rather reinforces the notion of sanctity of contract.  
In comparison to the level of substantive tenure security enjoyed by tenants 
during the pre-1994 era, one can confirm that the Rental Housing Act is currently not 
providing substantive tenure rights for urban residential tenants. The pre-1994 Rents 
Acts statutorily intervened in the relationship between landlord and tenant in order to 
grant tenants rights to enforce continuation of the lease upon expiration of the 
contractual term. During this period statutory intervention in the landlord-tenant 
sphere was justified as a result of the housing shortages. The question is whether 
the post-1994 government is currently not facing similar housing shortages that 
justify some form of statutory intervention in the landlord-tenant field, especially in 
light of the constitutional obligations provided for in sections 25(6), 26(1) and 
26(2).160 The Act is also too market-orientated and enhanced government 
involvement might lead to some stability.161 One can confirm that the Act is 
insufficient because it does not make provision for substantive tenure protection. In 
light of section 26(1) of the Constitution it is apparent that the Act is also 
unsatisfactory regarding the provision of rental housing as a form of tenure that could 
help alleviate housing shortages. The Act does not have any mechanism that 
encourages development in private rental housing that might result in increased 
housing stock. 
 
3.6.3 Eviction proceedings 
 
Once the landlord terminates the lease on one of the grounds stipulated in the 
contract (for instance where the contract expired by effluxion of time, which is 
unlikely to constitute an unfair practice) the Act has no relevance because the 
common law, read with section 26(3) of the Constitution, regulates the eviction. The 
Act does not afford substantive or procedural tenure protection for tenants facing 
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eviction, because once the lease terminates the landlord can approach the court for 
an eviction order. This is evident in the case law,162 as the Rental Housing Act is not 
taken into consideration where the courts have to consider the position of a tenant 
holding over. However, the procedural safeguards in section 26(3) of the Constitution 
are relevant in all eviction cases and should afford direct or indirect protection163 to 
tenants facing eviction in urban rental housing.164 Prevention of Illegal Eviction from 
and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act (PIE)165 is concerned with the regulation of 
eviction proceedings for unlawful occupiers and incorporates the aim of section 
26(3). The cooperation between PIE and section 26(3) has been quite challenging 
for the courts in the event of tenants holding over.166 The difficult question before the 
courts has been whether tenants who are holding over should be classified as 
unlawful occupiers who are protected under PIE or, alternatively, whether these 
tenants should enjoy direct constitutional protection as provided for by section 26(3) 
in the event of eviction. The issue whether tenants may rely directly on section 26(3) 
is addressed in section 3.9 below in terms of the subsidiarity approach. The 
inadequate tenure rights of tenants is a direct cause for this confusion and one can 
consequently argue that the Rental Housing Act needs to be amended in order to 
give effect to the Constitution. 
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3.6.4 Conclusion 
 
The effect of the Rental Housing Act is that it places emphasis on the sanctity of 
contract, because the Act constantly refers to the relationship between the landlord 
and the tenant as regulated by the contract. Apart form the emphasis placed on the 
contract, the common law position regarding termination of the tenancy is confirmed 
in the Act. Landlord-tenant relationships in urban residential areas are therefore 
currently regulated in terms of the private law notions of contract law and property 
law.  
The constitutional obligations provided for in sections 26(1) and 26(3) of the 
Constitution are not sufficiently given effect to in the Rental Housing Act. The Act 
does not promote secure rental housing as a viable option for adequate housing in 
terms of section 26(1), nor does the Act give effect to potentially enhanced tenure 
security in terms of section 26(3) by restricting evictions due to the personal 
circumstances of tenants. Based on these grounds one can conclude that the Rental 
Housing Act is inadequate, as it does not adhere to the constitutional obligations 
relating to access to adequate housing and eviction proceedings. In light of the 
discussion regarding the meaning of adequate housing in 3.4.3 and the need for 
secure rental housing in 3.5, one can conclude that the Rental Housing Act is in 
need of rectification and the legislature is obliged, in terms of sections 25(9) and 
26(2), to promulgate more efficient landlord-tenant legislation.  
It is also important to note the difference between the pre-1994 legislature‟s 
aim to provide substantive tenure rights for tenants and the post-1994 legislature‟s 
failure to afford secure occupation rights for urban residential tenants. The pre-1994 
legislature was motivated by housing shortages to create some form of continued 
occupation rights for tenants upon expiration of the lease. The statutory interventions 
amended the strong common law rights of landowners in order to afford some form 
of continued occupation rights for tenants. The post-1994 legislature is obliged in 
terms of section 25(6) of the Constitution to enact legislation that would secure 
occupation rights for occupiers whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of 
past racially discriminatory laws. In terms of sections 26(1) and 26(2) of the 
Constitution, the legislature is also obliged to enact legislation that would promote 
access to adequate housing.  
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The legislature has failed to give effect to these constitutional obligations 
within the landlord-tenant framework, as the Rental Housing Act is the primary Act 
that regulates rental housing in urban areas and the Act does not promote access to 
adequate rental housing, nor does it afford secure tenure rights for tenants. The 
strong common law rights of landowners therefore prevail as it is confirmed in the 
Rental Housing Act, instead of being amended in order to give effect to the 
constitutional obligations. This is in conflict with the constitutional aims and the 
legislature is obliged to rectify this inadequacy through amending the Act or enacting 
new legislation. 
 
3.7 Section 26(3) 
 
Section 26(3) of the Constitution ensures that no person may be evicted from his 
home without an order of court, made after considering all the relevant 
circumstances, and that no law shall permit arbitrary evictions. Section 26(3) is the 
constitutional provision that ensures at least due process for occupiers in the event 
of eviction.167 Section 26(3) can also be interpreted by the courts to afford 
substantive protection for occupiers.168  
The meaning of “all relevant circumstances” has given rise to a number of 
different interpretations by the courts which are discussed later in this chapter. 
Budlender identified four possible interpretations of this provision.169 The first 
possibility is that the phrase has no real meaning. The second possibility is that the 
legislature must prescribe what circumstances would be relevant in a given situation. 
The third interpretation is that the phrase reverses the onus of proof in eviction 
proceedings, while the fourth possibility is that the phrase provides the court with a 
discretion to refuse an eviction order, therefore overriding the owner‟s common law 
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section 26(3), to provide substantive tenure protection for marginalised tenants holding over. 
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 Budlender G “Justiciability of the Right to Housing – The South African Experience” in Leckie S 
(ed) National Perspectives on Housing Rights (2003) 207-219 at 211-212. 
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right to evict. Roux argues that no matter which interpretation one uses, section 
26(3) on its own has so far had no direct impact on the common law.170  
The core of the tenure reform anti-eviction strategy is nevertheless section 
26(3).171 The anti-eviction provision supports sections 25(6) and 25(9) in order to 
provide better tenure security for persons whose tenure is legally insecure because 
of past racially discriminatory laws, although section 26(3) applies to all occupiers 
and not only to persons whose land tenure is legally insecure because of past 
racially discriminatory laws. Occupiers whose tenure rights are insecure because of 
inadequate statutory protection or because the common law does not make 
provision for sufficient tenure security will at least enjoy the anti-eviction protection in 
terms of section 26(3) of the Constitution. The complexities associated with this form 
of land reform stretches beyond the temporary rectification of apartheid, because 
tenure reform is important in all eviction cases and therefore a time-consuming 
process that aims at providing permanent solutions for individuals occupying land 
with insecure tenure. The recognition and strengthening of existing rights are 
imbedded in land reform and is evident in the legislation promulgated to give effect to 
tenure reform.172 
The Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land 
Act173 is concerned with the suitable regulation of eviction proceedings for unlawful 
occupiers. Suitable regulation of eviction proceedings entails that evictions can only 
take place in a fair and equitable manner. The Act is essentially not concerned with 
the granting or strengthening of rights, but rather guarantees that evictions are 
conducted in a proper legal fashion.174 Nevertheless, the courts have interpreted PIE 
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 Roux T “Continuity and Change in a Transforming Legal Order: The Impact of Section 26(3) on 
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 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 310. 
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Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 308-311. 
173
 Act 19 of 1998. 
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1)” 2006 TSAR 277-299 at 283-299 for a discussion on the role of PIE with reference to case law. See 
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to provide substantive tenure protection for marginalised occupiers facing eviction. 
The Act emphasises fairness to all unlawful occupiers and defines an unlawful 
occupier as: 
“a person who occupies land without the express or tacit consent of the owner 
or person in charge, or without any other right in law to occupy such land, 
excluding a person who is an occupier in terms of the Extension of Security of 
Tenure Act, 1997, and excluding a person whose informal right to land, but for 
the provisions of this Act, would be protected by the provisions of the Interim 
Protection of Informal Land Rights Act”.175  
 
The strong common law position of landowners to evict tenants was limited by the 
introduction of section 26(3) of the Constitution and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction 
from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act (PIE).176 Pienaar proposes a method in 
dealing with the common law, anti-eviction legislation and the Constitution, although 
one should first determine whether PIE (or any other reform statute) is applicable. If 
there is no applicable legislation, the common law will prevail and the rei vindicatio 
will be applied. One should then determine whether section 26(3) of the Constitution 
has an impact on the application of the rei vindicatio.177 Van der Walt argues that the 
general expectation is that section 26(3) of the Constitution should be the point of 
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Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 277 mentions that 
the Court in PE Municipality did “not confine the circumstances which are considered relevant in 
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common law.” 
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departure in all eviction cases.178 All eviction cases, whether based on land reform 
statutes or the common law, might seem subject to the direct application of section 
26(3).179 However, the question whether section 26(3) could be relied on directly, or 
whether a party should first rely on the applicable legislation drafted in terms of 
section 26(3), is controversial in consideration of the case law. This complicated 
issue is addressed in section 3.9 later in this chapter. 
 
3.8 Case law 
3.8.1 Introduction 
 
One of the aims of this chapter is to analyse the sufficiency of the legislation that was 
introduced with the aim to give effect to tenure reform in urban housing, and more 
specifically urban rental housing. The amended common law right of landowners to 
evict tenants holding over is an important consideration, which could help determine 
the efficiency of the legislation. The tension between the legislation, Constitution and 
common law is evident in the case law, which provides an interesting framework to 
evaluate the efficiency of tenure reform in urban rental housing.  
The egalitarian reformist view is that the existing patterns of land holding are 
based on the common law, regulating land law in a manner that entrenches 
apartheid-type patterns of social domination and marginalisation. Land reform is 
aimed at transforming these patterns, which means that the common law has to be 
amended. One of the complexities within this process is to understand and accept 
the uncertainties caused by the land reform process while maintaining certainty 
regarding existing property rights and protecting such rights.180 The relationship 
between the legislation, Constitution and common law is unclear and intricate in 
landlord-tenant eviction cases as the courts are unfamiliar with the hierarchy of 
potentially conflicting laws under the Constitution. In some of the cases the courts 
applied section 26(3) of the Constitution, while in other cases PIE was applied 
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without reference to section 26(3). Tenure reform includes procedural and 
substantive controls in the event of eviction proceedings that strive to provide 
occupiers with better tenure security.  
Importantly, in none of the cases where the courts had to consider the 
eviction of unlawful tenants did the courts refer to section 25(6) of the Constitution. 
Initially, the courts did not refer to sections 26(1) and 26(2) of the Constitution, 
despite the fact that an eviction would deprive the tenant or her home. However, in 
the recent cases the courts considered the effect of eviction orders in light of the 
unlawful tenants‟ right to have access to adequate housing. It is noteworthy that the 
Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 does not play a significant role in the eviction of 
unlawful tenants. 
The relationship between the common law right of the landowner to evict an 
occupier and the strengthened, reform-orientated right of occupiers under the land 
reform legislation could be described as a “head-on conflict that forces the courts to 
choose between two irreconcilable political goals or value-systems.”181 This conflict 
is evident where anti-eviction legislation strives to give effect to the transformative 
purpose of the Constitution. However, the impact of the legislation on the common 
law rights of landowners was initially insubstantial because the courts refrained from 
interpreting the legislation in such a way as to give full effect to the spirit, purpose 
and object of the Constitution. In the case law it is clear that the high courts desist 
from exercising a dramatic impact on common law rights of landowners and the 
Supreme Court of Appeal initially also preferred to uphold the common law.182  
One could pose the question whether section 26(3) applies directly to 
landlord-tenant situations.183 Section 26(3) is drafted in general terms and it does not 
state whether it applies to the eviction of lawful or unlawful occupiers, nor does it 
state what the relevant circumstances are or whether the court has the discretion to 
refuse an eviction order on any of the circumstances it decided to consider.184 The 
effect of section 26(3) is unclear from the early case law. Initially, it was unclear 
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whether section 26(3) could for instance have changed the pleadings, given that the 
landowner could no longer only prove ownership but should also provide the court 
with the relevant circumstances of the occupier, or section 26(3) could have changed 
the substantive law, providing the occupier with a form of continued occupation 
rights. In the latter case, the court would have the discretion to refuse eviction based 
on the circumstances of the occupier. In the more recent cases the courts interpreted 
PIE, which gives effect to section 26(3), to afford substantive tenure protection for 
marginalised tenants holding over. 
 
3.8.2 Case law preceding Brisley and Ndlovu 
 
Absa Bank Ltd v Amod185 was the first case concerning the question whether PIE 
was applicable in the event of a tenant holding over. The tenant occupied the 
property in terms of an oral lease. When the lease terminated the owner applied for 
an eviction order. The tenant‟s occupation was initially lawful but became unlawful 
when he continued to occupy the premises after termination, which raised the 
question whether PIE was applicable, given that the Act applies to unlawful 
occupiers. The tenant argued that the court couldn‟t grant an eviction order because 
the owner did not comply with the provisions regulating eviction proceedings as 
provided for under PIE.186 In order to decide whether the Act applied to tenants 
holding over, Schwartzman J gave an in depth analysis of the Act and its purpose.187 
The judge considered the principles governing the interpretation of statutes and 
decided on this point that the Act should not be presumed to alter the common law 
position regulating landlord-tenant law; if that was the intention of the legislature it 
would have been made clear.188 Schwartzman J found that the Act does not apply to 
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unlawful occupiers of immovable property lawfully built on land.189 In the context of 
PIE, the court decided, “land” means vacant land and not permanent structures on 
land.190 The effect was that the Act was not meant to apply to formalized housing or 
to “normal” common law landlord-tenant situations.191 The court held that the Act 
could not be interpreted to turn the common law of landlord and tenant on its head; 
such interpretation would lead to an absurdity.192 The court concluded that the Act 
applied to unlawful occupiers, whose occupation was never lawful, of vacant land 
and that the Act did not amend the common law position of landlord and tenant 
because the legislature did not specifically indicate such an intention.193 The judge 
decided that PIE limits the common law right of landowners to evict unlawful 
occupiers and this limitation has to be applied restrictively.194 The court did not 
consider section 26(3) of the Constitution; the only question was whether PIE applied 
to tenants holding over.195 This restrictive interpretation of PIE dilutes the 
transformative purpose of the Act as the court should rather have evaluated the 
specific provisions of the Act, keeping in mind the history of land law and the aim of 
land reform.196 
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Josman AJ handed down judgment in Ross v South Peninsula Municipality197 
in the Cape Provincial Division. Mrs Ross unlawfully occupied property that belonged 
to the respondent. The respondent relied on Graham v Ridley,198 where Greenberg 
found that “proof that the appellant is the owner and that respondent is in possession 
entitled the appellant to an order giving him possession”.199 The Ross case seems 
similar to the Absa case but it was more complicated as the court took into account 
section 26(3) of the Constitution. Josman AJ held that the common law, as 
established in Graham, was amended by section 26(3).200 The court raised a couple 
of questions with regard to the impact of section 26(3) on the rights of landowners; 
the extent of the limitation on such rights; and whether the landowner had to make 
any allegations in order to evict an unlawful occupier.201 After extensive 
consideration of the latter question the court found that the issue of where the onus 
lies is determined by substantive law.202 The court decided that section 26(3) 
modified the common law and that any owner who claims an eviction order must 
allege relevant circumstances which would enable the court to give such an order.203 
According to the common law the owner can sue for eviction because he is 
entitled to recover lost possession. The cause of action would be that he is the 
owner and therefore prima facie entitled to possession. The mere fact that he is the 
owner constitutes grounds for possession and it is unnecessary to allege that the 
defendant is in unlawful occupation. After the owner proved his ownership by 
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producing a title deed in court the onus shifts to the defendant to prove his right of 
occupation.204 According to the common law, the owner is obliged to prove 
ownership, not to allege unlawful occupation of the defendant or any relevant 
circumstances.  
Keightley argues that the effect of the decision is that section 26(3) alters 
common law evictions, because the onus that rests on the owner is amplified.205 The 
court did not make a ruling in relation to the relevant circumstances, although it did 
refer to PIE and found that section 4(6) of the Act could guide the court in 
determining what circumstances should be considered.206 Josman AJ discussed the 
Absa case and agreed with its interpretation of PIE, which is why the Act was not an 
issue in the Ross case.207 The impact of the judgment regarding the legal position of 
the respondent was uncertain, because Mrs Ross was still an unlawful occupier even 
though the court refused to grant the eviction order and awarded her a certain 
degree of protection. Pienaar argues that the basis of her occupation right remained 
unlawful, because it was against the wishes of the landowner.208 The case raised the 
question concerning the extent to which section 26(3) of the Constitution amended 
the common law right of owners to evict occupiers and what allegations should be 
made by the owner. The court did not address these issues and only decided that 
the Constitution did change the content of the summons or the onus of proof.209 
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In the same year judgment was handed down in the Witwatersrand Local 
Division by Flemming DJP in Betta Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Ekple-Epoh210 where the 
court held that section 26(3) of the Constitution is not applicable to tenants holding 
over. The applicant instituted action in the magistrate‟s court for damages, claiming 
overdue rent and an eviction order. The court a quo refused to grant the eviction 
order because the mere fact of unlawful occupation was not sufficient grounds for an 
eviction order.211 Flemming DJP referred to the Ross decision and found that the 
object of section 26(3) “does not cover cases of ordinary trespass, whether in the 
form of squatting or holding over or otherwise.”212 The court adopted a conservative 
approach, stating that section 26(3) was aimed at protecting parties against a 
repetition of apartheid-type evictions.213 The court ignored one of the aims of land 
reform, namely that the eviction of unlawful occupiers must comply with the 
“minimum requirements and standards of due process, equity and fairness.”214 The 
court decided that section 26(3) applies vertically, referring to the section‟s content, 
context and wording.215 Flemming DJP held that PIE had no relevance in the case. 
The court relied on the Absa case and criticised the Ross decision for obtaining 
guidance from PIE in order to define “relevant circumstances”.216 The court also 
disagreed with the previous decisions where it is was found that the common law 
right of ownership, onus of proof and adequacy about pleadings have been changed. 
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The court referred to Graham v Ridley217 and Chetty v Naidoo218 and found that one 
of the entitlements of private ownership is that the owner is entitled to exclusive 
possession, that any other person could be excluded from the owner‟s property and 
that this right had not been amended by the Constitution.219 The court‟s point of 
departure with regard to the relationship between the common law and the 
Constitution was therefore that there is no need to restrict the common law right of 
owners to evict unlawful occupiers in order to promote the spirit, purport and object 
of the Constitution.220  
Flemming DJP relied on contract law principles and stated that in this case 
the contract of lease was cancelled. Consequently, the tenant was obliged to restore 
the property to the landowner; these principles were not amended by the 
Constitution but were in fact a “relevant circumstance” the court had to consider and 
apply.221 The court protected the notion of private ownership and the owner‟s right to 
possession where the defendant was in illegal possession of the owner‟s property, 
instead of developing the common law in order to give effect to the Constitution.222 
According to the court‟s reasoning, anything contrary to this would deprive the owner 
of ownership as the most important entitlement, namely the owner‟s exclusive right 
to possession would be lost. The effect would be to protect the land grabber and not 
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the owner.223 The court decided that the applicant was entitled to an eviction order 
(based on contract law principles)224 and that the relevant circumstances, which had 
to be considered by the court, had to appear in the pleadings. The only relevant fact 
was that the owner‟s property was occupied by the respondent without a sustainable 
reason.225 The court presupposed that the structure of property holdings, as 
regulated by the common law, was normal and generally accepted unless the 
opposite was proven. The court therefore assumed that the common law is the 
primary source of law with regard to landlord-tenant disputes.226 The court found that 
section 26(3) merely amended the pleadings while the substantive rights of the 
parties remained unaltered.227  
According to Hawthorne, Flemming DJP was in the unfortunate position 
where he had to adjudicate a case of deliberate abuse of the development of 
landlord-tenant law. The tenant was mala fide, which forced the court to focus on the 
commercial interests at risk rather than on the social implications of the rights 
enshrined in section 26(3) of the Constitution. The court‟s view that courts are 
required by the Constitution to consider factors such as the sanctity of contract, 
sanctity of ownership, the sense of equity of “right-minded” South Africans and the 
reception of a court‟s decision in society, instead of the hardship suffered by the 
parties in every individual case, was unconvincing.228 
In Ellis v Viljoen229 the same restrictive approach was followed by the court. 
The appellant occupied the respondent‟s property with the consent of the previous 
owner. The arrangement between the previous owner and the appellant was that of 
precarium.230 When the respondent bought the property and wanted to take 
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 2001 (4) SA 795 (C). 
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 See Ellis v Viljoen 2001 (4) SA 795 (C) 796H-798D for the facts of the case. The occupier never 
paid rent. She never made payments for water or electricity either. 
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possession of the house the appellant occupied at the time, she refused to vacate. 
The court was uncertain on what basis the appellant alleged that she had a right to 
continue occupation, because she never leased the property.231 Thring J gave a 
lengthy discussion of the Absa, Ross and Betta decisions232 and found that PIE had 
no relevance in the case.233 The court then considered the application of section 
26(3). Thring J briefly referred to the Ross decision and disagreed with the 
contention that the owner, seeking eviction, should allege relevant circumstances.234 
The court rather agreed with the Betta decision, in particular with the contention that 
the Constitution did not amend the common law position of landowners. Where the 
occupier unlawfully occupies the property of the owner, the owner should be entitled 
to an ejectment order. If this is the only relevant fact raised before the court, the 
owner is not under an obligation to raise any other “relevant circumstances”, 
although the occupier is at liberty to do so.235 Thring J held that anything contrary to 
this would impede section 25(1) of the Constitution, which protects property rights 
where it states that no person may be deprived of property, except in terms of law of 
general application.236  
Roux argues that the underlying assumption in this decision was that any 
alteration of the common law pleading requirements would constitute an infringement 
on the owner‟s property right, as protected in section 25(1) of the Constitution.237 The 
common law right of landowners to evict tenants upon termination of the lease is 
classified by the court as a protected property right under section 25 of the 
Constitution. Any interpretation that would amount to a deprivation of this right would 
be in conflict with section 25(1), because it would amount to an arbitrary deprivation 
of property.238 The court agreed with the court a quo that no valid defence was 
raised by the appellant against the rei vindicatio of the landowner and that no further 
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this matter. 
234
 Ellis v Viljoen 2001 (4) SA 795 (C) 804H-I. 
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relevant circumstances were pleaded by the parties which the court had to 
consider.239  
Van der Walt argues that the approach followed in Betta and Ellis is incorrect 
because the Constitution amended the common law position with regard to onus of 
proof. If one agrees that the Constitution is the primary source of law and the 
common law exists as subsidiary law, as it only applies to such an extent that it does 
not come into conflict with the Constitution, the decisions in Betta and Ellis must be 
inaccurate. The court can no longer grant an eviction order on the basis that the 
landowner simply proved that he is the owner and that someone else is in 
occupation of his residential property; section 26(3) of the Constitution states that all 
relevant circumstances must first be considered before an eviction order may be 
granted.240 The constitutional issue in Betta and Ellis could be approached in terms 
of sections 1 and 8 of the Constitution,241 combined with principles regulated in 
administrative law, as there is only one legal system and the Constitution is the 
primary source of law and not the common law. This approach takes into account the 
purpose, spirit and object of the Constitution, which ensures that transformation will 
take place. The impact of section 26(3) is that the court must consider the relevant 
circumstances (including the harm to the landowner and harm to the occupier), 
balancing the rights of both parties in a context-sensitive process, in order to decide 
whether an eviction order should be granted.242 In light of the Ellis decision, 
Liebenberg explains that: 
“The Court fails to develop a balanced normative framework in which the 
purposes and values underlying both property and housing rights are 
recognised. Instead, the common-law position in which property rights are 
accorded overriding significance is simply reaffirmed. This effectively denudes s 
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26(3) of much of its potential to transform the common law pertaining to the 
eviction of people from homes.”243 
 
3.8.3 Brisley v Drotsky 
 
In 2002 the Supreme Court of Appeal handed down judgment in the much debated 
case of Brisley v Drotsky.244 The respondent entered into a lease with the appellant 
and it provided that the appellant was entitled to occupy the property of the 
respondent in exchange for an amount of rent which had to be paid on the first day 
of every month. Mrs Brisley fell in arrears and the landlord cancelled the lease and 
instituted eviction proceedings. One of the questions the Court had to consider was 
whether section 26(3) of the Constitution was applicable. In terms of section 26(3) 
the court must consider all the relevant circumstances before granting an eviction 
order. The court could therefore be prohibited from granting an eviction order, even 
after the lease expired.245 The appellant relied on the Ross decision and alleged that 
the relevant circumstances the Court had to consider amounted to the circumstances 
under which the lease was cancelled and her (and her mother‟s) socio-economic 
circumstances.246 The majority disagreed with the Ross decision where the court 
held that PIE should give guidance in relation to the meaning of “relevant 
circumstances” in section 26(3) of the Constitution.247 The majority found that section 
26(3) applies horizontally and should therefore apply to landlord-tenant evictions, 
contrary to the Betta decision.248 However, the majority decided that only those 
circumstances that are legally relevant should come under consideration, which 
restricted the scope of circumstances the court must consider.249 The Court found 
that due to the fact that the Constitutional Assembly did not specify which 
circumstances are relevant, the presumption is that those circumstances that would 
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152 
 
have been relevant by means of the common law or applicable legislation will be 
considered relevant circumstances.250  
Apart from the legal fact that the applicant is the owner and the respondent is 
in occupation of the applicant‟s property, is it unclear what other circumstances 
should be taken into account.251 The housing provision of the Constitution forms part 
of the socio-economic rights, but the Court held that only legally relevant 
circumstances may be considered in terms of section 26(3). Based on this reasoning 
the Court found that it can only consider the fact that the applicant is the owner and 
the respondent is in unlawful occupation. Consequently, socio-economic conditions 
have no role in the evaluation.252  
The Court‟s reasoning is problematic for two reasons. The first is that the 
Constitution was drafted to introduce certain constitutional values that would form the 
foundation for a new constitutional dispensation. The Constitution explicitly overrides 
the common law where these two bodies of law come into conflict. Section 26(3) of 
the Constitution introduced a new requirement in eviction proceedings, namely that 
all relevant circumstances should first be taken into account before a court can evict 
an occupier. The common law does not have a similar requirement and one can 
therefore accept that section 26(3) overrides the common law with regard to all 
eviction proceedings and that no court may evict a person from his home without first 
considering all the relevant circumstances. Taking this into account one could pose 
the question why the Court relied on the common law to decide what circumstances 
are relevant in terms of section 26(3) if the Constitution overrides the common law in 
eviction proceedings. Secondly, the Court created a paradox because section 26 is 
supposed to give effect to the right of access to housing, which forms part of the 
socio-economic rights, whereas the effect of the decision is the opposite, namely that 
socio-economic circumstances may not be evaluated even though section 26(3) 
states that “all relevant circumstances” must be evaluated. The Supreme Court of 
Appeal had the opportunity to define “relevant circumstances” in landlord-tenant law 
in order to promote the constitutional values, taking into account the purpose of the 
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housing provision. The Court ignored these realities and retreated towards the 
comfortable and familiar common law position, which effectively suppressed the 
object and purpose of the Constitution.253  
The Court also found that it does not have the discretion to refuse an eviction 
order based on the personal circumstances (such as the availability of alternative 
accommodation) of the tenant, because personal circumstances are not legally 
relevant. The Court reasoned that if it took these circumstances into consideration it 
would deprive the landowner of an entitlement he had at common law.254 The 
essence of Brisley is that the eviction of tenants still functions within the common law 
principles, because landowners are entitled to exclusive possession in the absence 
of an explicit legal or statutory right of occupation.255 This right of the landowner is 
not restricted by section 26(3) of the Constitution because the personal 
circumstances of occupiers are, according to Brisley, irrelevant. The decision 
restrains the transformative purpose of section 26(3).256 The decision was not 
concerned with the application of PIE, neither was it concerned with any other reform 
laws. 
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3.8.4 Ndlovu v Ngcobo / Bekker v Jika 
 
In Ndlovu v Ngcobo / Bekker v Jika257 the majority of the Supreme Court of Appeal 
found that the anti-eviction provisions in PIE are applicable in the case of a tenant 
holding over after expiration of the lease.258 In the Ndlovu appeal the lease 
terminated lawfully, but the tenant refused to vacate the property.259 The applicant 
who instituted the eviction proceedings did not comply with the requirements set out 
in PIE and the only question before the Court was whether the applicant was obliged 
to do so. The Court considered the definition of an unlawful occupier in PIE and 
decided that if the legislature intended to exclude tenants holding over, an unlawful 
occupier would have been defined as “„a person who occupied and still occupies 
land without the express or tacit consent of the owner or person in charge, or without 
any other right in law to occupy such land‟.”260 The Court therefore found that PIE 
applies to all unlawful occupiers, irrespective of the fact that their occupation was 
previously lawful.261 The Court found that the purpose of the Act is to delay or 
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suspend an eviction order, in order for the court to determine whether it is just and 
equitable to evict the unlawful occupier in the given circumstances.262 The court has 
a wide discretion to determine whether to grant the eviction order, or determine the 
date of eviction.263 The aim of the Act is not to expropriate the landowner but rather 
to suspend his proprietary right to an eviction order.264 Where the owner complied 
with the procedural requirements he is entitled to apply for an eviction order, relying 
on his right as owner and the fact that the respondent is unlawfully265 in occupation 
of his property.266 The occupier can disclose relevant circumstances, which means 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
potential rental market will decrease. The case was extensively reported and criticized in the media, 
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that in principle the owner is entitled to an eviction order where the tenant does not 
oppose the application and disclose relevant circumstances.267  
In 2008 the Prevention of Illegal Eviction From and Unlawful Occupation of 
Land Amendment Bill was published.268 The most important aim of the Bill is to 
amend section 2 of PIE by adding that the Act does not apply to tenants or persons 
who initially occupied the property with the consent of the owner. The aim of the Bill 
is to restrict PIE to such an extent that neither tenants nor previous owners whose 
occupation became unlawful would fall under the ambit of the Act, in other words to 
reverse the effect of the Ndlovu decision. Apart from this, the court has the discretion 
to direct that the proceedings ought to be under PIE although the application was 
brought under the common law.  
One can conclude that Ndlovu did extend application of the Act because a 
landowner now has to comply with the strict eviction requirements provided for in PIE 
to obtain an eviction order. However, landowners can still bring eviction applications 
in terms of the common law. Case law following Ndlovu interpreted the decision as if 
it did not change the burden of proof. Currently, a landowner can still merely place 
before the court that he is the owner and that the respondent is in occupation of his 
property in order to obtain an eviction order.269  
The majority in Ndlovu based their decision on PIE and refrained from 
deciding what the relationship between section 26(3) of the Constitution, PIE and the 
common law is. The impact of the Constitution on the common law with regard to 
landlord-tenant evictions was consequently still uncertain after the decision.270 Roux 
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argues that after the Ndlovu decision the common law has very little application in 
eviction proceedings because either PIE, ESTA, the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) 
Act 3 of 1996 or the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act 31 of 1996 will be 
applicable and therefore not the common law.271 It is noteworthy that in neither 
Brisley nor Ndlovu, both dealing with tenants who refused to vacate the leased 
property upon termination of their right to occupy the premises, did the courts even 
mention the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999, despite the fact that it commenced on 1 
August 2000. This affirms the contention that the Rental Housing Act has had a 
limited impact on eviction proceedings. The Rental Housing Act is not concerned 
with the rights of tenants once the tenancy has terminated, but rather focuses on the 
validity of the tenancy and the contractual relationship between the parties. Once the 
lease terminates in accordance with the Act, the landlord can approach the court for 
an eviction order, whereafter the principles created in the case law will become 
applicable. 
 
3.8.5 Case law succeeding Brisley and Ndlovu 
 
In Kendall Property Investments v Rutgers272 the applicant, the owner of property, 
had a tacit lease agreement with the respondent. After the landlord gave the tenant 
one month‟s written notice to vacate the premises and the tenant refused to vacate 
the property, the applicant instituted action for eviction.273 Knoll J acknowledged that 
the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 and section 26(3) of the Constitution were 
relevant in the case and that the Act was enacted to give effect to section 26(3) in 
the landlord-tenant framework. The court mentioned that the aim of section 26(3) is 
to provide tenure security for tenants. Consequently, any legislation promulgated 
with the aim to give effect to section 26(3) has the object of strengthening tenure 
rights. The legislation ensures that eviction proceedings take place in a certain 
fashion, although one should also keep in mind that according to section 25 of the 
Constitution no owner may be arbitrarily deprived of property.274 In order to 
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understand what is meant by “relevant circumstances” the court referred to Brisley v 
Drotsky, although the court also referred to Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various 
Occupiers,275 where Sach J explained the constitutional matrix established by PIE, 
section 25 of the Constitution and section 26 of the Constitution.276 After referring to 
these decisions the court upheld the common law position, as confirmed in Chetty v 
Naidoo,277 where the Court confirmed that if the landlord wishes to evict the tenant 
on the basis that the lease terminated and the tenant relies on the validity of the 
lease, the onus is on the landlord to prove that the lease terminated. Section 4(5)(b) 
and (c) of the Rental Housing Act limits the common law right of a landlord to 
terminate the lease, which means that, in conjunction with the common law, the 
landlord is under a obligation to prove the valid termination of the lease. Accordingly, 
the court found that the landlord had to prove that the grounds of termination were 
specified in the lease and that it did not constitute an unfair practice. The landlord 
can only institute an action for eviction once the lease is validly terminated. Knoll J 
held that this procedure was in accordance with the Constitutional Court‟s 
interpretation of the constitutional matrix which gave rise to the Rental Housing 
Act.278  
Initially the judgment seemed to give content to the rights of unlawful tenants 
as protected under section 26(3) of the Constitution, especially where the court 
considered section 25(1) and the constitutional matrix as explained by the 
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Constitutional Court. Knoll J also mentioned that the Rental Housing Act gives 
content to section 26(3) of the Constitution and that one of the objectives of the Act 
should be to provide tenure security for all tenants. In light of these observations one 
can conclude that the court did acknowledge the potential of the Rental Housing Act 
to the extent that the Act can afford better tenure security for tenants. However, this 
would depend on the court‟s interpretation of the Act. Knoll J also identified some 
form of balancing that could be done between the rights of landowners (section 
25(1)) and the interests of tenants (section 26(3)). 
Unfortunately, the court did not give content to section 26(3), nor did the court 
contextualise the meaning of the constitutional matrix in landlord-tenant law. The 
court had the opportunity to clarify and determine the relationship between section 
26(3) of the Constitution, the Rental Housing Act and the common law with regard to 
the substantive rights of both landlord and tenant. Knoll J based his decision on the 
common law, in conjunction with the Rental Housing Act concerning the process that 
should be followed to terminate the lease. The court‟s focus was not on the 
substantive tenure rights of tenants after expiration of the lease as stated in the 
Constitution and partially acknowledged in Brisley v Drotsky. 
In Jackpersad v Mitha279 the court‟s point of departure was to balance the 
interests of the competing parties in a just and equitable way. In order to balance the 
interests of the parties, the court considered the personal and socio-economic 
circumstances of both parties. The owners of residential property wanted to evict 
sixteen tenants and applied for an eviction order.280 The first to eighth applicants sold 
the property to the ninth applicant, who wished to demolish the building in which the 
respondents rented accommodation. The overall aim was to extend the City Hospital 
and the property in issue had to be demolished in order to extend the hospital.281 
The applicants complied with the provisions in PIE, although the respondents relied 
on section 4(6) of PIE, alleging that it was not “just and equitable” that they should be 
ejected. Swain J referred to the Ndlovu decision and decided that the respondents 
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had to place before the court circumstances relevant under section 4(6) of PIE in 
order for the court to exercise its discretion. The court acknowledged that it had a 
broad judicial discretion in light of the particular circumstances of the case. The court 
found that it “must have regard to the interests and circumstances of the occupiers 
and pay due regard to the broader considerations of fairness and other constitutional 
values, so as to produce a just result.”282 Swain J stated that the court is faced with 
the conflicting interests of the owner of a property and the interests of the tenants 
who occupy it. The court referred to Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various 
Occupiers283 and held that these competing interests have to be balanced in a just 
way that would promote the constitutional vision of a caring society.284 The court 
found that the respondents had a duty to disclose relevant circumstances which fell 
within their knowledge.285  
The applicants alleged that the extensions to the hospital were urgent 
because of the increased demand from patients. If the extensions were not 
constructed instantly, the hospital would experience a decline in market share.286 
The court found that the applicants‟ interest in the matter was commercial, although 
the social value of the extensions to the broad public was also a factor the court had 
to take into account. Apart from the supplementary services that would be offered by 
the hospital, the court also considered the newly created job opportunities for 
construction workers in the short term and nursing staff in the long term. This 
indicates that the court considered the socio-economic consequences if the 
extensions were in fact undertaken.287 Swain J also considered the position of the 
respondents. The length of time during which the various tenants occupied the 
building and the age of the tenants were factors the court took into account. The 
court acknowledged the fact that nine of the respondents were pensioners and that a 
number of them were in poor health.288 The court therefore gave consideration to the 
personal circumstances of the respondents in terms of PIE.  
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Apart from these realities Swain J decided that the court received no 
information regarding the financial positions of the tenants and the effect that it would 
have on their ability to acquire other accommodation. This information was within the 
exclusive knowledge of the respondents, who chose not to disclose it to the court.289 
After considering the relevant circumstances of the competing parties, based on the 
information the court received, Swain J balanced the interests of the parties, “bearing 
in mind the constitutional vision of a caring society based on good neighbourliness 
and shared concern”, and found that it was just and equitable to grant an eviction 
order.290 
The case is an interesting but limited example of what contextual personal 
and socio-economic circumstances should preferably be disclosed by the parties in 
landlord-tenant eviction cases. It is unfortunate that the respondents did not provide 
the court with sufficient information regarding these circumstances which left the 
court with an uncomplicated decision.  
Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue & 
Another291 and The Occupiers, Shulana Court, 11 Hendon Road, Yeoville, 
Johannesburg v Steele292 are the most recent cases where the courts had to 
consider the eviction of unlawful tenants. These cases are discussed at length in 
Chapter 1 in order to illustrate the problems of insufficient substantive tenure rights 
of urban tenants and the undeveloped role and landlord-tenant law in light of the 
housing crisis.293 However, it is important to briefly mention some aspects of the 
decisions here, because the cases contribute to the development of landlord-tenant 
law. 
In Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue & 
Another294 the owner of property was entitled to an eviction order at common law 
and upon the unlawful tenants‟ failure to vacate the premises, claimed an eviction 
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order.295 The respondents were living in extreme poverty and it was apparent that 
they would not be able to acquire affordable alternative accommodation in the 
Johannesburg Central Business District, where they were living and working at that 
time.296 The court considered the occupiers‟ constitutional right to have access to 
adequate housing, the state‟s duty to introduce measures to give effect to this right 
(sections 26(1) and 26(2)) and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land 19 of 1998 (PIE).297 The state was unable to make available 
alternative accommodation to the occupiers and question the court consequently had 
to decide was whether private landowners could be compelled to accommodate 
unlawful occupiers who are unable to acquire affordable alternative 
accommodation.298 The court held that the private landowner was entitled to an 
eviction order, although the eviction order was suspended until the respondents 
could find alternative accommodation, and the state was ordered to pay the applicant 
an amount equivalent to the fair and reasonable monthly rental of the premises until 
the occupiers vacated the premises.299 
In The Occupiers, Shulana Court, 11 Hendon Road, Yeoville, Johannesburg v 
Steele300 the South African Supreme Court of Appeal had to decide whether to 
dismiss an application for rescission of an eviction order granted by default against 
the appellants.301 The respondent terminated the appellants‟ leases at common law 
and upon their failure to vacate the premises instituted eviction proceedings. The 
high court granted the eviction, even though the appellants failed to oppose the 
proceedings. The appellants applied for rescission of the eviction order.302 
In order to succeed in the application for rescission at common law the 
appellants had to show good cause for their default, which included “a bona fide 
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defence to the plaintiff‟s claim which prima facie has some prospect of success.”303 
In support of the rescission application one of the appellants explained the personal 
circumstances of the appellants. All the occupiers were poor and unable to find 
affordable alternative accommodation in the inner city.304  
The Court considered the constitutional duty of the state in light of the housing 
provision (section 26) and highlighted the importance of PIE as a mechanism that 
strives to give effect to section 26(3).305 The Court emphasised the duty of the courts 
to consider all relevant circumstances before granting an eviction order and held that 
the high court failed to discharge its statutory and constitutional obligations. In light of 
the appellants‟ personal circumstances, and specifically the fact that the eviction 
order might render the households homeless, the Court found that the appellants 
had established a bona fide defence and therefore also succeeded to show good 
cause for a rescission order in terms of the common law.306 The default eviction 
order was rescinded and the appellants were granted leave to oppose the eviction 
application.307 
In both cases, the landowners was entitled to eviction orders in terms of the 
common law, but the courts refused to grant the eviction orders, because it was not 
just and equitable in light of the occupiers‟ personal circumstances. The most 
important consideration was the fact that eviction might have rendered the 
households homeless. Despite the City‟s duty to accommodate vulnerable occupiers 
who are facing homelessness, the obvious problem remained that the City did not 
have alternative accommodation available. The courts refused to approve the 
eviction orders in consequence of the occupiers‟ socio-economic weakness. The 
courts had to prevent unjust evictions and therefore interpreted PIE, which gives 
effect to section 26(3), to provide substantive tenure protection for marginalised 
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occupiers, which is a form of class-related tenure protection afforded particularly to 
socially and economically marginalised occupiers of residential property. 
The courts refused to grant the eviction orders and consequently, were forced 
to burden the private landowners with the temporary duty to make available housing 
to the occupiers. In Blue Moonlight the court had to balance the rights of both parties 
and therefore decided to construe some form of payment for the private landowner in 
return for allowing the unlawful occupiers to remain on the property on a temporary 
basis. However, the state had to pay compensation in the form of rental payments. 
 
3.8.6 Conclusion 
 
The Brisley decision partially gave content to the meaning of section 26(3) where it 
held that “all relevant circumstances” meant all legally relevant circumstances. The 
Ndlovu decision made no reference to section 26(3), nor did the Court make any 
reference to the Brisley decision, while in Kendall the court based its decision on the 
common law and the Rental Housing Act, therefore not giving content to section 
26(3) of the Constitution either. The courts limited the significance of section 26(3) by 
deciding that the only relevant circumstances any court currently has to consider is 
the legally relevant circumstances. Section 26(3) serves a much wider purpose 
because it forms part of the housing provision, which ensures a right to have access 
to adequate housing, an obligation on the state to realise this right and better 
procedural safeguards for all occupiers in the event of eviction proceedings. In Jaftha 
v Schoeman and Others; Van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others308 the Court decided that 
“any measure which permits a person to be deprived of existing access to adequate 
housing limits the rights protected in s 26(1). Such a measure may, however, be 
justified under s 36 of the Constitution.”309 Section 26 thus “weighs against the 
eviction of people who already have access to housing.”310 This means that once a 
tenant is effortlessly evicted, without considering all relevant circumstances, the 
purpose of section 26(1) is undermined, because such an occupier will once again 
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be homeless, again joining the millions of homeless South Africans in dire need of 
housing.311  
In Jackpersad v Mitha the court developed some insight in terms of what the 
court can consider when faced with an eviction order. In the recent cases of Blue 
Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue & Another312 and 
The Occupiers, Shulana Court, 11 Hendon Road, Yeoville, Johannesburg v Steele313 
the courts interpreted PIE, which gives effect to section 26(3), in order to suspend 
eviction orders that would have resulted in occupiers being rendered homeless. In 
both cases the courts took into consideration the socio-economic circumstances of 
the occupiers and refused to grant the eviction orders, which the landowners were 
entitled to at common law.314 In Blue Moonlight the court interpreted PIE to provide 
substantive tenure protection for the occupiers, even though the eviction order was 
suspended for a limited period. 
A final issue that requires some brief consideration in this section is the 
tension between the constitutional property rights of landowners and the 
strengthened rights of occupiers. Section 25(1) of the Constitution states that “[n]o 
one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and 
no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property.”  
From the discussion in 3.2.3 one can conclude that the common law does not 
provide strengthened tenure rights for tenants that might come into conflict with the 
constitutional rights of landowners. It is also clear from the discussion in 3.4.2 and 
3.6.2 that the housing legislation applicable to urban landlord-tenant law, specifically 
the Rental Housing Act and the Social Housing Act, does not ensure strengthened 
tenure rights for tenants that might deprive private landowners of their property 
rights. In Brisley315 the Court found that although section 26(3) of the Constitution 
applies horizontally in landlord-tenant evictions,316 the court cannot refuse an 
eviction order based on the personal circumstances of the tenant as this would 
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amount to depriving the landowner of an entitlement he had at common law.317 In 
Ndlovu318 the Court extended the application of PIE to tenants holding over,319 which 
had the effect of suspending landowners‟ proprietary right to eviction.320 The result 
was that PIE provided strengthened tenure rights for urban residential tenants, even 
though the extent of protection was largely procedural. The effect of Blue Moonlight 
and Shulana Court is that the courts must consider the socio-economic 
circumstances of the occupiers, including their personal circumstances, during 
eviction proceedings. In terms of PIE the courts can refuse eviction orders on the 
basis of the tenant‟s socio-economic weakness. The court can refuse to grant the 
eviction order if it would be unjust in light of the occupier‟s personal circumstances. 
The courts are therefore at liberty to grant tenants substantive tenure protection in 
terms of PIE, based on the socio-economic weakness of the tenants. 
One should also note that the Prevention of Illegal Eviction From and 
Unlawful Occupation of Land Amendment Bill was published321 in 2008 and the most 
important aim of the Bill is to restrict the application PIE that tenants holding over 
would no longer fall under the ambit of the Act. 
The effect of the most recent decisions is that urban residential tenants who 
face eviction can resort to protection under PIE in order to prevent or suspend 
eviction. If the tenant holding over relies on section 26(3) on the basis of the Brisley 
decision, the extent of protection would be limited because only the legally relevant 
circumstances could be considered by the court. If the tenant relies on PIE, he might 
be awarded more protection, although the extent of the tenure protection would 
depend on the occupier‟s socio-economic circumstances and the court would only 
grant substantive tenure protection if the occupier has a socio-economic weakness.  
One can conclude from the discussion in 3.8 that the courts‟ efforts in 
developing strengthened tenure rights for urban residential tenants have developed 
quite extensively since the beginning of the post-1994 era.  
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However, new legislation in the urban landlord-tenant sphere that aims to 
provide substantive tenure protection for urban tenants is not unlikely, especially in 
consideration of the discussion in 3.9. The unavoidable question that arises is 
whether (current or future) legislation that strengthens the occupation rights of 
tenants, thereby restricting the property rights of private landowners, do (or could) 
not amount to a arbitrary deprivation,322 in contravention of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution. As mentioned earlier, section 25(1) contains two requirements, namely 
that deprivation must take place in terms of law of general application and that no 
law may permit arbitrary deprivation. Van der Walt mentions that these requirements 
function as threshold requirements to the extent that non-compliance would render 
the limitation (deprivation) invalid.323 It is important to note that “law of general 
application” includes the common law and customary law.324 The common law can 
therefore authorize a regulatory deprivation of property. A law of general application 
that authorizes deprivation of property must be non-arbitrary, generally applicable, 
accessible and specific in order to be constitutionally valid.325 Once it is confirmed 
that the law is generally applicable, the next question is whether the deprivation is 
non-arbitrary. In First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South 
African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of 
Finance326 the Constitutional Court proposed certain steps that should be followed 
when considering the constitutionality of any limitation of property rights, which 
includes the issue regarding arbitrariness, in order to determine whether the 
limitation was valid.327 The essence of the decision was that deprivation would be 
arbitrary if there was insufficient reason for it or if it was procedurally unfair.328 
The detail of this methodology is discussed in Chapter 8 in light of possible 
new legislation that would afford tenants strengthened tenure rights to give effect to 
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sections 25(6), 26(1) and 26(3). At this stage one can safely assume that the effect 
of anti-eviction statutes is to restrict the property rights of landowners as protected 
section 25(1). The constitutional justifiability of rent regulation, which includes 
strengthened tenure rights for tenants, is discussed in Chapter 6 by examining 
American landlord-tenant laws that include anti-eviction regulations. The question 
regarding the extent to which private property rights can be constitutionally limited is 
discussed in Chapter 7 by analysing German private and constitutional landlord-
tenant law. 
 
3.9 Constitutional analysis of legislation 
 
In light of the methodology used by the courts to decide landlord-tenant cases, and 
specifically the rights of urban residential tenants who continue to occupy the 
premises upon expiration of their leases, it becomes clear that the relationship 
between the common law, anti-eviction statutes and the Constitution is uncertain. 
Through an in-depth analysis of the 2007 Constitutional Court decisions, Van der 
Walt proposes a methodology that could be used when applying legislation that was 
enacted to give effect to constitutional provisions, although it also explains the 
method that parties (and the courts) could follow in cases where there is no 
legislation or in cases where the legislation is insufficient.329 The methodology is 
referred to as the subsidiarity approach (or principle). The questions that the courts 
struggle with, and that one can identify in the previous case law discussion, are 
formulated by Van der Walt as: 
“[w]hen should the Constitution or new legislation trump the common law; when 
should the common law be developed to promote the spirit, purport and objects 
of the Constitution …, [and] what should the effect of established common law 
norms and values be when it is unclear whether the Constitution or new 
legislation trumps the common law?”330 
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The point of departure in terms of this methodology is that a litigant must rely on 
legislation that was promulgated with the aim to give effect to a constitutional right if 
that person wishes to enforce that right.331 In such a case the litigant may not rely 
directly on the specific constitutional provision, except when the constitutional validity 
of the act is challenged.332 If the legislation was enacted to give effect to the 
constitutional provision and to codify the common law, the litigant must rely on the 
legislation to enforce that right and may not rely directly on the Constitution or the 
common law.333 However, legislation that was intended to codify the common law or 
give effect to a constitutional provision might sometimes leave what Van der Walt 
would refer to as “gaps”334 in that specific area of law. These gaps are areas of 
constitutional rights that were not enacted in any legislation and were therefore left 
untouched by the legislature, either by mistake or on purpose.335 In order to give 
effect to the right and thereby “fill the gap”, Van der Walt argues that the court must 
first apply and develop the common law in line with the constitutional right of the 
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claimant.336 If it is not possible or sufficient to develop the common law in line with 
the constitutional right, then the litigant can rely directly on the constitutional right.337  
In the absence of legislation Van der Walt argues that the claimant must first 
resort to the common law, unless she wishes to challenge the constitutional validity 
of the common law. If the claimant relies on the common law and the common law 
fails to give effect to the claimant‟s constitutional right, then the courts should 
interpret and develop the common law in line with the spirit, purport and objects of 
the Constitution in order to give effect to the right.338 However, if it is not possible to 
develop the common law sufficiently in line with the Constitution then the claimant 
should rely directly on the Constitution. If the common law is in conflict with the 
Constitution then the claimant would launch a constitutional attack to invalidate the 
common law, although this option is unlikely to occur. Where the common law is in 
line with the Constitution, but it does not give effect to the Constitution sufficiently, 
the court can either recommend legislation or provide the claimant with a 
constitutional remedy.339 If the court recommends legislation it would usually give the 
state a period of time to promulgate or amend the statute, while providing the 
claimant with an immediate remedy.   
One should note that in terms of the subsidiarity principle direct appeal to the 
Constitution is a last resort and could only follow once it is clear that the specific 
constitutional right has not been enacted in legislation and cannot be given effect to 
through the development of the common law.340 
In the landlord-tenant framework, as discussed throughout this chapter, it is 
apparent that there are three main constitutional provisions, namely sections 25(6), 
26(1) and 26(3) that relate to the tenure rights of urban residential tenants. In the 
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following paragraphs these sections and the laws that were promulgated in order to 
give effect to these rights are analysed by means of the subsidiarity approach that 
was developed by Van der Walt.341 The aim of this analysis is to identify areas of 
landlord-tenant law, specifically related to the tenure rights of urban residential 
tenants that are constitutionally protected, although not sufficiently given effect to in 
the legislative scheme. In some cases the shortcomings in existing legislation may 
be corrected through interpretation of the legislation (reading down, reading in), but 
in some instances gaps will remain that are too substantial for the courts to fill by 
way of judicial interpretation. According to the methodology developed by Van der 
Walt, once these areas of law (gaps) are identified the court should either develop 
the common law (indirect constitutional application) in line with the constitutional right 
in order to give effect to the right or construe a constitutional remedy (direct 
constitutional application) for the claimant.342 
Section 25(6) of the Constitution states that “[a] person or community whose 
tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or 
practices is entitled … to tenure that is legally secure”. In 3.3 above it was argued 
that this section applies to all black persons who currently occupy land with insecure 
title. In terms of this section, these individuals are entitled to secure tenure. In 3.3 it 
was also found that the legislature enacted a number of laws to secure the 
occupation rights of rural occupiers. However, the tenure rights of urban residential 
occupiers, and more specifically urban residential tenants, have to date not been 
addressed sufficiently in terms of this constitutional provision. Even if the Rental 
Housing Act 50 of 1999 and the Social Housing Act 16 of 2008 were not enacted 
with the specific aim to provide urban tenants with secure tenure in terms of section 
25(6), these laws still cover the landlord-tenant sphere that forms a large percentage 
of the general housing market and should therefore ensure secure tenure for black 
urban residential tenants with insecure tenure. In 3.6.2 it was argued that the Rental 
Housing Act does not give adequate security of tenure.  
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In terms of the subsidiarity approach one can confirm that there are gaps in 
the legislative scheme, because the insecure tenure rights of black urban residential 
tenants have not been addressed sufficiently in legislation and these households are 
entitled to redress in terms of section 25(6). Generally speaking, these gaps are of a 
nature and scope that cannot be rectified through judicial interpretation. The courts 
should therefore first aim at developing the common law in line with section 25(6), 
but the success of this option is doubtful because the essence of the common law is 
to enforce the strong right of the landowner to repossess the property once the right 
of the tenant has expired. This rule was entrenched rather than qualified in sections 
4(5)(c) and 4(5)(d)(ii) of the Rental Housing Act.343  
Another option is a direct constitutional approach, in which case the claimant 
tenant would rely directly on section 25(6) in order to acquire a constitutional remedy 
(or defence), based directly on the relevant constitutional provision, that would 
provide her with secure tenure. However, the diversity of tenants in South Africa and 
their different needs in relation to secure tenure renders this option unlikely, as large 
numbers of claimants and defendants would have to approach the courts repeatedly 
and on an ongoing basis in order to acquire an appropriate constitutional remedy for 
each specific case. From the discussion it becomes clear that new legislation could 
most easily and efficiently provide black urban residential tenants with secure 
occupation rights, while giving clarity for case law to follow. Legislation is a better 
solution because it can provide diverse tenants with different tenure rights. 
A similar line of argument applies to section 26. Section 26(1) of the 
Constitution is known as the housing provision and it states that “[e]veryone has the 
right to have access to adequate housing.” In 3.4.3 it was argued that security of 
tenure forms a key aspect of adequate housing. In 3.6.2 and 3.4.2 it was argued that 
the Rental Housing Act and the Social Housing Act do not afford urban residential 
tenants with secure tenure, as these laws reinforce the strong common law rights of 
landowners to evict tenants upon expiration of their leases. The preamble of both the 
Rental Housing Act and the Social Housing Act refers to section 26(1) and based on 
the discussion in 3.4.2 it is consequently clear that these laws form part of the nexus 
of laws that give effect to individuals‟ right to have access to adequate housing. 
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However, in section 3.4.2 it was also argued that the extent of increased access to 
housing as made available by these laws is inadequate. When the content of urban 
tenants‟ tenure rights, as included in the legislation, is considered in light of the 
international definition of adequate housing it is evident that these laws do not give 
effect to section 26(1) sufficiently, as urban tenants are not provided with adequate 
housing, because they occupy leased property with insecure tenure. The landlord-
tenants laws also fail to introduce measures that would promote access to rental 
housing. 
It follows that there is a gap in the legislative scheme that is in need of 
rectification. This could be done by either developing the common law in line with the 
Constitution (indirect constitutional application) or by relying directly on the 
Constitution (direct constitutional application) in order to acquire a constitutional 
remedy. Once again it is doubtful whether these options would be useful. The core of 
the common law is to protect the rights of landowners and not to strengthen the 
tenure rights of occupiers who usually acquire a mere personal right. In order to 
provide tenants with secure tenure rights and thereby aim to adhere to section 26(1), 
the common law would have to be amended drastically. Indirect constitutional 
application is consequently not a viable solution. Direct constitutional application 
might provide the claimant with the required constitutional remedy, although this may 
not result in the best long term solution due to the variety of tenants and their 
corresponding diverse tenure needs. New legislation that affords better tenure rights 
to urban residential tenants with the aim to give effect to section 26(1) is a more 
viable option in providing adequate rental housing. Legislation would also be able to 
solve the complexity of the urban rental market with regard to the extent of tenure 
security necessary for different tenants, as some tenants would require better tenure 
security than others. The issue regarding the extent of increased access to urban 
housing (and specifically rental housing) could also be addressed in legislation if the 
legislature can introduce and develop incentives for private developers to invest in 
the provision of rental housing. Some initiative has already been introduced in the 
Social Housing Act where the government must fund the social housing programme 
to promote the supply of rental housing stock. This initiative must be supported and 
developed to encourage private investment in the provision of housing. 
174 
 
In terms of section 26(3) of the Constitution “[n]o one may be evicted from 
their home … without an order of court made after considering all the relevant 
circumstances”. Section 4(5)(d)(ii) of the Rental Housing Act requires that a landlord 
who wishes to repossess his property must first obtain an order of court. This 
provision is not necessarily in conflict with section 26(3), because a claimant-tenant 
would be able to argue that section 4(5)(d)(ii) must be read in light of section 26(3) 
and that eviction may then only follow once the court has considered all the relevant 
circumstances. The effect of Ndlovu v Ngcobo / Bekker v Jika344 is that the 
Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1999 
(PIE) applies to tenants holding over.345 The Act gives effect to section 26(3) of the 
Constitution, as it mandates the courts to consider the relevant circumstances of 
unlawful occupiers before eviction may follow. According to Blue Moonlight and 
Shulana Court, the courts must consider the personal and socio-economic 
circumstances of unlawful tenants, in terms of PIE, during eviction proceedings. The 
courts can therefore refuse to grant eviction orders, based on the socio-economic 
weakness of tenants, and provide marginalised occupiers with substantive tenure 
rights. This position is bound to change as the 2008 Bill intends to limit application of 
PIE to unlawful occupiers who initially occupied the land unlawfully. As mentioned in 
3.8.4 this would exclude tenants who are holding over. In such a case the eviction 
proceedings of urban tenants would be regulated under section 4(5)(d)(ii) of the 
Rental Housing Act, which would necessitate some interpretation in light of section 
26(3) by the courts.  
The application of the subsidiarity approach is different in consideration of 
section 26(3), because the Rental Housing Act (and Social Housing Act) supposedly 
gives effect to section 26(3) of the Constitution. These statutes did not codify the 
common law, because landlords can still rely on the common law to evict tenants. 
There would be a gap in the landlord-tenant scheme once PIE is amended, as these 
laws, namely the Rental Housing Act and the Social Housing Act, do not give effect 
to section 26(3), but rather allow common law evictions.346 In terms of section 39(2) 
of the Constitution the court must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
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Rights when interpreting legislation. The court has the ability to read the aim of 
section 26(3) into the Rental Housing Act, although the question remains whether 
this technique would be sufficient to give effect to section 26(3), especially once PIE 
is amended and tenants holding over are no longer protected in terms of PIE, but 
only in terms of the Rental Housing Act. In light of section 26(3), read with section 
39(2), the courts can afford protection for tenants in the event of eviction by reading 
some tenure security into the Rental Housing Act. The question is whether the courts 
would be able to sufficiently construe some protection for urban tenants by means of 
this method, because the tenure needs of all urban tenants are not necessarily 
similar. The diversity of tenants justifies new or amended legislation that would 
provide protection in the case of eviction, either through the provision of substantive 
occupation rights or through procedural protection. The extent of the protection must 
depend on the specific needs of the tenant. 
From the discussion one can conclude that the enactment of new legislation 
is the best option to address the gaps that exist or that developed in the landlord-
tenant legislation. New legislation would be able to address the different areas of law 
that are currently not giving effect to the constitutional obligations as stated in 
sections 25(6), 26(1) and 26(3), although the current landlord-tenant laws could also 
be amended to include new forms of secure tenure. At this stage it would be 
premature to suggest details regarding new legislation, or even an entirely new 
landlord-tenant framework, because it is unclear what forms of tenure security (and 
rent control) should be afforded to which tenants. The diversity of urban residential 
tenants in South Africa justifies different levels of tenure security, because these 
tenants‟ tenure needs are diverse. By analyzing foreign landlord-tenant laws that 
ensure substantive tenure security for diverse members of society during different 
economic, political and social periods in time, one can start to formulate possible 
forms of tenure rights for urban residential tenants in South Africa. 
 
3.10 Conclusion  
 
The post-1994 government formulated a vision of how it proposed to provide housing 
to all South Africans. This vision was drafted in various policy documents and was 
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amended during the last couple of years. The focus was initially to grant home 
ownership to homeless individuals, although lately the government realised that 
home ownership is not necessarily possible or preferable to all who are in need of 
housing. Currently the government is placing more emphasis on rental housing in the 
private and social sector as a form of tenure that could give access to adequate 
housing.347 Rental housing could prove to be the more preferable form of tenure for 
marginalised occupiers, because the state can (and should) be proactively involved 
in the provision of housing. Through the provision of social rental housing where the 
state is involved and acting as landlord the legislature can more easily asses, 
evaluate and amend the laws to suit the needs of all occupiers. In the pre-1994 era 
the legislature also accommodated white marginalised tenants during housing 
shortages by regulating the private rental market. Rental housing is a key form of 
housing for vulnerable occupiers, because the state can actively act as guardian in 
the provision of secure housing. This is evident from the foreign law discussions in 
Chapters 4, 6 and 7. 
From the discussion in 3.4.3 it is clear that adequate housing includes secure 
occupation rights and that if the government aims to make available housing in the 
form of rental housing then tenants would have to be afforded secure tenure. 
In terms of section 26(2), the state has a positive obligation to introduce 
measures in the form of policy and legislation that would give effect to the right to 
have access to adequate housing. The rental housing legislation enacted in order to 
give effect to this obligation is the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 and the Social 
Housing Act 16 of 2008. The question is whether the legislation is efficient to 
alleviate housing shortages and provide individuals with adequate housing, thereby 
adhering to the transformative goal of the Constitution and rectifying the imbalances 
of apartheid. In terms of section 26(1) housing shortages can be alleviated by 
providing enough adequate housing. However, adequate housing includes secure 
tenure and the current tenure rights of urban occupiers, and more specifically urban 
tenants, are not secure, because these rights are still largely based on the common 
law. The provision of rental housing, either in the private or social sector, in order to 
satisfy the constitutional obligation in sections 26(1) and 26(2), would be suspect if it 
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were not combined with secure occupation rights, since insecure tenure was the 
basis upon which the apartheid government could evict black occupiers. 
The case law discussed in this chapter suggests that the anti-eviction 
measures introduced under section 26(3) of the Constitution and PIE can ensure 
substantive security rights for urban tenants. The courts failed to give content to the 
meaning of section 26(3) of the Constitution in the area of landlord-tenant law and 
rather suppressed the meaning of the section by relying on the common law to 
determine what “relevant circumstances” should be considered in order to make a 
fair eviction order. Recently the courts interpreted PIE to grant substantive tenure 
protection for marginalised urban tenants, which is a development that should be 
supported. However, the Prevention of Illegal Eviction From and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Amendment Bill proposes to amend section 2 of PIE by adding 
that tenants whose occupation became unlawful would not fall under the ambit of the 
Act, which would remove tenants from the protection of the Act. The substance of 
the primary landlord-tenant legislative measures introduced to give effect to the 
housing provision reinforces the common law. The majority of landlord-tenant 
measures merely provide occupiers, and more specifically tenants, with procedural 
safeguards. If landlords follow the procedural methods included in the statutes, 
tenants would usually be evicted. The landlord-tenant laws do therefore not afford 
substantive tenure protection in the form of continued occupation rights for tenants in 
general. The substantive tenure protection (in terms of PIE in the recent cases) was 
exceptional and derived from due process measures. The substantive tenure 
protection was granted during the eviction proceedings and had a limited protective 
effect, because it applied temporarily. 
The history of forced removals, made possible through weak tenure rights of 
black occupiers; the current socio-economic state of homeless individuals; and the 
constitutional obligations to ensure secure tenure (section 25(6)), access to 
adequate housing (section 26(1)) and due process in the event of evictions (section 
26(3)) require new landlord-tenant legislation in urban residential areas that would 
provide various occupiers with better tenure security in the form of continued 
occupation rights upon expiration of the lease in order to establish a home. The 
Rental Housing Act and the Social Housing Act, drafted under the positive obligation 
of the state in terms of sections 26(1) and 26(2) of the Constitution, refer to the 
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common law position of tenants upon termination of the lease. The legislation 
reinforces the common law position of urban tenants and private (or public) 
landowners when considering security of tenure. In terms of the subsidiarity 
approach one can conclude that the landlord-tenants laws, and some of the other 
anti-eviction measures, fail to give full effect to the Constitution. The case law also 
reflects this reality, as the courts struggle to sufficiently give effect to the 
constitutional measures through interpreting the legislation. From the discussion in 
3.9 it is doubtful whether the courts would be able to provide urban tenants with 
substantive tenure rights by reading in the relevant rights, because the ambit and 
complexity of such a task is too complicated and wide. It would be more sufficient for 
the legislature to draft new legislation that gives effect to section 25(6) and section 
26. 
In order to develop new legislation to improve tenure security in urban rental 
housing, the government should give more consideration to previous South African 
rents legislation, which is discussed in Chapter 2. These statutes awarded 
substantive tenure security for tenants in urban areas during housing shortages by 
providing that the landlord could only terminate the lease upon expiration of the 
contract if certain circumstances prevailed, focusing primarily on the circumstances 
of the landlord. English, German, Dutch and American landlord-tenant legislation, 
which is discussed in Chapters 4-7, should also be considered because it affords 
similar tenure security. German legislation sometimes delays or prevents termination 
of a residential lease in order to avoid unjustifiable hardship for the tenant and 
therefore focuses on the personal circumstances of the tenant. English legislation 
makes provision for security of tenure in various sectors. These diverse sectors 
ensure different levels of tenure security, because the occupiers in each sector vary. 
Some tenants enjoy substantive tenure protection, while others are merely granted 
procedural safeguards. The latter is usually tenants in the private market, while the 
former is usually social sector tenants. The vulnerable and marginalised occupiers 
who usually occupy social housing enjoy substantive security of tenure and some 
form of rent control.  At common law the landlord can only end the tenancy by means 
of a court order. However, through statutory intervention the legislature afforded 
some tenants continued occupation rights upon termination of the original tenancy. 
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In some cases reasonableness (which includes the personal circumstances of the 
tenant) is a factor the courts have to consider.  
Tenure security for urban residential tenants could be improved by affording 
the tenant certain rights to continue the lease after termination of the lease, while 
placing restrictions on the rights which the landlord normally would have had at 
common law to end the relationship. At this stage it is important to note that a new 
legislative framework in the area of landlord-tenant law has to be context-sensitive. 
The diversity of tenants in South Africa necessitates a context-sensitive landlord-
tenant framework that would provide some tenants with better security of tenure than 
others, among other things in an effort to protect the rights of landowners. The 
possible intricacies of this framework are discussed in Chapter 8. The balancing of 
rights between that of landlord and tenant is a core consideration in successfully 
drafting such a legal framework. The rights of landowners have to be restricted in a 
constitutionally justified manner without unfairly depriving landowners of such rights. 
The rights of landowners, as protected in section 25(1) of the Constitution, have to 
be balanced with the strengthened rights of tenants.  
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4.1 Introduction 
 
Housing shortages that developed in Europe as a result of the First and Second 
World War motivated the English legislature to enact legislation in order to provide 
better tenure rights for tenants, thereby statutorily interfering in the relationship 
between landlord and tenant. This statutory intervention was initially justified by dire 
socio-economic circumstances, although the security principles underlying the 
statutes remained on the statute book for most of the twentieth century (during which 
period Britain also experienced economic prosperity) and some of these principles 
are currently still enshrined in the landlord-tenant regulatory framework. The effect of 
the legislation is to place restrictions on termination of the tenancy, which in turn 
results in a prolonged tenancy as eviction becomes impossible. Through the 
operation of some statutes, tenants can practically enjoy a tenancy for life at 
reasonable rents, as some of the statutes also restrict the rent. Where the landlord 
succeeds in terminating the tenancy, eviction may follow, although it is subjected to 
procedural controls that ensure due process and fairness.1 In all the rental sectors 
the landlord is obliged to claim possession in court in order to obtain an eviction 
order. In some instances the court has a wide discretion to consider various 
circumstances, mostly related to the personal circumstances of the tenant and the 
impact that the eviction order might have on the tenant and his family. The landlord‟s 
strong common law right to evict the tenant upon expiration of the lease, in 
accordance with an explicit provision in the lease, or through the operation of general 
property (or contract) law is in these instances restricted substantively to prevent an 
unjustifiably harsh impact on the tenant or his family.2 
The pre-1994 position in South Africa with regard to the reasons for regulation 
of the landlord-tenant relationship is comparable to the English position after the 
Second World War.3 The aim of the pre-1994 South African statutes was also to 
provide continued occupation rights for tenants upon expiration of the lease, 
combined with rent control, although the position in the two jurisdictions were 
different. The Rents Acts in South Africa only granted tenure security for white 
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 Van der Walt AJ Property in the Margins (2009) 83. 
2
 Van der Walt AJ Property in the Margins (2009) 83. 
3
 See Chapter 2. 
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tenants, while the English landlord-tenant legislation applied (and still applies) to 
tenants according to the type of landlord, either being a social or private landlord. In 
South Africa the strong common law right of landlords to repossess their property 
when the tenancy has terminated resurfaced during a period of economic upswing,4 
while the English legislature never abolished security of tenure or rent control in its 
entirety within the landlord-tenant framework (which includes the private and social 
sector), but rather amended the degree of security according to changing housing 
policy. The English legislative framework regulating landlord-tenant law is complex 
because the rental market is divided into various sectors, each providing different 
levels of tenure security to different members of society. The substance of the 
security afforded constantly changes in these various sectors, driven by the 
government‟s ever-changing housing policies in response to socio-economic 
circumstances. 
The continued operation of these English statutes through periods of 
economic prosperity is noteworthy because the legislature chose not to abolish the 
legislation, since some individuals are still in need of affordable, secure rental 
housing during periods of economic prosperity.5 Throughout the twentieth century 
the English legislature has developed a landlord-tenant scheme that is context-
sensitive as it caters for most members of society while continually adapting the aim 
of the various statutes to respond to changes in the housing policy that reflect the 
socio-economic circumstances. It is therefore necessary to investigate and examine 
the whole of the English landlord-tenant system in some detail, because it presents 
answers to numerous questions regarding the failure of the current landlord-tenant 
laws in South Africa to provide adequate housing and tenure security in accordance 
with the post-apartheid constitutional obligations. 
This chapter is divided into five broad sections. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 explain 
the fundamental English leasehold concepts and the nature of a tenancy in English 
law, since the English land law system differs substantially from the South African 
one. The importance of housing policy with regard to the extent of statutory 
intervention through legislation is discussed in section 4.4. In 4.5 some of the 
                                                          
4
 See section 2.4 in Chapter 2. 
5
 The allocation of different forms of rental housing to diverse members of society is a complex set of 
rules and policies within the landlord-tenant framework. See Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in 
Context (2007) 190-202 for the allocation of social and private rental housing in the UK. 
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policies that were introduced in English law and their effect on previous legislation 
and the rental housing market in general are discussed. Section 4.6 is an in-depth 
discussion of the current statutes that regulate landlord-tenant law in England and 
Wales, specifically in relation to the level of tenure security afforded and, to a lesser 
extent, the limited use of rent control.  
 
4.2 Leasehold concepts 
 
An important concept to take note of in English land law is the notion of an estate in 
land (analogous to an interest in land) because land cannot be owned.6 One can 
therefore acquire an interest in land, comprising of certain rights and obligations. The 
rights and obligations will depend on the individual‟s interest in the land. Such an 
interest can be held for various periods of time, depending on the nature of the 
interest.7 The Law of Property Act 1925 provides that only two estates in land are 
capable of existing at law, namely an estate in fee simple absolute in possession and 
a term of years absolute, although other estates can exist in equity.8 The holder of a 
fee simple absolute in possession, commonly known as a freeholder, acquires an 
estate in the land for an unlimited time, which is the closest one can come to the 
civil-law notion of ownership of land in English law.9 A term of years absolute is 
known as a lease or a leasehold estate10 and is an estate in land for a fixed term, 
although it can also be held periodically.11 The holder of a term of years is commonly 
                                                          
6
 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 48-49 states that the law “is one of possession” 
and not ownership. 
7
 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 3. 
8
 Section 1. 
9
 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 6 defines the position of the 
freeholder as the “holder of the greatest estate in land”.  The freeholder has the ability to create lesser 
estates in the land by renting out the property. If the freeholder decides not to occupy the property 
himself and grants a lease, he would be known as the landlord. If the freehold estate owner occupies 
the property, he is known as the “owner-occupier”. A leaseholder would not be able to acquire the 
whole of the estate because the freeholder retains the reversion: Garner S A Practical Approach to 
Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 9. 
10
 Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5
th
 ed 2009) 307 mention that, according to the labour 
government, the law of leasehold is currently “flawed” because it has “its roots in feudal system”, 
which is regarded as “heavily weighted in favour of one party (ie the landlord)”. The tenant merely 
acquires a wasting asset for which he has paid the full market value. 
11
 A lease could be defined as the transaction which enables the landlord to vest a term of years in 
the tenant, but the terms “tenancy”, “lease” and “term of years” are currently all being used to describe 
the proprietary interest (or estate) vested on the land: Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5
th
 
ed 2009) 307. 
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known as the leaseholder.12 A term of years absolute is a proprietary interest in 
land.13 The holder of the term of years is also entitled to create a new, shorter, 
interest out of his tenancy14 by sub-leasing the land.15 Various individuals can each 
hold an estate in one piece of land at the same time, although their estates differ.16 
Clarke states that the purpose of a lease is to divide the interests of the property 
between various individuals by means of contract.17 Clarke argues that such a 
division of interests is also known as “a split in ownership”.18 The tenant will acquire 
fundamental “property” rights in the leased land (such as the right to exclude), while 
the landlord will retain the reversionary19 interest, along with certain other rights 
(including the right to alienate the reversionary interest). “Ownership” comprises of 
various rights and through lease these rights are divided between the landlord and 
the tenant (or tenants). It is central to English landlord-tenant law that policy must 
ensure a balanced split of “ownership” between the parties, taking into consideration 
the interests of all the parties involved.20 The point of departure in English landlord-
tenant law is the relationship between the landlord and the tenant in respect of the 
leased land and not merely the relationship between one of the parties and the land, 
nor the plain contractual relationship between the parties.21 
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 Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5
th
 ed 2009) 307. 
13
 Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5
th
 ed 2009) 306. 
14
 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 5 defines a tenancy as the tenant‟s interest in 
the land.  
15
 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 5. Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law 
(5
th
 ed 2009) 306 mention that a term of years can be the subject of a range of transactions in the 
form of either assignment or sublease. 
16
 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 3-4. 
17
 Clarke D “Long Residential Leases: Future Directions” in Bright S (ed) Landlord and Tenant Law. 
Past, Present and Future (2006) 171-190 at 172. 
18
 Clarke D “Long Residential Leases: Future Directions” in Bright S (ed) Landlord and Tenant Law. 
Past, Present and Future (2006) 171-190 at 172.  
19
 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 23 defines a reversion as “the landlord‟s 
interest in the property remaining after the lease has been granted”. 
20
 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 49. See section 4.4 below for a discussion on 
housing policy. 
21
 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 3-4. One should also take 
note of two other categories of occupiers at common law, known as the licensee and the trespasser. 
The licensee is an occupier who acquires the permission to use the property, although the possession 
of the land stays with the freeholder. The licensee can therefore not exclude the freeholder from the 
property. The main difference between a tenancy and a licence is that of exclusive possession. A 
licensee is not entitled to exclusive possession, while a tenant can exclude the landlord and third 
parties from the leased premises: Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 79. The 
trespasser uses the land without permission. The term “squatter” does not have a significant meaning 
in English land law because the lawfulness of the occupier‟s occupation will determine whether he is a 
licensee or a trespasser. The term squatter rather refers to a long-term trespasser: Garner S A 
Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 5, 10-12. 
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In order to create a tenancy (also known as a lease) there must be a landlord 
and a tenant; the tenant must have exclusive possession for a definite period of 
time;22 the land must be identifiable and the landlord must preserve a reversion. 
Payment of rent is not a requirement for the creation of a tenancy, although the 
absence of rent will have the effect of excluding the tenant from Rent Act 
protection.23  
The contractual nature of a lease persists in modern landlord-tenant law, 
although the creation of interests in land through the use of these contracts is central 
to understand and appreciate landlord-tenant law.24 In Rye v Rye25 Lord Denning 
stated that all tenancies contain covenants26 and are created by means of 
agreement between the two contracting parties. One should distinguish between 
express and implied covenants. Express covenants are the obligations agreed upon 
between the parties, while implied covenants are enforced upon the contracting 
parties by means of the common law or statute.27 Where the parties fail to reach an 
agreement with regard to certain obligations or where the parties forget to include 
certain covenants, such covenants will be implied by means of the common law in 
order to provide the tenant with a bare minimum of protection. If the implied common 
law covenant is in conflict with the express covenant, the express covenant will 
prevail; but where the express covenant is in conflict with a covenant implied by 
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 A tenancy can be for any period of time but it must be for a definite or determinable period: Wilkie 
M, Luxton P, Morgan J & Cole G Landlord and Tenant Law (5
th
 ed 2006) 4. 
23
 See Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 6-9 for a discussion of 
these requirements. See also Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 67-77 for a 
discussion of the essential elements of a lease. See Wilkie M, Luxton P, Morgan J & Cole G Landlord 
and Tenant Law (5
th
 ed 2006) 22-27 with regard to the formalities for creating a valid lease. 
24
 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 28. 
25
 [1962] 2 WLR 361 (HL) 514. The court had to consider whether a person can grant a tenancy to 
himself. Lord Denning found that this would be impossible because “every tenancy is based upon an 
agreement between two persons and contains covenants expressed or implied by the one person 
with the other.” 
26
 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 45 defines covenants as the 
terms of the contract, although initially this term was used to define a contractual term which formed 
part of a lease made by deed. A covenant is not akin to a contractual term because a covenant 
imposes obligations and rights on subsequent parties that acquire an interest in the land. Covenants 
are therefore binding on subsequent occupiers of the land after the original parties have departed, 
while contractual terms will only bind the two contracting parties.  
27
 Wilkie M, Luxton P, Morgan J & Cole G Landlord and Tenant Law (5
th
 ed 2006) 29. See also Wilkie 
M, Luxton P, Morgan J & Cole G Landlord and Tenant Law (5
th
 ed 2006) 28-29 for a discussion on the 
various implied and express covenants. An interesting express covenant to take note of, although not 
universally applied, is a rent review provision. This provision provided the landlord with the means to 
increase the rent during the tenancy at certain points in time in order for the rent to reflect market 
value. These review provisions only made provision for a rent increase: Garner S A Practical 
Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 63. 
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statute, the covenant implied by statute will trump the express covenant. The 
purpose of these statutes is to grant some protection for tenants because of the 
unequal bargaining power between the landlord and the tenant. The parties can 
therefore not contract out of statutory covenants.28 
The extent of tenant protection afforded by the legislature in English landlord-
tenant law depends on various factors. It is primarily important to distinguish 
between long residential leases29 at low rents and short-term tenancies.30 A long 
leaseholder has the ability to create various interests in the leased property, 
analogous to the capability of the freehold estate owner, while a short-term tenant‟s 
right to create further interests in the land is limited because the period of his 
occupation is shorter and uncertain. The interests, in relation to land, allocated to 
long leaseholders are to a certain extent similar to that of freeholders. A long 
leaseholder will acquire substantial interest in the property, thereby assuming a 
position that closely resembles ownership in the land. However, the long leaseholder 
is still subject to certain constraints (including the terms on which the home is 
rented), whereas freeholders are completely free from such constraints. The short-
term tenant can also acquire various interests in the property, combined with long-
term tenure security, although such a tenant will never be thought of as the “owner-
occupier” because continual payments are still required in order for him to occupy 
the land.31 A long leaseholder usually pays a lump sum at the beginning of the 
tenancy, whereafter extremely low rent payments (known as ground rents) are made 
during the course of the long-term tenancy.32 The long leaseholder can sell his 
interest in the property for a capital sum because the lease has a capital value, but a 
long lease is nevertheless still a “wasting asset” because the lease will depreciate as 
the remainder of the lease gets shorter.33 The largest part of the capital value will 
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 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 59.  
29
 A long residential lease is a lease exceeding 21 years. The lease is purchased for a premium, 
whereafter the lessee has to pay ground rent, and not necessarily a market rent (Bright S Landlord 
and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 225). See Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 
226-227 for a discussion on long leasehold and the various problems associated with this form of 
tenure. 
30
 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 225 mention that the relationship between 
landlord and tenant is different in consideration of short-term tenancies and long-term tenancies. 
31
 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 50. 
32
 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 249 refers to the Rent Act 
1977, the Housing Act 1988 and the Housing Act 1985. 
33
 See Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 12-13 for a background on policy 
considerations with regard to long leases. 
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usually be with the long leaseholder, while in the case of short-term tenancies the 
capital value remains with the freehold estate owner because the reversionary 
interest represents the capital value of the land. “Ownership” will therefore attach to 
the party that has the interest with the greatest capital value.34 The focus of this 
chapter will not be on the position of the long leaseholder but rather on the statutory 
protection made available for short-term tenants, because long-term tenants are 
excluded from statutory protection provided for by the three main statutes35 that 
apply to residential tenancies.36 
The Rent Act 1977, the Housing Act 1985 and the Housing Act 1988 are the 
three main statutes that regulate tenure security for residential37 short-term tenants. 
In order to determine which statute is applicable one has to look at the nature of the 
landlord. If the landlord is a local authority (also referred to as the housing authority), 
the Housing Act 1985 will apply. Initially housing associations38 were also regulated 
under the Housing Act 1985, although these associations were moved into the 
private sector by the Housing Act 1988. After 1988 housing associations could 
borrow financing from the private sector, which enabled them to make housing 
available for tenants as “council tenants” instead of market-rent private tenants. A 
large percentage of these associations were registered with the Housing Corporation 
and became known as registered social landlords.39 Recently the Housing and 
Regeneration Act 2008 was enacted, which now mainly regulates social housing and 
the delivery of affordable housing. Part 1 of the Act makes provision for the 
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 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 50. Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law 
(5
th
 ed 2009) 309 mention that the only real difference between the freeholder and the leaseholder 
with regard to the notion of “estate ownership” is duration, because both forms grant exclusive 
possession. The tenant is entitled “to exercise the rights of an owner of land, which is in the real 
sense his land albeit temporarily and subject to certain conditions”: Street v Mountford [1985] AC 809 
at 816 per Lord Templeman. 
35
 The Housing Act 1985, the Rent Act 1977 and the Housing Act 1988. Part 1 of the Landlord and 
Tenant Act 1954 provides some protection for the long leaseholder. 
36
 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 162. For a detailed discussion 
of long residential leases see Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 225-234. 
37
 Commercial property and agricultural land falls outside the scope of this chapter. See Bright S 
Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 235-256 & 257-270 for an explanation of business 
tenancies and agricultural tenancies respectively.  
38
 Mullins D & Murie A Housing Policy in the UK (2006) 178 define housing associations as 
“independent, non-profit-distributing organizations governed by voluntary boards to provide mainly 
rented housing at below market rents”.  
39
 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 7-8 explains how the number of associations 
expanded from providing rented accommodation to only a small group of individuals, especially the 
elderly or disabled, until the 1980s, whereafter the large-scale voluntary transfer programme was 
implemented, which transferred a large volume of local authority housing stock to housing 
associations. 
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establishment of a Home and Communities Agency (HCA), which is a combination of 
Housing Corporations and English Partnerships. The Office for Tenants and Social 
Landlords (TSA), introduced in Part 2, is a new system of regulation for social 
housing. In terms of the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008, the TSA is currently 
the regulator for social housing, while all registered social landlords (RSLs) are now 
referred to as “private registered providers of social housing”. 
 Local-authority housing has always been part of public housing, forming part 
of the social sector. The aim of the local authority, in relation to the category of 
occupiers it wanted to provide housing for, transformed to providing accommodation 
to individuals who tended to be more vulnerable, where it previously granted homes 
to the more contented working class.40 Social housing, made available by local 
authorities and registered social landlords, is usually occupied by the poor and 
marginalised on a long term basis, although the tenancy usually consists of short 
contractual terms.41 The benefits of social housing was confirmed in 2007 by the 
Hills review,42 which found that social housing provides stability and security for low-
income tenants, as well as improved quality of housing (especially compared to the 
quality of housing these households could afford in the private market).43 
The private rental sector is governed by two statutes, namely the Rent Act 
1977 and the Housing Act 1988. If the tenancy was granted before 15 January 1989 
the tenant would be protected by the Rent Act 1977, while if the tenancy was granted 
on or after 15 January 1989, the tenant would be protected by the Housing Act 
1988.44 The private rental sector underwent a drastic transformation during the last 
century as it provided twelve percent of housing in England during 2006 compared to 
ninety percent in 1914. The legislature introduced controls in 1915 to improve 
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 Local authorities were forced by central government to provide cheaper accommodation to lower-
income individuals; adopting a “welfare-orientated” role instead of building good quality homes. By 
1977 local authorities were statutorily forced to provide housing to the more marginalised. The 
Housing Act 1980 introduced the “right to buy” that enabled council tenants to buy their homes at a 
reduced price and become freehold owners. This led to a loss of housing stock. The quality of local 
authority housing stock currently occupied by the poorest of the poor deteriorated: Bright S Landlord 
and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 7. 
41
 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 8. 
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 Hills J “Ends and Means: The Future Roles of Social Housing in England” (Case Report 34, 
February 2007). 
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 Hills J “Ends and Means: The Future Roles of Social Housing in England” (Case Report 34, 
February 2007) 69-70. 
44
 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 162-163. 
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security of tenure and impose rent control.45 These statutes intervened in the law of 
supply and demand, which contributed to the drastic decline in the size of the 
private-rented sector. The Rents Acts contributed to the decline because landlords 
were unable to set their own rent levels, which meant that they could no longer make 
an adequate return on their investment.46 However, various other policies also had 
an effect on the decline in the private sector.47 The aim of the Housing Act 1988 is to 
deregulate the whole of the private sector by abolishing rent control in its entirety and 
to afford the landlord with an option to provide substantive tenure protection.48 By 
“liberalising” the sector the government is removing security of tenure; giving 
landlords the means to force tenants from their homes upon expiration of the lease 
and consequently making it difficult for families to establish themselves in their 
surrounding community.49 One could argue that especially low-income tenants would 
be detrimentally affected by this policy, but the social housing sectors are functioning 
as a form of housing for lower income households and do provide secure rental 
housing. 
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 Rent control basically provided that certain houses within the rateable value limits had their rents 
controlled according to a formula. Increases were permitted by exception: Partington M Landlord and 
Tenant. Text and Materials on Housing and Law (2
nd
 ed 1980) 245. 
46
 See Partington M Landlord and Tenant. Text and Materials on Housing and Law (2
nd
 ed 1980) 285-
292 for a discussion of the economic consequences of rent restrictions. According to a number of 
economic theorists, the imposition of rent control inevitably reduces the amount of accommodation 
available for letting. Lansley S Housing and Public Policy (1979) 117-119 concludes that the general 
effect of rent control is both positive and negative, as there will be a reduction in the cost of housing to 
existing tenants and a redistribution of income from landlords to tenants, although rent control will also 
discourage building of new rental accommodation and promote the deterioration of existing rental 
stock. The extent of each of these consequences is uncertain. As a result of the redistributive effect of 
rent control, “[t]enants are subsidised by their landlords, irrespective of their comparative incomes. By 
subsidising only one part of the rented market, rent controls also redistribute income away from 
landlords of controlled property to landlords of uncontrolled property”. Hayek FA Verdict on Rent 
Control: Essays on the Economic Consequences of Political Action to Restrict Rents in Five Countries 
(1972) xi argues that the introduction and implementation of rent control, rent regulation or rent 
restriction has led to damaging social and economic consequences, including the encouragement of 
immobility; swamping consumer preference; eroding production incentives; and distorting land-use 
patterns and the allocation of scarce resources. Donnison DV The Government of Housing (1967) 
265 explains how housing shortages develop through the growth of employment and population in 
areas where there are planning controls that prevent an increase in housing supply.  
47
 Bright S Landlord and Tenant in Context (2007) 9 mentions the promotion of owner-occupation and 
the advent of council housing as contributory factors. 
48
 The tenants who occupy private rental housing and the landlords who offer such accommodation 
are diverse, which poses challenges for regulation. The current housing situation necessitates an 
increase in private rental housing in order to provide housing to the economically weak (being unable 
to afford owner-occupation) and to those with the need to be mobile within the sector: Bright S 
Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 10-12. 
49
 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 12. 
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4.3 Nature of tenancy 
 
In order to understand modern English landlord-tenant law one has to appreciate the 
multifaceted nature of a tenancy. Garner asserts that a tenancy is a contractual 
relationship, an interest in land50 and to some extent a creature of statute.51 Bright 
explains how the landlord-tenant relationship functions within a grid of housing laws, 
disability laws and human rights laws, combined with laws regulating anti-social 
behaviour and the improvement of social structures.52 Together, these spheres of 
law, combined with economic and trade policies, influence the rights and obligations 
of landlord and tenant, in the process exercising a substantial impact on the 
relationship between the parties, despite the fact that their fundamental rights and 
responsibilities are still determined by the express agreement between the parties 
and the implied covenants.53 Landlord-tenant law is not static and the government 
must be able to amend the law when necessary. 
In English law a lease provides the tenant with a real right. The tenant‟s 
interest is a proprietary interest, enforceable against the landlord and his 
successors.54 Leases were initially regulated as mere contractual agreements and 
this characteristic of a lease persists in modern landlord-tenant law, but it is now 
broadly acknowledged that a lease is also a proprietary interest.55 In Milmo v 
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 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 130 mention that a tenancy 
bears certain characteristics beyond the mere contractual relationship because the consequences of 
the tenancy affect third parties. 
51
 The statutory nature of a tenancy is evident in consideration of the termination of tenancies. In most 
cases the landlord has to comply with the relevant statutory requirements in order to evict a tenant 
upon expiration of the lease: Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 
130. 
52
 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 3. 
53
 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 26 also mentions that, although some laws 
influence the relationship of landlord and tenant, not all of these laws provide legal rights. 
54
 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 27 refers to Birks P “Before we Begin: Five 
Keys to Land Law” in Bright S & Dewar J (eds) Land Law. Themes and Perspectives (1998) 458-486 
at 473-475. The South African position is similar, although the tenant only acquires a limited real right 
upon registration of the lease against the title deed. In the absence of registration the principle of huur 
gaat voor koop provides the tenant with additional protection in the event of sale. See section 2.2.2 in 
Chapter 2 for more detail on the huur gaat voor koop rule. 
55
 A lease is therefore predominantly a contract, although it is also property, which means that 
“property-based” law will apply in leasehold disputes: Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context 
(2007) 28-29. Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5
th
 ed 2009) 307 mention that currently one 
can easily overlook the fact that the leasehold relationship is based on a contract, because the 
character of the lease is defined as proprietary rather than contractual. 
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Carreras56 the court stated that all tenancies contain an element of tenure, even 
though such tenure is not purely contractual. In Bruton v London and Quadrant 
Housing Trust57 the House of Lords disagreed where it stated that the relationship 
between landlord and tenant is “not concerned with the question of whether the 
agreement creates an estate or other proprietary interest which may be binding upon 
third parties.”58 
Historically, leases were seen as contracts providing one party with a right to 
possess land for a specified period of time. The covenants were primarily implied 
and the nature of the lease consisted of the tenant‟s obligation to pay the rent, while 
the landlord was obliged to provide the tenant with peaceful possession.59 In Total 
Oil Great Britain Ltd v Thompson Garages (Biggin Hill) Ltd60 the court affirmed the 
complex interaction between compound contractual agreements and property as an 
interest in land. Lord Denning stated that in order to terminate an estate in land, one 
cannot rely on purely contractual methods such as repudiation and acceptance. The 
complex interaction (and sometimes tension) between contract-based rules and 
property-based rules was addressed in Hammersmith and Fulham LBC v Monk,61 
where the Court had to decide whether a joint tenant could terminate a joint tenancy 
unilaterally. Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated that the issue consisted of a tension 
between a property-based approach, asking whether one party can terminate the 
other‟s right to live in his home, and a contract-based approach, asking whether one 
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 [1946] KB 306 (CA) 311 per Lord Greene MR, where it was stated that one cannot have a purely 
contractual tenure and “[t]enure exists by reason of privity of estate.” 
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 [2000] 1 AC 406 (HL).  
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party could be bound to a contract against his will.62 Bright explains that this tension 
didn‟t really present a legal tension between contract and property because the only 
real property issue (and approach which might have been significant) was the fact 
that the decision could influence an occupiers use of his “home”; bearing no legal 
significance at the time.63 The Court concluded that, according to contract law 
principles, the joint tenant could unilaterally serve notice to quit and terminate the 
tenancy.64 
The nature of a tenancy can therefore be described as a contract and an 
interest in land, although the different interests of the parties in relation to the 
tenancy are also important in order to understand the effect of such an arrangement 
on larger social structures. It could easily be assumed that most landlords have no 
more than a commercial interest in their leased property, maintaining their 
investment purely in order to receive profitable regular payments and a satisfactory 
capital value on the reversion.65 However, some private-sector residential landlords 
have a “personal” attachment to the land. In this sense property takes on a distinct 
economic and social role in the larger society because it remains a limited resource 
necessary for human flourishing. The social value of the property will depend on the 
underlying intention of the landlord. A social landlord would for instance perceive the 
property as a social utility, enabling the landlord to participate politically and 
contribute to society on a “welfare-based” level.66  
The interests of the tenant depend on the particular tenant. In the case of a 
long residential leasehold the lease could be perceived as his only financial asset 
and therefore represent some form of wealth for the tenant. In the case of short-term 
tenancies (usually accompanied by market rent payments) a different perception is 
more probable, as such a tenant would not perceive the property as a financial 
investment because he did not pay a premium. In either case, the lease will always 
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carry a substantial worth exceeding any monetary value.67 A residential tenant will 
also attach substantial value to the leased property as a home. The concept of 
“home” has received extensive consideration during recent years.68 Currently, the 
concept of “home” resembles much more than the mere physical shelter associated 
with it. A secure home is also a means of connecting families within a community. It 
enables individuals to obtain some stability and a sense of belonging which would 
contribute towards better social structures and improved individual well-being.69 The 
tenant‟s interest in the lease, especially with regard to the concept of home, depends 
on the level of tenure security afforded to him by the legislature. If the government‟s 
housing policy is aimed at providing better tenure security for tenants, allowing them 
to occupy leased property for continuous periods, depending on their will and good 
behaviour, these occupiers can experience a sense of connectedness and establish 
their place in society.70 One should therefore ask, especially in the South African 
context, whether the government is pro-actively affording tenants the means to 
establish themselves in their communities through landlord-tenant legislation that 
provides better tenure security, which would allow occupiers to create a home.71  
The law regulating landlord-tenant arrangements has been defined as a 
regulatory law.72 The concept of regulatory law is not easily definable, although 
Bright mentions that it is concerned with “state control directed to social and 
individual action to address problems of social risk or market failure.”73 Blandy 
argues that regulatory laws either substitute private rights with state control through 
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the use of agencies74 or subject private rights to less comprehensive regulatory 
restrictions. It is sometimes important for regulatory laws to co-exist with and 
supplement rights-based law. In the context of landlord-tenant it is sometimes 
necessary to grant tenants more than a regulatory right.75 One should therefore 
consider the role and aim of parliament when examining housing policy, because the 
legislation might override the strong common law rights of landlords in rights-based 
law in order to provide better and more secure rights for tenants through regulatory 
law. The question then is whether landlord-tenant legislation, being regulatory law, is 
in conflict with rights-based law in the form of the common law rights of landlords, 
and whether the correct housing policy is being followed and developed by 
parliament in each rental housing sector in order to sustain the optimal balance and 
proportionality in the provision of rental housing.  
 
4.4 Law and policy 
 
Before considering the various statutes enacted by the government to afford better 
security of tenure for residential tenants, it is imperative to take note of the 
importance of policy in housing law. Bright defines policy as “the result of a decision 
taken as to how to achieve a particular objective.”76 Such an objective could take a 
general form, for instance promoting owner-occupation instead of leasehold, or it 
could be more specific, for example, “a decision about the particular approach to be 
taken towards the obligation to repair”.77 The government can also identify a broad 
objective and thereafter create various policies in order to achieve that objective. 
Where there is a lack of policy, it is possible that the law will develop in an unguided 
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manner. It is essential for government to develop consistent policies regarding 
housing, although some policies might conflict due to the fact that different policies 
benefit different members or groups of society.78 Cullingworth explains that: 
“Every country‟s housing policies contain the seeds of several such conflicts, 
for housing is so central a feature of the economy and the way of life it supports 
that many of the competing aspirations at work in a society gain some 
expression in this field.”79 
 
The landlord-tenant legislation promulgated in England and Wales originated from 
policy considerations in relation to economic and social circumstances. These 
statutes could be described as an intervention in the rental housing sector because it 
placed restrictive controls on the landlord-tenant relationship. Tenants in the private 
rented sector faced uncertainty because of the social and economic conditions 
created by the First World War and the legislature had to intervene in order to 
provide some stability.80 This illustrates the connection between social and political 
uncertainty and statutory intervention. Social and economic circumstances usually 
influence key reforms in the rental housing market, placing emphasis on policy 
considerations that could result in transformation,81 although some of the major 
reforms are not necessarily connected with these conditions. In some instances 
reform can take place merely to provide the tenant with a stronger right. 
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Strengthened rights of tenants might result in some balance between the contracting 
parties with regard to the division of different interests.82 
The state may intervene in the rental housing market for a variety of reasons, 
including the desire to grant better tenure security for tenants, to develop and 
improve the supply of affordable housing or to maintain economic production. The 
extent to which the state should intervene (for either economic or social reasons) is 
uncertain and an unavoidable issue in landlord-tenant law.83 Statutory intervention 
manifestly restricts the rights of landowners to use their property in the way which 
they seem fit and, unsurprisingly, such intervention usually stimulate some form of 
debate opposing the restrictions by private sector landlords. Initially, the “powerful 
political and philosophical rhetoric of property” was used to oppose statutory 
restrictions.84 This power of property rhetoric influenced the executive and parliament 
in placing a restriction on law making.85 In the middle ages the majority of writers 
agreed that the right to property formed part of what was called “the fundamental law 
of England” which bound parliament and the Crown.86 Irrespective of the lack of a 
written constitution, the right to property was included in the constitution (in the 
broader sense) which recognised that the state had a limited power to regulate 
property.87 The state has intervened in both the social sector (including public and 
social housing) and private sector, placing restrictions on the contractual freedom of 
the parties and therefore effectively limiting the power of owner-occupiers. However, 
the power of property rhetoric is not undermined by these restrictions, because 
regulatory interference with property still requires justification.88  
According to Reich, one of the functions of property is to distinguish between 
private and public power. Private power functions within the boundaries of property, 
because it provides the owner (or owner-occupier) with a greater degree of 
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freedom.89 Within this “circle” the owner has authority and the state must justify any 
regulatory interference. These principles are similar in the common law, where the 
point of departure was to give effect to the property or economic interests of a 
person. If the state exercised state power, the interests of individuals had to prevail 
except where there was clear authority for these interests to be restricted. In such an 
event the statutory requirements for the restriction had to be strictly complied with.90 
It is questionable whether this logic of recurrent justification for state intervention in 
landlord-tenant law is ideal in a transformative setting. 
Although the law is central to the process of transformation, one should keep 
in mind that economic, social and political factors also influence reform in a 
subsidiary manner. The law must constantly adapt and amend in order to efficiently 
adhere to the wider changing socio-economic and political context. If the legislature 
promulgates laws in order to achieve certain policies, without taking the economic, 
social and political context into consideration, the resulting policies might not be 
successful.91 The “political will, energy and resources” of a country in relation to its 
housing system is important when applying regulatory laws. Regulatory measures 
will fail without the political will, to support (and initiate) the policies.92  
The UK housing policy is currently receiving significant political attention, 
especially after the Barker report93 of 2004 concluded that the instability of the 
housing market adversely affected macroeconomic volatility.94 In 2007 two housing 
reports were initiated by the government. The Hills report95 focused on the role of 
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social housing and the Cave review96  focused on the regulation of social housing. 
The underlying aim guiding the housing policy at the moment is to provide a decent 
home for every person. The primary goal is to guarantee an adequate supply of 
housing, while the subsidiary goal is to provide affordable houses in a decent 
standard. The government is also striving to create “sustainable communities” where 
individuals would choose to live.97 
Apart from the government‟s aim to make available an adequate supply of 
housing, one should take note of the various housing sectors and their different 
functions within this process of supplying homes. The enhancement of owner-
occupation still takes precedence in the housing policy, but it includes attention for 
different forms of shared ownership because not all occupiers can afford “full 
ownership”.98 The English legislature has developed a complex tenure99 system that 
provides different kinds of homes, with different levels of security of tenure, in order 
to accommodate individuals with diverse needs. Of importance to the landlord-tenant 
framework is that there are four types of tenure: owner-occupation, council renting, 
housing association renting and private renting.100 In order to understand the 
government‟s involvement in the process of providing housing, one should primarily 
distinguish between social renting and private renting. Social housing (including 
social renting) is provided by “not-for-profit” landlords at below-market rents, 
although “for profit” developers have recently become involved in this sector.101 
Social housing can usually be associated (or recognised) with supply-side subsidies 
from the state, consisting of financial aid for certain programmes; below-market rents 
imposed by legislation; provision of housing for low income candidates and 
enhanced tenure security when facing eviction.102 The function of the government is 
central in social housing because this sector of housing provision is a form of 
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“governance”.103 The concept of social housing creates a framework where it 
becomes possible for the government to regulate the sector in order to achieve 
social ideals, including responsible tenants (realised through moral regulation); the 
provision of decent standard housing to a diverse group (referred to as a 
redistributive agenda); and a “social integrationist agenda”.104 Social housing 
therefore serves a fundamental role in society in which the provision of affordable, 
decent housing is central.105 Against this background one can conclude that social 
rental housing is a key form of housing for marginalised occupiers, because the state 
is proactively involved in the provision of housing. The state is at liberty to assess the 
market, amend the legislation where it is not functioning efficiently and provide 
secure homes to low-income households.  
In order to understand the English rental housing framework, especially with 
regard to the level of tenure security provided for by the legislature, it is necessary to 
distinguish between different types of landlords. As mentioned previously, the 
Housing Act 1988 regulates housing association lettings and private lettings. 
However, the level of tenure security afforded to housing association tenants differs 
from the level provided for private sector tenants. Currently, housing associations 
prefer to give longer-term security of tenure for its tenants, while the private sector, 
functioning in the private market, is not providing long-term tenure security. The 
tenure security enjoyed by housing association tenants is similar to the rights 
enjoyed by council housing tenants, regulated by the Housing Act 1985. The social 
housing sector (including council housing and housing associations) is providing 
long-term tenure security for its tenants, because these tenants generally tend to be 
the vulnerable members of the community. The level of tenure security granted by 
the landlord is therefore a determining factor in the division of the rental housing 
framework.106 The social sector (as phrased within this chapter) therefore consists of 
public housing, which is usually made available by the local authority, and social 
housing, which is provided by housing associations. The private sector consists of 
housing made available by private landlords. This distinction is useful in 
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consideration of the level of tenure security afforded. The legal division, that is, the 
legislation applicable to the different relationships, is not as useful in practice. 
 
4.5 Historical survey 
4.5.1 Private sector 
 
The changing social and political circumstances during the last century influenced 
statutory intervention in landlord-tenant law, although the interventions have been 
inconsistent and complicated.107 Before the beginning of the twentieth century the 
relationship between landlord and tenant was based on the common law and 
custom, which placed strong emphasis on freedom of contract and property. During 
this period there was little or no government interference in the landlord-tenant 
relationship and the private sector represented more than ninety percent of the rental 
market.108 At the end of the nineteenth century, increased urbanisation led to a 
shortage of housing supply in urban areas.109 The Rents Act 1915110 was enacted to 
provide security of tenure and rent control in the private rental sector, although it was 
intended as a temporary war-time “emergency” measure.111 As a result of increased 
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inflation and continued housing shortages the legislature introduced further 
regulatory measures, which remained on the statute book for the largest part of the 
twentieth century. During the 1950s112 deregulation of the private rental market led to 
the exploitation of tenants, but since the Protection from Eviction Act 1964 required a 
court order before eviction could take place, tenants enjoyed the protection of due 
process in eviction proceedings.113 The 1965 Rent Act replaced the initial rent control 
provisions with a new system of rent regulation. Rent control was aimed at freezing 
rents at historic levels, although making provision for certain increases, while rent 
regulation included consideration of the value of the property when determining a 
“fair rent”. The scarcity of housing was irrelevant when determining the rent.114  
As a result of state regulation in the private rental sector the rental housing 
market became unattractive as an investment opportunity for landlords, which 
contributed to a decline in private rental housing during the twentieth century. At the 
end of the 1970s the private rental sector merely provided thirteen percent of 
housing. Government regulation contributed to this decline, although the absence of 
state subsidies also played a role.115 The Rent Act 1977 consolidated the previous 
Rents Acts and provided long-term tenure security for tenants.116 The law of 
residential leases was in a “reasonably coherent and comprehensive state” in 
1979,117 but after the Conservative Party was elected in 1979 the policy changed, 
moving away from the aim to grant better tenure security for tenants and towards 
increasing private rental housing supply.118 The government created new forms of 
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letting in the Housing Act 1980, although maintaining some regulation over rent 
through fair rent controls. Security of tenure was gradually phased out, especially 
through the introduction of “shorthold” tenancies, which afforded landlords the means 
to regain possession upon expiration of the lease.119  
At the end of the 1980s the government was convinced that security of 
tenure, combined with rent control, had a major impact on the decline of private 
rental housing and therefore deregulated the sector through the enactment of the 
Housing Act 1988. The result was that long-term private tenants could be evicted at 
the end of their contractual tenancy and that the landlord could determine the rent.120 
Through the deregulation of the private rental market and the introduction of tax 
incentives,121 the government anticipated some growth in the sector, combined with 
an increase in corporate investment. The private rental sector did increase by 25 
percent from 1988 to 1999, but currently the sector represents merely eleven percent 
of the housing stock in Britain.122 
 
4.5.2 Social sector 
4.5.2.1 Housing association lettings 
 
Public housing provided a small percentage of housing until 1945, when the mass 
house-building programmes led to an increase in the building of publicly owned 
dwellings.123 The Rents Acts regulated housing association lettings, which practically 
formed part of the social sector, but were regulated under the private sector. In 1954 
some of these social-sector tenancies fell outside of the private sector. The Housing 
Corporation was created in 1964 but only became significant in 1974, when housing 
associations were obliged to register with the Corporation in order to receive public 
funds. The role of social housing gradually increased through the enforcement of 
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registration. Housing associations could acquire capital from these funds to construct 
new housing developments.124 The Rent Act 1977 provided that, if the association 
was registered with the Housing Corporation, the lease would not be regulated by 
the Rent Act.125 The role of social housing was uncertain because it could either 
make available large-scale housing to various members of the community, or provide 
housing only to the most vulnerable as a “safety net”.126 Local authorities chose to 
make available quality housing to tenants with secure incomes,127 which forced the 
government to make available subsidies.128 In 1980129 housing associations that 
were registered afforded secure tenure rights for tenants, although rent regulation 
was still enforced on all housing associations through the Rents Acts.  
During 1986 the government realised that it had to reduce government 
subsidies to housing associations, but a general decrease in the funds that were 
available for the associations was not considered sensible. In order to enable 
housing associations to receive finance from private funders these associations had 
to be privatised, which led to the transfer of housing associations from the social 
sector to the private sector. On 15 January 1989130 housing associations became 
part of the private sector, which meant that the Housing Act 1988 became applicable 
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 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 164. Currently the Corporation has a 
regulatory role: it provides guidance with regard to issues such as rent setting and allocation policies. 
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 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 188. 
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 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 157. See in this regard Harloe M The 
People’s Home? Social Rented Housing in Europe & America (1995) 71-72 where the author makes a 
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 Local authorities had the discretion to allocate housing without any constraints from the state. 
Some local authorities adopted a bureaucratic approach (allocating housing on a fair and equal 
basis), although the procedures and rules had a discriminatory effect in some instances. This 
approach was unsatisfactory and the government introduced a “market-based mechanism” for the 
allocation of housing: Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 191, 197. Private-sector 
landlords are at liberty to choose their tenants as long as they comply with the non discrimination 
laws: Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 201. 
128
 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 157. 
129
 After 1980 housing associations became more important in the provision of housing. Before 1960 
the local authority took responsibility for the development of social rental housing, while shortly 
thereafter more emphasis was placed on the role of housing associations through the creation of the 
Housing Corporation and legislation: see further Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 
159. 
130
 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 165. 
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to housing association tenants.131 Housing association tenants received “assured 
tenancies” and therefore lost the tenure security they were afforded as local authority 
tenants. Housing associations were also at liberty to set their own rent levels 
because the “fair rent” requirement no longer applied to these associations.132 
The nature of housing associations changed as a result of the stock transfer 
programme and the right to acquire (RTA) programme implemented in 1996, which 
was similar to the right to buy programme.133 The stock transfer programme made 
provision for the transfer of council housing to housing associations, while the right to 
buy programme enabled council tenants to purchase council property at a 
discount.134 Housing associations started off as non-profit organisations, providing a 
limited amount of housing, but recently these associations have doubled in size and 
are functioning like a business.135 
 
4.5.2.2  Local authority lettings 
 
Initially, council tenants had periodic leases that could be ended by notice to quit. 
The relationship was governed by the common law and local authority tenants did 
not enjoy the statutory security of tenure that was afforded to private tenants. 
Although there was no statutory system of protection, the local councils “exercise[d] 
their powers in a public-spirited and fair way in the general public interest”.136 
Parliament retained its policy of non-intervention in public rental housing until the 
Thatcher administration introduced legislative measures to regulate the relationship 
between council tenants and the local authority. In 1966 the local authority housing 
stock had expanded to 27 percent of the housing stock (in comparison to the 24 
percent of housing made available by the private sector).137  The Tenant‟s Charter 
that was introduced in 1980 ensured protection for local council tenants in the event 
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 Shelley v London County Council [1948] 1 KB 274 (CA) 283. 
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of eviction although, according to Brandon LJ, this codification was not intended to 
meet any immediate housing crisis.138 The Charter was to a large extent a 
codification of the local authority rental system and was adopted in the Housing Act 
1985.139  
After 1980 state intervention decreased and the role of the local authority 
became less dominant.140 Owner-occupation increased through the implementation 
of various policies, especially the right to buy (RTB) scheme that was introduced in 
1980. Secure council tenants who had occupied council housing for a period of at 
least three years could purchase the property at a generous discount, but the local 
authority was not allowed to use that capital to build new council houses, which 
again led to a shortage in public housing.141 The restrictions placed on new building 
also contributed to this shortage. The RTB system was successful in its aim to 
increase owner-occupation,142 but the social consequences were that only the very 
poor eventually occupied council housing by the end of the 1990s. The effect was 
that wealthier council tenants were enabled to buy the better quality council houses, 
while the marginalised and poor remained in the dilapidated remaining council 
housing stock. The absorption of the lowest income group in council housing led to 
social exclusion,143 which resulted in social and economic problems.144  
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 Harrison v Hammersmith and Fulman London Borough Council [1981] 1 WLR 650 (CA) 661. 
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 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 189. State control through legislation or 
subsidies in the public rental sector affected local authority autonomy in housing. Interference was 
inspired by welfare reasons rather than to establish direct state control over the implementation of 
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 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 160. The role of the local authority changed 
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 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 160-161. In 1982, 200 000 council houses 
were bought by council tenants: these houses were not replaced with new council houses. Currently 
more than 1.7 million houses have been bought through the RTB system. Government policy with 
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owner-occupiers. See sections 180-194 of the Housing Act 2004 for the amendments applicable to 
the exercise of a right to buy and sections 195-205 for the provisions relating to disposals attracting 
discounts other than under the right to buy. 
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 RTB enabled households that would not have been able to do so without the policy to become 
owner-occupiers. Council tenants could also remain in their homes and therefore did not have to 
move location. Owner-occupation increased from 55 percent in 1979 to 70 percent in 2000: Bright S 
Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 161. 
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 Social exclusion is the result of various problems including poor housing, unemployment, low 
incomes, discrimination and ill health: Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 162-163, 
referring to the Social Exclusion Unit of the ODPM (http://www.communities.gov.uk/housing/   
(accessed 21 July 2009)). 
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These problems were addressed through various programmes,145 including 
large-scale voluntary transfer (LSVT). In terms of this programme council stock was 
transferred to housing associations, while the introduction of registered social 
landlords (RSL) in 1996 made provision for the formation of non-profit bodies to take 
over council stock. RSL included housing associations and “local housing 
companies” that had local authority representation on their board. Through stock 
transfer the local authority could access new private finance to restore local authority 
housing.146 
 
4.6 Current legislation 
4.6.1 Rent Act 1977  
 
The Rent Act 1977 regulates private sector tenancies, but generally it only applies to 
tenancies granted before 15 January 1989.147 According to section 1, a “protected 
tenancy” is a tenancy148 under which a dwelling house is let149 as a separate 
dwelling.150 Section 4(1) provides that certain dwellings will be excluded from the 
Act, based on the rateable value of the property. The section states that, if the 
property falls within one of the classes identified in section 4(2), it will be excluded 
from the ambit of the Act.151 These sections illustrate the aim of the Act which is to 
afford protection for lower income tenants and not to provide protection for wealthy 
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 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 162. At the end of the 1990s council housing 
represented 13 percent of the housing stock. See Malpass P & Murie A Housing Policy and Practice 
(5
th
 ed 1999) 17-18 for a discussion of residualisation (“a process embracing changes in the social 
composition of council housing as well as the related policy changes”) and marginalisation (referring 
to the decrease in demand for labour as machines replace labour, resulting in poor individuals relying 
on council housing because they cannot access housing elsewhere). 
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 Certain bodies called housing action trusts were formed to improve council housing and sell the 
houses to private landlords or housing associations, but this programme was not successful: Bright S 
Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 163. 
146
 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 164. 
147
 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 165. There are three 
exceptions where the landlord can create a protected tenancy after 15 January 1989. See Garner S A 
Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 165 in this regard. 
148
 The tenancy may be for a fixed term or periodic: Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and 
Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 166. 
149
 In order for a tenancy to fall within the scope of the Act, there has to be some form of rent paid and 
the rent has to be quantifiable in money terms: Barnes v Barratt [1970] 2 QB 657 at 667. 
150
 See Evans DL & Smith PF Evans: The Law of Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1985) 240-244 for a 
discussion of the qualified conditions necessary to constitute a tenancy. 
151
 See Evans DL & Smith PF Evans: The Law of Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1985) 245 for a 
discussion of these sections and the operation of the various classes. 
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occupiers who choose to rent high rateable value properties.152 Contrary to section 
4, section 5 excludes tenancies at a low rent. The aim of this section is to “exclude 
long leaseholders who pay a nominal ground rent to their freeholder” and not 
(necessarily) to exclude tenants occupying private rented accommodation on a 
periodic basis who pay low rents.153 Sections 6-16 also exclude various other 
tenants, including a tenant who occupies a dwelling-house which is let with other 
land;154 lettings to students;155 holiday lettings;156 agricultural holdings;157 licensed 
premises;158 assured tenancies;159 and business tenancies.160 
Section 2(1) provides that if the protected tenant remains in the property upon 
expiration of the protected tenancy, he becomes a statutory tenant.161 The statutory 
tenancy commences when the protected tenancy concludes. The protected tenancy 
can end by notice to quit (in the case of a periodic tenancy), forfeiture,162 effluxion of 
time (in the case of a fixed-term tenancy) or through any other common law 
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 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
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159
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 Section 24(3). See Evans DL & Smith PF Evans: The Law of Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1985) 
246-257 for a discussion of these exclusions. See also section 101 for the exclusion of overcrowded 
dwellings. 
161
 There are four requirements for a statutory tenancy to commence: the tenant must have been a 
protected tenant as provided for under the Rent Act; the protected tenancy must have been 
terminated; the protected tenant must have occupied the relevant property before the tenancy ended; 
and the protected tenant must have continued to occupy the leased property after the protected 
tenancy has terminated: Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 182. 
The terminology is similar to that used in the pre-1994 South African Rents Acts: see Chapter 2. 
162
 Where the tenant has committed a breach of covenant the landlord can make use of a remedy 
called forfeiture. The remedy enables the landlord to re-enter the dwelling and forfeit the tenancy. 
Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5
th
 ed 2009) 469 describe forfeiture as the “most draconian 
weapon in the armoury of the landlord”. Through the exercise of this remedy the landlord can reclaim 
the property as part of his proprietary interest, clearly demonstrating the strong common law right of 
landlords to effortlessly repossess the leased property, also referred to as “the owner‟s absolute 
power of exclusion in civil-law systems”: Van der Walt AJ Property in the Margins (2009) 99. Initially, 
this remedy was so extensive that the landlord did not even have to obtain a court order. Where the 
tenant refused to vacate the premises he could use force in order to physically re-enter the property: 
Butcher v Poole Corporation [1943] KB 48. The remedy has become ineffective recently as a result of 
due process regulation. The United Kingdom Law Commission Termination of Tenancies for Tenant 
Default (2006) Law Com No 303, Part 2: Overview of the Scheme recommended that the entire 
remedy should be abolished and replaced with a statutory scheme for termination of tenancies. 
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method.163 Once the contract ends according to the common law, the statutory code 
affords the tenant continued occupation rights. The protected tenancy depends on 
the contractual relationship of the parties and can only exist as long as the contract 
is intact. The statutory tenancy also depends on the nature of the previous contract 
as a protected tenancy. The statutory tenancy will only arise through the operation of 
section 1 of the Rent Act or through succession.164 If the landlord wishes to 
repossess his property he would have to terminate the protected tenancy (also 
referred to as the contractual tenancy), whereafter the tenancy would automatically 
convert into a statutory tenancy. The only way in which a landlord can terminate the 
statutory tenancy is to claim possession in court, based on one of the grounds for 
possession, as stated in the Act. The court can only grant the possession order if the 
landlord can prove a relevant ground for possession.165 The Rent Act therefore 
amended the common law position according to which the tenant‟s right to occupy 
the premises terminated upon expiration of the contract.166  
A statutory tenancy is a personal right and does not provide the tenant with a 
proprietary interest.167 The tenancy is created by statute (and can therefore be 
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 Van der Walt AJ Property in the Margins (2009) 99 mentions that forfeiture, effluxion of time and 
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 Evans DL & Smith PF Evans: The Law of Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1985) 290-294. See Wilkie 
M, Luxton P, Morgan J & Cole G Landlord and Tenant Law (5
th
 ed 2006) 197-200 for an extensive 
discussion of the succession of statutory tenancy as regulated by the Rent Act 1977 and the 
amended position regulated under the Housing Act 1988. The general rule is that the tenancy will not 
end as a result of the death of the tenant. At common law the residue of the tenancy will succeed in 
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546-551; Van der Walt AJ Property in the Margins (2009) 97. 
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 Bridge SB Residential Leases (1994) 99. Where a landlord institutes a claim for possession based 
on one of the grounds listed in section 98, although excluding the grounds listed in Schedule 15 Part 
II, the court has a discretion to adjourn the proceedings, stay or suspend the execution of the order or 
postpone the date of possession: Evans DL & Smith PF Evans: The Law of Landlord and Tenant (2
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ed 1985) 289-290. See Wilkie M, Luxton P, Morgan J & Cole G Landlord and Tenant Law (5
th
 ed 
2006) 196-197 for a discussion of the suspension or postponement of possession orders with 
reference to the Rent Act 1977 and the Housing Act 1980.  
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 Wilkie M, Luxton P, Morgan J & Cole G Landlord and Tenant Law (5
th
 ed 2006) 187. 
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 In Keeves v Dean [1924] 1 KB 685 at 686 per Lush LJ the court found that a statutory tenancy 
does not provide the tenant with a proprietary interest but rather affords the tenant with a “status of 
irremovability”. According to Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 
181-182 a statutory tenancy cannot in general be assigned, disposed of by will or be sub-let (the 
whole of the property, see Roe v Russel [1928] 2 KB 117 (CA)). A statutory tenancy will bind a 
successor to the landlord‟s title but will not prevail against a mortgagee seeking possession in order to 
realise his security: Britannia Building Society v Earl [1990] 1 WLR 422 (CA). See Garner S A 
Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 184-188 for a discussion of statutory 
tenancy through succession. The general rule is that the statutory tenancy can be transmitted to a 
member of the deceased tenant‟s family, although the Housing Act 1988 introduced restrictive rules 
governing succession. The nature of the transmission will also depend on when the tenant dies, who 
the successor is and which transmission it is (the Rent Act 1977 makes provision for a second 
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defined as a creature of statute)168 and not by agreement, although the terms of the 
protected tenancy will remain relevant and will be adopted in the statutory tenancy, 
provided the terms of the tenancy are consistent with the Rent Act.169 Considering 
these provisions one can conclude that the Act does grant substantive tenure 
rights170 for the tenant through the mechanism of statutory tenancy and by allowing 
the landlord to repossess the property in limited, statutorily defined circumstances.171  
If a statutory tenant does not voluntarily vacate the leased premises upon 
termination of the protected tenancy, the landlord will only be able to repossess the 
property by obtaining a court order.172 Section 98 regulates the limited circumstances 
under which a landlord can obtain a possession order, although one should 
distinguish between section 98(1) and section 98(2). Section 98(1) regulates the 
“discretionary grounds”, while section 98(2) regulates the “mandatory grounds”.  
Section 98(1) states that the court can only grant a possession order if the court 
considers it reasonable and is convinced that there is either suitable alternative 
accommodation available for the tenant or one of the circumstances as specified in 
any of the cases in Part I of Schedule 15 (also known as the “discretionary cases”) is 
satisfied.173 Where the landlord proves one of the discretionary grounds, but the 
court does not consider the possession order reasonable, the landlord will not be 
able to repossess the property because reasonableness is an “overriding 
requirement”.174  
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 According to Wilkie M, Luxton P, Morgan J & Cole G Landlord and Tenant Law (5
th
 ed 2006) 187, 
the statutory tenant is not a tenant in the true sense of the word because he has “no estate or interest 
in the premises, no existing contract of tenancy and no right at common law to retain possession”. 
169
 Bridge SB Residential Leases (1994) 105. Where the protected tenancy for instance states that the 
tenant is obliged to vacate the property upon termination of the contract, the term would be 
inconsistent with the Act and therefore be excluded from the statutory tenancy. One of the terms 
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nd
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this regard Evans DL & Smith PF Evans: The Law of Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1985) 275-277. 
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 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 181. 
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 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 197. 
173
 This section therefore requires reasonableness and either the availability of alternative 
accommodation or one of the grounds as provided for in the schedule. 
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 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 202. 
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In Cumming v Danson175 the court found that, in order to establish whether a 
possession order is reasonable, the court has to consider “all relevant circumstances 
as they exist at the date of the hearing”, which gives the court a wide discretion in 
determining reasonableness.176 The court is at liberty to consider any factor, “in a 
broad-common sense way”, that might affect either the landlord or the tenant and 
may attach the appropriate weight to the given factor.177 The question of 
reasonableness will vary in each case because the circumstances will differ. The 
court has to consider the unique circumstances of each case on a fact based 
approach.178 From the case law it follows that the courts consider various 
circumstances, including the personal circumstances of both parties.179 The tenant‟s 
emotional attachment to the property, considering the length of time during he 
occupied the premises, has also been taken into account.180 In addition, the courts 
have considered circumstances not directly related to the parties, such as the 
general purpose of the Act181 and the public interest.182  
The alternative accommodation requirement183 will be satisfied if the landlord 
obtains a certificate from the local authority certifying that it will provide the tenant 
with the necessary accommodation or if the landlord arranges accommodation for 
the tenants from another private landlord.184 In terms of the Act, the alternative 
accommodation will only be suitable if it either offers full Rent Act protection or 
security of tenure that is reasonably equal to the extent of protection granted by the 
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 Wilkie M, Luxton P, Morgan J & Cole G Landlord and Tenant Law (5
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 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 202. In Darnell v Millwood 
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because each case is determined on its own set of facts. 
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 Personal circumstances would include the health of the parties (Briddon v George [1946] 1 All ER 
609 at 610), the age of the parties (Battlespring Ltd v Gates (1984) 11 HLR 6 (CA) 11), the financial 
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for wanting possession (Minchburn Ltd v Fernandez (1987) 19 HLR 29 (CA) 33). 
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 Redspring Ltd v Francis [1973] 1 WLR 134. 
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 Cresswell v Hodgson [1951] 1 All ER 710. 
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 See also the general discussion on alternative accommodation with regard to the Rent Act 1977, 
Housing Act 1988 and Housing Act 1985 in Evans DL & Smith PF Evans: The Law of Landlord and 
Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1985) 277-279. 
184
 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 199. 
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Rent Act 1977.185 The Housing Act 1988 makes provision for the continuation of a 
protected tenancy in alternative accommodation after 15 January 1989 if, “in the 
circumstances, the grant of an assured tenancy would not afford the required 
security”.186 The Rent Act also requires that the accommodation must be “reasonably 
suitable to the needs of the tenant and his family as regards proximity to place of 
work”.187 Paragraph 5 furthermore requires that the character and rental of the 
accommodation must be suitable. In order to satisfy this requirement the landlord 
would usually have to persuade the court that the accommodation is reasonably 
suitable to the “housing needs” of the tenant and his family.188 There has been some 
controversy in the courts regarding this requirement. In Hill v Rochard189 the court 
found that the Rents Acts were not intended to protect the tenant‟s particular taste 
for amenities. In Redspring Ltd v Francis190 the court found that environmental 
factors such as the absence of a garden, a busy thoroughfare next to the premises 
and close proximity of a pub and fish and chip shop could render a property 
unsuitable. The court took a different view in Siddiqui v Rashid,191 where it was found 
that the alternative accommodation proposed by the landlord was suitable even 
when the accommodation would place the tenant too far from his social connections, 
mosque and cultural interests. 
If the landlord is unable to satisfy the alternative accommodation requirement 
he would have to prove one of the cases listed in Part 1 of Schedule 15, additionally 
to the reasonableness requirement in order to rely on section 98(1).192 Case 1 
incorporates the situation where the rent is in arrears or where the tenant breaches 
an obligation in the lease. If the landlord wishes to rely on case 1 he would have to 
give the tenant a fair opportunity (through a letter of demand) to pay the rent at a 
certain date before he can apply for a possession order.193 Case 2 regulates the 
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nd
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position regarding nuisance or annoyance194 to adjoining occupiers and usage of the 
dwelling for illegal or immoral purposes.195 If the tenant or person residing with the 
tenant is found guilty of nuisance or annoyance to adjoining occupiers, the landlord 
would be able to rely on this ground although, if the landlord wishes to rely on the 
fact that any of these persons used the property for illegal (or immoral) purposes, he 
would have to prove that the person has been convicted. If the premises deteriorated 
as a result of the tenant‟s neglect or acts of waste, the landlord can rely on case 3.196 
Case 5 regulates the position where the tenant gives notice to quit „but then 
subsequently decides to remain in the premises.197 Case 6 may entitle the landlord 
to repossess the premises where the tenant sublet or assigned the property without 
the landlord‟s consent, even if there is no prohibition against subletting or 
assignment in the contract.198 Case 8 applies to “service tenants” where an employer 
provides accommodation to a full-time employee as part of the working arrangement. 
Where the employee ceases to work for the employer/landlord he would be able to 
rely on case 8 to repossess the property in order to offer it to a new employee.199 
Where the dwelling is reasonably required by the landlord for residential occupation 
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of Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1985) 280. 
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deteriorated owing to acts of waste by, or the neglect or default of, the tenant or any person residing 
or lodging with him or any sub-tenant of his and, in the case of any act of waste by, or the neglect or 
default of, a person lodging with the tenant or a sub-tenant of his, where the court is satisfied that the 
tenant has not, before the making of the order in question, taken such steps as he ought reasonably 
to have taken for the removal of the lodger or sub-tenant, as the case may be.” The definition of 
“waste” includes unauthorised improvements: Marsden v Edward Heyes Ltd [1927] 2 KB 1 (CA). See 
case 4 for the position regarding the deterioration of furniture. For a discussion of cases 2-4 see 
Evans DL & Smith PF Evans: The Law of Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1985) 281-282. 
197
 The landlord must have acted as a result of the notice to quit. The landlord should either have sold 
or leased the property to a third party, which would result in serious prejudice if he cannot obtain 
vacant possession of the premises. See Evans DL & Smith PF Evans: The Law of Landlord and 
Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1985) 282. 
198
 Evans DL & Smith PF Evans: The Law of Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1985) 282. This ground is 
only relevant for protected tenants because a statutory tenant cannot assign a tenancy or sublet the 
whole of the property. 
199
 Evans DL & Smith PF Evans: The Law of Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1985) 283. The occupying 
tenant had to be a full-time employee and the right to occupy the premises had to be part of the 
working arrangement between himself and the employer/landlord. The employment must also have 
ceased. The dwelling must be reasonably required for the new employee, engaged in a full-time 
employment with the employer/landlord. 
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by himself, his children (provided that they are over eighteen years old), his parents 
or his wife‟s parents, the landlord can rely on case 9 to repossess his property.200 In 
terms of case 9, the court will not necessarily make an order for possession even 
when the landlord satisfies this requirement, because the court has to consider all 
the relevant circumstances, including whether alternative accommodation is 
available for either of the parties. The court will take into account the extent of the 
hardship that would be suffered by the tenant in the event of a possession order and 
the possible hardship suffered by the landlord in the absence of a possession 
order.201 If the court finds that the possible extent of hardship suffered by the tenant 
exceeds the hardship suffered by the landlord, the court will not make an order for 
possession.202 Case 10 provides that where the tenant sublet part of the property 
under the provisions of the Rent Act and the rent payable by the sub-tenant exceeds 
the registered rent,203 the landlord can claim repossession. 
In terms of section 98(2), the landlord can also obtain a possession order if 
the circumstances of the case are as specified in any of the cases in Part II of 
Schedule 15 (also known as the “mandatory cases”). If the landlord can prove one of 
the cases in Part II, he will be entitled to a possession order without having to prove 
reasonableness.204 When the court is faced with a claim for possession and the 
landlord relies on one of the mandatory grounds, the court does not have a 
discretion to refuse the eviction order, based on reasonableness. However, the 
landlord must serve written notice to the tenant before “the relevant date”,205 stating 
the possible mandatory ground for possession.206  
                                                          
200
 It is interesting to note that the Act does not include the wife of the landlord. See the rest of this 
provision regarding certain time limitations. See also Evans DL & Smith PF Evans: The Law of 
Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1985) 283-285 for a discussion of this ground. 
201
 Case 9, Schedule 15, Part III, para 1. In order to determine whether repossession of the premises 
is reasonably required the court will consider whether the landlord is currently occupying residential 
property, whether the leased property is close to the landlord‟s place of work and whether the landlord 
or a member of his family is unhealthy. 
202
 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 208. The court has a wide 
discretion to the extent that it can consider any circumstances, including the personal circumstances 
of both parties. 
203
 See text accompanying ffn 218-221. 
204
 See Wilkie M, Luxton P, Morgan J & Cole G Landlord and Tenant Law (5
th
 ed 2006) 192-194 for a 
brief discussion of these grounds. 
205
 Schedule 15, Part III, para 2 regulates the relevant date. In the majority of cases the relevant date 
is the beginning of the tenancy. 
206
 If the court finds that it is just and equitable to disregard the notice requirement, it has the 
discretion to do so when considering cases 11, 12, 19 and 20: Garner S A Practical Approach to 
Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 209. 
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Case 11 regulates the position where the owner-occupier, who previously 
occupied the premises as his residence, wishes to repossess his property. One of 
the requirements is that the owner-occupier has not let the property, after a specified 
date as stated in the Act, on a protected tenancy unless the necessary notice was 
served by the landlord. The landlord also has to satisfy one of the conditions 
mentioned in Part V of Schedule 15.207  Case 12 enables the landlord to repossess 
his property where he purchased the property with the intention of occupying it when 
he retires, but rented out the property while he worked full-time.208 The landlord had 
to have served notice on a new protected tenant who entered the tenancy after 14 
August 1974 and one of the conditions in Part V of Schedule 15 (paragraphs (b)-
(e))209 must have been met. The landlord is also obliged to notify the tenant of the 
possible ground for possession on the relevant date, although the court can 
dispense with this requirement.210 Case 13 provides the landlord with the means to 
regain possession of holiday accommodation where the landlord granted a longer 
tenancy, out of season, which falls within the protection of the Rent Act 1977.211 In 
order to rely on case 13 the dwelling must have been let under a tenancy for a term 
of years certain not exceeding eight months; the landlord must have notified the 
tenant that possession might be recovered under this case; and the dwelling must 
have been occupied as holiday accommodation within a period of twelve months. 
Case 14 enables an educational institution to regain possession where it granted a 
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 These conditions provide that a) the dwelling is required for residential occupation by the owner-
occupier or any member of his family who resided with him when he last occupied the premises; b) 
the owner-occupier retired from regular employment and requires the dwelling-house as his 
residence; c) the owner-occupier died and a family member who resided with him at the time of his 
death requires the dwelling for residential purposes; d) the owner-occupier died and his successor in 
title requires the premises for residential purposes or for the purpose of disposing of it with vacant 
possession; e) the dwelling is subject to a mortgage, granted before the tenancy, and the mortgagee 
is entitled to exercise a power of sale (conferred on him by the Law of Property Act 1925) and he 
requires vacant possession of the dwelling in order to exercise that power; and f) the owner-occupier 
requires vacant possession in order to dispose of the property and use the proceeds of that disposal 
to acquire a new residence which is more suitable to his needs. The reason should be that the current 
leased dwelling-house is no longer reasonably suitable to the needs of the owner, especially 
considering his place of work. 
208
 Case 20 is similar as it enables a member of the armed forces to claim possession of his rented 
property which was purchased with the intention to occupy it in future. See case 20 for the necessary 
requirements and Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 212-213 for a 
discussion of this ground. 
209
 See fn 207 above. 
210
 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 210. 
211
 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 210. Holiday accommodation 
is usually excluded from Rent Act protection through section 9. 
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tenancy, regulated under the Rent Act 1977, during for instance a college holiday.212 
The dwelling must have been let under a tenancy for a term of years certain not 
exceeding twelve months and the landlord must have notified the tenant that he 
might repossess the property under case 14. Case 15 is relevant where a landlord 
usually provides accommodation to a minister of religion and requires vacant 
possession for that purpose.213 Case 16 enables a landlord to repossess property in 
order to accommodate his agricultural employee.214 Case 19 grants the landlord with 
a right to claim possession where the premises were occupied under a protected 
shorthold tenancy215 which terminated and converted into a statutory tenancy.216 If 
the dwelling is overcrowded217 in a way that renders the occupier guilty of an 
offence, the landlord can obtain a possession order in terms of section 101. 
A major difference between the Rent Act 1977 and the Housing Act 1988 is 
the extent of tenure security granted, but also the inclusion of rent control in the Rent 
Act and the absence thereof in the Housing Act. The Rent Act makes provision for 
the establishment of “fair rents”,218 which is determined by a rent official.219 The rent 
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 Section 8 of the Act usually excludes lettings to students. 
213
 The landlord must notify the current tenant of the possible ground for possession; the court must 
be satisfied that the minister requires the premises for residential purposes in order to perform his 
duties and the dwelling must be held specifically for this purpose. 
214
 The Act requires that the dwelling must have been occupied by such an employee before the 
current tenancy was granted and the landlord must have given notice to the current tenant (which is 
not an agricultural employee) of the possible ground for possession. See cases 17 and 18 containing 
provisions related to agricultural tenancies. 
215
 The protected shorthold tenancy was created by the Housing Act 1980 and afforded the landlord 
the means to grant a short fixed-term tenancy without providing security of tenure for the tenant: 
Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 212. 
216
 In order to rely on this ground the landlord had to give notice to the tenant and no further tenancy 
may have been granted after the protected shorthold tenancy. 
217
 The dwelling has to be overcrowded within the meaning of Part X of the Housing Act 1985. 
218
 The determined fair rent is the highest rent the landlord can obtain from the tenant, although if the 
rent determined by the rent officer is higher than the rent agreed upon between the contracting 
parties, the tenant can pay the lowest rent, being the rent agreed upon in the contract. If the contract 
makes provision for rent increases the landlord is allowed to increase the rent, but the rent cannot be 
increased beyond the registered rent: Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 
1998) 193. Section 57 enables the tenant to recover the excess amount of rent paid after registration. 
The effect of registration is therefore retrospective. Rent regulation usually restricts rents, but with the 
conversion of tenancies from rent control to rent regulation rents did increase quit substantially: 
Partington M Landlord and Tenant. Text and Materials on Housing and Law (2
nd
 ed 1980) 284, Table 
5.8. See also Evans DL & Smith PF Evans: The Law of Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1985) 258-259 
for an outline of the fair rent system. 
219
 In order to create a fair rent the tenant, landlord, both parties (section 67) or the local authority can 
apply for the registration of a fair rent in a prescribed form to the rent officer. The interest of the local 
authority would be to ensure that public funds are not being wasted through the payment of 
excessively high rents where the tenant receives housing benefits: Garner S A Practical Approach to 
Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 189. The interest of the local authority takes the form of a public 
interest. See Evans DL & Smith PF Evans: The Law of Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1985) 262-265 
for detail of the different application procedures. 
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determined by a rent official cannot be overruled by the contract or by market forces. 
The applicant (or applicants) must propose a fair rent, after which the rent officer will 
inform the other party to make recommendations and, if necessary, oppose the 
proposed rent.220 When the rent officer decides on a fair rent he will inform both 
parties and register the rent in the registration area.221 Once the rent is registered the 
rent will attach to the land and not to the parties.222 The rent will be applicable to the 
property as long as the property is let under the Rent Act 1977. In Hanson v Church 
Commissioners223 the court found that the fixing of fair rent is a matter in which the 
public interest is involved because the registered rent will affect the immediate 
parties and neighbouring parties when they determine their rent. Section 67(3) 
makes provision for a new application after two years, although it also states that the 
parties can apply for the registration of a new rent when the terms of the tenancy 
change or when the condition of the premises changes.224 The parties can also 
jointly apply for the registration of a new rent. 
The Rent Act 1977 does not define a fair rent, although it does provide some 
guideline in section 70 according to which the rent officer can verify a fair rent.225 
                                                          
220
 After both parties had the opportunity to make proposals the rent officer usually consults with the 
parties and visits the premises: Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 
189.  
221
 Section 66 makes provision for the registration of rents in a register created for various areas. The 
rent officers are obliged to keep the register up to date and make it available for inspection. The rent 
officer must record the rent payable, the particulars of the tenancy and specifications of the dwelling. 
If one of the parties is unsatisfied with the registered rent he can appeal to the rent assessment 
committee after which the committee will confirm the rent or determine a new rent: Garner S A 
Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 189-190. 
222
 The registered rent will bind future lettings, irrespective of a change in tenant or landlord: Garner S 
A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 189. 
223
 [1977] 2 WLR 848 at 833 per Lord Denning. 
224
 This section also contains a general provision which states that “any other circumstances which 
were considered at the time the rent was registered so as to make the registered rent no longer a fair 
rent” will enable a party to apply for a new rent. See London Housing Properties v Cowan [1977] QB 
148 for a discussion of the effect of an application for re-registration. At 152 Lord Widgery found that 
one should “ask whether there have been changes in the condition of the house or in the other factors 
specifically referred to in the section [section 67(3)], and, if there have been, to ask the second 
question, which is whether as a result of those changes the registered rent is no longer a fair rent”. 
Partington M Landlord and Tenant. Text and Materials on Housing and Law (2
nd
 ed 1980) 260 
mentions that the effect of inflation would tend to increase the registered rent rather than to provide a 
mechanism according to which the tenant can reduce the rent.   
225
 See Evans DL & Smith PF Evans: The Law of Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1985) 268-271; Wilkie 
M, Luxton P, Morgan J & Cole G Landlord and Tenant Law (5
th
 ed 2006) 201 for a discussion of the 
determination of a fair rent. See also Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 460-465 for 
a discussion on fair rent and some of the problems associated with this form of regulation. She 
mentions that the effect of the implementation of fair rents was in fact a rise in rents (at 460-461). 
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Section 70(1) explicitly excludes all personal circumstances226 and then lists 
circumstances that the rent officer should take into consideration, including the 
condition of the dwelling;227 the presence of furniture and the quality thereof; the 
payment of a premium; and the assumption that the number of persons seeking 
regulated tenancies228 of similar dwellings in that particular locality is not greater than 
the number of dwellings available.229 In Mason v Skilling230 the Court found that the 
rent officer should determine a fair rent that would be fair to both landlord and 
tenant.231 Section 70 affords the officer the discretion to adopt any method in 
determining the fair rent, provided that such a method is not unlawful or 
unreasonable.232 The preferred method is to examine the registered rents of 
comparable properties233 in the locality, although the officer can also consider 
whether the landlord will receive a fair return on the capital value of the property 
(being the value of the property with vacant possession).234 In the Mason case the 
Court found that the security of tenure provided to the tenant is a personal 
circumstance and therefore irrelevant in determining the fair rent.235  
Section 70 (2) provides that it shall be assumed that the number of persons 
seeking to become regulated tenants of similar dwellings in the area is not 
significantly greater than the number of dwellings available. This section demands 
that the scarcity value of the properties, being available for private rental housing as 
regulated under the Rent Act 1977, will be disregarded when the fair rent is 
                                                          
226
 The rent officer will therefore not be allowed to consider the financial situation of the tenant: Garner 
S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 192. 
227
 Section 70(1)(a) states that  the “age, character, locality and state of repair of the dwelling-house” 
should be considered. 
228
 Wilkie M, Luxton P, Morgan J & Cole G Landlord and Tenant Law (5
th
 ed 2006) 187 define both 
protected and statutory tenancies as “regulated” tenancies. 
229
 Section 70(1)(2). Section 70(1)(3) provides a list of factors the rent officer should disregard, 
including improvements conducted by the tenant; any defects attributable to failure by the tenant; and 
any improvement to the furniture by tenant. 
230
 [1974] 1 WLR 1437 (HL). 
231
 Mason v Skilling [1974] 1 WLR 1437 (HL) 1440 per Lord Reid. 
232
 Mason v Skilling [1974] 1 WLR 1437 (HL) 1439 per Lord Reid. 
233
 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 191-192 explains that the 
concept of comparable properties is complicated by the introduction of the Housing Act 1988. A rent 
officer should therefore distinguish between properties regulated by the Rent Act 1977 and the 
Housing Act 1988, because the rents of tenants occupying property that is regulated by the Rent Act 
1977 will be considerably less than those leased under the Housing Act 1988. The rents of tenants 
occupying property under the Housing Act 1988 will be determined by market forces and will therefore 
be higher than fair rents determined by rent officers under the Rent Act 1977. Fair rents are immune 
from market forces and suppressed through the system of rent registration. 
234
 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 191. 
235
 Mason v Skilling [1974] 1 WLR 1437 at 1440 per Lord Reid. 
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determined.236 The purpose of this section is to address the problem of landlords 
profiting excessively as a result of housing shortages.237 In BTE Ltd v Merseyside 
and Cheshire Rent Assessment Committee and Jones238 the court had to determine 
whether a rent officer should consider comparable properties in the locality which are 
regulated in terms of the Housing Act 1988 and therefore assured tenancies. The 
assessment committee only took into account the rents of comparable properties let 
as regulated tenancies (tenancies regulated under the Rent Act 1977). The court 
found that this was wrong and concluded that the rent officer should consider market 
rents where there is no scarcity of housing.239 The result of the decision is that 
market forces will influence fair rents and increase the rent to a level comparable 
with assured tenancies.240  
 
4.6.2 Housing Act 1988 
 
The Housing Act 1988 came into operation on 15 January 1989 and is currently the 
principal act regulating private sector tenancies, because the Rent Act 1977 
generally only applies to tenancies created before this date.241 The Housing Act 
1988 makes provision for two types of tenancies, namely the assured tenancy and 
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 See Partington M Landlord and Tenant. Text and Materials on Housing and Law (2
nd
 ed 1980) 
246-258 for a discussion of fair rents and the effect of excluding scarcity. See in this regard 
Metropolitan Property Holdings v Finegold [1975] 1 WLR 349 at 352 per Lord Widgery, where he 
considers section 70(1)-(2) of the Rent Act and concludes that “[p]arliament is undoubtedly seeking to 
deprive a landlord of a wholly unmeritorious increase in rent which has come about simply because 
there is scarcity of houses in the district and thus an excess of demand over supply.” 
237
 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 192 states that “[t]he 
valuation should be based upon the inherent value of the property in question and should not reflect 
an increase in value brought about by a fluctuation in the market”.  
238
 [1992] 24 HLR 514. 
239
 BTE Ltd v Merseyside and Cheshire Rent Assessment Committee and Jones [1992] 24 HLR 514 
at 517-518. 
240
 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 192. One can therefore also 
question the impact and the use of rent control in the private sector in general. Wilkie M, Luxton P, 
Morgan J & Cole G Landlord and Tenant Law (5
th
 ed 2006) 201 state that the fair rent regime will 
cease to exist in time due to the fact that one cannot create new protected tenancies. 
241
 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 203. The amount of regulated tenancies was 
lower than 200 000 in 2004/2005, while assured tenancies exceeded 200 000 and assured shorthold 
tenancies amounted to almost 1.6 million. Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 
ed 1998) 214 states that one of the main concerns of the Rent Act was that landlords couldn‟t regain 
their property for long periods of time. The result was that the Act effectively undermined their right to 
control the use of their property. The protected shorthold tenancy introduced by the Housing Act 1980 
attempted to provide some relief to landlords, but it was unsuccessful because tenants could still 
apply for a fair rent. 
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the assured shorthold tenancy. The difference between the two categories is mainly 
the level of security of tenure afforded to the tenant in each case. Where the tenant 
occupies property with an assured tenancy the landlord would have to prove one of 
the grounds under Schedule 2 of the Act to obtain a possession order. Where the 
tenant occupies the property with an assured shorthold tenancy the landlord merely 
needs to prove that the tenancy has terminated and that notice requiring possession 
has been served to the tenant.242 The result of the shorthold regime, introduced by 
the Housing Act 1988 and the Housing Act 1996, has been a general decline in 
assured tenancies. One can speculate that only housing associations would grant 
assured tenancies.243 Currently almost ninety percent of the private rented sector 
consists of assured shorthold tenancies.244 
In order to create an assured tenancy (including an assured shorthold 
tenancy) five conditions must be fulfilled.245 Section 1 of the Housing Act 1988 
requires that there must be a tenancy246 under which a dwelling is let as a separate 
dwelling247 to a tenant (who is an individual) as his only or principal home.248 The 
tenancy must also not be excluded by one of the exceptions listed in Schedule 1 of 
the Act.249 
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 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 214. The landlord is still 
obliged to obtain a possession order. 
243
 Wilkie M, Luxton P, Morgan J & Cole G Landlord and Tenant Law (5
th
 ed 2006) 204. 
244
 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 203.  
245
 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 204. See Bridge SB Residential Leases 
(1994) 9-25 for a detailed discussion of the definition of an assured tenancy and the requirements 
constituting this definition. 
246
 A “tenancy” includes a fixed-term or periodic tenancy and a sub-tenancy or an agreement for a 
tenancy, although it will not include a licence: Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant 
(2
nd
 ed 1998) 220. 
247
 The dwelling can be let with other land, provided that the main purpose of the letting is the 
provision of a home. In order for the property to fall within the definition of a dwelling there must be 
some “degree of permanency in the siting of the structure”: Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in 
Context (2007) 206. A mobile home can fall within this definition. 
248
 An individual can only claim protection under the Housing Act 1988 for one home, which must be 
his main residence, while section 2 of the Rent Act 1977 provided that the tenant had to occupy the 
property as his residence in order to acquire protection, which means that a person was able to claim 
protection for two homes: Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 206. 
249
 Paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 excludes tenancies created before the commencement of the Act. 
Tenancies of dwellings with high values are excluded by para 2. Tenants who occupy tenancies that 
exceed £25 000 per year (now £100 000) can usually negotiate their own terms and do not need 
statutory protection because there is not a shortage of such dwellings: Bright S Landlord and Tenant 
Law in Context (2007) 207. The amount of £25 000 was increased to £100 000 by The Assured 
Tenancies (Amendment)(England) Order 2010 on 25 March 2010. Paragraph 3 excludes tenancies at 
a low rent (less than £1000 a year in the Greater London area or £250 elsewhere) or tenancies at no 
rent. Schedule 1 also excludes business tenancies (para 4), licensed premises (para 5), tenancies 
under which agricultural land is let with a dwelling (paras 6 and 7), lettings to students (para 8), 
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Subject to the contractual term, the assured shorthold tenancy provides no 
long-term security to the tenant because the landlord can regain possession after six 
months of commencement of the tenancy. Once the tenancy has terminated the 
landlord can give two months notice, provided that this is at least six months after the 
beginning of the tenancy.250 Prior to the commencement of the Housing Act 1996 the 
landlord had to notify the tenant, in accordance with the guidelines contained in 
section 20 of the Housing Act 1988, that the tenancy would be an assured shorthold 
tenancy.251 Section 19A of the Housing Act 1988 reversed this position by stating 
that all private tenancies concluded after 28 February 1997 will automatically be 
assured shorthold tenancies, except where the landlord wishes to create an assured 
tenancy by serving notice to the tenant prior to the commencement of the tenancy.252 
In terms of schedule 2 of the Act, notice could be served before the tenancy is 
granted or during the course of the tenancy to convert an assured shorthold tenancy 
into an assured tenancy.253 The landlord may not deprive an assured tenant of 
security of tenure by giving him a new assured shorthold tenancy.254 Upon the 
expiration of a fixed-term assured tenancy a statutory periodic tenancy arises255 and, 
according to Schedule 2A (paragraph 8), such a tenancy will be an assured tenancy 
and not an assured shorthold tenancy.  
An assured tenancy will only terminate if the landlord can convince the court 
that a statutory ground for possession exists.256 The grounds for possession are 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
holiday lettings (para 9) and tenancies where the tenant lives in close proximity to the landlord (para 
10). Lettings by “public landlords”, including the Crown, any government department or local authority, 
are also excluded from the Act (paras 11 and 12). For additional detail on these exclusions see Bright 
S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 207-210; Wilkie M, Luxton P, Morgan J & Cole G 
Landlord and Tenant Law (5
th
 ed 2006) 182-186; Bridge SB Residential Leases (1994) 25-40. 
250
 Section 21(5). See also Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 203. 
251
 See Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 215-216 for the position 
before 28 February 1997 with regard to the creation of assured shorthold tenancies. 
252
 Schedule 2A of the Housing Act 1988. Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 
ed 1998) 215 mentions that landlords were unfamiliar with the procedure set out in section 20 of the 
Act, which resulted in the creation of a vast number of assured tenancies instead of assured shorthold 
tenancies.  
253
 Paragraph 2 of Schedule 2A. Paragraph 3 provides that an assured tenancy can be created if the 
tenancy states that the tenancy is not an assured shorthold tenancy. An assured tenancy will also 
arise where a family member succeeds to a Rent Act tenancy (Section 39 of Housing Act 1998; 
Schedule 2 para 4). Where a local authority transfers housing stock to the private sector the former 
secure tenant will become an assured tenant and not an assured shorthold tenant (para 5). 
254
 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 218. 
255
 Section 5. 
256
 Section 5(1). The landlord is required to serve notice on the tenant before the possession 
proceedings can commence (section 8). See Wilkie M, Luxton P, Morgan J & Cole G Landlord and 
Tenant Law (5
th
 ed 2006) 207-208 for a discussion of the required procedure. 
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listed in Schedule 2 of the Housing Act 1988. The Act therefore provides substantive 
tenure security by overriding the landlord‟s common law right to end the tenancy. 
The way in which the Act functions depends on whether the tenant has a fixed-term 
tenancy or a periodic tenancy.257 It is important to distinguish between three types of 
tenancies. The assured tenancy can either be a fixed-term contractual tenancy, a 
periodic contractual tenancy, or a statutory periodic tenancy. The last-mentioned 
tenancy is created by statute, while the other two tenancies are created by 
agreement.258 
If the tenant occupies the property under a periodic assured tenancy and the 
landlord serves the tenant with a notice to quit, such a notice shall have no effect.259 
At common law a notice to quit would have terminated the tenancy. Under the 
statutory scheme, the tenancy will continue on its original terms until the landlord can 
prove a ground for possession in court. The original periodic assured tenancy will 
simply continue and not convert or change “status” from a contractual tenancy to a 
statutory tenancy, despite any notice served by the landlord.260 
When a fixed-term tenancy terminates through effluxion of time the Act states 
that a periodic tenancy will automatically arise and afford the tenant continued 
occupation rights.261 The new statutory periodic tenancy can only be terminated by 
an order of court if the landlord can prove a ground for possession.262 The terms of 
the statutory periodic tenancy are determined by section 5(3) of the Housing Act. 
This section states that the statutory periodic assured tenancy will take effect 
immediately after the original fixed-term tenancy terminated. The tenancy is deemed 
to have been granted by the previous landlord to the previous tenant and the 
premises remain the same as was granted under the fixed-term tenancy. The 
periods of the tenancy are the same as those for which rent was last payable under 
the fixed-term tenancy and the other terms are the same as those of the fixed-term 
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 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 226. 
258
 Bridge SB Residential Leases (1994) 41. 
259
 Section 5(1). 
260
 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 227. 
261
 Section 7(6) makes provision for the termination of a fixed-term tenancy before the tenancy has 
expired in limited circumstances. An order for possession can only be granted where the landlord is 
seeking possession under grounds 2 or 8, or 10 to 15 of Schedule 2 and the terms of the tenancy 
must make provision for it to be brought to an end on the ground in question. The landlord therefore 
has to reserve the right to re-enter for a breach of the ground in question: Garner S A Practical 
Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 229. 
262
 Section 5(2). 
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tenancy,263 except any term which makes provision for determination by the 
landlord.264  
In order to terminate an assured tenancy (fixed term or periodic) the landlord 
first has to successfully notify the tenant of his intention to bring possession 
proceedings.265 He then has to prove one of the grounds for possession listed in 
Schedule 2 of the Act. Section 7(3) states that if the landlord can prove one of the 
mandatory grounds listed in Part I (grounds 1-8), the court must grant the 
possession order, while section 7(4) states that if the landlord can establish one of 
the discretionary grounds listed in Part II (grounds 9-16), the court has to consider it 
reasonable to grant the possession order. 
Part I of Schedule 2 lists the mandatory grounds for possession. Ground 1 
makes provision for a landlord to repossess his property where he previously 
occupied the premises as his principal home. In order to rely on this ground the 
landlord must have served notice in writing to the tenant at the beginning of the 
tenancy, stating that possession might be recovered under this ground, although the 
court can dispense with the notice requirement if it finds it just and equitable to do 
so. The landlord can also rely on this ground if he is seeking possession for 
occupation by himself or his spouse. In such a case it is not required that the 
landlord or his spouse previously occupied the property.266 Ground 2 regulates the 
position where a mortgage was granted before the beginning of the tenancy and the 
mortgagee requires vacant possession of the dwelling in order to exercise a power of 
sale conferred on him by the mortgage or by section 101 of the Law of Property Act 
1925. The tenancy can therefore be terminated by relying on ground 2 prior to the 
expiration of the contract. The landlord can only rely on this ground if he served 
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 The terms of an assured tenancy is usually the terms agreed upon between the parties, illustrating 
the aim of the Act to afford parties the freedom to negotiate and enter into a tenancy on whatever 
terms they decide. The Act does, however, imply certain terms into an assured tenancy. See Bridge 
SB Residential Leases (1994) 42-43 for a discussion of the terms of an assured tenancy. 
264
 Either the landlord or the tenant can alter the terms of the statutory periodic tenancy by following 
the procedure set out in section 6 of the Act, although section 6 only applies to a statutory periodic 
tenancy arising from a fixed-term tenancy. See Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and 
Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 230-231 for a discussion of this procedure, including the alteration of rent. 
265
 Section 8. See also Bridge SB Residential Leases (1994) 54-55 for a discussion of the 
requirements to comply with section 8. 
266
 This ground is similar to case 11 of the Rent Act 1977, although it is not required that the landlord 
intends to occupy the premises once he repossesses the property: Wilkie M, Luxton P, Morgan J & 
Cole G Landlord and Tenant Law (5
th
 ed 2006) 208. Bridge SB Residential Leases (1994) 58 
mentions that the landlord can use this ground to repossess the property in order to sell his interest in 
the property. 
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notice at the beginning of the tenancy, although the court is at liberty to dispense 
with this requirement.267 Where a landlord let his holiday property for a period not 
exceeding eight months and wishes to regain the property, he can rely on ground 3, 
provided he notified the fixed-term tenant that possession might be recovered on this 
ground.268 Ground 4 enables a landlord to regain student accommodation where the 
premises were leased during a holiday period,269 while ground 5 permits a landlord 
to regain possession from a tenant in order to make accommodation available to a 
minister of religion.270 Where a landlord intends to demolish, reconstruct or carry out 
substantial works on the dwelling, he can rely on ground 6 to repossess the leased 
property. The Act requires that there must be a genuine desire to undertake the work 
and a reasonable prospect that the work will take place. It is also required that the 
work could not reasonably be carried out with the tenant still in possession.271 Where 
the landlord acquired his interest in the property after the tenancy was granted, he 
would not be able to rely on this ground.272 If the landlord succeeds under this 
ground, he is compelled to pay to the tenant an amount equal to reasonable 
expenses likely to be incurred by the tenant in moving from the dwelling.273 Ground 7 
allows a landlord to repossess the property where the original tenant has died and 
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 In Britannia Building Society v Earl [1990] 1 WLR 422 the court found that where the mortgagee 
did not consent to the tenancy, the tenant will have no protection.  
268
 Holiday lettings are usually excluded from the protection of the Act (Schedule 1, Part I, para 9), 
although in this instance the Act makes an exception for the letting of holiday accommodation out of 
season that will be protected under the Act. The court cannot dispense with the notification 
requirement. Ground 3 is similar to case 13, listed in Part II of the Rent Act 1977. 
269
 Student lettings are usually excluded from Housing Act protection (Schedule 1, Part I, para 8) 
although the Act provides that the tenant will be an assured tenant if he rents the accommodation 
during holidays. In such an instance the landlord can regain possession if he notified the tenant that 
possession might be regained under this ground (the court cannot dispense with this requirement), if 
he afforded the tenant with a fixed-term tenancy not exceeding twelve months and if the premises 
was let as a student letting prior to the grant of the current tenancy. See case 14 for the similar 
position under the Rent Act 1977. 
270
 In order to rely on this ground the landlord must have notified the tenant of the possible use of this 
ground and the dwelling must be held by the landlord for the purpose of being available for occupation 
by a minister of religion as a residence from which to perform his duties. The court must be satisfied 
that the minister requires the premises for this reason. Case 15 in the Rent Act 1977 makes provision 
for a similar ground for possession. See Bridge SB Residential Leases (1994) 60-61 for a discussion 
of the accelerated possession procedure. This procedure is only applicable to grounds 1, 3, 4 and 5 
and it accelerates the possession proceedings.  
271
 Where the tenant agrees to vary the terms of the tenancy in order to grant the landlord access to 
undertake the work, possession will not be granted by the court. 
272
 The Act does state that where the landlord acquired his interest in the property after the tenancy 
was granted, he can rely on this ground, provided he did not acquire the interest for money or 
money‟s worth.  
273
 Section 11. Where there are any disputes regarding the recovery of unpaid sums, the tenant can 
make use of judicial resolution through the civil process: Wilkie M, Luxton P, Morgan J & Cole G 
Landlord and Tenant Law (5
th
 ed 2006) 209. 
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the periodic tenancy (or the statutory periodic tenancy) passed on to another person 
by virtue of the deceased will or intestacy.274 If the tenant is in serious rent arrears 
the landlord can rely on ground 8 to repossess the property, although ground 8 is 
exceptional (and similar to ground 2 in this regard) as the landlord can rely on this 
ground before the fixed-term tenancy terminates.275 
The discretionary grounds for possession are listed in Part II of Schedule 2 of 
the Housing Act 1988. If the landlord can prove one of the discretionary grounds the 
court may only grant the possession order if it considers it reasonable to do so. To 
determine whether the possession order would be reasonable the court must 
consider all relevant circumstances and apply a broad, common-sense view, after 
which the appropriate weight should be attached to each factor.276 If the landlord can 
prove that suitable alternative accommodation is available for the tenant or will be 
available when the order for possession takes effect, the landlord can rely on ground 
9. The requirement for suitable alternative accommodation will be met if the landlord 
can either produce a certificate from the local housing authority, certifying that the 
authority will provide the necessary accommodation or if the landlord can prove that 
either he or another private landlord will supply suitable alternative accommodation. 
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 The landlord will not be able to rely on this ground if the deceased tenant‟s spouse or cohabitee 
succeeded to the tenancy (see section 17 of the Act). Bridge SB Residential Leases (1994) 63 
mentions that the successor can take occupation of the dwelling but the landlord has a discretion, for 
twelve months, to assess the new tenant and decide whether he can continue to occupy the 
premises. The landlord will assess the character and financial viability of the successor in order to 
make this decision. Once the landlord decides that he does not want the new tenant to remain in the 
dwelling he can seek possession without having to justify his decision, provided this is done within the 
twelve month period.  
275
 To successfully rely on this ground the landlord has to convince the court that at the date of service 
of notice (see section 8) and at the date of the hearing that at least eight weeks‟ rent is unpaid, if the 
rent is payable weekly; or at least two months‟ rent is unpaid, if the rent is payable monthly; or at least 
one quarters‟ rent is more than three months in arrears, if rent is payable quarterly; or at least three 
months‟ rent is more than three months in arrears, if rent is payable yearly (as amended by section 
101 of the Housing Act 1996). A tenant will be able to avoid repossession by paying some arrears 
after he received the section 8 notice or by counterclaiming that the rent was not paid due to breach 
of the landlord‟s covenant to repair: Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 
1998) 243-244. In such an instance the tenant can argue that he has a counterclaim against the 
landlord‟s claim for rent and that his counterclaim for damages can be set off against the whole of the 
landlord‟s claim: British Anzani (Felixstowe) v International Marine Management (UK) Ltd [1980] QB 
137. The reason for rent arrears is often some failure in the administration of housing benefits rather 
than the tenant‟s unwillingness to pay: Wilkie M, Luxton P, Morgan J & Cole G Landlord and Tenant 
Law (5
th
 ed 2006) 209. This ground has raised some debate due to the harsh impact sometimes 
associated with this ground. See Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 614-616 for 
some detailed discussion on this ground and the social issues related to it. 
276
 Cumming v Danson [1942] 2 All ER 653 at 655 per Lord Greene MR. Section 9 of the Act provides 
the court with a wide discretion to either adjourn the proceedings for a certain period; suspend or stay 
the execution of a order; or impose certain conditions as the court sees fit, provided that such 
conditions would not be unreasonable or cause exceptional hardship to the tenant. 
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In order to satisfy this requirement in the case where the local authority is not 
providing the accommodation, the proposed accommodation will be deemed suitable 
if it affords the tenant security of tenure which is reasonably equal to an assured 
tenancy. The proposed accommodation must also be reasonably suitable to the 
needs of the tenant and his family in consideration of certain factors, namely 
proximity to place of work, rental and extent of accommodation provided in the 
neighbourhood by the local authority to persons whose needs are similar to those of 
the tenant and his family; or reasonably suitable to the means of the tenant and to 
the needs of the tenant and his family concerning extent and character.277 If the 
landlord succeeds in terms of this provision he is obliged to pay to the tenant 
reasonable expenses likely to be incurred by the tenant in moving from the 
dwelling.278  
Ground 10 enables a landlord to claim repossession where rent is 
outstanding. The landlord is required to prove that some rent was outstanding at the 
date upon which proceedings were issued and at the date of service of the section 8 
notice.279 The rent must have been in arrears at the time when the section 8 notice 
was served. This notice has to be served by a landlord in order to succeed with 
possession proceedings.280 Where the tenant constantly falls into arrears but pays 
the outstanding rent after the issue of proceedings but before the date of the hearing, 
the landlord can rely on ground 11 to repossess the property.281 Where any 
obligation of the tenancy (other than one related to the payment of rent) has been 
broken or not performed, the landlord can rely on ground 12 to claim repossession, 
although a trivial breach will unlikely justify a possession order.282 The court will 
determine the seriousness of the breach by considering whether the breach is 
remediable and whether it is continuing.283 Ground 13 enables a landlord to 
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 Part III Schedule 2, paras 1-3. 
278
 Section 11(1). 
279
 There is no minimum amount of rent arrears required and the landlord does not have to show that 
the rent was still in arrears at the date of the hearing, although the court would unlikely grant the 
possession order where the rent was paid at the date of the hearing: Garner S A Practical Approach 
to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 245. 
280
 See section 8 of the Act for more detail on the required notice. 
281
 Wilkie M, Luxton P, Morgan J & Cole G Landlord and Tenant Law (5
th
 ed 2006) 210 mention that 
“persistent delays” can be interpreted to deduce two meanings. It can either mean that the tenant has 
a long history of rent arrears or that one or two instalments have been in arrears for a long period of 
time. 
282
 Ground 12 is similar to case 1 under the Rent Act 1977. 
283
 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 246. 
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repossess the property where the condition of the dwelling or any other common 
parts of a building comprising the dwelling deteriorated through acts of waste by 
neglect or default of the tenant (or any other person residing in the dwelling).284 The 
landlord can rely on ground 14 if the tenant or a person residing in or visiting the 
dwelling has been guilty of conduct causing or likely to cause a nuisance285 or 
annoyance to a person in the locality; or has been convicted of using the dwelling for 
immoral or illegal purposes.286 To determine whether the possession order would be 
reasonable, the court has to consider the effect that the nuisance has had on 
persons other than the person against whom the order is sought; any continuing 
effect the nuisance is likely to have on such persons; and the effect that the nuisance 
would be likely to have on such persons if the conduct is repeated.287 Ground 14A is 
similar, as it makes provision for possession proceedings where a couple lived in the 
dwelling and one of the partners left the dwelling as a result of violence or threats of 
violence by the other partner.288 Where the landlord can prove that he granted the 
assured tenancy in consequence of the tenant‟s employment, by the landlord, and 
that employment has ceased to exist, the landlord can claim possession by relying 
on ground 16.289 Section 102 of the Housing Act 1996 introduced ground 17, which 
enables a landlord to claim possession where the tenant represented false 
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 Ground 15 is similar as it enables the landlord to claim possession where the condition of furniture, 
provided by the tenancy, has deteriorated as a result of ill-treatment by the tenant. 
285
 “Nuisance” was defined in Tod-Heatly v Benham (1889) LR 40 Ch D 80 at 98 as “an inconvenience 
materially interfering with the ordinary comfort physically of human existence, not merely according to 
elegant or dainty modes and habits of living, but according to plain and simple notions among the 
English people.” The court stated that “annoyance” has a much wider meaning and defined 
annoyance as something which “reasonably troubles the mind and pleasure, not of a fanciful person 
or of a skilled person who knows the truth, but of the ordinary sensible English inhabitant.” 
286
 The landlord can also rely on this ground where the tenant has been convicted of an arrestable 
offence in the dwelling or in the locality of the dwelling. This ground (and ground 14A) was introduced 
by section 148 of the Housing Act 1996 “as part of a number of changes intended to facilitate 
possession when occupiers or those for whom they have some responsibility commit anti-social 
behaviour”: Wilkie M, Luxton P, Morgan J & Cole G Landlord and Tenant Law (5
th
 ed 2006) 210. The 
landlord can rely on this ground even where the behaviour is only likely to cause nuisance to any 
person in the locality, therefore not limited to neighbouring occupiers.  
287
 Section 9A. 
288
 The Act requires that the landlord must be a registered social landlord or a charitable housing trust. 
The couple must be a married couple or a couple living together as husband and wife. It is sufficient if 
one of the partners left the property as a result of violence towards himself/herself or a member of the 
family who resided with the partner. The court must also be satisfied that the partner who left is 
unlikely to return. In order to succeed the landlord must comply with the additional requirements 
provided for in section 8A. See Metropolitan Housing Trust v Hadjazi [2010] EWCA Civ 750. 
289
 This ground is similar to case 8 in the Rent Act 1977, although in terms of ground 16 a 
replacement employee is not required. 
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statements, knowingly or recklessly, to the landlord in order to acquire the assured 
tenancy.290 
It is important to clarify that an assured periodic tenancy can succeed to the 
assured tenant‟s spouse or civil partner if that person was occupying the dwelling as 
his only or principal home, while succession rights are granted to a broader range of 
persons if the tenancy is a protected tenancy regulated by the Housing Act 1985. 
The Housing Act 1985 includes the deceased tenant‟s spouse or civil partner or 
another member of the deceased tenant‟s family, provided that person occupied the 
dwelling with the deceased tenant throughout the twelve months preceding his 
death.291  
 
4.6.3 Housing Act 1985 
 
The Housing Act 1985292 regulates local authority tenancies. A “secure tenant” 
acquires various statutory rights from the Act, combined to afford the tenant 
substantive tenure rights. A tenancy under which a dwelling is let as a separate 
dwelling is a secure tenancy293 at any time294 when the conditions described in 
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 This ground is similar to ground 5 as listed in Part I of Schedule II of the Housing Act 1985, 
regulating public sector tenancies. 
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 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 547; Van der Walt AJ Property in the Margins 
(2009) 98. 
292
 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 292 states that the aim of the 
Act is to “provide a regime within which the public sector can effectively perform the function of 
providing housing for the less privileged”. 
293
 For a discussion of the terms of a secure tenancy see Bridge SB Residential Leases (1994) 229-
233; Wilkie M, Luxton P, Morgan J & Cole G Landlord and Tenant Law (5
th
 ed 2006) 269-272. The 
general rule is that the terms of the tenancy will be those agreed upon between the parties, although 
certain terms will be implied by statute, including terms related to the rent payable, assignment, sub-
letting, repairs and alterations. The terms of the tenancy can also be varied through agreement, in 
accordance with the tenancy or in accordance with the Act. See sections 102-103 for detail regarding 
the variation of terms and the procedure prescribed by the Act. The Housing Act 1985 contains no 
system of rent control. Section 24(1) enables a local authority to make reasonable charges as it sees 
fit, provided that the authority review the rents as circumstances may require (section 24(2)). Section 
24(3) requires that when the authority exercises its functions under this section it must “have regard in 
particular to the principle that the rents of houses of any class or description should bear broadly the 
same proportion to private sector rents as the rents of houses of any class or description”. Garner S A 
Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 318-319 states that this section‟s aim is to 
ensure that the differential between the rents charged for different types of dwellings in the public 
sector should be similar to the differential between the rents charged for the same types of dwellings 
in the private sector. Where a tenant is dissatisfied with the rent he can seek judicial review, although 
the local authority has a wide discretion to determine the rent. In Luby v Newcastle-under-Lyme 
Corpn [1964] 2 QB 64 at 72 Diplock LJ found that the courts are not allowed to interfere in the 
process of determining rent because the local authority is best equipped to make this decision, 
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sections 80 (also known as the landlord condition) and 81 (also known as the tenant 
condition) are satisfied.295 In order to satisfy the landlord condition the landlord must 
be one of the prescribed bodies listed in section 80(1) of the Act. The landlord will 
usually be the local authority.296 Prior to 1988 the list included registered social 
landlords (also previously known as housing associations), although Part I of the 
Housing Act 1988 amended the list to exclude housing corporations, charitable 
housing trusts, registered and unregistered housing associations. Since 15 January 
1989 these bodies were removed from the list, after which all registered social 
landlords moved to the private sector.297 The tenant condition will be satisfied if the 
tenant is an individual298 who occupies the dwelling as his only or principal home.299 
Even if sections 79-81 are satisfied, the tenancy will not necessarily be a secure 
tenancy if one of the exclusionary paragraphs in Schedule I of the Housing Act 1985 
is applicable.300  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
although where the authority‟s discretion is exercised in a manner which no reasonable man would 
consider justifiable, the court is entitled to interfere. This decision was confirmed in Backhouse v 
Lambeth BC (1972) 116 SJ 802. Currently the government is striving to reduce the unjustifiable 
differences between public rents and rents set by registered social landlords. The government is 
implementing a “rent restructuring” process in order to achieve a coherent structure of social rents: 
DETR “Quality and Choice: A Decent Home for All, The Housing Green Paper” (April 2000). 
294
 The words “at any time” imply that an occupier may change his status from being a secure tenant 
to losing that status as a result of changing circumstances: Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in 
Context (2007) 210. The tenant will be a secure tenant if the conditions of sections 80 and 81 are 
satisfied. If one of the conditions is not satisfied the tenant will no longer be a secure tenant, although 
once that condition is later satisfied, the tenant will regain security: Hussey v Camden London 
Borough Council (1995) 27 HLR 5 (CA). 
295
 Section 79(1). See also Wilkie M, Luxton P, Morgan J & Cole G Landlord and Tenant Law (5
th
 ed 
2006) 264-266; Bridge SB Residential Leases (1994) 218-223 for a discussion of these requirements. 
296
 The list also includes a development corporation, a housing action trust, an urban development 
corporation and certain housing cooperatives. 
297
 The effect is that after this date “all new tenancies granted by registered social landlords will be 
held on assured rather than secure tenancies.” Tenancies granted before this date will be tenancies 
regulated under the Housing Act 1985: Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 
1998) 294. See section 35 of the Housing Act 1988 for a list of exceptions regulating the status of 
tenants who acquire a secure tenancy after 15 January 1989. 
298
 Where the tenancy is a joint tenancy each of the occupiers must be individuals and at least one of 
them must occupy the dwelling as his principal home. 
299
 See Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 213-214 for a discussion of this 
requirement. One should also note that section 79(3) states that a licensee may be a secure tenant, 
although the effect of this section was restricted by Westminster City Council v Clarke [1992] 2 AC 
288 (HL) 293, where the House of Lords found that a licensee could only be a secure tenant if he 
could exercise exclusive possession of a separate dwelling.  
300
 The list in Schedule I includes long leases; introductory tenancies; employment related tenancies 
(referring to a tenancy granted by a public body as a result of the tenant‟s employment); short-term 
tenancies of land acquired for development, which enables the landlord to temporarily let land that 
was acquired for development; temporary accommodation for homeless persons, provided the 
tenancy is granted under the homeless duties in Part VII of the Housing Act 1996; short-term 
tenancies for persons taking up employment; temporary lettings while works are effected; agricultural 
holdings; student lettings; and commercial lettings. See Bridge SB Residential Leases (1994) 223-
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Before considering the security of tenure provided for under the Act, one 
should take note of introductory and demoted tenancies. The local authority can 
choose to grant introductory tenancies, which are not secure tenancies, to new 
tenants.301 An introductory tenant does enjoy some of the rights enjoyed by secure 
tenants,302 but security of tenure is excluded. The introductory tenancy functions on 
a trial basis for one year, during which period the local authority can decide whether 
the tenancy should end or continue.303 If the conduct of the tenant is acceptable, the 
introductory tenancy will continue after the probationary period and automatically 
convert into a secure tenancy. If the tenant misbehaves, the local authority is at 
liberty to end the tenancy for any reason, provided the correct procedure is 
followed.304 Once a local authority decides to operate such an introductory tenancy 
regime, all new periodic tenancies entered into will initially be introductory 
tenancies.305 The introductory tenancy will cease to exist if the circumstances are 
such that the tenancy would not otherwise be a secure tenancy; if a person other 
than the local authority becomes the landlord; where the landlord revokes the 
election to operate an introductory tenancy regime; or where the tenancy ceases to 
be an introductory tenancy because the tenant has died and there is no 
successor.306 The landlord is at liberty to end the introductory tenancy at any point 
during the introductory period if the landlord is of the opinion that the tenant is 
unsuitable.307 To end the tenancy the landlord must obtain an order for possession, 
after which the landlord serves notice to the tenant in accordance with section 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
229; Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 215-217 for a discussion of these 
exclusions. 
301
 Section 124(1) of the Housing Act 1996. 
302
 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 214 explains that introductory tenants will 
enjoy the right to succession and the right to be consulted on housing management issues, although 
they will not be able to alienate their rights under the tenancy, nor will they be able to exercise the 
right to buy option. 
303
 Section 125(2) of the Housing Act 1996. 
304
 Introductory tenancies promote the campaign against anti-social behaviour as they enable 
landlords to evict disruptive, anti-social tenants effortlessly, which resembles the policy that “secure 
status is something to be „earned‟”: Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 214. 
305
 Sections 124(2)-(3) of the Housing Act 1996 makes provision for three exceptions, namely where 
the tenant was a secure tenant immediately before the tenancy was entered into; where the tenant 
was an assured tenant of a registered social landlord in respect of the same dwelling prior to the new 
tenancy; or where the tenancy was entered into in pursuance of a contract made before the election 
was made. 
306
 Section 125(5) of the Housing Act 1996. 
307
 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 297. 
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128.308 The court can order repossession without considering whether such an order 
would be reasonable. The landlord does not have to prove any ground for 
possession, nor must he establish whether suitable alternative accommodation is 
available.309 
Where the secure tenant has been involved in anti-social behaviour or where 
he used the premises for unlawful purposes the county court can make a “demotion 
order” if the court considers it reasonable, following an application made by the 
landlord. Once the order is granted the secure tenancy will cease to exist and 
convert into a demoted tenancy, which will continue for a period of one year. During 
the demoted tenancy the landlord can easily end the tenancy by serving notice to the 
tenant. The notice must include the landlord‟s reasons for ending the tenancy and 
inform the tenant of his right to review. The court has to grant the possession order if 
these requirements are met.310 
The Housing Act 1985 makes provision for security of tenure through section 
82(1), which states that the landlord can only terminate the secure tenancy by 
obtaining a possession order.311 The court can only make a possession order if the 
landlord can prove one of the grounds listed in Schedule II of the Act.312 To provide 
substantive tenure rights for tenants, the Act overrides the landlord‟s common law 
right to terminate the tenancy upon expiration of the lease.313 A fixed-term tenancy 
could be terminated, at common law, either by effluxion of time or through the 
exercise of a right of re-entry or forfeiture, as stated in the tenancy. If the tenancy is 
a secure fixed-term tenancy and the lease makes provision for a right of re-entry or 
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 The notice must include the landlord‟s reasons for ending the tenancy and it must inform the tenant 
of his right to request a review of the landlord‟s decision to evict the tenant, although where the 
landlord confirms this decision in court, the court has to order repossession: Bright S Landlord and 
Tenant Law in Context (2007) 214. 
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 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 297. See Wilkie M, Luxton P, 
Morgan J & Cole G Landlord and Tenant Law (5
th
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introductory and demoted tenancies. See also section 179 of the Housing Act 2004 for the necessary 
extensions provided for introductory tenancies. 
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 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 214-215. 
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 One should note that the aim of the Act is to provide strengthened occupation rights for tenants 
through security of tenure. Where the landlord wishes to end the tenancy by serving notice to quit, 
such a notice will not be effective. Where the tenant gives notice to quit the Act will not provide 
security of tenure: Greenwich LBC v McGrady (1983) 6 HLR 36 at 40. Where a secure periodic 
tenancy is held by joint tenants, one of the tenants can end the tenancy unilaterally (Hammersmith & 
Fulham LBC v Monk [1992] 1 AC 478 (HL)), although where one of the tenants wishes to end a fixed-
term secure tenancy through surrender, he would have to acquire the consent of the other tenant 
(Leek & Moorlands Building Society v Clark [1952] 2 QB 788).  
312
 Section 84(1). 
313
 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 302. 
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forfeiture, the landlord is unable to forfeit the tenancy before expiration of the lease. 
Section 82(3) states that the court will not order possession of the dwelling in 
pursuance of the forfeiture provision but, if the tenancy was not secure and if the 
landlord can prove that the court would have made an order forfeiting the tenancy, 
the landlord will be entitled to an order terminating the tenancy.  
If the court does terminate the fixed-term tenancy, the tenancy continues as a 
statutory periodic tenancy through the operation of section 86(1).314 A statutory 
periodic tenancy will arise automatically upon expiration of the lease, either through 
effluxion of time or where the court terminated the fixed-term tenancy under section 
82(3). The terms of the statutory periodic tenancy are determined by section 86(2), 
which provides that the periods of the tenancy are the same as those for which rent 
was last payable under the first tenancy and the terms of the tenancy are the same 
as those of the first tenancy. The section also states that the terms are confined to 
those that are compatible with a periodic tenancy and do not include any provision 
for re-entry or forfeiture. To obtain a possession order, terminating the statutory 
periodic tenancy (or the original periodic tenancy), the landlord would have to satisfy 
the requirements in sections 83 and 84.315  
According to section 83 the landlord must serve a “notice seeking possession” 
to the tenant before he can start the proceedings for possession.316 The notice must 
be in the prescribed form, specify the ground on which the court will be asked to 
make an order for possession and give particulars of that ground.317 Through the 
operation of these sections the tenant will have the opportunity to rectify any 
breaches under the tenancy and avoid possession proceedings. It is essential that 
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 Where the landlord decides to grant the tenant a further secure tenancy (either fixed-term or 
periodic) of the same dwelling after expiration of the original tenancy, section 86(1) will not be 
applicable. 
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 Wilkie M, Luxton P, Morgan J & Cole G Landlord and Tenant Law (5
th
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secure tenancy can be either a fixed-term tenancy or a periodic tenancy, although the latter is the 
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316
 In terms of section 83(1)(b), the court can dispense of the notice requirement if it considers it just 
and equitable to do so. Section 83(4)(a) requires that the note must contain a specified date at which 
the proceedings may be begun, although this date may not be earlier than the date on which the 
tenancy could be brought to an end by notice to quit given by the landlord (section 83(5)). Section 
83(3) makes provision for an exception when the landlord is relying on ground 2 in Schedule II 
(nuisance or other anti-social behaviour). According to this section the notice must state that 
proceedings for possession may be begun immediately. The landlord is therefore enabled to act 
quickly where the tenant is misbehaving. 
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 Section 83(2). 
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the landlord must stipulate sufficient particulars of the ground he intends to rely on in 
the notice.318  
Once the landlord satisfies the section 83 requirements he can apply for a 
possession order by relying on one of the grounds listed in Schedule II of the Act. 
The grounds for possession are divided into three categories. Part I (grounds 1-8) is 
the discretionary grounds and the court may only grant the possession order if one of 
the grounds are proved and the court considers it reasonable to do so. Grounds 9-
11, listed in Part II, will only be sufficient to obtain a possession order if the landlord 
can also prove that there will be suitable alternative accommodation available for the 
tenant when the order takes effect. If the landlord wishes to rely on one of the 
grounds listed in Part III, he would have to prove one of these grounds, convince the 
court that the possession order would be reasonable and that there is suitable 
alternative accommodation for the tenant when the order takes effect. The result is 
that the majority of “good” tenants will enjoy a life-long secure tenancy except where 
an estate management reason for eviction exists.319  
The first discretionary ground enables a landlord to apply for a possession 
order where the rent is in arrears320 or where the tenant is in breach of an obligation 
of the tenancy. In order to successfully rely on the first section of this ground the 
landlord would have to prove that some rent was outstanding at the date of the issue 
of proceedings. If the tenant pays the outstanding rent after the issue of proceedings 
but before the hearing, the court will usually not find it reasonable to grant the 
possession order except where there are unusual circumstances.321 Where the 
tenant breached one of the obligations of the tenancy (which forms the second 
section of this ground), the court will consider all the circumstances in order to 
determine whether a possession order would be reasonable.322 Ground 2 states that 
where a tenant, or a person residing in or visiting the dwelling, has been guilty of 
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 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 304.  
319
 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 218. The grounds listed in Part II could be 
defined as “estate management” grounds because they facilitate better estate management. 
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 Wilkie M, Luxton P, Morgan J & Cole G Landlord and Tenant Law (5
th
 ed 2006) 275 mention that 
rent arrears is the most commonly used ground for possession proceedings. 
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 Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
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would include where the tenant has a history of late payments. 
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 The court will consider the seriousness of the breach, whether there is a possible remedy, whether 
the tenant is likely to repeat the breach, whether there is an alternative remedy (Garner S A Practical 
Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 305-306) and whether the breach was deliberate or 
persistent (Sheffield City Council v Jepson (1993) 25 HLR 299). 
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conduct causing, or likely to cause, nuisance or annoyance to a person in the 
locality,323 or has been convicted of using the dwelling for immoral or illegal 
purposes, or has been convicted of an arrestable offence, the landlord can apply for 
a possession order.324 Ground 2A was introduced by the Housing Act 1996 and 
enables the landlord to apply for possession proceedings where one of the partners 
of a married couple (or a couple living together as husband and wife) left the dwelling 
as a result of domestic violence.325 The aim of this ground is to allow the landlord to 
repossess the dwelling where a single person is occupying a family-size home. The 
landlord can rely on ground 3 if the condition of the dwelling or any common parts 
deteriorated as a result of acts of waste by the tenant or person residing in the 
dwelling.326 If the tenant knowingly or recklessly made a false statement to the 
landlord in order to acquire the local authority accommodation and the landlord was 
induced by this statement, he can rely on ground 5 to apply for repossession.327 
Ground 6 is unique as it has no counterpart in the private sector. It makes provision 
for a landlord to seek a possession order where a tenant obtained a lump sum for 
exchanging his tenancy under section 92 of the Act.328 Ground 7 is also unique to 
local authority tenancies as it allows a landlord to apply for a possession order where 
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 A person in the locality includes a resident, visitor or any other person engaging in lawful activity in 
the locality. 
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 Ground 2 has a wide scope because the tenant can face possession proceedings as a result of a 
visitor‟s conduct, exercised in the locality. It is not required that the conduct of a visitor must in fact 
amount to nuisance or annoyance. The conduct merely needs to be likely to cause a nuisance or 
annoyance. In order to determine whether the possession order would be reasonable the court has to 
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 The Act requires that either one of the partners must have been a tenant; that one of the partners 
left the dwelling as a result of domestic violence by the other partner towards either that partner or a 
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unlikely to return to the dwelling. This ground is identical to ground 14A of the Housing Act 1988, but 
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 Ground 4 is similar, but it regulates the condition of furniture included in the tenancy. 
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 This ground illustrates that the demand for public sector housing is greater than the supply and 
public sector landlords strive to accommodate applicants with the greatest need: Garner S A Practical 
Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 308.  
328
 This ground is included to prevent the exploitation of section 92, which makes provision for public 
sector tenants to exchange tenancies: Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 
1998) 309. See Garner S A Practical Approach to Landlord and Tenant (2
nd
 ed 1998) 315 for a 
discussion of section 92. 
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the tenant is an employee of the landlord and the tenant is guilty of misconduct.329 It 
also requires that the dwelling must form part of a building which is held mainly for 
purposes other than housing purposes and the building must consist mainly of 
accommodation other than housing accommodation. Where a secure tenant was 
temporarily placed in alternative accommodation while works were being carried out 
in his principal home and the works are completed, the landlord can rely on ground 8 
to repossess the temporary accommodation. In order to successfully rely on this 
ground the landlord should prove that the tenant agreed, at the time when the 
arrangement was finalised and before the works commenced, to move back into the 
original dwelling upon completion of the works. All of the above-mentioned grounds 
are included in Part I of Schedule II of the Act and the court must consider the 
possession order reasonable before it can grant such an order. 
If the landlord relies on any of the grounds listed in Part II of Schedule II 
(grounds 9-11), the court can only grant the possession order if it is convinced that 
there is suitable alternative accommodation available. Part IV of Schedule II defines 
suitable alternative accommodation as premises let as a separate dwelling under a 
secure tenancy; premises let as a separate dwelling under a protected tenancy, 
although excluding a tenancy which might fall under one of the cases in Part II of 
Schedule 15 of the Rent Act 1977; or premises let as a separate dwelling under an 
assured tenancy, provided the tenancy is not an assured shorthold tenancy nor a 
tenancy under which the landlord might recover possession under any of grounds 1-
5 in Schedule II of the Housing Act 1988. Part IV also requires that the 
accommodation must be reasonably suitable to the needs of the tenant and his 
family. A certificate from the local authority stating that it will provide the tenant with 
suitable alternative accommodation is sufficient evidence to satisfy this requirement, 
but it is insufficient where the landlord itself is a local authority.330 If the landlord did 
not acquire a certificate from the local authority, the court shall consider the factors 
listed in paragraph 2 of Part IV, which includes the nature of the accommodation; the 
distance of the accommodation available from the place of work or education of the 
tenant and his family; the distance of the accommodation from the home of any 
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 The tenant can also be an employee of a local authority, a new town corporation, a housing action 
trust, an urban development corporation, the development Board for Rural Wales, or the governors of 
an aided school. It is therefore not required that the landlord must also be the employer. 
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 Paragraph 4 of Part IV of Schedule II of the Housing Act 1985. 
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member of the tenant‟s family;331 the needs (concerning extent of accommodation) 
and means of the tenant and his family; the terms on which the accommodation is 
available and the terms of the secure tenancy; and the possibility of furniture to be 
given for use and, if so, the nature of the furniture.332 
Ground 9 enables a landlord to apply for a possession order where the 
dwelling is overcrowded in a way that would render the occupier guilty of an 
offence.333 Where the landlord intends to demolish or reconstruct the building or part 
of the building comprising the dwelling, or intends to carry out work on that building, 
and cannot reasonably do so without repossessing the dwelling, he can rely on 
ground 10 to claim a possession order.334 If the landlord is a charity and the tenant‟s 
continued occupation of the dwelling would conflict with the objects of the charity, the 
landlord can rely on ground 11 to claim a possession order. 
Where the landlord wishes to rely on one of the grounds listed in Part III of 
Schedule II, he would have to convince the court that such a possession order would 
be reasonable and that suitable alternative accommodation is available for the tenant 
when the possession order is made. Ground 12 enables the landlord to apply for a 
possession order where the tenant occupies accommodation in a building which is 
not primarily used for housing purposes and the tenant was an employee of the 
landlord. The landlord can repossess the premises if he reasonably requires the 
accommodation for someone engaged in his employment. If the dwelling has 
features that accommodate physically disabled individuals and it is occupied by a 
tenant who is not physically disabled, the landlord will be able to rely on ground 13 to 
claim a possession order if the landlord requires the accommodation for a physically 
disabled person.335 Where the tenancy vested in the tenant by virtue of section 89 
                                                          
331
 This factor will only be considered if proximity to the family member‟s home is essential to the 
tenant or that member‟s well-being. 
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 The court will only consider this factor if furniture was provided by the landlord for use under the 
secure tenancy. 
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 The dwelling must be overcrowded within the meaning of Part X of the Housing Act 1985. 
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 Ground 10A is similar as it permits a landlord to gain vacant possession of a dwelling occupied by 
a secure tenant in order to sell it for redevelopment under a redevelopment scheme approved by the 
secretary of state. Redevelopment schemes were introduced by section 9 of the Housing and 
Planning Act 1986 and concerns the redevelopment of dwellings occupied under secure tenancies: 
Bridge SB Residential Leases (1994) 242. 
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 Ground 14 is similar, but the landlord must be a housing association or housing trust which lets 
dwellings only for occupation by persons whose circumstances make it especially difficult for them to 
satisfy their need for housing. Ground 15 is also similar as it enables a landlord to claim possession 
proceedings where the dwelling is one of a group of dwellings which is let by the landlord for 
occupation by persons with special needs and the tenant is not someone with special needs. It is also 
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(succession to periodic tenancy) and the accommodation is more extensive than is 
reasonably required by the tenant, the landlord may rely on ground 16 to obtain a 
possession order.336 To determine whether the possession order would be 
reasonable the court has to consider the age of the tenant, the period the tenant 
occupied the property as his principal home and any financial or other support given 
by the tenant to the previous tenant. 
Section 85 affords the court an extended discretion regarding the terms of the 
order in cases where the court has to consider reasonableness, including Part I and 
Part II under Schedule II of the Act. The court is at liberty to adjourn the proceedings 
for some period337 or, on making an order for possession, the court may stay or 
suspend the execution of the order or postpone the date of possession for such a 
period as the court thinks fit.338 On such an adjournment, stay, suspension or 
postponement the court must impose conditions with respect to the payment of rent 
(or rent arrears if applicable), unless such a condition would cause exceptional 
hardship to the tenant or would be unreasonable.339 If the terms of the suspended 
order are breached, or when the court does make an order for possession, the 
secure tenancy will terminate. Previously, if the tenant remained in the dwelling and 
maintained a satisfactory rent account, the local authority would often allow the 
tenant to continue occupying the premises. These tenants were commonly known as 
“tolerated trespassers”340 and it had been alleged that quite a substantial number of 
these tenants, until recently, occupied local authority housing.341 In terms of Part 1 
(Schedule 11) of the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008, a tenancy will cease to 
exist on the date that the tenant is evicted. The creation of new tolerated trespassers 
is therefore prevented in both the private and social sectors. Part 2 of the Act 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
required that the landlord must require the dwelling for occupation by a person who has those special 
needs. 
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 It is also required that the notice of the proceedings for possession under section 83 must have 
been served more than six months, but less than twelve months, after the date of the previous 
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provides that existing tolerated trespassers will receive new tenancies, similar to the 
previous tenancy. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
Since the introduction of the Housing Act 1988 the level of tenure security afforded to 
tenants in the private sector has diminished considerably as a result of the general 
deregulation policy initiated by parliament. As a result of this policy private landlords 
and housing association landlords can choose the level of tenure security they would 
afford tenants. For the greater part of the twentieth century, private sector tenants 
enjoyed extensive security of tenure, combined with rent control (or rent regulation), 
while council housing tenants‟ security was legally insubstantial, because it was 
unregulated until the legislature enacted the Housing Act 1985. The Housing Act 
1985 currently regulates local authority tenancies and provides them with 
substantive tenure rights. An important reality to consider in light of the policy 
decisions of parliament is the efficiency of the private rental housing market. One 
could argue that, if the market is functioning efficiently, there is no need to impose 
extensive regulatory security of tenure or rent control,342 provided that there is some 
mechanism affording efficient tenure protection for those members of society who 
need it. 
The efficacy of the British landlord-tenant system could be found in its ability 
to provide different forms of rental housing, with different levels of security of tenure, 
to various individuals with diverse needs. One could argue that the protection 
granted in the private sector has decreased because there is no longer a need to 
impose strict rent control or extensive security of tenure in this sector, while there is 
such a need in the social sector because this sector makes accommodation 
available for the most vulnerable and poorest members of society. Accordingly, it 
makes sense that social sector tenancies could only be terminated through the grant 
of a court order, provided the court considers it reasonable to do so, whereas 
assured shorthold tenancies could be terminated at the end of six months after 
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commencement of the tenancy, without the court considering reasonableness. At the 
same time, the legislature did not abolish security of tenure or rent control in the 
private sector completely, but merely qualified its previously strict implementation. 
The landlord-tenant system in its entirety is therefore context-sensitive and 
adaptable to changing socio-economic circumstances. 
Ultimately, one should also take into account the effect that legislation has on 
the common law by comparing the impact of the statutes. The Rent Act 1977 grants 
security of tenure through the creation of a statutory tenancy, which commences 
when the protected (contractual) tenancy terminates. The protected tenancy 
terminates, in accordance with the common law, through either effluxion of time or 
notice to quit, in the case of a periodic tenancy, or through the operation of any other 
common law method. The common law is therefore to a certain degree kept intact as 
it is still required to terminate the protected tenancy, although its effect is softened 
through the operation of the Act in its aim to provide continued occupation rights for 
tenants. The common law does play a role in the ultimate termination of the tenancy, 
as the commencement of the statutory tenancy is dependent on the termination of 
the protected tenancy, which allows the common law to still exist and function to a 
certain extent.  
A fixed-term local authority tenancy, regulated under the Housing Act 1985, is 
similar because a statutory periodic tenancy will arise upon termination of the lease. 
The fixed-term tenancy must first end through effluxion of time (through the operation 
of the common law) before statutory intervention becomes applicable, but where 
there is a provision in the lease allowing forfeiture, such a provision will not 
necessarily be available to the landlord. The landlord can only terminate a secure 
periodic tenancy through the operation of the Act as he has to prove one of the 
grounds listed in Schedule II of the Act. A notice to quit will therefore have no effect. 
Where a landlord wishes to terminate a private sector assured periodic 
tenancy under the Housing Act 1988, he would also have to prove one of the 
grounds for possession as listed in the Act and a notice to quit will have no effect. 
Upon expiration of a fixed-term assured tenancy, the Act makes provision for the 
continuation of the tenancy through the operation of the periodic assured tenancy. If 
the lease contains a forfeiture provision the landlord would not be able to rely on it to 
end the fixed-term tenancy. One could conclude that in some cases, especially 
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periodic tenancies, the legislation is so overpowering that it completely extinguishes 
the operation of the common law. In these cases the effect of the legislation is to 
alter the common law into a state of “non-existence”. The Rent Act 1977 grants 
substantive tenure security for tenants through the imposition of a statutory 
mechanism which only comes into operation after the termination of the contractual 
tenancy. The contractual tenancy expires through the operation of the common law. 
The Housing Act 1988 also provides security of tenure through assured tenancies, 
although its impact on the common law differs because the usual common law 
methods used in terminating the contractual tenancy are replaced by provisions of 
the Act that afford better tenure security through a continuation of the tenancy.  
The unavoidable questions are to what extent parliament was intent on 
extinguishing the common law regarding security of tenure in landlord-tenant law; 
where the effect of the legislation is so drastic as to render the common law futile; 
and whether the common law can resurface in future. 
From the discussion it follows that the efficiency of the English landlord-tenant 
framework could be identified in its ability to provide adequate, but different, levels of 
tenure security to diverse members of society. The extent of tenure security provided 
for by the statutes reflects parliament‟s housing policies, which is context sensitive to 
the changing socio-economic circumstances. It is clear that the aim of the legislature 
was (and still is) to give effect to the housing policies in order to react to the 
changing socio-economic circumstances. The common law would not have been 
able to provide these different levels of tenure security to diverse households in the 
landlord-tenant sphere. When considering the complexity of the statutes individually 
and then as a whole nexus of laws, which aims to provide adequate housing, one 
can conclude that the common law would not have been able to respond to the 
housing needs of all tenants as successfully as the legislation has. In order to give 
effect to the housing policies and respond to the changing housing needs, the 
legislature had to either amend the common law to a certain extent or override the 
workings of the common law completely.  
South African landlord-tenant law is different, but comparable on this point, as 
the Constitution mandates tenure reform (sections 25(6) and 26(3)) and access to 
adequate housing (section 26(1)) through the enactment of legislation (sections 
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25(9) and 26(2)). However, the laws343 that have been enacted in the landlord-tenant 
sphere in order to give effect to these obligations largely reinforce the common law 
instead of correcting its shortcomings.344 The weak tenure rights of urban residential 
tenants in South Africa is a direct result of the inadequacy of the legislation, because 
the legislation does not override the common law to provide continued occupation 
rights for tenants, nor does it amend the substantive occupation rights of tenants as 
developed in terms of the common law. In order to give effect to tenure reform and 
provide access to adequate housing in the South African rental housing market, the 
legislature would have to develop landlord-tenant legislation that provides different 
levels of tenure security to diverse households, based on their personal needs. 
When considering the complexity of the English landlord-tenant statutes and the 
effect it had on the common law, it becomes apparent that new landlord-tenant 
legislation in South Africa would have to override the common law in order to be 
suitably and sufficiently context-sensitive. 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 4 illustrated the impact of landlord-tenant legislation on the English common 
law, especially with regard to the protection of tenants. The Chapter also 
emphasised the continuous amendment of legislation to improve tenure security for 
various occupiers with diverse needs. Over the course of decades, the English 
parliament has consistently adapted and developed an extensive landlord-tenant 
legislative scheme in order to accommodate the changing socio-economic 
circumstances. Within this scheme, certain tenants enjoy strong tenure security 
associated with continued occupation rights, while others occupy residential property 
with hardly any security of tenure. One could argue that weak domestic occupation 
rights of tenants, as provided by the legislation, are not incidental, but rather a 
decision of parliament, because the extent of statutory tenant protection is a central 
aspect of housing policy and landlord-tenant law.  
From the discussion in Chapter 4 it is clear that English landlord-tenant law 
has developed since the beginning of the twentieth century according to the policy 
aims of parliament and that the legislative scheme that currently regulates the entire 
residential landlord-tenant framework reflects the domestic needs of all tenants (and 
landlords) as comprehensively as possible. Parliament has solely been responsible 
for formulating correct housing policies that reflect the housing needs of society and 
until 2000, when the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force, parliament could 
introduce housing policies and enact legislation that regulate the occupation rights of 
residential tenants, without restraint or approval by any other body of law. This 
position changed when the Human Rights Act came into force to the extent that it 
made the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 1950 applicable to English law. 
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (ECHR) functions as an external examiner and can 
influence domestic landlord-tenant law that has developed over decades, reflecting 
well-researched and context-sensitive housing policies, according to certain rights 
enshrined in the Convention. The role of the Convention is therefore similar to the 
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South African Constitution 1996,1 as all law (common law and legislation) must be in 
line with the Convention. In light of the case law it is clear that the courts (in South 
Africa and the UK) are sometimes uncomfortable with establishing and upholding the 
hierarchy of laws.2  
The United Kingdom ratified the ECHR in 1951. However, the rights 
enshrined in the Convention only became enforceable in UK domestic law in October 
2000, when the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force.3 The Convention was 
made applicable through the operation of two sections, namely sections 3(1) and 6 
of the Act. Section 3(1) provides that “primary legislation and subordinate legislation 
must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention 
rights”.4 Section 6(1) of the Act states that “[i]t is unlawful for a public authority to act 
in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right”. Where a landlord is a “public 
authority”, it therefore has to exercise his duties in compliance with the Convention 
because the Human Rights Act 1998 is applicable. One can safely assume that all 
local authority landlords fall under the definition of a “public authority”.5  
Section 6(3) of the Act extended the definition of a “public authority” by 
providing that a “public authority” includes a court or tribunal and any person whose 
functions are of a public nature. Where a landlord is a registered social landlord, the 
position is unclear, because registered social landlords are treated as private 
landlords in the housing legislation, although they also receive state funding and 
exercise certain statutory housing duties, as regulated by the Housing Corporation.6 
In Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v Donoghue,7 Lord 
Woolf CJ found that a registered social landlord could be defined as a “public 
authority”, depending on the context and function of the specific registered social 
                                                          
1
 See section 3.2 in Chapter 3. 
2
 See sections 3.8 and 3.9 in Chapter 3. 
3
 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 271. The Council of Europe adopted the 
Convention in 1950, shortly after the United Nations (UN) implemented the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in 1948. The Declaration made significant international statements with regard to the 
protection of fundamental rights including the right to housing, although these rights were not legally 
enforceable:  Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 271. 
4
 This section is similar to section 39(2) of the South African Constitution, which states that “[w]hen 
interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law … every court … must promote the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.” 
5
 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 274. 
6
 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 274. 
7
 [2002] QB 48. 
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landlord.8 In the case law following Poplar, the courts focused on the character of the 
function concerned rather than the nature of the body.9 It is important to note that 
section 6(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998 also includes the courts as a “public 
authority”. The courts must therefore exercise their duties in compliance with the 
Convention. In Kay and Others v Lambeth LBC; Leeds City Council v Price and 
Others,10 the House of Lords confirmed that “[t]he court‟s own practice and 
procedures must be Convention-compliant”.11 
The Convention right that has the most profound impact on the termination of 
lease relationships and therefore also the most profound impact on tenants‟ tenure 
security is article 8(1), which provides that “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his 
private and family life, his home and his correspondence”. Apart from the complex 
statutory landlord-tenant scheme developed by the English parliament, various 
tenants have relied on article 8(1) for protection against eviction. Importantly, the 
right enshrined in article 8(1) is not absolute but qualified by article 8(2), which states 
that “[t]here shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of the … economic well-being of the country … or for the 
protection of the rights of and freedoms of others”.12  
The European Court of Human Rights has granted tenants and unlawful 
occupiers extended protection in terms of this provision. By contrast, the application 
of this provision has generated a lot of uncertainty in the English courts. Judging 
from the case law, the relationship between the English common law, the domestic 
legislative scheme and article 8 of the ECHR, with regard to the protection of existing 
occupation rights (or interests) for tenants and unlawful occupiers, is complicated 
and fraught with uncertainty. The tension between these three bodies of law is 
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 Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v Donoghue [2002] QB 48 at 67-68. 
See the decision at 56-57 for the facts of the case and 69-70 for the determining factors that 
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Birmingham City Council and Others [2007] 3 WLR 112 (HL).  
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 [2006] 2 AC 465 (HL). 
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501. See also Weaver v London & Quadrant Housing Trust [2008] EWHC 1377 (Admin). 
12
 Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 610. 
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similar to the position in South Africa,13 primarily because the English courts are also 
uncertain about the impact of the Convention (similar to the South African 
Constitution) on domestic law. The legislative landlord-tenant framework in English 
law is much more extensive than the landlord-tenant statutes in South Africa14 and 
the common law is therefore more significant in South Africa than in Britain. The role 
of the Convention in the area of landlord-tenant law, and more specifically the 
occupation rights of tenants, is therefore to test whether the legislative scheme 
(rather than the common law) that was developed by parliament is in line with the 
rights enshrined in the Convention. The role of the South African Constitution is also 
to test the constitutional validity of the common law and legislation, but – as was 
explained in Chapters 2 and 3 – the South African common law is more significant 
with regard to the eviction of tenants.    
 
5.2 Case law preceding article 8 success  
 
Shortly after the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force the English courts were 
faced with questions regarding the application of article 8(1) of the ECHR in the 
event of evictions. The initial cases concerned the eviction of tenants whose 
tenancies terminated in accordance with domestic law. The tenants, in the different 
cases, relied on article 8 of the ECHR to oppose the landlords‟ right to possession in 
terms of the domestic law. In the initial cases, which were all heard by the domestic 
courts, the courts applied a restrictive approach when interpreting the role of article 
8.  
In Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v 
Donoghue,15 a local housing authority (London Borough of Tower Hamlets) granted 
a weekly non-secure tenancy16 to the defendant in terms of the Housing Act 1985. 
The local authority created a housing association in order to transfer a portion of the 
                                                          
13
 See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the post-1994 South African position. 
14
 See section 3.4.2 in Chapter 3 for a discussion of post-1994 South African landlord-tenant 
legislation. 
15
 [2002] QB 48. 
16
 Section 79(1) of the Housing Act 1985 defines a “secure tenancy” as “[a] tenancy under which a 
dwelling is let as a separate dwelling … at any time when the conditions described in sections 80 and 
81 … are satisfied.” See text accompanying ffn 293-300 in Chapter 4 and Bright S Landlord and 
Tenant Law in Context (2007) 210-218 for further detail on the definition of a secure tenancy. 
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local authority housing stock to the association. The housing association was known 
as Poplar and the property occupied by the defendant was part of the transferred 
housing stock. The local authority issued proceedings for possession against the 
defendant, but the proceedings were withdrawn because the property was 
transferred to the housing association and therefore no longer formed part of the 
local authority housing stock. The local authority notified the tenant that she held an 
assured shorthold tenancy17 under the Housing Act 1988 and that the housing 
association was her new landlord. Shortly thereafter Poplar served a notice to quit to 
the defendant in terms of section 21(4) of the Housing Act 1988.18 In the Court of 
Appeal, Lord Woolf CJ stated that the district judge had to make the order for 
possession “if the defendant had a tenancy which was subject to section 21(4) and 
the proper notice was served”.19 One of the remaining issues in the Court of Appeal 
was whether the defendant could rely on article 8 of the ECHR to oppose Poplar‟s 
right to possession under section 21(4) of the Housing Act 1988.20  
The court acknowledged that an eviction order would have an impact on the 
defendant‟s family life and that the outcome of article 8(2) is consequently 
important.21 In order to determine whether Poplar could rely on article 8(2), Lord 
Woolf CJ stated that the intention of parliament, when enacting section 21(4) of the 
Housing Act 1988, was to provide accommodation to a dependent group of 
individuals in need of social housing. Lord Woolf CJ found that this general aim 
should take preference over a case-related issue such as the defendants‟.22 The 
court emphasised the complexity and broad economic repercussions of housing (and 
specifically rental housing) policy and concluded that parliament is better equipped to 
decide what is in the public interest, especially with regard to housing policy. The 
question whether the courts should have a more distinct role to play in a section 
                                                          
17
 A private landlord can let property under the Housing Act 1988 either as an assured tenancy or as 
an assured shorthold tenancy. The latter does not provide extensive security of tenure, while the 
assured tenancy affords the tenant greater tenure security. See text accompanying ffn 245-250 in 
Chapter 4 and Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 187-188; 203-204 for more detail 
on assured shorthold tenancies. 
18
 Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v Donoghue [2002] QB 48 at 56. 
19
 Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v Donoghue [2002] QB 48 at 59. 
20
 The court also had to determine whether Poplar was a “public authority” in terms of section 6(3) of 
the Human Rights Act 1998. Lord Woolf CJ identified important factors to take into consideration in 
the specific circumstances and found that the functions of Poplar were so similar to those of the 
previous local authority (Tower Hamlets) that it could be defined as a “functional public authority”: 
Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v Donoghue [2002] QB 48 at 69-70. 
21
 Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v Donoghue [2002] QB 48 at 70. 
22
 Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v Donoghue [2002] QB 48 at 69. 
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21(4) possession claim was said to be a legislative policy decision made by 
parliament and as such the courts should treat this decision with deference. The 
application of the Human Rights Act 1998 does not provide the courts with a 
discretion to disregard the decisions of parliament in cases where there might have 
been a breach of the Convention.23 Lord Woolf CJ found that section 21(4) is an 
essential procedural measure in a democratic society for recovering a tenant‟s 
property once the tenancy has terminated. The parliamentary decision to restrict the 
discretionary power of the court in a section 21(4) application forms part of policy 
and the courts should abide by this decision.24 
In Lambeth LBC v Howard,25 the appellant had a secure tenancy26 in terms of 
the Housing Act 1985. The county court gave an outright possession order against 
the appellant on the grounds that he harassed his neighbour. Section 84, read with 
Part I of Schedule II of the Housing Act 1985, states that the court may make an 
outright possession order or a suspended possession order on grounds of nuisance 
or annoyance to neighbours if it is reasonable to do so.27 In the Court of Appeal, the 
appellant argued that the outright possession order was unreasonable and an 
unjustifiable interference with his rights under article 8 of the ECHR.28 The court had 
to consider the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the ECHR on English 
domestic law, with regard to the statutory right of the local authority to evict the 
appellant on grounds of harassment to neighbouring occupiers.29 Sedley LJ30 found 
that there is no incompatibility between article 8 of the ECHR and section 84, read 
with Part I of Schedule II of the Housing Act 1985, if the court considers the outright 
possession order reasonable. The right to respect for a person‟s home provided for 
in article 8(1) is not “an absolute concept, nor, given Article 8(2), an unqualified 
right”.31  
                                                          
23
 Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v Donoghue [2002] QB 48 at 71. 
24
 Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v Donoghue [2002] QB 48 at 71. The 
court found that section 21(4) of the Housing Act 1988 was not in conflict with the defendant‟s right to 
family life as stated in article 8(1) of the ECHR and that there was no other contravention of article 8. 
25
 [2001] 33 HLR 58. 
26
 See fn 16 above for the definition of a secure tenancy.  
27
 Lambeth LBC v Howard [2001] 33 HLR 58 at 638-639. 
28
 Lambeth LBC v Howard [2001] 33 HLR 58 at 638. 
29
 Lambeth LBC v Howard [2001] 33 HLR 58 at 643. 
30
 See Lambeth LBC v Howard [2001] 33 HLR 58 at 647-648 for the concurring judgements of Hale 
LJ and Thorpe LJ.  
31
 Lambeth LBC v Howard [2001] 33 HLR 58 at 644. 
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The court also acknowledged that article 8(1) is applicable if there is a threat 
to an individual‟s home in the form of a claim for possession. If the landlord is a local 
authority, section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 will become relevant and raise 
the question whether the interference with the individual‟s home is justified.32 Sedley 
LJ found that the court should apply the principle of proportionality to determine 
whether the interference is justified, even though the forthcoming decisions of the 
courts would unlikely change as a result of article 8 of the ECHR.33  
The central question was not merely whether the outright possession order 
was in accordance with the law, but also whether the immediate eviction resulting 
from the order was necessary in a democratic society, in order to protect the rights 
and freedoms of others. The appellant had harassed his neighbour and thereby 
deprived her of the “freedom from fear and the right to live in peace”.34 Sedley LJ 
concluded that the outright possession order was necessary to protect the 
appellant‟s neighbour from his continuing harassment, because it was proportionate 
to the pressing social need of his neighbour in the sense that there was no other 
solution that the court could find in order to achieve the legitimate aim.35 
In Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v 
Donoghue,36 the court acknowledged that any eviction order would have an impact 
on a tenant‟s right to respect for his home and article 8(1) would therefore become 
applicable. However, the court was not prepared to disregard parliamentary 
decision-making by overriding the statutory right of the housing association, because 
the Human Rights Act 1998 does not enable the courts to create Convention-
compliant rights. In Lambeth LBC v Howard,37 the court expanded the strength of 
article 8 of the ECHR by stating that once article 8(1) is applicable and there has 
been an infringement, article 8(2) requires that such interference must be justified. In 
order to determine whether the interference was justified, the court had to apply a 
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 Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 also raises the issue whether the meaning of “reasonable”, 
as provided for in the Housing Act 1988, is Convention-compliant:  Lambeth LBC v Howard [2001] 33 
HLR 58 at 645. The legislative construction of the Act must therefore comply with the Convention. 
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 Lambeth LBC v Howard [2001] 33 HLR 58 at 645. 
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 Lambeth LBC v Howard [2001] 33 HLR 58 at 645. 
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 Lambeth LBC v Howard [2001] 33 HLR 58 at 646-647. 
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 [2002] QB 48. 
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 [2001] 33 HLR 58. 
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proportionality test.38 In Poplar, the legislation provided the landowner with a clear 
substantive right to possession. The court did not have a discretion to refuse the 
possessory claim and therefore merely had to apply the law as developed and 
enacted by the legislature. The Lambeth case was different, since the legislation 
included that the court had to consider the eviction order reasonable within the given 
circumstances before it could grant the possession order. The court therefore had a 
discretionary role in deciding whether to grant the possession order and could 
consider the proportionality of the order in the light of article 8 of the ECHR. 
In Harrow LBC v Qazi,39 the respondent and his former wife leased council 
housing from the local authority under Part IV of the Housing Act 1985 as joint 
secure tenants.40 The joint tenancy was terminated by the wife‟s unilateral notice to 
quit the tenancy. (This form of termination forms part of the common law and is not 
provided for in the legislation.) The respondent continued to occupy the premises 
with his new partner, despite the fact that he had no legal or equitable proprietary 
right to remain in the house under the relevant English law.41 Before Mrs Qazi served 
the notice to quit, Mr Qazi‟s occupation right was regulated under the Housing Act 
1985, which affords reasonably strong tenure security for tenants.42 However, the 
common law notice to quit bypassed this protection and granted the local authority a 
clear substantive common law right to possession. The local authority was entitled to 
possession and claimed the property from the respondent, but Mr Qazi argued that 
the Human Rights Act 1998 was applicable and required that the court had to 
consider whether the eviction order would be proportionate in the light of his article 
8(1) right to respect for his home.43 His claim was therefore based on the contention 
that the dwelling was his “home” in terms of article 8(1) and that the local authority 
                                                          
38
 See Luba J “Residential Possession Proceedings and Article 8 (Part 2): The Impact on the Private 
Sector” (2002) 6(2) Law and Tenant Review 9-12; Van der Walt AJ Property in the Margins (2009) 
106-107. 
39
 [2004] 1 AC 983 (HL). See also the recent cases of Wandsworth LBC v Dixon [2009] EWHC 27 
(Admin); Wilson v London Borough of Harrow [2010] EWHC 1574 (QB) for similar cases. 
40
 See fn 16 above for the definition of a secure tenancy and Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in 
Context (2007) 670 for more detail on joint tenancies. 
41
 In Harrow LBC v Qazi [2004] 1 AC 983 (HL) para 94 Lord Millett mentions that the respondent 
could claim protection from any third party who did not have an immediate right, because he was still 
in actual possession of the premises. 
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 See text accompanying ffn 311-315 in Chapter 4 for a short explanation on the level of tenure 
security provided for secure tenants. 
43
 Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5
th
 ed 2009) 125-126. See Harrow LBC v Qazi [2004] 1 
AC 983 (HL) paras 40-45 per Lord Hope of Craighead for further detail with regard to the facts of the 
case. 
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acted in breach of his article 8 right by claiming possession of the property. The local 
authority had to justify its actions in terms of article 8(2), because article 8(1) was 
“engaged”.44 The first question the House of Lords had to consider was whether the 
respondent occupied the property as his “home” in terms of article 8(1), even though 
he had no legal or equitable right to remain in the property. The Court unanimously 
found that Qazi did occupy the premises as his “home”. His lack of a right to occupy 
the property could therefore not influence the fact that he did occupy the premises as 
his “home”.45  
The second, more complex question was whether a local authority could 
make use of a procedure to recover possession from a former tenant, which leads to 
a possession order being granted automatically, or whether the court should have 
the opportunity to consider the proportionality of the eviction order before it is 
granted. On this basis, the court will always have the discretion to decide whether or 
not to grant the possession order.46 The test for proportionality requires that the local 
authority has to prove that the possession order is necessary in terms of article 8(2) 
of the ECHR.47 
Lord Millett found that article 8(1) and 8(2) had to be read together because 
article 8(2) requires that the interference with the respondent‟s home must not be 
arbitrary and therefore in accordance with the law.48 The interference with the 
respondent‟s right to respect for his “home” could be justified if a proportionate 
balance is struck between either the interference and the competing public interest 
or the interference and the necessary “protection of the rights and freedoms of 
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 Harrow LBC v Qazi [2004] 1 AC 983 (HL) para 59. 
45
 Harrow LBC v Qazi [2004] 1 AC 983 (HL) paras 8-11 per Lord Bingham of Cornhill; para 29 per 
Lord Steyn; paras 60-68 per Lord Hope of Craighead; para 95 per Lord Millett; para 148 per Lord 
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the court must order possession. 
47
 Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5
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 ed 2009) 125-126. Article 8(2) ensures that any 
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 Lord Millett interpreted article 8 so as to provide some protection for the individual‟s right to live a 
normal life in peace without interference by public authorities, instead of affording the occupier a 
proprietary right: Harrow LBC v Qazi [2004] 1 AC 983 (HL) para 89. At para 123 Lord Scott of Foscote 
referred to the general aim of the Convention and found that it was not intended to “engage in social 
engineering in the housing field”, but rather to protect fundamental rights and freedoms. 
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others”.49 The possession order would interfere with Qazi‟s right to respect for his 
home, but his right to occupy the premises was confined to his tenancy and this right 
was terminated by his former wife‟s notice to quit the tenancy. The possession order 
was necessary to protect the rights of the appellant, leaving no question with regard 
to a balance to be struck.50 Lord Millett concluded that the court, as a public 
authority, is not obliged in each case to consider whether a possession order would 
be justified in terms of article 8(2) and therefore proportionate. Once the court 
concludes that the landlord is entitled to a possession order as a matter of domestic 
law, taking into consideration the legislative scheme developed by parliament, “there 
is nothing further to investigate”.51 Nevertheless, the tenancy was terminated by the 
wife‟s notice to quit, which forms part of the common law, not the applicable 
legislation. 
Lord Scott of Foscote argued that article 8(1) of the ECHR makes provision 
for a general right to respect for an individual‟s home life in all its aspects, including 
the “home”. Article 8(2) sets out the “gateways” through which the public authority is 
allowed to interfere with the article 8(1) right. The interference will only be 
permissible if it is in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society 
for one of the reasons provided for in the article.52 The aim of article 8 is to protect 
individuals‟ “home life” against arbitrary interference by the state or public authorities. 
However, article 8 was not intended to create additional proprietary rights for tenants 
in a way that would restrict landlords‟ property and contractual rights.53 The 
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 Harrow LBC v Qazi [2004] 1 AC 983 (HL) para 101. 
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 Harrow LBC v Qazi [2004] 1 AC 983 (HL) para 103. 
51
 Harrow LBC v Qazi [2004] 1 AC 983 (HL) para 108. It was clear that under domestic law the 
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among various things that affect a person‟s right to privacy”. The right to respect for the home is 
concerned with protection against public authority interference rather than the protection of the home 
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respective rights of landlord and tenant depend on a combination of common law 
rules and principles and the relevant legislation that forms part of the legislative 
scheme enacted by parliament. This is the case even in the event of eviction 
proceedings. If the tenant does not have a right under domestic law to remain in 
possession, he cannot rely on article 8 to invent such a right.54 Lord Scott of Foscote 
concluded that article 8 should not have been applied in the case because “an article 
8 defence can never prevail against an owner entitled under the ordinary law to 
possession”.55 Even when applying article 8 in the specific circumstances, the 
possession order would be in accordance with the law and necessary to protect the 
rights of the appellant.56 
Lord Hope of Craighead agreed with Lord Millett and Lord Scott of Foscote 
that an individual‟s contractual and proprietary right to possession cannot be resisted 
by an occupier‟s right to respect for his home in terms of article 8.57  The majority of 
the House of Lords therefore found that the proportionate balancing between the 
rights of landlords and the interests of tenants had already been done by parliament 
through the enactment of legislation (or the absence of the legislation and the 
relevance of the common law). Parliament is best equipped to give effect to the 
various policies, especially housing policies that take the form of complex statutory 
housing schemes. If the landlord is entitled to claim possession under domestic law, 
article 8 cannot be raised as a defence, because it was never intended to create 
proprietary rights for tenants. If that was the case the effect of article 8 would be to 
diminish the contractual and property rights of landlords without statutory authority. 
The ECHR does therefore not establish a “supra-national charter of rights” that 
renders it necessary to scrutinize the rights established by parliament in the relevant 
legislation.58 Lord Millett and Lord Scott of Foscote did develop certain approaches in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
as a proprietary right and any interference with this right must be measured against the wider 
interests of the community: Harrow LBC v Qazi [2004] 1 AC 983 (HL) para 51. See also Hughes D & 
Davis M “Human Rights and the Triumph of Property: The Marginalisation of the European 
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 Harrow LBC v Qazi [2004] 1 AC 983 (HL) para 125. 
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 Harrow LBC v Qazi [2004] 1 AC 983 (HL) para 149. 
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 Harrow LBC v Qazi [2004] 1 AC 983 (HL) para 149. 
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 Harrow LBC v Qazi [2004] 1 AC 983 (HL) para 84. 
58
 Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5
th
 ed 2009) 127. One can assume that the position 
regarding the compliance of the common law is uncertain. 
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order to solve an article 8 defence against a claim for possession,59 but these 
strategies were irrelevant in the case as a result of the emphasis that the House of 
Lords placed on the hierarchy of domestic law in relation to human rights law.60  
The majority approach was challenged by strong dissenting speeches by Lord 
Steyn and Lord Bingham of Cornhill.61 Lord Steyn argued that the views of the 
majority effectively emptied article 8(1) of any meaning, because it does not provide 
any purposive interpretation of the article as read against the composition and aim of 
the Convention. According to Lord Steyn, the majority approach “allows domestic 
notions of title, legal and equitable rights, and interests, to colour the interpretation of 
article 8(1)”.62 The view of the minority was intended to endorse a human rights 
“landscape” through the operation of the Human Rights Act 1998 with the use of the 
proportionality requirement, in order to allow European scrutiny of domestic law.63 
Both Lord Bingham of Cornhill and Lord Steyn approved the acceptance of 
developing European jurisprudence in decisions such as Sheffield City Council v 
Smart,64 where Laws LJ found that the courts should apply the standards in article 
8(2) more strictly in eviction cases in order to comply with the tenant‟s Convention 
rights.65  
Bright66 explains that at this stage, the decision of the majority in Qazi67 
applied to all cases where possession proceedings were instituted against occupiers 
without a right to remain on the property in domestic law. The impact was also that 
an occupier‟s article 8 defence could never prevail against a landowner‟s mandatory 
right to possession. If the court did require a proportionality test and balancing 
exercise in every eviction case, the purpose of a mandatory right to possession that 
enables the landowner to quickly evict the occupier would be undermined. However, 
                                                          
59
 Harrow LBC v Qazi [2004] 1 AC 983 (HL) para 101 per Lord Millett; para 120 per Lord Scott of 
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the problem with the majority approach is that it did not allow any possibility for 
review in order to ensure that the relevant domestic law was Convention-compliant.68 
Van der Walt69 argues that the problem with all notice to quit cases involving a joint 
tenancy is that the remaining occupier is unaware of the other tenant‟s intention to 
end the joint tenancy. The remaining tenant will only realise that his right to occupy 
the property was terminated once he is served with possession proceedings from the 
landlord. At this point the tenant can no longer apply for a new tenancy or state a 
case for continued occupation rights.70 In Poplar71 the court found that the rights 
enshrined in the Convention cannot trump parliamentary legislative decision-making. 
This decision was taken one step further in Qazi,72 where the majority found that the 
rights enshrined in the Convention could never trump English domestic law, including 
the common law. This decision restricted the operation of the ECHR to such a 
drastic extent that it was uncertain whether an article 8 defence could ever succeed. 
 
5.3 Qualified success under the article 8 challenge 
 
The issues addressed in Harrow LBC v Qazi73 were revisited in the European Court 
of Human Rights in Connors v United Kingdom.74 The applicant and his family had 
resided on a local authority gypsy site for thirteen years, with the necessary 
contractual license to occupy a plot. The local authority (the Leeds City Council) 
issued proceedings for summary possession against the applicant, based on the 
grounds that he occupied a plot without the necessary license. In the witness 
statement the site manager asserted that the defendants breached the license 
agreement, although no particulars of the breach were given. During the hearing, the 
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applicant requested that the Council would review its decision to terminate the 
applicant‟s license. Shortly thereafter the high court refused to permit an application 
for judicial review. The county court granted a possession order and the applicant 
and his family were evicted from the caravan site.75 The European Court of Human 
Rights examined the relevant domestic law regarding the provision of gypsy sites; 
unauthorised stationing of caravans; and security of tenure on caravan sites. It was 
clear that the local authority was entitled, under domestic law, to summary 
possession without a judicial review process to determine whether the possession 
order was reasonable and justifiable.76  
However, without referring to the decision of the House of Lords in Harrow 
LBC v Qazi,77 the European Court of Human Rights found that article 8 was 
applicable and that the eviction of the applicant did interfere with his article 8(1) right 
to respect for his home. The parties agreed that the interference was in accordance 
with the law and that it protected the rights of the local authority and the rights of the 
other occupiers of the site, the remaining question being whether the eviction was 
proportionate and necessary “in a democratic society” in pursuit of a legitimate aim, 
namely to protect the rights and freedoms of the local authority and other 
occupiers.78 
The Court found that the initial assessment of whether an article 8 
interference is “necessary in a democratic society” for a legitimate aim, is made by 
the national authorities. The interference must answer a “pressing social need” and 
be proportionate to that aim. However, the relevance and sufficiency of the case-
specific reasons for the interference remains subject to review by the courts in order 
to determine whether the interference is Convention-compliant.79 The Court 
acknowledged that the national authorities are better equipped to assess local needs 
and conditions, specifically those related to social and economic policies. National 
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authorities must therefore enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in these areas, 
although the margin will vary according to the nature of the specific Convention right 
in question. Where the Convention right is crucial for the individual‟s well-being and 
enjoyment of life, the margin of appreciation will be narrower. The margin of 
appreciation will depend on the circumstances of each case where social and 
economic policy considerations arise in the context of article 8, “with particular 
significance attaching to the extent of the intrusion into the personal sphere of the 
applicant”.80 The Court emphasised that the procedural safeguards that are available 
to a citizen facing eviction proceedings, as determined by the national authority when 
developing the regulatory framework, will be an important indication of whether the 
national authority remained within its margin of appreciation.81 The Court also found 
that the vulnerable position of gypsies justifies placing a positive obligation on 
national authorities, by virtue of article 8 of the ECHR, to facilitate the effective 
protection of their special needs within the regulatory framework.82 
The Court found that there was a violation of the applicant‟s article 8 right 
because the eviction took place without the necessary procedural safeguards. The 
serious interference with the applicant‟s article 8 right requires justification in the 
form of providing reasons of public interest. The case was therefore concerned with 
the “policy of procedural protection for a particular category of persons”.83 The legal 
framework regulating the occupation rights of gypsies did not provide the necessary 
procedural protection for the applicant and therefore violated his article 8 right.84 The 
local authority‟s power to summarily evict the applicant without giving reasons and 
                                                          
80
 Connors v United Kingdom [2005] 40 EHRR 189 para 82. 
81
 Connors v United Kingdom [2005] 40 EHRR 189 para 83. 
82
 Connors v United Kingdom [2005] 40 EHRR 189 para 84. Bright S “Article 8 again in the House of 
Lords: Kay v Lambeth LBC; Leeds CC v Price” [2006] Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 294-308 at 
303 mentions that this positive obligation might also appear in other situations, although it is uncertain 
in what context the obligation will arise. From Kay and Others v Lambeth LBC; Leeds City Council v 
Price and Others [2006] 2 AC 465 (HL), one might speculate that the positive obligation will arise in 
the context of vulnerability of classes of individuals. Bright S “Article 8 again in the House of Lords: 
Kay v Lambeth LBC; Leeds CC v Price” [2006] Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 294-308 at 305 
distinguishes between public and private landlords with regard to “positive obligations”, by stating that 
only public authorities (landlords) have a positive duty to protect vulnerable occupiers under article 8 
of the ECHR. 
83
 Connors v United Kingdom [2005] 40 EHRR 189 paras 86, 95. 
84
 Gray K & Gray SF Elements of Land Law (5
th
 ed 2009) 128. 
257 
 
without being subject to judicial review did not serve any “pressing social need” and 
was therefore found to be disproportionate.85 
In Harrow LBC v Qazi,86 Lord Millett and Lord Scott of Foscote developed 
certain procedures for an article 8 defence, but they did not include the necessary 
guidelines to determine in which cases an article 8 defence could be raised and 
possibly succeed. Therefore there was some uncertainty with regard to the 
relevance of article 8. In Connors v United Kingdom,87 the European Court of Human 
Rights accepted that the national authorities must enact legislation in order to give 
effect to various policies. Through the enforcement of these complex housing 
schemes, Convention rights might be infringed. However, the courts must evaluate 
the interference in each case in order to determine whether it is proportionate and 
pursues a legitimate aim. This approach clearly altered and possibly developed the 
reasoning in Qazi to such an extent that one can conclude that the majority in Qazi 
was wrong to state that an article 8 defence can never prevail against an owner 
entitled to possession in terms of the domestic law.88 It is also important to note that 
in Connors, the Court found that the legal framework regulating the procedural 
safeguards of the gypsy community in eviction proceedings was inadequate. The 
Court did not question the substantive right of the local authority to evict gypsies. 
The apparent incompatibility between Harrow LBC v Qazi89 and Connors v 
United Kingdom90 was resolved in the conjoined decision of Kay and Others v 
Lambeth LBC; Leeds City Council v Price and Others.91 In the Leeds case a number 
of gypsy travellers entered a recreation ground without the permission of the local 
authority landowner. The local authority commenced proceedings for possession, 
based on the ground that the travellers were trespassers who refused to vacate its 
property. The travellers agreed to these facts and claimed no defence under 
municipal law, but relied on article 8 of the ECHR as a defence, arguing that Leeds 
was in breach of its statutory duty to provide gypsies with sites to park their 
caravans. They contended that the local authority had to show justification under 
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article 8 of the ECHR before they could be evicted, because of their exceptional 
personal circumstances, namely their medical problems and history of forced 
evictions.92 In the Kay case the local authority made residential property available to 
a number of occupiers for several years, although the property was later leased to a 
housing trust (LQHT) and the appellants were allowed by the trust to occupy the 
property with licenses. In Bruton v London and Quadrant Housing Trust,93 the court 
found that all the occupiers, including the appellants, who had been allowed by 
LQHT to occupy properties under similar licenses, held tenancies94 and was 
therefore tenants and not licensees. The local authority gave notice to LQHT to 
terminate the lease and subsequently initiated possession claims against the various 
occupiers of the property. The occupiers claimed that they have become tenants of 
the local authority and as an alternative defence relied on the article 8 right to 
respect for their homes.95  
Against this background, the House of Lords, sitting as a panel of seven 
judges, had to reconsider its decision in Harrow LBC v Qazi.96 All seven judges 
agreed that the proposition made by the majority in Qazi, namely that a landowner‟s 
unqualified right to possession in terms of the domestic law can never be challenged 
by an article 8 defence, must be reconsidered and brought in line with the Connors 
decision.97 The Court unanimously found that courts can generally assume that the 
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domestic law had already struck a suitable balance between the competing interests 
and that the law is Convention-compliant, referring to article 8 and article 1 of 
Protocol 1 of the ECHR.98 In general, courts can also assume that a landowner‟s 
proprietary entitlement to possession as stated under the domestic law provides the 
landowner with the necessary justification, as required by article 8(2), to interfere 
with the occupier‟s article 8(1) right to respect for his home.99 A public authority 
landowner therefore does not have to prove justification for the defendant‟s eviction 
by referring to the “social merits” of the case in every possession proceeding. Such 
an approach avoids a “colossal waste of time and money”.100 All seven Law Lords 
agreed that the appellants in both cases must succeed with their respective claims 
for possession,101 although the majority and minority‟s reasoning regarding when the 
defendant‟s article 8 defence could succeed differed.102  
The majority identified two highly exceptional cases103 where article 8 of the 
ECHR might provide the occupier with a successful defence against a landowner‟s 
undisputed municipal right to possession. The first case is where “a seriously 
arguable point is raised that the law which enables the court to make the possession 
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order is incompatible with article 8”.104 In such a case the county court should either 
try and give effect to the law in a Convention-compliant manner or adjourn the 
proceedings and allow the high court to resolve the compatibility issue.105 Lord Scott 
of Foscote made a similar proposition, although specifying that “the law” would 
include statutory and common law rules.106 It is also important to note that “the law” 
consists of substantive rights and procedural controls. An article 8(1) defence could 
therefore challenge the landowner‟s substantive right to possession or the 
procedural safeguards regulating the eviction process.107 
The second case is where the occupier disputes the “decision of a public 
authority to recover possession as an improper exercise of its power at common law 
on the ground that it was a decision that no reasonable person would consider 
justifiable”.108  
Considered together, these two grounds indicate that any article 8 defence 
must therefore challenge the law (either substantive or procedural law) or the 
decision of a public authority that allowed the eviction order. A defendant cannot 
raise an article 8 defence based on his personal circumstances.109 If that was 
possible, the Human Rights Act 1998 would allow a “merits review” in cases where 
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the law (meaning the legislation) had already struck the proportionate balance.110 To 
a large extent, the majority restated the Qazi decision, although admitting some 
exceptions. The effect of the majority decision reaffirms the nature of housing law as 
a body of law that upholds the right of the stronger party, namely the freeholder. The 
proprietary right of the landowner will trump the “home” right of the tenant,111 except 
in highly exceptional circumstances where there is a deficiency in the law itself.  
The minority strongly disagreed on this point, arguing that where a public 
authority seeks to evict a person from his “home”, that occupier must be given a fair 
opportunity to contend that, given the facts of the specific case, the requirements of 
article 8(2) have not been met.112 This does not necessarily mean that the public 
authority must prove in every case that the eviction order would be justifiable and in 
accordance with article 8(2), but rather that the occupier must be given the 
opportunity to raise an article 8 defence.113 If the occupier does not make use of this 
defence, the public authority can rely on domestic property law and claim 
possession.114 In the case where the statutory scheme, as developed by parliament, 
regulates the specific position of the occupier and the statutory prescribed conditions 
that allow the eviction order are met, it is highly unlikely that the occupier would gain 
any additional protection from article 8(1) of the ECHR. Where the relationship 
between the local authority landowner and tenant (or occupier) is not regulated by 
legislation, “[i]t cannot be said that the relationship between the parties … is the 
subject of a balance struck by parliament, but it is not unrealistic to regard the 
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general law as striking such a balance”.115 Lord Bingham of Cornhill for the minority 
concluded that the courts should follow its usual procedure and make a possession 
order if it is satisfied that the domestic law requirements are met, unless the occupier 
has a seriously arguable case contending that the law that requires the court to 
make the possession order is Convention-incompatible; or that the local authority‟s 
exercise of its powers in seeking a possession order is unlawful under section 6 of 
the Human Rights Act 1998 in light of the occupier‟s personal circumstances.116  
Lord Bingham of Cornhill for the minority therefore identified two instances 
(similar to the majority) where an occupier can resist possession proceedings by 
relying on article 8 of the ECHR. The first instance is in essence identical to the first 
instance stated by the majority, namely that the occupier has to make an arguable 
case contending that “the law” is not Convention-compliant. The second instance 
seems similar to the one identified by the majority, although the effect is much 
broader. According to the majority, the occupier has to argue that the decision of the 
public authority to claim possession is an improper exercise of its duties and 
therefore unjustifiable, while the minority is of the opinion that any occupier can raise 
an article 8 challenge based on his personal circumstances. The decision of the local 
authority to claim possession can be justifiable, but nevertheless challenged by the 
occupier if his personal circumstances are of such a nature to substantiate a 
defence. The minority therefore adopted a much broader view of the types of 
circumstances that could be raised by an occupier facing eviction. According to the 
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minority the Human Rights Act 1998 enables any occupier to raise an article 8 
defence and resist eviction on the basis of “social fact”.117  
In McCann v United Kingdom,118 the applicant and his wife occupied local 
authority housing as joint secure tenants119 under the provisions of the Housing Act 
1985. The marriage broke down and Mrs McCann was re-housed elsewhere on 
grounds of domestic violence, while the applicant remained on the premises.120 Mrs 
McCann terminated the tenancy by signing a notice to quit, whereafter the applicant 
was given notice to vacate the property.121 The local authority instituted possession 
proceedings against the applicant in the county court, while he contended that the 
proceedings, in particular the grounds for eviction relying on the notice to quit, was 
incompatible with his article 8 right to respect for his home.122 The county court found 
that, according to domestic law, the applicant had no defence against the local 
authority‟s right to possession, although, given the circumstances of the case, the 
judge held that the local authority did not act in compliance with article 8 of the 
Convention.123 The Court of Appeal found that the applicant could not raise an article 
8 defence and that the local authority “acted lawfully and within its powers in 
obtaining the notice to quit, which had the effect of terminating the secure 
tenancy”.124 The applicant was evicted, whereafter the decision came before the 
European Court of Human Rights. 
The European Court of Human Rights briefly took into account the domestic 
law and relevant housing policy, referring to the notice to quit under common law; 
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security of tenure under the Housing Act 1985; and the local authority‟s domestic 
violence housing policy.125 The recent decisions of the House of Lords in Harrow 
LBC v Qazi126 and Kay and Others v Lambeth LBC; Leeds City Council v Price and 
Others127 were taken into consideration128 before the Court decided that the article 8 
defence was the only part of the application which raised “questions of law which 
[were] sufficiently serious that their determination should depend on an examination 
of the merits”.129  
The European Court of Human Rights agreed with the national courts, and it 
was accepted by the parties, that the local authority house continued to be the 
applicant‟s “home” despite the fact that his right to occupy the premises under 
domestic law was terminated. It was also agreed that the effect of the notice to quit, 
together with the possession proceedings, interfered with his article 8(1) right to 
respect for his home.130 The Court found that the interference was in accordance 
with the law and that it pursued a legitimate aim in protecting the rights of the local 
authority to reclaim local authority housing stock from former tenants with no 
contractual or proprietary right to occupy the property. The interference was also 
necessary to ensure that the statutory housing scheme, as developed by parliament, 
was efficiently applied.131 The question was whether the interference was 
proportionate to these legitimate aims and therefore “necessary in a democratic 
society”.132  
The Court found that the loss of an individual‟s home is the most intrusive 
form of interference with the right to respect for the home and that any home-
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occupier facing this magnitude of interference should generally be able to have the 
proportionality of the interference tested by an independent tribunal, despite the fact 
that the occupier‟s right to remain on the premises has expired under domestic law. 
Such interference should be tested against the background of article 8 of the 
Convention.133 The Court emphasised that the applicant‟s tenancy could have been 
terminated by the local authority in accordance with the Housing Act 1985, provided 
that one of the specified grounds in the Act was proven and the Court was satisfied 
that the possession order would be reasonable. If the local authority had initiated 
possession proceedings in accordance with the Housing Act 1985, the personal 
circumstances of the applicant would have been taken into consideration by the 
court in order to determine whether the possession order would be reasonable.134 
However, the local authority bypassed these provisions by obtaining a common law 
notice to quit the joint tenancy from the applicant‟s former wife. The Court concluded 
that through the course of this procedure, the local authority did not give “any 
consideration to the applicant‟s right to respect for his home”.135 The judicial review 
proceedings did not provide an opportunity for an independent tribunal to examine 
the proportionality of the interference in terms of article 8 of the ECHR and as a 
result of such inadequate procedural safeguards the Court found that there was a 
violation of article 8.136 Once again, analogous to the European Court of Human 
Rights‟ decision in Connors, the Court found that “the law” was defective because it 
did not include the necessary procedural safeguards for the occupier to state his 
circumstances or present his case during the eviction proceedings. The Court did not 
question the substantive rights of the local authority, because the notice to quit had 
terminated the joint tenancy, whereafter the local authority had an undisputed right to 
reclaim the property. However, the Court indirectly questioned the common law rule 
that a joint tenant can unilaterally terminate a joint tenancy by serving a notice to 
quit.  
In Doherty (FC) and Others v Birmingham City Council,137 the House of Lords 
had to decide whether a local authority could obtain a summary possession order 
against a occupier who resided on the local authority‟s caravan site without a 
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licence.138 The local authority served a notice to quit on the appellant, who had been 
residing on the site for seventeen years.139 The local authority asserted that they 
required vacant possession of the site in order to carry out essential improvement 
works. The appellant relied on article 8 of the ECHR to oppose the eviction, 
contending that the local authority would only be entitled to a possession order if it 
was proportionate in light of all the circumstances of the case and that, given the 
circumstances of the case, this test was not satisfied. The appellant therefore relied 
on the local authority‟s duty not to act in a way that would not be Convention-
compliant in terms of section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998.140  
The House of Lords confirmed its previous decisions in Harrow LBC v Qazi141 
and Kay and Others v Lambeth LBC; Leeds City Council v Price and Others,142 
making it clear that the decision was in line with the basic law as laid down by the 
majority in Qazi and Kay.143 Lord Hope of Craighead confirmed the basic rule that an 
article 8 interference, which results from the application of the law, does not violate 
the Convention unless the law enabling the public authority‟s right to possession is 
defective. The local authority‟s unqualified right to possession should not be 
diminished or denied as a result of the occupier‟s personal circumstances.144  
Lord Hope of Craighead confirmed that an occupier can only raise a defence 
against a possession order by challenging the law under which the order is sought 
and can therefore not challenge the eviction proceedings based on his personal 
circumstances.145 However, the present case was exceptional as the law itself was 
defective. The legal framework that regulated the appellant‟s case excluded the 
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gypsy community from the required procedural safeguards.146 Lord Hope of 
Craighead affirmed the “gateways” to solving the applicant‟s case by stating that the 
courts should first try and find a solution through gateway (a) and, if unsuccessful, 
attempt to solve the problem through gateway (b).147 Through part (i) of gateway (a) 
the courts should try and interpret the law (or give effect to the law) in a way that is 
compatible with the Convention right.148 Lord Hope of Craighead found that the 
relevant legal framework could not be interpreted in a way that would be compatible 
with the appellant‟s article 8 Convention right.149 The Court also found that a 
declaration of incompatibility under part (ii) of gateway (a) was unnecessary,150 
which led the Court to search for a possible solution under gateway (b).151 Gateway 
(b) can provide the occupier with a defence in the form of a challenge to the public 
authority‟s decision to seek possession. The occupier can challenge the decision of 
the public authority on the ground that it was an improper exercise of the authority‟s 
power.152 Lord Hope of Craighead concluded that it would be appropriate to examine 
the reasonableness of the local authority‟s decision to institute possession 
proceedings against the appellant, considering the aim to acquire vacant possession 
to carry out essential works and the length of time the appellant resided on the 
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site.153 The Court allowed the appeal and remitted the case to the high court in order 
to review the local authority‟s reasons for terminating the appellant‟s occupation 
right.154  
The reasoning of the majority is somewhat confusing,155 because Lord Hope 
of Craighead initially found that the law itself was defective, but then decided that 
“solving” the incompatibility issue through gateway (a) was impossible, which led the 
reasoning to gateway (b).156 However, in Kay the majority found that an occupier can 
raise an article 8 defence in two highly exceptional cases. The first case is where the 
occupier argues that the law itself is defective (gateway (a));157 and the second case 
is where the occupier disputes the decision of the local authority as an improper 
exercise of its power at common law (gateway (b)).158 Lord Hope of Craighead 
initially argued that the law itself was defective but concluded that the occupier could 
challenge the decision of the local authority on the ground that it was an improper 
exercise of the authority‟s power, thereby relying on gateway (b).159 It is interesting to 
note that the Court‟s eventual assessment was a proportionality balancing exercise. 
In order to determine whether the decision of the local authority was an improper 
exercise of its power at common law, the Court had to consider the reasonableness 
thereof in the light of the factual position of the occupier.160 To determine whether the 
decision of a local authority is “improper”, the courts would have to consider the local 
authority‟s reasons for making the decision to evict the occupier and the factual 
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position of the occupier. It is unclear what the difference is between the factual 
position of an occupier and his personal circumstances.161 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
The legislative landlord-tenant scheme that has been developed by parliament is 
context-sensitive as it affords different levels of tenure security for diverse groups of 
members of society with different needs. Within this legislative framework some 
tenants enjoy better tenure rights than others. To argue that the weak tenure rights 
of some tenants, as provided for in the legislation, are accidental and therefore in 
need of rectification is unconvincing as a result of the complexity and extent of the 
legislative framework. The regulated tenure rights of tenants are a direct result of 
housing policy that reflects parliamentary decision-making. However, the English 
common law in the area of landlord-tenant law is not completely codified and some 
common law principles still apply. The common law and the legislation together form 
the domestic law and must be Convention-compliant. On this point the South African 
position is comparable, because the South African common law and legislation must 
comply with the Constitution, although it must also give effect to the Constitution, 
which entails certain obligations.162 However, direct application of the South African 
common law might in some cases be suspect as a result of the influence of 
apartheid. The South African courts should therefore be more hesitant when 
applying the common law, especially in eviction cases, because forced evictions 
made racial segregation possible in terms of the common law as it was then 
interpreted.  
One can conclude that the tenure rights of residential tenants in English law 
have received extensive consideration by parliament and by the legislature. The 
occupation rights of tenants are primary in English landlord-tenant law and are 
therefore mostly regulated. It is therefore unlikely that the English landlord-tenant 
statutes would be in contravention of the Convention, but this is not the case in 
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consideration of the common law. The tenure security of urban residential tenants in 
South Africa is different, as it has not been addressed extensively in legislation and 
one can conclude that it has not been taken into consideration by the South African 
government to the extent that it should have, especially in light of its constitutional 
obligation to do so. The tenure rights of South African urban tenants are currently 
limited to the common law forms of protection and therefore not necessarily in line 
with the Constitution.163 
The South African Constitution is different from the ECHR, because it places 
certain obligations on the state. However, the role of the ECHR is similar to the 
South African Constitution to the extent that it also functions as a final examiner, 
testing whether the domestic law is Convention-compliant. According to the case law 
the courts are hesitant to question and challenge the decisions made by parliament, 
but there are limited areas (“gaps”) in the legislative scheme that are in need of 
rectification. The role of the ECHR is therefore to identify those areas of law that 
require reconsideration, even if it only provides better procedural safeguards for 
weak occupiers. 
From the case law discussion it is clear that the courts were initially uncertain 
regarding the application, and impact, of the ECHR on English domestic law. The 
first cases applied a restrictive approach when considering the role of article 8(1) and 
consequently found that in case of eviction the domestic law, including statutory and 
common law, had already struck the necessary balance between the rights of the 
parties. Article 8 therefore had no role to play, as it was not intended to create 
proprietary rights for tenants. In the subsequent cases, including cases decided in 
the European Court of Human Rights, the courts developed jurisprudence that gave 
more clarity regarding the application and role of article 8. The courts agreed to a 
certain extent that an article 8 defence could succeed in two cases, namely where 
the law is defective (substantive or procedural) or where the decision of the local 
authority was improper and unreasonable. 
An alternative framework for analysing an article 8 defence against 
possession proceedings suggests that any claim for possession consists of three 
parts and any one of these parts could be incompatible with the occupier‟s article 
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8(1) right to respect for his home.164 A proprietary claim for possession consists of an 
established proprietary right to seek possession (part (i)); a decision to make the 
claim for possession (part (ii)); and the correct legal procedure (part (iii)). Part (i) 
concerns substantive property law, which consists of a complex body of law, 
including the common law and the statutory scheme developed by parliament. The 
decision of a local authority (acting as social landlord in the social housing sector)165 
to claim possession would fall under part (ii) and is regulated by domestic public law, 
while part (iii) forms part of procedural law.166 When considering the case law against 
the background of this framework, a certain pattern emerges. In the case law167 
where the local authority landowner had a clear right to possession under domestic 
law and the occupier relied on article 8(1) to challenge the substantive right of the 
landowner, the courts applied the domestic law strictly and granted the possession 
order. The cases in which an article 8(1) defence succeeded either described the 
decision of the local authority as an improper exercise of its power at common law168 
or attacked “the law” for providing inadequate procedural safeguards.169 Stated 
differently, it is highly unlikely that an occupier will succeed when arguing that the 
substantive property law violated his article 8 right, especially where the landowner‟s 
substantive right to possession is regulated in terms of statute law. If this was not the 
case and unlawful occupiers could rely on article 8(1) to resist eviction, based on 
their personal circumstances, article 8 could potentially “redistribute domestic 
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proprietary entitlement”, possibly in conflict with considered policy decisions of the 
English parliament.170 
One can conclude that an occupier may succeed with an article 8 challenge in 
the case where the law substantiating the possession order is defective; where the 
procedural safeguards regulating the eviction process are defective; or where the 
decision of the local authority (in the case where the landowner is a local authority) is 
an improper decision at common law or in terms of the relevant legislation. It is clear 
from the case law that the courts are hesitant to declare the substantive domestic 
law contrary to the Convention, because it would undermine parliamentary decision-
making and sovereignty. In the case law where the courts did provide some form of 
protection through article 8 of the Convention, the decisive reason was either that the 
law was defective as a result of inadequate procedural safeguards or that the local 
authority‟s decision was an improper decision. 
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6.1 Introduction 
 
The imposition of rent regulation in the United States of America was initially justified 
by emergency conditions that resulted from the First and Second World War. The 
initial justification for regulating the private landlord-tenant relationship was based on 
extreme housing shortages that led to landlords exploiting the dire socio-economic 
circumstances by increasing rents. The emergency housing shortages existed in 
various states throughout the United States and rent regulation was not an unusual 
restriction on the common law rights of landowners during this period. On several 
occasions the United States Supreme Court upheld the restriction on the right of 
landowners to evict tenants upon expiration of the lease and the justification for rent 
control in light of the socio-economic circumstances. In due course, the majority of 
states abolished rent regulation, whereafter landlord-tenant law on evictions returned 
to the common law position, according to which the landlord could rely on summary 
eviction proceedings to evict the tenant once the lease had terminated. Generally, 
state intervention in the private landlord-tenant market is justified in the presence of 
a housing crisis, although rent regulation could also be justified where it is in the 
public interest for some other reason.  
The State of New York, and more specifically New York City, introduced rent 
regulations in response to the extreme housing shortages that resulted from the 
wars, although the nature of the regulations changed throughout the post-war 
decades and transformed from being a broad-spectrum form of protection for 
countless New Yorkers towards being a form of social protection for a specific group 
of individuals in a specified area. The residential landlord-tenant system in New York 
City could be categorized into different sectors with different levels of tenure security. 
The private landlord-tenant relationship is currently still regulated quite extensively, 
with the aim to place restrictions on rent increases while providing security of tenure 
for a various group of tenants. To some extent, public rental housing in New York is 
also federally regulated in instances where the government is involved in the 
provision of housing for low to moderate income households. Public rental housing is 
aimed at providing affordable, secure housing for households through the provision 
of either government housing or rental subsidies. In the State of New York, and more 
specifically New York City, funds are made available to not-for-profit companies to 
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construct and in due course provide rental housing for low-income households. The 
provision of low-income rental housing is a form of social housing.  
The residential landlord-tenant system in the State of New York, more 
specifically New York City, has developed and become increasingly complex over 
decades, since it is regulated by various laws that function on different government 
levels. Collectively, the laws provide secure homes to different members of society, 
although the laws that regulate the private rental market are applied generally. These 
laws are therefore not context-sensitive in protecting only the vulnerable members of 
society, but apply to all households that occupy certain buildings in the private rental 
market. The laws that regulate public rental housing are more context-sensitive, 
because they are aimed at alleviating hardship for low-income households through 
the provision of decent affordable housing, but the level of tenure security in public 
rental housing is nevertheless not as high as in the private market. This might seem 
counter-intuitive, but the public housing stock is limited and the state must be able to 
evict tenants on specified grounds as stated in the federal statutes and regulations. 
These laws ensure adequate procedural safeguards for public housing tenants. 
The landlord-tenant system in New York, more specifically New York City, is 
indispensable as a comparable jurisdiction for a number of reasons. The laws that 
regulate the private and public rental market form a body of tenant protection. 
Collectively these laws protect different households with diverse income levels, 
although the underlying aim could be to address the high percentage of 
homelessness in New York City, especially in comparison to other major cities. The 
continued imposition of rent regulation in the private rental market could therefore be 
justified in light of this socio-economic problem. The Supreme Court of Appeal and 
other courts have found that the rent regulation laws are constitutionally justifiable, 
as will be shown below. The courts have held that the restrictions placed on the 
common law rights of landowners must be considered within the specific socio-
economic circumstances. These restrictions serve a legitimate public purpose in 
protecting tenants while balancing the interests of the parties. The regulatory 
systems in the private and public sector aim to provide protection for weak tenants, 
which form part of the public welfare. The courts have found that the public interest 
justifies some degree of public control in the sphere of rental housing. 
 
276 
 
6.2 Justification for rent regulation 
6.2.1 Common law171 
 
Currently, the majority of residential common law leases172 in the US are either fixed-
term tenancies or periodic tenancies.173 The “term” of the lease could either indicate 
the period of the lease or it could refer to the interest or estate that the tenant derives 
from the tenancy.174 The commencement and end of the term of the lease must be 
indicated with reasonable certainty. This requirement is fundamental to the validity of 
the lease.175 However, the inclusion of a rent obligation is not an essential part of the 
lease. A rent provision is generally included in most leases; and in such a case the 
amount of the rent is a vital part of the lease.176 
The landlord is generally not obliged to renew the lease in the absence of an 
express covenant to offer a renewal.177 Where a clause in the lease makes provision 
for an extension of the tenancy without any notice of acceptance required by the 
tenant, the mere act of the tenant holding over while paying rent which is accepted 
by the landlord, amounts to an extension of the lease. An extension is simply a 
continuation of the existing term of the lease, while a renewal constitutes the 
implementation of a new lease.178 In the case where the lease does not make 
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ed 2009) 14-89. The New York Real Property Law (NYRPL) § 232-c states that a landlord‟s 
acceptance of rent, offered by a tenant holding over, creates a month-to-month tenancy unless an 
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provision for a renewal, the landlord is at liberty to refuse renewal, which would result 
in termination of the tenant‟s occupation rights.179 At common law, the landlord could 
terminate the tenancy upon expiration of the lease without having to state any 
reasons for her decision, while the tenant was restricted in questioning the landlord‟s 
motive. Recently, this unilateral freedom of the landlord to merely terminate the 
tenancy or to refuse renewal has been restricted by general public policy concerns 
that resulted in legislation.180 The core of this restriction is to prevent the landlord 
from evicting a tenant who enforced certain legal rights, which resulted in the 
landlord‟s motivation to evict the tenant. There has to be a link between the tenant‟s 
enforcement of rights and the landlord‟s motivation to evict the tenant. This form of 
eviction is referred to as a “retaliatory eviction” and the restriction on this form of 
eviction is currently an established common law principle in residential landlord-
tenant law,181 although it is also enacted in some legislation.182 
Where the tenant remains in possession upon termination of the lease without 
any renewal or extension agreement with the landlord, the lease is generally referred 
to as a holdover tenancy.183 At common law, the landlord has the options to either 
treat the tenant as a trespasser and commence eviction proceedings184 or accept the 
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ed 2004) 60. The landlord can claim damages for the fair rental value of the premises during the 
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continued occupation of the tenant as a new tenancy.185 Once the landlord institutes 
eviction proceedings, the tenant‟s prior occupancy becomes one at sufferance.186 
The landlord would usually evict the tenant by relying on a summary proceeding, 
which is a quick and effective method to recover possession once the tenancy has 
terminated. This method is available in all states and would generally only require a 
couple of days‟ notice to the tenant before the landlord can institute the eviction 
proceedings.187 
 
6.2.2 Landlord-tenant regulation 
 
The modern perception of the landlord-tenant relationship has been influenced by 
various factors, including urbanization, industrialization, consumerism and social 
consciousness. This has led the courts to view a residential landlord as the party 
with superior knowledge of the “product” and therefore also with superior bargaining 
power. The position of tenants is seen in a very different light, since tenants are 
allegedly merely interested in establishing a home within the given “product” of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
holdover period and any costs incurred by the landlord pertaining to the eviction proceedings: Hill DS 
Landlord and Tenant Law in a Nutshell (4
th
 ed 2004) 64. 
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 Friedman MR Friedman on Leases Volume 2 (5
th
 ed 2009) 18-41; Hill DS Landlord and Tenant 
Law in a Nutshell (4
th
 ed 2004) 60. The decision to accept the holdover tenancy rests with the 
landlord, as the tenant would be bound by this election even in the case where the tenant did not 
necessarily intend to enter a renewed tenancy: Friedman MR Friedman on Leases Volume 2 (5
th
 ed 
2009) 18-42. The holdover doctrine has been modified by statutes in order to provide some relief for 
tenants, especially where the landlord could unilaterally raise the rent and enforce the succeeding 
term. These laws make provision for a shorter term for which the tenant is bound: Hill DS Landlord 
and Tenant Law in a Nutshell (4
th
 ed 2004) 63. The position of the tenant is indeterminate for the brief 
period of time after termination of the lease and before the landlord enforces her election. The 
landlord‟s acceptance of rent (or any demand for rent) after termination of the lease indicates her 
intention in favour of a new tenancy: Friedman MR Friedman on Leases Volume 2 (5
th
 ed 2009) 18-
42. The holdover tenancy is generally deemed to be a new tenancy, although the terms of the original 
tenancy are generally incorporated into the renewed tenancy, except for those terms adjusted by the 
parties and the term of the lease: Hill DS Landlord and Tenant Law in a Nutshell (4
th
 ed 2004) 62. 
Recently, holdover tenancies tend to be periodic tenancies instead of fixed-term tenancies: Friedman 
MR Friedman on Leases Volume 2 (5
th
 ed 2009) 18-46 – 18-47. 
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 ed 2009) 18-43. Hill DS Landlord and Tenant 
Law in a Nutshell (4
th
 ed 2004) 60 defines a “tenant at sufferance” as “[a] tenant who originally 
entered into possession rightfully but wrongfully continues in possession after termination of his 
lease”. Dukeminier J, Krier JE, Alexander GS & Schill MH Property (6
th
 ed 2006) 368 state that a 
tenancy at sufferance arises when the tenant holds over and that the landlord then has the option to 
allow renewal or to institute eviction proceedings. However, this common law rule has been altered by 
several jurisdictions: Dukeminier J, Krier JE, Alexander GS & Schill MH Property (6
th
 ed 2006) 368-
369. 
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 Dukeminier J, Krier JE, Alexander GS & Schill MH Property (6
th
 ed 2006) 409. 
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landlord.188 As a result of this new conception of the landlord-tenant relationship, the 
courts started to implement a warranty of habitability in residential rental housing, 
which has led to new regulations and housing codes throughout the metropolitan 
cities.189 “Residential landlords have become a species of regulated public utility.”190 
The majority of courts apply the warranty of habitability only to property leased for 
residential purposes. This distinction is not foreign to general landlord-tenant 
principles, as the laws (both the common law and legislation) do provide better 
protection for residential tenants. This could be as a result of the assumption that 
commercial tenants have greater bargaining power than residential tenants, because 
commercial tenants usually have better information when drafting the lease.191 
However, housing shortages also contribute to unequal bargaining power (also 
referred to as monopoly power) in the residential landlord-tenant market. At common 
law, landlords are at liberty to include certain terms and conditions in the lease that 
may have a harsh impact on tenants, thereby exploiting unequal bargaining power 
during periods of housing shortages. The courts can play a role in scrutinizing the 
contracts that are created on unequal bargaining power, but some argue that such a 
case-by-case approach could be inefficient.192  
The implied warranty of habitability forms part of a corpus of various 
reforms193 that strives to assist tenants (and specifically the poor) in finding 
affordable housing of decent quality. The risk in imposing these reforms, especially 
the warranty of habitability, is that landlords would respond by increasing the rents. 
The result would be a general improvement in the standard of rental housing, 
combined with rent increases, which could possibly be counter-productive in 
consideration of the initial problem of limited affordable housing of an acceptable 
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 The role of federal, state and local governments in “regulating, producing and financing … public 
and private housing tenements” has also been expanded as a result of this modern conception of the 
landlord-tenant relationship: Friedman MR Friedman on Leases Volume 2 (5
th
 ed 2009) 1-14. See 
also Singer JW Introduction to Property (2
nd
 ed 2005) 439. 
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 Friedman MR Friedman on Leases Volume 2 (5
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 ed 2009) 1-14. 
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 Singer JW Introduction to Property (2
nd
 ed 2005) 439. 
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 Dukeminier J, Krier JE, Alexander GS & Schill MH Property (6
th
 ed 2006) 376. The most obvious 
objection against a case-by-case approach is the time constraint involved. 
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 See Dukeminier J, Krier JE, Alexander GS & Schill MH Property (6
th
 ed 2006) 361-444 for a 
discussion of some of these reforms, including the warranty of habitability and the retaliatory eviction 
principle. 
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quality. The question is whether rent control, combined with some government-
assisted housing programmes, could solve this predicament.194  
Rent control legislation generally aims to alleviate undue hardship suffered by 
tenants as a result of housing shortages and the increased cost of housing, although 
these laws are also aimed at ensuring a fair return on the landlord‟s rental housing 
investment. Rent control is usually combined with housing code regulations that 
compel landlords to rehabilitate rental housing stock and it encourages the 
construction of new units.195 The majority of rent control laws require some form of 
housing emergency as the foundation for justifying the imposition of these 
regulations, although in some states the existence of a housing emergency is not a 
requirement for such justification “if the statutes serve the public interest.”196 A 
shortage of decent low- and moderate-income housing stock, combined with a 
period of inflation, could firstly initiate new housing policy that aims to protect 
vulnerable tenants and then justify the enactment of rent control laws because it 
would be in the public interest. These collective socio-economic circumstances 
would have the most drastic long-term effect on low- and moderate-income 
households. These households would have to assign a greater portion of their 
income to remain in their current homes or move to lower cost housing.197 The 
impact of these circumstances result in new housing policies that gradually develop 
over a period of time and eventually give effect to statutory intervention in the 
relationship between landlord and tenant. Rent controls are generally aimed at 
placing restrictions on the rent charged198 and providing continued occupation rights 
for tenants through anti-eviction measures.199 The strengthened protection of 
tenants‟ occupation rights could also be given effect to through the development of 
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 Rents are usually set at historical levels (referred to as the base rent), which serves as the 
foundation for all rent increases. The base rent is typically the rent charged six months prior to the 
enactment of rent control laws. The majority of rent control laws allow annual rent increases, because 
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maintenance or major improvements: Singer JW Introduction to Property (2
nd
 ed 2005) 476. 
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right of the landowner to evict the tenant. 
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the common law, although the necessary extent of tenant protection and the aim of 
providing strengthened tenure rights for a marginalised group of occupiers is more 
efficiently addressed through the progressive development of housing policy and 
enactment of landlord-tenant legislation.  
 
6.3 Contextual background 
6.3.1 Introduction 
 
During the Second World War, rent control was introduced in various states and 
municipalities.200 Since the 1970s, restrictions on rent increases were also enacted 
through a number of ordinances and by-laws in several municipalities. The 
imposition of rent control in municipal areas is usually initiated by state statutes and 
municipal charters that force the municipalities to enact rent control laws.201 The 
imposition of rent control laws in various states was never an unusual statutory 
intervention.202 During the Second World War, nationwide rent controls were 
introduced through the federal Office of Price Administration; this imposition was 
extended in 1947 by the federal Housing and Rent Act.203  
The majority of the rental housing stock in the US is privately owned by for-
profit landowners. The government has intervened in the private rental market on a 
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 Keating WD “Rent Control: Its Origins, Histories and Controversies” in Keating WD, Michael BT & 
Skaburskis A (eds) Rent Control: Regulation and the Rental Housing Market (1998) 1-15 at 1 
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 Scherer A Residential Landlord-Tenant Law in New York (2008) 118. The Act applied to all 
residential housing completed on or before February 1947: 50 United States Code Annotated (USCA) 
Appendix § 1892(c)(3). 
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state and local level, although the interventions were primarily aimed at regulating 
the condition of the premises. Federal housing policy has always been aimed at 
promoting homeownership (especially for middle-income households) and the 
necessary sustainability for this ideal was made possible through “mortgage 
insurance and tax deductibility of mortgage interest and property taxes. That remains 
the focus of the government‟s broad policy today.”204 However, various housing 
policies have emerged that address socio-economic concerns, such as the 
affordability of low-income housing.205 In 1937, the government enacted the Public 
Housing Program, which provided federal subsidies to state and local governments 
to develop low-income housing. Since 1974, federal housing assistance escalated 
with the introduction of below-market-rent subsidies, provided through either the 
Section 8 Program or housing vouchers.206 The main reason for the federal 
government‟s restrictive approach in developing more affordable housing options for 
low- to medium-income households is that the federal government is constitutionally 
not obliged to make housing available to all households, as the Constitution of the 
United States of America 1787 guarantees neither a right of access to housing, nor 
basic welfare needs.207 Nevertheless, the individual states can make provision for 
some welfare-based rights.  
 
6.3.2 New York City 
 
In 1943 New York City introduced rent control in response to the extreme housing 
shortages. However, rent control was also introduced in New York City 
“to facilitate the mobilization of the civilian labour force needed by the defence 
industry during World War II. By imposing a firm ceiling on rents, rent control 
not only dampened upward price pressures and speculation in the existing 
housing stock, but also had the effect … of diverting investment capital from 
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housing into productive sectors of the economy that were more closely allied 
with the war effort.”208  
 
In 1950, the New York State legislature decided not to discard rent control. This 
decision was based on the recommendation of a Temporary State Housing Rent 
Commission that observed the system of rent control in various communities.209 The 
justification for the continued imposition of rent control was based on its temporary 
status and the persisting housing shortages that resulted from the war. Governor 
Harriman stated that rent control formed part of a “broader housing program” and 
that it was intended to operate on a temporary basis until the supply of adequate 
housing increased.210 New York City introduced rent controls to address housing 
shortages that initially formed part of the emergency wartime measures, but rent 
control was also used for economic reasons, such as diverting capital from the 
housing sector to increase production. In 1950, the New York Emergency Housing 
Rent Control Act made provision for the continuation of rent control in New York 
State, although the rent regulation laws enacted during the 1960s could be identified 
as the core legislation on which the current New York City (including some 
communities outside the City) rent regulation system is based.211  
The laws underwent some modification in the 1970s and 1980s, but the 
general aim was to “empower localities to impose rent controls and to govern the 
terms of the local laws.”212 In 1993, it was found that thirty percent of New York City‟s 
rent-stabilized tenants lived under the federal poverty line and that these households 
had a very slim chance of acquiring public housing. Deregulation therefore became 
less attractive, as it would lead to even more homelessness in a city where the 
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percentage of homeless individuals was already high in comparison to other major 
cities.213 In 2003, the rent regulation laws in New York State were again extended for 
a period of eight years.214 Rent control has not been phased out in New York City to 
date, even though it is obvious that the initial justification for rent regulation is no 
longer applicable. 
In comparison to the rest of the major US cities, New York City has a low 
percentage of homeowners, during the 1980s amounting to less than three in ten.215 
The City has a large private rental housing market and thirty percent of the market is 
unregulated. Tenants in the unregulated section of the market are paying more than 
the market rent, while tenants in regulated apartments either pay ten to forty percent 
below the market rent or fifty to ninety percent below the market rent, depending on 
the type of rent regulation applicable.216 Rent control was introduced as a temporary, 
emergency wartime measure aimed at encouraging economic development through 
increased production, but it was also necessary to alleviate some of the hardship 
suffered by the majority of New Yorkers in consequence of limited affordable rental 
housing. However, over the preceding half century rent control has developed into a 
form of social welfare. Rent control is a form of state intervention in the private 
market aimed at achieving certain social goals.217 Rent control could therefore also 
be perceived as a form of social planning that acts as a “mediator between market 
forces and public needs.”218  
New York State is both interesting and useful as a comparative source, 
because Article V of the Constitution of the United States of America 1787219  states 
that “[n]o person shall … be deprived of life, liberty, or property”. The New York 
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Constitution requires the state to provide some welfare benefits to the needy, 
although the implementation of this obligation is subject to legislation.220 In Callahan 
v Carey221 the New York Supreme Court created a right to shelter in New York 
City.222 In New York, the state is therefore obliged to provide welfare benefits to the 
needy and homeless persons have a right to shelter. In comparison to South Africa, 
one can identify similarities regarding the protection of private property (section 25(1) 
of the Constitution) and the right to shelter (section 26(1) of the Constitution).223 
However, the imposition of rent regulation throughout the twentieth century and the 
progressive justification for limiting the private law rights of landowners in 
accordance with the federal and state constitutions is more extensively developed in 
New York (and more specifically New York City) than in South Africa. The initial 
justification for rent regulation in New York was similar to previous rent regulation in 
South Africa, although the progressive justification and continuous imposition of 
statutory intervention in landlord-tenant law in New York, and New York City as an 
urban setting, is different from South African landlord-tenant law. One of the 
consequences of deregulation in New York could be increased homelessness, which 
justifies rent regulation as it is in the public interest to alleviate homelessness. The 
question is whether the reduction of homelessness is in the public interest in South 
Africa and whether insecure tenure rights of urban residential tenants contribute to 
homelessness in South Africa. 
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6.4 Rent regulation in New York City 
6.4.1 Rent Control Law and Rent Stabilization Law 
 
New York City enacted the Rent Control Law as well as the Rent Stabilization Law 
under the authority delegated to it by the State of New York, which enabled the City 
to create legislation. The New York City Rent Control Law is a continuation of federal 
and state control of rents.224 The two systems regulate privately owned housing in 
New York City and outside the City, which effectively creates four systems of rent 
regulation. However, the differences between rent control and rent stabilization have 
become “muted” over the preceding years to such an extent that one can hardly 
establish which system is more stringent.225 
The Rent Control Law applies to all housing units in buildings consisting of 
three or more units. The building had to have been completed or converted to 
residential use before 1 February 1947 and the unit had to have been occupied by 
the same tenant or the tenant‟s successor for continuous periods since 1 July 
1971.226 Rent-controlled apartments are subject to vacancy decontrol, which means 
that when the tenant voluntarily vacates the apartment, it will no longer be subject to 
the Rent Control Law and would therefore become deregulated.227 In New York 
City,228 primary residences in buildings with a minimum of six units are subject to the 
Rent Stabilization Law, although the units had to have been built prior to 1 January 
1974. It is also required that the unit should not be regulated under the Rent Control 
Law.229 
                                                          
224
 Scherer A Residential Landlord-Tenant Law in New York (2008) 121-122. The Rent Control Law 
(RCL) was enacted in 1962, while the Rent Stabilization Law was enacted in 1969.  
225
 Scherer A Residential Landlord-Tenant Law in New York (2008) 113: “Rent control, which came 
first, was traditionally the more stringent with regard to rent setting, evictions, provision of building 
services, and enforcement.” 
226
 Scherer A Residential Landlord-Tenant Law in New York (2008) 123. See 123-125 for some 
exceptions to this general application. Some units might be included, while others might be exempted 
even though it might seem as though such units should be covered. 
227
 Scherer A Residential Landlord-Tenant Law in New York (2008) 126-127. As a consequence, the 
number of rent-controlled units in New York City are diminishing quite rapidly, as there were only 43 
000 rent-controlled apartments in 2005 by comparison to the 100 000 apartments in 1993. 
228
 The coverage of rent-stabilized buildings outside New York City is analogous to the position in the 
City if the relevant locality adopted the Emergency Tenant Protection Act (ETPA), although some 
municipalities also require a higher number of units per building: Scherer A Residential Landlord-
Tenant Law in New York (2008) 127. 
229
 Scherer A Residential Landlord-Tenant Law in New York (2008) 128. This coverage is regulated in 
terms of the Rent Stabilization Law and the Emergency Tenant Protection Act. If an owner received 
287 
 
The Rent Stabilization system places a restriction on the rent charged by 
regulating the rent at the beginning of a tenancy as well as annual rent increases.230 
The annual rent increases are determined by the Rent Guidelines Boards (RGB), 
which are situated in New York City and some of the other counties (including 
Nassau, Westchester and Rockland). These boards establish maximum rent 
increases for new tenancies and for renewed leases, but special rent increases are 
also provided for in cases where a landlord is experiencing some form of hardship or 
where certain improvements were made to the premises.231 The annual rent 
increase for rent-stabilized tenants can only be charged upon renewal of the lease. 
Rent-stabilized tenants are entitled to have their tenancy renewed for either one or 
two years and the maximum rent for the renewed period would be determined 
administratively by the Rent Guidelines Board.232  
The Rent Control system introduced the maximum base rent (MBR) system in 
1972, which allows the New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal 
(DHCR) to set rent increases in the maximum base rent system for rent-controlled 
apartments,233 although landlords are allowed234 to increase rents annually to a 
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maximum of 7.5 percent, also referred to as the maximum collectible rent (MCR).235 
Under all four systems of rent regulation, special rent increases236 are permitted with 
the approval of the DHCR and are usually coupled with either some form of hardship 
suffered by the landlord (the landlord is for instance not making a profit)237 or some 
investment238 made by the landlord in relation to the premises.239 
The New York City Rent Stabilization Code provides security of tenure for 
tenants, requiring that the owner of a rent-stabilized unit must offer a renewal lease 
to the tenant upon expiration of the original lease. The terms and conditions of the 
renewed tenancy must be identical to the expired lease,240 although the landlord is at 
liberty to offer the tenant more favourable terms in the renewed lease.241 The 
landlord is required to offer the renewed lease prior to the expiration of the original 
tenancy. This period is also referred to as the “window period”.242 However, the 
landlord is also required to notify the tenant (during the window period) of her 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
DHCR six months before the rent increase order is given, wherein she confirms that all rent-impairing 
violations on the premises have been corrected or abated and that 80 percent of all other violations 
have been corrected: New York City Administrative Code §26-405(h)(6). 
235
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increased to a maximum of 7.5 percent in New York City. Outside New York City annual rent 
increases are determined by the DHCR. 
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 The Rent Stabilization Code and the Rent Stabilization Law make provision for certain rent 
increases where the landlord made “major capital improvements” to the building, but prior DHCR 
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Administrative Code § 26-511(c)(6)(b). All four systems of rent regulation make provision for rent 
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Scherer A Residential Landlord-Tenant Law in New York (2008) 188. See 189-195 for more detail on 
the rate of rent increase in relation to the cost of improvement. 
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240
 §2522.5(g) New York City Rent Stabilization Code. One exception to this requirement is that the 
landlord may include a provision in the lease to allow rent increases, although subject to the orders of 
the DHCR: Scherer A Residential Landlord-Tenant Law in New York (2008) 197. 
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 Scherer A Residential Landlord-Tenant Law in New York (2008) 198. 
242
 This period is between 150 and 90 days prior to termination of the lease if the apartment is in New 
York City: §2523.5(a) New York City Rent Stabilization Code. If the apartment is outside the City, the 
period is between 120 and 90 days prior to expiration of the lease: §2503.5(a) Emergency Tenant 
Protection Regulations. 
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intention to refuse renewal and terminate the tenancy.243 The tenant is obliged to 
respond to the landlord‟s offer within sixty days. Failure to respond within this period 
entitles the landlord to institute summary eviction proceedings upon termination of 
the lease.244 The landlord is proscribed from refusing to renew the lease, except 
where there is a legal basis for refusal.245 In the case where the landlord fails to offer 
renewal without relying on a specified ground for refusal, the tenant may continue to 
occupy the premises246 because the tenant‟s continued occupation right is protected 
by the Rent Stabilization Law and the Rent Stabilization Code. Refusal of the 
landlord to renew the lease does not deprive the tenant of any rights provided for 
under the Rent Stabilization Law.247 The continued tenancy is governed by the terms 
and conditions of the original tenancy and the landlord is prohibited from increasing 
the rent, as any rent increase requires a renewed lease.248 
Where a fixed-term rent-controlled tenancy terminates and the tenant remains 
in the dwelling, the tenant automatically becomes a “statutory tenant”. The terms and 
conditions of the new statutory tenancy are identical to the original tenancy, except 
for the provisions that are inconsistent with statutory restraints; the term of the lease; 
and the rent.249 
 
6.4.2 General basis for eviction 
 
If the tenant, occupying either a rent-controlled or rent-stabilized apartment, remains 
in the premises upon expiration of the lease and refuses to vacate the property, the 
landlord can seek to evict the tenant through a “holdover proceeding”.250 The 
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244
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 The basis for refusal is provided for in the Rent Stabilization Law and the Rent Stabilization Code: 
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 § 2523.5(d) Rent Stabilization Code. 
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 Scherer A Residential Landlord-Tenant Law in New York (2008) 203.  
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 Scherer A Residential Landlord-Tenant Law in New York (2008) 540. The term “holdover” refers to 
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relevant basis for the holdover proceeding is context-sensitive, because it would 
depend on the terms of the lease; the applicable statutory provisions;251 and 
constitutional rights of the tenant.252 Where the government is involved in the 
operation of housing or the ownership of the unit, the due process clauses of the 
Federal Constitution and the New York Constitution will place certain restrictions on 
the claimants.253 According to the Real Property Actions Proceedings Law 
(RPAPL),254 the basis for the tenant‟s eviction would depend on the form of housing 
involved, which includes privately owned housing and government involved housing. 
Where the tenancy is regulated, the rent regulation laws provide a number of other 
grounds for eviction, while publicly owned and subsidized housing is also regulated 
with its own basis for eviction.255 
Where a tenant occupies an unregulated unit and the government is not 
involved in the operation of the dwelling (either through owning it or providing some 
form of assistance), the landowner may commence the holdover proceedings upon 
expiration of the lease by relying on a ground listed in the lease.256 However, once a 
fixed-term tenancy expires due to lapse of time, the landowner may institute eviction 
proceedings by relying on the mere fact that the tenancy expired.257 The common 
law right of the landowner to summarily evict the tenant upon expiration of the lease 
is therefore applicable in the absence of government and statutory intervention in the 
private landlord-tenant relationship. 
The rights and duties of both landlord and tenant are usually included in the 
lease, although some obligations are derived from legislation. A tenant (including 
regulated tenants) may generally be evicted for non-compliance, a ground which 
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 These regulations include the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law; the Rent Control and 
Rent Stabilization Laws; and various other laws that govern subsidized housing on different 
government levels: Scherer A Residential Landlord-Tenant Law in New York (2008) 541. 
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lease. 
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 Scherer A Residential Landlord-Tenant Law in New York (2008) 551-552. Scherer mentions that 
the right of the landowner to evict the tenant once the tenancy has expired, without having to state 
any reasons, has its origins in the feudal, common law notion of the relationship between landlord and 
tenant. However, § 711(1) of the Real Property Actions Proceedings Law currently enables a 
landowner to institute a summary eviction order against a tenant holding over.  
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includes failure to comply with the terms of the tenancy or the tenant‟s obligations as 
provided for in the statutes.258 Nevertheless, it is required that the tenant‟s obligation 
must be significant and that the violation should also be severe.259 Violations of the 
lease include the installation of certain appliances without the consent of the 
landlord; the commission of waste or unauthorized alterations; overcrowding; and 
chronic late payment.260 The Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law and the 
rent regulation laws enable the landlord to institute eviction proceedings in instances 
where the tenant failed to pay the rent,261 although the tenant can avoid eviction by 
paying the rent prior to the issuing of a warranty of eviction. Chronic late payment is 
different, since the repeated failure to pay rent is considered to be a severe violation 
of the lease and therefore a ground for acquiring a holdover proceeding.262  
A tenant may also be evicted if he creates a nuisance, although the tenant‟s 
conduct must be of such a nature that it threatens the life, health or safety of the 
other tenants or the landowner.263 In terms of the Rent Stabilization Code and the 
Rent and Eviction Regulations, numerous types of behaviour can amount to a 
nuisance and form the basis for eviction, but the tenant‟s conduct must be 
unreasonable.264 It is also required that the conduct must be “recurring, frequent, 
continuous, or extremely dangerous.”265 An allegation of an illegal activity on the 
premises is a ground for eviction, which is governed by a number of federal and 
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Regulations; § 2524.3(a) Rent Stabilization Code. 
259
 Scherer A Residential Landlord-Tenant Law in New York (2008) 555. Where the tenant violated 
one of the terms of the tenancy, he is entitled to cure the breach prior to the commencement of the 
eviction proceedings. 
260
 See Scherer A Residential Landlord-Tenant Law in New York (2008) 561-568 for a detailed 
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 Scherer A Residential Landlord-Tenant Law in New York (2008) 572. Objectionable conduct is a 
ground for eviction in terms of § 711(1) of the Real Property Actions Proceedings Law and the rent 
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 Scherer A Residential Landlord-Tenant Law in New York (2008) 574. 
265
 Scherer A Residential Landlord-Tenant Law in New York (2008) 574. 
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state statutes.266 Furthermore, landlords, law enforcement agencies and neighbours 
may institute eviction proceedings based on the allegation of a tenant‟s illegal 
activity.267 Where it is found that the property was used for an illegal activity, the 
tenancy would be void.268 The New York rent regulation statutes include additional 
provisions that regulate the eviction of rent-controlled and rent-stabilized tenants for 
illegal activity. A tenant occupying a rent-controlled (or rent-stabilized)269 unit would 
be evicted if he used the premises for “immoral or illegal purposes”.270  
 
6.4.3 Eviction of rent-regulated tenants 
 
Generally, all rent-regulated tenants who occupy units that are governed by the Rent 
Stabilization Law or the Rent Control Law, and who continue to pay their rent upon 
termination of the lease, may only be evicted if the landlord is able to establish a 
clear basis for eviction provided for in the relevant laws and regulations.271 In some 
cases, depending on the ground for eviction, the landlord of a rent-controlled or rent-
stabilized unit may institute eviction proceedings directly in court, although for other 
grounds the landlord is required to obtain the approval of the DHCR.272 Where the 
landlord of a rent-controlled unit obtains approval for eviction from the DHCR after 
fulfilling the necessary criteria, the DHCR would issue a “certificate of eviction”. 
Hereafter the landlord may bring a summary eviction proceeding.273 The landlord of 
a rent-stabilized unit is generally obliged to offer the tenant a renewal lease, although 
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 See Scherer A Residential Landlord-Tenant Law in New York (2008) 579-580 for a discussion on 
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the landlord may seek permission from the DHCR, based on certain grounds, to 
refuse to renew the lease.274 If the landlord is successful in obtaining permission, she 
may commence a summary eviction proceeding upon expiration of the lease.275 
Where the DHCR permits the landlord of a rent-stabilized unit to refuse renewal, the 
DHCR must mandate the landowner to pay the tenant‟s moving expenses to a 
“suitable” dwelling, offered at the same or a lower regulated rent, in a nearby area.276 
If the tenant is unable to find such a unit, the owner may be required to pay the 
difference in rent between the landowner‟s unit (from which the tenant has been 
evicted) and the new unit for a certain period as determined by the DHCR.277 
The rent regulation laws provide a number of grounds that enable landlords of 
rent-controlled and rent-stabilized units to evict tenants. These grounds are 
discussed simultaneously, due to the large number of similar grounds, although 
reference is made to the relevant system (or systems).  
The amended Rent Stabilization Code enables a landlord to bring an eviction 
proceeding based on the ground that the tenant engages in unwarranted behaviour 
that amounts to harassment. The conduct must be a continual unreasonable use of 
the property that aims to harass the owner; other tenants; or neighbouring 
occupiers.278 The landlord of a rent-controlled or rent-stabilized unit may institute 
eviction proceedings based on the ground that the tenant occupies the premises in a 
manner that is illegal. The occupancy must subject the owner to civil or criminal 
penalty or violate a contract with government agencies.279 Where the landlord of a 
rent-stabilized unit offers a renewal lease and the tenant refuses to renew the lease, 
the landlord may institute eviction proceedings.280  
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The subletting of private housing is generally regulated by the New York Real 
Property Law,281 but the subletting of rent-stabilized units is governed by the Rent 
Stabilization Code282 and any violation of this code is a ground for eviction.283 Where 
the tenant legally sublets the unit, but violates the Rent Stabilization Code by 
overcharging the subtenant,284 the landlord may rely on this violation as a basis for 
eviction, although the court will consider various factors (including the amount 
overcharged and the length of the sub-tenancy) to determine whether eviction is 
appropriate.285 The tenant is also required to maintain the dwelling as his primary 
residence, while subleasing the premises. During this period he must have the 
intention to reoccupy the dwelling upon expiration of the sublease. Where the tenant 
does not fulfil this requirement, he could be evicted.286 
The landowner of a not-for-profit institution may evict the tenant if the owner 
prefers to use the premises in relation to the work of the institution.287 The landowner 
is not required to obtain prior permission from the DHCR.288 However, it is required 
that the operation of the institution includes some charitable or educational aim and 
that repossession of the property is necessary for the institution to function 
properly.289 
In terms of the Rent Stabilization Code, the landowner may evict the tenant if 
he unreasonably refuses access to the premises for the purpose of making certain 
repairs or for the purpose of inspection. The necessary repairs or improvements 
must be authorized by the DHCR or by law. The landlord may also evict the tenant if 
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he refuses reasonable access for the purpose of making a showing to a person with 
a legitimate interest.290  
The Rent Control Laws and the Rent Stabilization Laws that govern the 
eviction proceedings where the landowner reclaims the premises for “personal use 
and occupancy” are similar in certain respects,291 although they differ in relation to 
the place where the proceeding should be brought; the burden of proof the landlord 
is required to satisfy; and the penalty involved in the case where the landowner fails 
to reoccupy the premises.292 Both systems require that the landlord must be a 
natural person; the interpretation of the term “family member” is analogous.293 
Another similarity is the exemption of senior and disabled persons. The landlord is 
prohibited from claiming an eviction order, based on the ground of personal use, 
where the tenant (or the tenant‟s spouse) is a senior citizen or a disabled person, 
except if the landlord offers the tenant equal (or more superior) housing at the same 
or lower regulated rent in the neighbouring area.294  
Generally the landlord of a rent-stabilized unit may evict the tenant and 
reclaim the property for her personal use and occupancy if her primary residence is 
New York City.295 However, the landlord may rely on the basis of personal use to 
refuse renewal of the lease. The eviction proceeding may therefore only be brought 
once the original tenancy has terminated.296 It is also required that the landlord (or 
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member of her family) prove her intention to actually reoccupy the premises.297 
Failure to reoccupy the premises and use the unit as her primary residence for a 
period of three years will deprive the landowner of rent increases for three years, 
unless the owner reoffers the unit to the tenant at the same terms and the tenant 
accepts the offer. The owner may also attempt to establish that certain 
circumstances prevented her (or her family member) from reoccupying the premises 
for three years.298  
The owner of a rent-controlled unit must first acquire DHCR approval through 
obtaining a certificate of eviction before she may approach the Housing Court and 
seek a warranty of eviction based on the ground of personal use.299 In order to 
succeed in acquiring the certificate, the landlord must show that she seeks (in good 
faith) to reoccupy the unit because of “immediate and compelling necessity” for her 
personal use or for the use of an immediate family member.300 Where the landowner 
(or her immediate family member) fails to reoccupy the premises within thirty days, 
the landlord shall be liable to the tenant for three times the damage he sustained in 
relation to the removal.301 Where the tenant has occupied the unit for a minimum 
period of twenty years, the landlord is prohibited from evicting the tenant on the basis 
of personal use and occupation. This exception does not apply to rent-stabilized 
tenancies and therefore only protects long-term tenants in rent-controlled units.302 
The aim of the rent regulation laws is to provide security of tenure for tenants 
and to enable occupiers to create a home. Therefore, if the landlord can establish 
that the tenant is not using the unit as her primary residence, which basically is 
analogous to “the home”, the tenant may be evicted.303 However, the landlord of a 
rent-stabilized unit has to rely on this basis to refuse renewal and may therefore only 
bring the eviction proceeding once the tenancy has terminated. Failure by the tenant 
to use the unit as his primary residence is not a breach of the lease, but rather a 
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ground for refusing renewal.304 For the landlord to succeed, she must prove that the 
tenant is not using the premises as his primary residence. The Rent Stabilization 
Code includes certain factors305 that form part of the evidence to determine whether 
the tenant used the unit as his primary residence.306 Once the court establishes that 
the tenant of a rent-stabilized unit failed to use the property as his primary residence, 
the tenant cannot cure this past failure.307 
The landlord of a rent-controlled unit may seek to evict the tenant when she 
requires the premises for substantial alterations or remodelling,308 although the 
landlord would first have to acquire a certificate of eviction from the DHCR.309 It is 
required that the aim of the alterations or remodelling must be to subdivide “an 
underoccupied housing accommodation containing six or more rooms … into a 
greater number of housing accommodations”.310 
Where the landlord of a rent-controlled or rent-stabilized unit seeks to 
demolish the premises, the landlord may institute eviction proceedings against the 
tenant,311 although prior DHCR approval is necessary.312 However, the owner does 
not require DHCR approval where the building contains three or fewer occupied 
units; or one occupied unit in a building containing ten or fewer units.313 The 
landowner of a rent-controlled unit must secure the approvals for demolition as 
required by law; replace the demolished building with a new building; and show that 
the new building contains at least twenty percent more housing than the demolished 
building; show that the necessary arrangements are in place to relocate the tenants; 
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and obtain the required demolition and construction permits.314 In terms of the Sound 
Housing Act 1974, the landlord is also required to prove that there is “no reasonable 
possibility of earning 8.5 percent net annual revenue on the property‟s assessed 
value.”315 Where the landlord is successful in obtaining the certificate of eviction, she 
is obliged to provide relocation assistance to the tenant.316  
The landlord of a rent-stabilized unit must gain permission from the DHCR to 
refuse to renew the lease based on the ground of demolition. To obtain permission, 
the landlord must prove (at a hearing) that she is acting in good faith and seeks to 
recover possession of the housing accommodation in order to demolish the building 
and construct a new building. The landlord must also show that she has obtained 
approval of plans for the new building, or that the DHCR confirmed that she has 
submitted the plans to the city agency. Before the hearing, the landlord is obliged to 
provide some proof to the DHCR that confirms her financial ability to complete the 
demolition and the new construction.317 Where the landlord succeeds in obtaining 
the necessary permission, she is required to pay the tenant‟s relocation expenses.318 
Another basis that the landlord of a rent-controlled or rent-stabilized unit may 
rely on to evict the tenant is where the landlord seeks to withdraw the occupied 
premises from the housing (and non-housing) market.319 The landlord of a rent-
controlled unit is required to obtain a certificate of eviction from the DHCR in order to 
institute eviction proceedings based on this ground,320 while the landlord of a rent-
stabilized unit must acquire permission from the DHCR to refuse to renew the 
tenancy.321 Both regulatory systems require that the landlord must show a lack of 
intent to “rent or sell all or part of the structure.” The landlord must also show that 
she either requires the premises for a business which already exists322 or show that 
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there are substantial violations within the building. The violations must amount to fire 
hazards or conditions dangerous to the life and health of the tenants. The cost of 
removing such violations must be equal to, or exceed, the value of the structure.323 
Where the landlord of a rent-controlled unit is a non-profit institution that operates 
exclusively for charitable or educational purposes, the landlord must show that the 
institution requires the unit in connection with the aim of the institution and that the 
unit must therefore be withdrawn from the rental market.324 Where the landlord of a 
rent-controlled or rent-stabilized unit is successful in obtaining permission from the 
DHCR, she is required to provide relocation assistance to the tenant.325 
In terms of the Rent Stabilization Code, the landlord can seek permission to 
refuse to renew the lease where the landowner intends to remove certain unsafe 
conditions and rehabilitate or demolish the premises under provisions of the Private 
Housing Finance Law; the Housing New York Program Act; or the United States 
Housing Act of 1937.326 In order to succeed, the landlord must indicate that she 
complies with the required financing and prove that the nature of the workings 
require vacant possession. However, the removal of the tenant is only temporary and 
the landlord must agree to reoffer the renovated unit to the tenant.327 
Apart from the rent regulation laws pertaining to the private landlord-tenant 
market, tenure security and restrictions on rents are also provided for in the public 
rental market. In New York City the private rental market is regulated by the rent 
control and rent stabilization laws, although the federal government is also involved 
in the provision of public rental housing. From the preceding section it is clear that 
rent regulation in the private market is currently still quite extensive, as the rent 
control laws and rent stabilization laws restrict rent increases and afford substantive 
tenure rights for regulated tenancies. The central role of the government is apparent 
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in light of the responsibility of the New York State Division of Housing and 
Community Renewal (DHCR) and one can confirm that the local authority is 
progressively involved in the provision of housing within the private rental market.  
   
6.5 Public rental housing 
6.5.1 Introduction 
 
Where the government is involved in the provision of housing, either through 
regulation; subsidies; or direct ownership, certain principles become relevant that 
might have some restrictive impact on the actions of the landlord. Certain 
constitutional constraints, combined with the government‟s obligation not to act in an 
arbitrary manner, could limit government action. Any dispute that arises between the 
government (or government-assisted landlords) and tenants has to comply with 
these general procedural principles. Tenants who occupy housing that is funded by 
the government are entitled to due process of law when the landlord (or the 
government) takes an action that influences their rights, especially when rents are 
raised or when their tenancies are terminated.328 Generally, where the government is 
involved in a housing unit, the tenant cannot be evicted from her home without proof 
of good cause. The federal government is involved in the provision of housing for low 
and moderate income households through federally subsidized housing that is either 
owned by the government (also referred to as the Public Housing Program) or 
owned by private for-profit or not-for-profit parties. The Section 8 Program involves 
the provision of rent subsidies and forms the greatest part of the Public Housing 
Program.329 
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6.5.2 Public Housing Program 
 
The Public Housing Program is federally authorized and funded,330 although state-
chartered public housing authorities (PHAs)331 are accountable for the development 
and management of the public housing projects. The public housing authorities are 
the owners of these projects and can obtain the necessary financing through the 
“sale of bonds backed by the United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD).”332 Public housing tenants are required to pay rent that is equal 
to the greater of either thirty percent of adjusted gross income; ten percent of gross 
income; or, where the tenant is a public assistance recipient, a state-established 
fixed amount of rent.333 Public housing authorities are also allowed to implement 
ceiling rents that are lower than the mentioned formula and that reflect the 
reasonable market value of housing,334 although the minimum rent that a public 
tenant is required to pay is 25 US dollars.335 
Federal, state and local laws and regulations regulate public housing in New 
York State336 and the public housing authority for New York City is the New York City 
Housing Authority (NYCHA).337 In order to determine whether an applicant is eligible 
for public housing, the authority must consider the applicant‟s household income;338 
household composition;339 citizenship status; and his probable behaviour as a public 
housing tenant.340 The public housing authority is required to have an application 
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process for admission to the Public Housing Program.341 Generally, admission is 
allowed on a “first come, first served” basis, although the local housing authority may 
determine that some groups should receive priority. Priority is given to persons in 
need, including the homeless.342  
The size of the public housing unit allocated to a successful household 
depends on the personal circumstances of the family members and their diverse 
needs, which includes the age, sex and medical needs of all the household 
members.343 The rent of the housing unit is determined as mentioned previously, 
although where there is a decrease in the household‟s income the housing authority 
must make provision for a rent redetermination during the period of the tenancy.344 
However, the household is obliged to report any income increase during the term of 
the lease and once the housing authority is informed of such an increase, it must 
consult with the family in order to make an appropriate adjustment.345 
The terms of the lease between a tenant and a housing authority is restricted 
by federal statutes and regulations.346 The lease must state the amount of the 
rent;347 the services and utilities provided by the housing authority;348 the 
responsibility of the housing authority to maintain the unit in relation to wear and 
tear;349 and that the tenant may entertain guests.350 The lease must also contain 
certain obligations of the tenant, which includes a prohibition against subleasing or 
provision of accommodation to boarders. The lease must include the tenant‟s duty to 
use the premises as a private dwelling; to comply with the relevant regulations (and 
codes) pertaining to the housing authority; to behave in such a manner as to not 
cause nuisance to other occupiers; to refrain from illegal activity; and to allow the 
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housing authority access for repairs.351 Housing authority accommodation is in high 
demand because the rents are low and the maintenance of the premises is good. 
When the tenant of a public housing unit relocates or dies, the remaining members 
of the household would therefore often prefer to remain in the unit. The housing 
authority is burdened with numerous applications for public housing and would 
regularly seek to evict unauthorized occupiers in order to accommodate the housing 
backlog. The succession rights of the remaining family members and the issue of 
whether they are entitled to tenancy status is a contested matter.352 
Public housing is a property interest and the tenancy governing the 
relationship between the housing authority landlord and tenant may therefore not be 
terminated, nor may the tenant be evicted, without adequate procedural 
safeguards.353 Where the housing authority seeks to terminate the tenancy, federal 
regulations require that the housing authority base its assertion on the fact that the 
tenant seriously or repeatedly violated the terms and conditions of the lease. 
However, the housing authority could also terminate the tenancy based on a good 
cause.354 The housing authority is primarily required to give adequate notice of the 
proposed termination to the tenant and to state the grounds for eviction in the 
notice.355  
The ground for eviction must be stated in the lease or in the housing 
authority‟s rules and regulations. Tenants occupying public housing in New York City 
may be evicted on the ground of “nondesirability”, which includes behaviour of the 
tenant that constitutes some danger to the health and safety of neighbours; 
behaviour of the tenant that amounts to sexual or immoral conduct in the vicinity of 
the premises; the tenant‟s conduct that causes damage to the premises, property or 
employees of the housing authority; the tenant‟s conduct that disturbs the peaceful 
occupation of other tenants; or behaviour that amounts to common law nuisance.356  
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Where the tenant breached one of the housing authority‟s rules or regulations, 
the housing authority may rely on this breach as a ground for eviction, although the 
tenant must be given an opportunity to meet with one of the housing authority‟s 
members to discuss the problem and cure the breach.357 Where the tenant is 
experiencing problems in paying the rent, the housing authority is obliged to assist 
the tenant and take “all possible action to improve the tenant‟s rent paying records”, 
prior to seeking eviction.358 However, chronic rent delinquency remains a basis for 
eviction. Public housing tenants are obliged to inform the housing authority annually 
of all the occupiers in the given unit and notify the authority of any changes in the 
composition of the household. The housing authority may seek an eviction order 
where there are unauthorized occupiers in the unit.359 The tenant is also obliged to 
inform the housing authority annually of the household income and notify the housing 
authority of any change in household income. Failure to submit such notifications 
could subject the tenant to termination of the tenancy, based on breach of rules.360 
Public housing tenants are generally prohibited from keeping pets and refusal to 
remove a pet may constitute a ground for eviction.361  
In Department of Housing and Urban Development v Rucker362 the United 
States Supreme Court found that where a member of a household; a guest; or any 
person under a household member‟s control, engages in criminal or drug-related 
activity, the public housing authority may evict the entire household, regardless of 
whether the other members were involved in the activity or even knew about the 
activity.363 After this decision, the United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development included a section in the regulations that authorizes the public housing 
authorities to use its discretion in determining such a case. The public housing 
authority must consider all the relevant circumstances of the case; the extent of the 
household‟s participation in the activity; the seriousness of the offense; and the effect 
that eviction would have on the innocent household members.364 A public housing 
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tenant is always entitled to a notice of charges, which serves as a notice of 
termination. This notice must contain the ground for eviction that the housing 
authority is relying on to terminate the tenancy.365 However, where the tenant is 
evicted on the basis of illegal use of the premises, the tenant is not entitled to a 
notice.366  
 
6.5.3 Section 8 Program 
 
The Section 8 Program, which is administered by public housing authorities and 
more specifically the New York City Housing Authority in New York City, generally 
enables low-income tenants to rent private housing through federally funded 
subsidies.367 The subsidy usually pays for the difference between the “fair market 
rent” (“FMR”) and thirty percent of the household income.368 The benefits derived 
from the Section 8 Program are either tenant-based or project-based, although the 
majority of tenants that benefit from the Section 8 Program form part of the Existing 
Housing Program, which is tenant-based.369 Where the tenant receives a certificate 
or voucher and has to find accommodation in the private market, the benefit would 
be tenant-based, while the benefit would be project-based if it is attached to a 
specific housing unit. The project-based subsidy would therefore benefit a 
succeeding tenant once the original tenant vacated the premises, since the benefit is 
attached to the unit and cannot relocate with the tenant.370 
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The Existing Housing Program is tenant-based and the largest programme in 
the Section 8 Program.371 Once the tenant‟s application is successful,372 he would 
receive the promise of a subsidy (paid out in the form of a voucher), whereafter he 
must secure a housing unit in the private market that he could rent. The owner of the 
unit and the public housing authority would agree upon a Housing Assistance 
Payment (HAP) contract. According to the Housing Assistance Payment contract, 
the public housing authority is required to pay the private landlord a section of the 
rent. Acceptance by the landlord “constitutes a waiver of the right to maintain a 
holdover proceeding.”373 The subsidy is either in the form of a certificate or a 
voucher. Where the tenant receives a certificate, he would generally have to pay 
thirty percent of the adjusted household income as his part of the rent. The owner of 
the housing unit must agree to charge the fair market rent (as established by the 
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development for the metropolitan 
region)374 and comply with the required housing standards in order to be accepted 
for the Program.375 The public housing authority is required to pay the owner the 
difference between the contracted rent, which would not be more than the fair market 
rent, plus a utility allowance and thirty percent of the tenant‟s income.376 The public 
housing authority can pay the difference between thirty percent of the tenant‟s 
income and the legal rent where the fair market rent is higher than the legal rent. The 
public housing authority must approve the lease between the owner and the 
tenant377 and inspect the dwelling on an annual basis to ensure that it does comply 
with the housing quality standards.378 
The Section 8 Voucher Program differs from the Certificate Program, because 
vouchers are provided to the family participants in the form of rental subsidies. The 
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subsidy amounts to the difference between thirty percent of the tenant‟s adjusted 
household income and the payment standard, which is based on the fair market rent 
and not the actual rent for the housing unit. The owner is not restricted in the amount 
of rent charged, such as the fair market rent that is annually adjusted for the 
Certificate Program. Therefore, the owner may charge any rent that is reasonable,379 
but the owner must comply with the “Housing Quality Standards”.380 Where the 
tenant leases an apartment and the rent is less than the payment standard, the 
tenant would be able keep the excess subsidy. However, in the case where the rent 
is higher than the payment standard, the tenant would be obliged to pay more than 
thirty percent of his adjusted household income.381 
For both the Section 8 Certificate and Voucher Program, the “contract rent”382 
is the rent charged by the landlord, while the “tenant rent” is the portion of the rent 
that the tenant is responsible for.383 Where the public housing authority fails to pay 
the remainder of the rent, the tenant is not obliged to pay that portion of the rent, 
because the public housing authority‟s obligation derives from the Housing 
Assistance Payment contract between the landlord and the public housing 
authority.384 Therefore, the core of the Section 8 lease is that the tenant merely 
agrees to pay his share of the rent, while the public housing authority must cover the 
remainder of the rent charged. Even upon termination of the subsidy the tenant 
would not become liable for the public housing authority‟s portion of the rent, which is 
the subsidy portion of the rent.385 
Section 8 vouchers or certificates that form part of the Existing Housing 
Program are available to tenants who occupy rent-regulated units. The mere fact that 
the tenant receives a Section 8 voucher or certificate does not influence the 
application of the rent regulation laws. A rent-regulated unit would remain subject to 
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the regulatory laws despite the Section 8 status of the tenant.386 The Section 8 
Program, which is federally regulated, and local landlord-tenant laws should function 
in accordance with each other, since federal law was not intended to obstruct (or 
conflict with) local rent regulation laws.387 However, if the provisions of the Section 8 
Program do conflict with local rent regulations, the provisions of the Section 8 
Program are supreme law.388 Where the unit is subject to the Rent Stabilization Law, 
the tenant is entitled to a lease renewal, because the owner‟s acceptance of the 
Section 8 subsidy does not exempt the unit from the Rent Stabilization Law and 
Code.389 However, it is uncertain whether the landowner of a rent-stabilized unit is 
compelled to renew the lease with the continuation of the Section 8 subsidy as a 
result of the obligation in terms of the Rent Stabilization Law.390 
Generally, leases subject to the Section 8 Program are no longer 
automatically renewed,391 while automatic renewal was previously required.392 A 
Section 8 lease must be for at least one year393 and if the lease was entered into 
prior to 1997, the tenant may only be evicted for cause.394 If the prime tenant395 of a 
household dies or leaves the dwelling, the remaining household members may 
succeed to the prime tenant‟s Section 8 benefit, although the family member who 
wishes to succeed to this benefit must preferably be listed as an occupier on the 
household composition and income documentation.396 In order to determine whether 
the remaining family members are entitled to succession, the public housing 
authority is required to hold an administrative hearing.397 
                                                          
386
 Scherer A Residential Landlord-Tenant Law in New York (2008) 325. Federal law does not exempt 
federally subsidized units (including Section 8 units) from any level of rent regulation, although in 
instances where there is any conflict between federal and state law, federal law remains supreme law: 
Scherer A Residential Landlord-Tenant Law in New York (2008) 325. 
387
 Scherer A Residential Landlord-Tenant Law in New York (2008) 325. 
388
 Scherer A Residential Landlord-Tenant Law in New York (2008) 326. 
389
 Fishel v New York City Conciliation and Appeal Bd 123 Misc 2d 841, 474 NYS 2d 908 (1984). 
390
 Scherer A Residential Landlord-Tenant Law in New York (2008) 326. 
391
 24 Code of Federal Regulations § 982.309(b). This general rule does not apply to rent-stabilized 
tenancies. 
392
 In Maia v Castro 139 Misc 2d 312, 527 NYS 2d 154 (Dist Ct 1988), the court found that all leases 
subject to the Existing Housing Program entered into after 10 May 1984, were automatically renewed. 
393
 24 Code of Federal Regulations § 982.309(a)(1). 
394
 Scherer A Residential Landlord-Tenant Law in New York (2008) 331. 
395
 The tenant is now defined as the person who executes the lease: 24 Code of Federal Regulations 
§ 982.4(b).  
396
 Scherer A Residential Landlord-Tenant Law in New York (2008) 331. 
397
 Scherer A Residential Landlord-Tenant Law in New York (2008) 332. 
309 
 
One should distinguish between termination of the tenant‟s subsidy and 
termination of the lease. The tenant‟s Section 8 subsidy could be terminated where 
he violated a requirement as provided for in the Program,398 while termination of the 
lease would generally occur where the tenant violated a term of the lease.399 The 
landlord‟s decision to for instance demolish the building or use and occupy it herself 
could be a basis for termination of the lease. Where the lease expires, the subsidy 
would not necessarily expire, although termination of the subsidy could often lead to 
termination of the lease, because the tenant can rarely afford to pay the contract 
rent.400 If the tenant‟s Section 8 subsidy terminates, he would not become liable for 
that portion of the rent, because he initially agreed to pay only the rent not covered 
by the subsidy. The landlord may not claim the subsidy-portion of the rent from the 
public housing authority either once the tenant is evicted.401  
The tenant‟s Section 8 subsidy could only be terminated under the older 
regulations if he committed fraud under a housing assistance programme; violated 
certain “family obligations”; participated in illegal drug-related activity; or breached an 
agreement to refund the public housing authority in order to clear his debt.402 In 
terms of the new regulations, the tenant‟s Section 8 subsidy may also be terminated 
in the case where he for instance failed to give the public housing authority a copy of 
an eviction notice or where he failed to occupy the premises.403 Apart from the 
regulations that govern federally subsidized projects, there are additional provisions 
that regulate the Section 8 Program and especially termination of the tenancy.404 
Previously it was required that the landlord had to show “good cause” to successfully 
terminate an Existing Housing Program tenancy, but this requirement was 
suspended by the 1996 United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) Appropriations Bill.405 If the tenant is not protected by State rent 
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regulation, such as the New York City Rent Stabilization Law, the landowner may 
institute eviction proceedings once the Section 8 tenancy expires.406 However, if the 
tenant is protected, for instance by the New York City Rent Stabilization Law, which 
requires renewal of the lease, the landlord is prohibited from evicting the tenant upon 
expiration of the Housing Assistance Payment contract.407 
 
6.5.4 Private Housing Finance Law: Mitchell-Lama housing 
 
Apart from the federally subsidized housing and the rent regulation laws in New York 
State and more specifically New York City, New York State subsidizes and regulates 
the provision of housing under a number of other regulatory systems.408 One of 
these subsidized systems of housing is the Mitchell-Lama housing programme, 
which forms part of the Private Housing Finance Law. Mitchell-Lama housing may be 
held by either a not-for-profit corporation or a not-for-profit cooperative corporation 
(also known as a mutual housing company) and is financed with loans authorized by 
the New York Private Housing Finance Law.409 The loans are made directly by the 
state or by New York City. Where the loans are issued by the state, the DHCR would 
supervise the loans, while loans made by New York City would be supervised by the 
New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD).410 The 
tenant selection (based on income); rent charged; occupancy; and eviction are all 
government-supervised.411  
In order to qualify for Mitchell-Lama housing (in both the State and the City), 
the tenant‟s (or household‟s) apparent aggregate annual income must not exceed 
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seven times the annual rent.412 If the tenant‟s income increases to a level higher than 
the maximum eligible rent, he is obliged to pay surcharges. The rent is determined 
on a project-by-project basis, although the rent should cover the general costs of the 
project, which includes the maintenance; operation; and debt service costs.413 The 
housing company that operates the specific project may require a rent increase, 
although such an increase must be based on an increase in the project‟s costs and 
the DHCR or New York City Department of Housing Preservation and 
Development414 must approve the increase.415 
The grounds for termination of the tenancy in state and city-supervised 
Mitchell-Lama housing are analogous, although the procedures are different.416 The 
grounds for eviction include behaviour of the tenant that amounts to nuisance; 
violations of the agreement or failure to comply with the lease obligations; use of the 
unit for immoral or illegal purposes; refusal to allow reasonable access to the 
landlord; failure by the tenant to reveal his true income; or failure by the tenant to use 
the unit as his principal residence. The landlord may also evict the tenant when she 
requires the unit for a shareholder (or other person) who made a generous 
deposit.417 Suspension of a non-profit company is made possible through 
“prepayment of government-aided assistance.”418 However, once the company is 
dissolved, the property may be withdrawn from Mitchell-Lama regulations.419 The 
premises would then become subject to the Rent Stabilization Law and Code.420 
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6.6 Constitutionality of rent regulation 
6.6.1 Constitutional provisions  
 
As Singer mentions,421 various conflicts arise from the landlord-tenant relationship, 
but the constitutionality of rent regulation has become a topic of interest in certain 
communities because some have argued that the local government rent regulation 
laws amount to an unconstitutional taking of property. The argument that rent 
regulation provides some protection for low to moderate income households against 
displacement seems to be accepted as constitutional justification, considering the 
limited success of challenges against it in the case law. The property clause in the 
Constitution of the United States of America 1787422 consists of two parts, known as 
the “Due Process Clause” and the “Takings Clause” respectively.423 Article V of the 
Constitution states that “[n]o person shall … be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without 
just compensation.”424 The first section of this article is known as the due process 
clause because it states that no person shall be deprived of property without due 
process of law, while the second section of the article is referred to as the takings 
clause because it ensures that property shall not be taken for public use without just 
compensation.425  
The regulation of the use of property in the US is associated with federal and 
state restrictions on the use of property, also referred to as the police power. These 
restrictions are imposed legitimately in order to generally protect the “health, safety 
and morals” of the community and are therefore not accompanied by 
compensation.426 Van der Walt explains that the legality of a regulation may be 
constitutionally challenged on the basis that the regulation amounts to a “regulatory 
taking” or “inverse condemnation”, which could be defined as a regulation that 
“assumes the form of a mere regulatory control of the use of property, but in effect 
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amounts to a taking of the property without compensation”.427 Singer explains that 
the ultimate criteria used by the courts to determine whether an exercise of police 
power amounts to a constitutional regulation or a unconstitutional taking, is to query 
whether the regulation wrongfully “forc[es] some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”428  
Where the public health and safety is under threat, it is generally accepted 
that the exercise of police power is justified regardless of the impact on individual 
property rights. However, where the police power is exercised in the regulation of 
property not directly threatening the health and safety of the public, the government 
action can more easily be described as a regulatory taking.429 Conventionally, the 
exercise of police power is associated with the first-mentioned form of regulation. 
This form is also referred to as regulation in the narrow sense, which includes 
regulations of the use of property with the aim to protect the public health, safety and 
wealth. Nevertheless, certain socio-economic regulations, including rent regulation, 
could fall under a wider concept of police power.430 
 
6.6.2 Case law 
 
In the 1921 United States Supreme Court case of Block v Hirsh431 the defendant, 
Hirsch, instituted proceedings to recover possession of his premises from the 
plaintiff, Block, who remained in the leased premises upon expiration of the tenancy. 
Block refused to surrender possession, relying on the District of Columbia Rents Act 
of 1919.432 Section 109 of the Act provided that the tenant could remain in the leased 
premises upon expiration of the lease if he continued to pay the rent and abided by 
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the terms of the tenancy. The Act also enabled the landlord to reclaim possession for 
his own use or the use of certain family members, if the tenant was given thirty days‟ 
notice. Even though Hirsh allegedly wanted the property for his own use, he failed to 
give the tenant adequate notice, since he denied the validity of the Act. Section 122 
of the Act stated that certain provisions in the Act were necessary in response to the 
growing housing (and rental housing) emergencies resulting from the war. The rental 
housing conditions in the District of Columbia became dangerous to the public 
health.433 
The Court found that in the given social circumstances during that period, the 
public interest did justify some degree of public control in the sphere of rental 
housing. The remaining question was whether the statutory regulation was excessive 
and therefore amounted to an unconstitutional taking.434 Justice Holmes upheld the 
Act, finding that the Act protected tenants (and especially those who needed to work 
for the government) against unreasonable rent increases, which were made possible 
through war conditions. The only critique Holmes J mentioned in relation to the effect 
of the Act was that tenants could remain on the premises upon expiration of the 
lease at the same rent, unless it was modified by the Commission, thereby severely 
restricting the rights of the landowner.435 Holmes J explained that this result was in 
fact necessary in light of the larger policy that if the tenant remained subject to the 
landowner‟s power to evict, the aim in limiting the rent charged would fail. This policy 
is also familiar in English law.436  
In 1922, shortly after Block v Hirsch, the United States Supreme Court 
decided Edgar A Levy Leasing Co v Siegel,437 which also concerned the 
constitutionality of rent regulation laws in the State of New York. The facts were 
similar to those in Block v Hirsch: the defendant-tenant was holding over and the 
anti-eviction laws protected him against eviction.438 The question was whether the 
Emergency Housing Laws of the State of New York were constitutionally valid. The 
laws amended the substantive law with the aim to provide security of tenure for 
tenants in possession of residential property by allowing such tenants to remain in 
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possession for a certain period while paying reasonable rents as determined by the 
courts.439  
Justice Clarke found that the laws involved an emergency and that they were 
created by the legislature to promote the health, morality, comfort and peace of the 
people of New York State, thereby also promoting public welfare through the 
exercise of the police power.440 Justice Clarke mentioned that if such an emergency 
existed, it would validate resorting to the police power to address the crisis and 
guard the public welfare.441 Various committees were appointed by the Mayor of 
New York to determine whether there was a housing crisis. It was confirmed that 
there was a great shortage of housing, which led to landlords exploiting tenants 
through extreme rent profiteering. For the purpose of rent increases, “legal process 
was being abused and eviction was being resorted to as never before”, which 
resulted in overcrowding, insanitary conditions, discomfort and general social 
discontent.442 The Court upheld the anti-eviction law and found that it was not an 
unconstitutional taking of property, for that reason alone.443 The state‟s discretion in 
protecting the public welfare through a constitutional substantive statute had not 
been exceeded by the State of New York.444 
In Loab Estates Inc v Druhe,445 the Court of Appeals of New York was faced 
with a similar constitutional challenge. The landlord disputed the validity of some 
provisions of the Administrative Code of the City of New York, which restricted the 
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rights of landowners to evict tenants from units within the City.446 The landlord 
intended to evict twenty-nine families from apartment houses in order to demolish 
the building and convert it into a loading platform. The Administrative Code enabled 
a landlord to evict tenants and withdraw a building from the rental market, but it 
required a certificate of eviction. To acquire such a certificate, the landlord had to 
make provision for relocation of the tenants. The housing rent commission could not 
issue the certificate of eviction because the appellant failed to provide relocation 
assistance for the tenants.447 The appellant consequently contended that the local 
law deprived a landowner of property without due process of law because it 
prohibited the landowner from withdrawing his property from the rental market.  
The court found that the restrictions placed upon the landlord should be seen 
within the context of the state of emergency during that period. The court referred to 
Block v Hirsch and found that similar prohibitions were placed upon the rights of 
landlords during a period with even lesser emergency conditions. The court therefore 
decided that such restrictions fell within the scope of the police power in terms of 
which property rights could be limited without compensation.448 As a result of the city 
council and legislature‟s decision to place restraints upon the rights of landowners to 
withdraw their property from the rental market, arising from the threat of “chaos and 
confusion” and the need to balance the opposing interests of landowners and 
occupying tenants, the legislation did not amount to a taking of the appellant‟s 
property without due process of law.449  
In 1988, the United States Supreme Court was once again faced with a 
constitutional challenge regarding a rent regulation law. In Pennell v San Jose,450 the 
appellants challenged a rent control ordinance that allowed a hearing officer to 
determine whether a proposed rent increase by the landlord would be allowable. The 
officer had to consider various factors, including the “hardship to the tenant”.451 The 
aim of the rent control ordinance was to accommodate certain needs created by the 
San Jose housing situation, which included the prevention of unreasonable rent 
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increases; the alleviation of undue tenant hardship; and the assurance to landlords 
of a fair return on their investment. The ordinance made provision for annual rent 
increases, but where the annual rent increase exceeded eight percent, the tenant 
could object and a hearing would follow to determine whether the proposed increase 
was reasonable under the circumstances. The hearing officer would consider various 
circumstances, including “the hardship to the tenant”, before making this 
determination. The economic and financial impact of the proposed increase had to 
be considered by the officer to establish whether there was in fact such a “hardship 
to the tenant”.452  
The appellant contended that application of the “tenant hardship” provision 
amounted to a taking of private property for public use without compensation, 
because an additional rent reduction based on the ground of “tenant hardship” 
constitutes a “transfer of the landlord‟s property to individual hardship tenants; the 
Ordinance forces private individuals to shoulder the „public‟ burden of subsidizing 
their poor tenants‟ housing.”453 The appellant also contended that the just 
compensation requirement in the takings clause was created to prohibit government 
from forcing certain individuals to bear public burdens that should be borne by the 
public as a whole.454 
Justice Rehnquist found that the scheme (created by the Ordinance) that 
allowed the officer to consider various factors relating to the economic and financial 
position of the landlord and the tenant was a rational attempt to equalise the 
opposing interests of the parties. The scheme was aimed at protecting tenants by 
placing a restriction on burdensome rent increases, while ensuring a fair return on 
landlords‟ investment.455 The Ordinance was therefore not unconstitutional under the 
due process requirement because it served a legitimate purpose in protecting 
tenants, while balancing the interests of the parties by allowing reasonable rent 
increases.456 Van der Walt explains that rent control, which is a form of price 
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regulation, is generally constitutionally valid if it is legitimately aimed at protecting 
consumer welfare.457 
The most recent constitutional challenge concerning a rent regulation law that 
was heard by the United States Supreme Court was Yee v City of Escondido,458 
although the law regulated mobile home tenancies rather than tenancies in 
general.459 The claimants were the owners of mobile home parks in Escondido, 
California. They argued that a local rent control ordinance, viewed in light of the 
California Mobilehome Residency Law, constituted an unconstitutional taking of 
property without compensation, because it amounted to a permanent physical 
invasion of their property.460 The Mobilehome Residency Law restricted the basis 
upon which a park owner could terminate mobile home owner‟s tenancy. The 
grounds for eviction included failure to pay rent; violation of park rules; and the park 
owner‟s decision to change the use of his land.461 The disputed ordinance, adopted 
in the wake of the Mobilehome Residency Law, set rents back to their 1985 level and 
prohibited rent increases without the approval of the city council. The claimants 
contended that the effect of the rent control law was to deprive them of all use and 
occupancy of their property, while the residing tenants of the mobile homes acquired 
a right to physically use the property of the landowner on a permanent basis.462 The 
petitioners concluded that the ordinance transferred an interest in the land, namely 
the right to occupy the land indefinitely at below market rent, from the mobile park 
owner to the mobile home owner, because the effect of the Mobilehome Residency 
Law in conjunction with the rent control ordinance was to increase the value of the 
mobile home, while converting the mobile park owner to a “perpetual tenant of the 
park”.463 The value of the mobile home would allegedly increase since the mobile 
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home owner could rent the pad at below market rents for consecutive periods 
without facing the threat of eviction.464 
Justice O‟Connor found that a physical taking only occurs where the 
government compels a landowner to accept physical occupation of his land, which is 
different from what happened in this case, because the mobile park owners 
voluntarily leased their land to mobile home owners and the park owners could still 
decide to withdraw their land from the rental market.465 The Court concluded that the 
rent control ordinance, considered in light of the Mobilehome Residency Law, did not 
amount to a taking, because it did not authorize an unwanted physical invasion of 
the petitioners‟ property, but rather regulated the use of the property.466 Singer 
explains that the takings clause generally requires compensation in the case where 
the government authorizes a physical invasion that comprises “forced occupation by 
strangers”.467 However, in this case Justice O‟Connor argued that the rent control 
ordinance did not compel landowners to open their property to the public, because 
the park owners had already opened the land to strangers by renting out the pads 
and therefore the restriction placed on their right to exclude certain tenants could not 
amount to a taking.468 
In Seawall Associates v City of New York,469 the Court of Appeals of New 
York had to consider whether a local law resulted in the physical occupation of the 
plaintiff‟s property and whether it therefore amounted to an uncompensated taking. 
In 1985 Local Law 59 was enacted to suspend the demolition (or conversion) of 
structures containing single-room occupancy (SRO) properties. Local Law 22 
extended this suspension and required that all the owners of single-room occupancy 
properties had to rehabilitate vacant units and place the units on the rental market. 
Upon failure, landowners were served with severe penalties.470 Landowners were 
compelled to make every single-room occupancy unit habitable and lease the unit at 
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controlled rents. If the unit remained unoccupied for thirty days, the owner was 
presumed to have violated the requirements.471  
The question was whether the obligations and restrictions imposed by the 
government forced certain property owners to bear a public burden that should have 
been borne by the public as a whole.472 The court found that the regulations violated 
the takings clause of the Constitution and article 1 (Part 7) of the New York State 
Constitution, because the laws imposed upon the landowners societal obligations 
beyond the scope of their just share.473 The court found that the impact of the laws 
resulted in a physical taking, because it enabled the City to forcefully control the 
landowner‟s possessory interests.474 Where the owners were compelled to allow 
occupation of their vacant property by strangers, the deprivation of the landowner‟s 
rights was found to be sufficient to result in a physical taking.475 The court 
distinguished between previous decisions of the Supreme Court, such as the Bowles 
and Loab decisions, which upheld rent control as constitutional, as these decisions 
did not concern laws that forced landowners to rent their properties to strangers 
which constituted a physical taking. The other rent control cases concerned the 
beneficial purpose of the regulation or the extent of the relevant police power. In 
those cases the courts had to consider restrictions placed upon existing landlord-
tenant relationships where the landlord voluntarily placed the property in the rental 
market.476 The court acknowledged that the aim of the laws, namely to alleviate 
homelessness, was socially important, but disapproved of the means sought to 
address this societal problem.477 Hancock JR for the majority concluded that: 
“[N]o one disputes the City‟s power – indeed its duty – to fashion meaningful 
solutions to address homelessness. No one disputes that the City has the 
power to prohibit the demolition of SRO properties, or direct restoration of SRO 
units to habitable conditions to be leased at modest rents for indefinite periods. 
The City clearly has that power. The question is who is to pay for this and, more 
particularly, whether the City – in accordance with constitutional mandate – 
must compensate property owners before it can „place [them] in a business, 
force[] them to remain in that business and refuse[] to allow them to ever cease 
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doing [that] business.‟ The issue is not one of „economic due process‟, but 
constitutional demand.”478   
 
6.7 Conclusion  
 
The rental housing market in New York City is both interesting and comparable to 
the rental housing market in England and Wales. It is necessary to compare the 
landlord-tenant systems to identify important aspects within the New York City 
model. 
For the majority of the twentieth century, the private rental market in England 
and Wales provided housing to the majority of tenants, which included low-income 
tenants. At the end of the century the provision of social housing increased and was 
aimed at providing housing for low-income households. Numerous low-income 
tenants in England and Wales currently occupy social housing. 
Throughout the twentieth century the private rental market was regulated in 
order to protect tenants, including low-income tenants.479 The private rental market 
became unattractive as an investment opportunity for landlords, which contributed to 
the decline in private rental housing. As the housing policy changed to increase 
private rental housing the market was deregulated, but during this period the social 
housing market increased and started to make housing available for low-income 
households. Currently the private market can uphold deregulation, because the 
social housing market is providing a type of “safety net” for vulnerable occupiers. The 
social housing market is regulated quite extensively in order to protect vulnerable 
occupiers through the provision of affordable secure rental housing.480 
The private rental market is therefore not burdened with the indirect duty to 
provide housing to low-income households, because affordable secure rental 
housing is made available by local councils and housing associations that 
collectively form the social housing sector. This sector can accommodate the social 
                                                          
478
 Seawall Associates v City of New York 74 NY 2d 92 (1989) 117-118. 
479
 See section 4.5 in Chapter 4 for a discussion of previous rent regulation laws in the England and 
Wales. 
480
 See sections 4.5.2 and 4.6.2 in Chapter 4 for a discussion of social housing regulations in England 
and Wales. 
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market, because it is governmentally equipped with means to monitor the demand 
for low-income housing. 
The position in New York City is different, but comparable. Currently the 
majority of the rental housing stock in the United States of America is privately 
owned by for-profit landowners. The percentage of private homeowners in New York 
City is low in comparison with the other major US cities. The percentage of private 
rental housing in New York City is high, especially by comparison to the limited 
number of public rental housing stock. The private rental market is providing housing 
to a high number of households, including low-income households. In New York City, 
the public rental sector is not providing the required number of housing units for low-
income households. The private rental market is therefore burdened with the indirect 
duty to accommodate low-income households. In Chapter 4 it was argued that if the 
private rental market is functioning efficiently, there would not necessarily be a need 
to regulate the market if there is some mechanism ensuring affordable and secure 
housing for the more vulnerable members of society. In New York City the private 
rental market provides housing to a range of households, including low-income 
households.  
The current position in New York City is very different from the earlier 
position, when the majority of New Yorkers, and in fact the majority of Americans, 
were desperately in need of affordable rental housing. During that period the 
emergency housing shortage affected all income groups and possible tenant 
exploitation justified rent regulation in the private market. The courts held that rent 
regulation measures were constitutionally justifiable in light of the housing crisis, 
because landlords could exploit tenants.481 Currently a number of private housing 
dwellings are regulated and the justification for rent regulation subsequently shifted 
to the provision of affordable rental housing for a small, specified group of low-
income individuals. The rent charged in the deregulated private rental sector is 
higher than the market rent, which indicates a form of tenant exploitation. If the 
leases of low-income tenants who occupy regulated rental housing in the private 
market expire, their chances of acquiring public rental housing would be very slim, 
because public housing stock is limited. Low-income households would also struggle 
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 See the discussion of Block v Hirsh 256 US 135 (1921) and Edgar A Levy Leasing Co v Siegel 258 
US 242 (1922) in section 6.6.2 above. 
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to find deregulated accommodation in the private market, because the rent is higher 
than the market rent and therefore much higher than the rent these households 
previously had to pay in the regulated market. Currently, the aim of the regulations is 
to avoid an increase in homelessness, because the immediate effect of deregulation 
would be an increase in rents. The more recent justification for rent regulation is 
therefore based on the public interest.  
From the case law discussion it is clear that the Supreme Court of Appeal and 
other courts have found that some regulatory laws are constitutionally justifiable, 
because it serves a legitimate purpose in protecting tenants while balancing the 
interests of the parties.  
The point of departure in landlord-tenant case law regarding the justifiability of 
rent regulations is that it is constitutionally valid, because it is in the public interest. 
However, the extent of the regulation could render it unconstitutional, especially 
when a small section of society must bear the public burden alone and when the 
regulations are disproportionate. Where the restrictions force certain property owners 
to bear this public burden alone the court have found that it amounts to a taking 
without compensation and is therefore unconstitutional. The courts have found that 
rent regulations are constitutionally justifiable if the landlord allowed the tenancy. In 
Yee the Supreme Court held that the law did not amount to an unconstitutional 
taking because it did not authorize an unwanted physical invasion. In Seawall the 
court declared a law unconstitutional because the impact of the law was to force 
landowners to open their property to the public, which amounted to an 
unconstitutional physical taking. 
In German law482 the fundamental feature of property is to enable the holder 
of property to secure a sphere of freedom in which he can develop his own life. A 
statutory regulation that deprives the owner of this right is held to constitute an 
invalid and unjustified taking. However, the German Federal Constitutional Court has 
found that tenure security in residential property is important and it justifies 
restrictions on landowners‟ property rights, because it enables tenants to reach a 
level of personal autonomy. The security of the home is central for the individual (or 
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 See Chapter 7 for a discussion of German landlord-tenant law regarding the protection of tenants‟ 
occupation rights. 
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household) to make decisions and participate in society.483 German law differs from 
American law to the extent that it does not have uncodified common law, but rather a 
Civil Code that protects the tenure rights of tenants.484 In addition Article 14 of the 
German Basic Law, which functions as a constitutional property clause, was crafted 
to protect property rights and to enable the legislature to enact legislation that would 
give effect to the public interest. The contents and limits of property must be 
developed by the legislature, while the use of property must serve the public interest. 
The rights of landowners must always be taken into account, but it is subject to 
social limitations. 
In the American context, Singer explains that landlord-tenant relationships 
divide property rights between the landlord and the tenant to the extent that the 
tenant receives a possessory right, while the landlord retains the reversion. 
According to the case law, regulations that provide tenants with better tenure 
security by restricting the common law rights of landowners is constitutional, 
provided that it does not become excessive.485 The justification for granting the 
tenant continued occupation rights upon termination of the lease is apparent when 
balancing the interests of both landlord and tenant. When balancing the interests of 
the parties the situation could sometimes arise that it would be in the public interest 
to “privilege the interests of tenants in continued access to their homes over the 
interests of landlords in recovering possession of the property.”486 However, this form 
of regulation must be distinguished from forcing landowners to lease their properties. 
Forcing property owners to let their property is according to the American case law 
unjustifiable as it amounts to a physical taking. 
                                                          
483
 See section 7.4 in Chapter 7 regarding the fundamental feature of property in German law. 
484
 See section 7.3.2 in Chapter 7 for a discussion of the provisions in the German Civil Code 
regulating landlord-tenant law and specifically the tenure rights of tenants. 
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 See Chapter 7. 
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7.1 Introduction 
 
Throughout the twentieth century the private rental housing sector in Germany has 
represented a large percentage of the housing market and it remains the most 
common form of housing.1 The rental housing market was subjected to state 
intervention since the outbreak of the First and Second World War in order to 
accommodate households in dire need of affordable housing. The initial introduction 
of tenant protection measures and rent control had detrimental consequences for 
landowners and the housing market in general, because it was disproportionate in 
relation to building costs and inflation.2 After the Second World War new rental 
housing measures were introduced that restricted the rights of landowners with the 
aim to accommodate tenants, but these measures were combined with state 
assistance in the form of public funds. These funds attracted private investment in 
the rental housing market, which resulted in an increase in residential property stock, 
while allowing rent control and tenant protection measures to continue, because 
landowners became more content with restrictions on rent and other tenure security 
measures.  
Social housing was introduced3 during a period when a large percentage of 
low-income households had difficulty entering the private housing market. Social 
housing made provision for affordable, secure rental housing combined with access 
control, in order to accommodate the more vulnerable and marginalised group of 
households. Currently, this form of housing is being phased out, because of the 
government‟s financing system.4  
Landlord-tenant law is presently regulated in the Civil Code.5 The Civil Code 
makes provision for tenant protection and restricts rent increases, although rent 
control as such has been phased out. The market is presently being deregulated, but 
security of tenure for tenants is still provided for. These provisions apply to all 
tenants, irrespective of their income. However, where cancellation of the lease could 
                                                          
1
 See text accompanying ffn 16, 71 below. 
2
 See text accompanying ffn 26-28. 
3
 Social housing was introduced in 1950. See the discussion of the introduction of social housing in 
7.2.2 below. 
4
 Droste C & Knorr-Siedow T “Social Housing in Germany” in Whitehead C & Scanlon K (eds) Social 
Housing in Europe (2007) 90-140 at 93-95. 
5
 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB). Landlord-tenant law is regulated in Book 2, Title 5 of the BGB. 
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cause a hardship for the tenant or a member of the tenant‟s household, the tenant 
can resist eviction on that basis. This provision6 indirectly ensures that vulnerable 
tenants are protected against unjustifiably harsh circumstances that result from 
eviction. The Civil Code specifically includes the example where a tenant would 
become homeless after cancellation as a form of hardship.7 
During the twentieth century the provision of housing, and more specifically 
the protection of tenants‟ occupation interests, has developed from being a “public 
concern” towards becoming an interest that forms part of the general public interest. 
The public interest is protected in the German Basic Law to such an extent that it has 
to be weighed against the interests of property owners.8 In the landlord-tenant 
context the property rights of landowners are therefore constitutionally balanced with 
the socially protected interests of residential tenants.9 In the American courts,10 
including the United States Supreme Court, it has been argued that rent regulations 
amount to an unconstitutional taking of property, but at least in some cases these 
regulations have been upheld as constitutionally valid regulatory law because they 
are in the public interest. The German Federal Constitutional Court has also 
considered landlord-tenant disputes regarding rent regulations,11 although the 
German disputes have always concerned the extent of the regulations rather than 
the constitutional justifiability of these laws. The courts therefore had to consider 
whether the legislature correctly weighed up the interests of the parties when it 
regulates and determines the contents of property rights. Where property serves the 
public interest (or forms part of the public interest) and society at large has a share in 
that interest, the legislature‟s incentive to restrict the rights of the property owner 
increases. The nature of residential property, and more specifically leased residential 
property, justifies strict regulation by the legislature because it serves a social 
function in the provision of housing. The interests of the tenants are socially 
recognisable interests that justify protection by the legislature. In the case of housing 
shortages the social importance of residential housing increases to the extent that it 
becomes a limited resource, which is a vital commodity for society. In these 
                                                          
6
 BGB § 574(1). 
7
 BGB § 574(2). 
8
 See text accompanying ffn 159-160 below and the case law discussion in 7.4.2 below. 
9
 See the discussion in 7.4.1 - 7.4.3 below. 
10
 See section 6.6.2 in Chapter 6 for a discussion of American case law regarding the constitutionality 
of rent regulations. 
11
 See section 7.4.2 below. 
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circumstances the role of the government in governing this resource changes, as 
more stringent regulations regarding residential property are justified. The social 
importance of the property providing housing to society might then outweigh the 
private property rights of landowners. 
However, the restrictions placed on the rights of landowners are not perceived 
as exceptional or emergency statutory interventions or interferences, as the tenant 
protection measures are included in the German Civil Code12 and therefore form part 
of the private law on a permanent basis. In American law (and pre-1994 South 
African law)13 rent regulations are perceived as temporary measures that interfere 
with the strong common law rights of landowners with the aim to provide 
strengthened tenure rights for weak, poor, vulnerable, and marginalised occupiers in 
times of extreme need or hardship. In the current South African housing context the 
social importance of housing and strengthened tenure security for the previously 
disadvantaged are also highlighted in sections 25(6) and 26(1) of the Constitution, 
although the courts (and the legislature) have upheld the strong common law rights 
of landowners.14 In American law (and pre-1994 South African law) the justification 
for limiting private landowners‟ common law property rights in order to afford better 
tenure rights for tenants is therefore based on the general public consensus that 
there is a great disparity between the common law rights of landowners and tenants. 
When facing housing shortages this disparity increases to such an extent that rent 
regulations are justified. In German law the justification for rent regulations is based 
on the importance of substantive tenure rights that enables tenants to participate in 
society, make their own decisions and achieve personal autonomy, which is a 
general rather than a temporary, emergency justification. The social importance of 
residential property is recognised in most jurisdictions, especially when facing 
housing shortages, but the tension between the rights of landowners and tenants are 
perceived and analysed from different perspectives, which results in different 
landlord-tenant regimes. 
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 See section 7.3.2 below. 
13
 See section 2.3 in Chapter 2 for a discussion of rent regulations in pre-1994 South Africa. 
14
 See sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.8 in Chapter 3. 
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7.2 Contextual background 
7.2.1 State intervention in rental housing market (World War I – World War II) 
 
In the beginning of the twentieth century housing in Germany15 was to a large extent 
unregulated and left to the free market. The nature of private property was generally 
a private matter and the state did not intervene in the affairs of landowners, 
especially the relationship between landlord and tenant. During this period ninety 
percent of the German population lived in rented housing.16 The housing market 
remained unregulated and was shaped by market forces instead of housing needs 
until the First World War, whereafter the free-market approach to housing was 
replaced by public concern.17 The economic complications that developed and 
increased throughout the war forced the state to intervene in the housing market.18 
Initially, tenants who were dependants of soldiers were protected against eviction 
and shortly thereafter, legislation was enacted to protect fighting men from eviction.19 
In the same year legislation was passed to provide general protection for tenants in 
rent arrears. At the end of 1914 a decree was issued that made provision for the 
establishment of “rent settlement offices”20 (Mieteinigungsämter), which manifested 
                                                          
15
 As far as the period between 1945 and 1990 is concerned, this section is based on rental housing 
development in the former West Germany. Housing in the former German Democratic Republic (East 
Germany) was different, as three different types of ownership existed, namely state housing, co-
operative housing and private housing. During the immediate post-war period the majority of dwellings 
were privately owned. However, by 1957 state housing stock increased, as 79 percent of all housing 
construction was for state housing. Rents in older state properties remained very low as a result of a 
rent freeze in 1936, while the overall cost of rentals was also relatively low. As a result of the low state 
rents the renting of private property was often seen as a burden on the landowner, because the cost 
of repair work for the owner often exceeded the rent paid by the tenant. Co-operative housing 
schemes were operated by non-profit building societies and the co-operative schemes remained 
owners of all its housing. Co-operative housing construction was financed by local authorities and 
essentially formed part of government planning. See Staemmler G “East Germany” in Wynn M (ed) 
Housing in Europe (1984) 220-246 at 236-239. 
16
 Bessel R Germany after the First World War (1993) 166-167. See 167 for a brief discussion on the 
conditions of rental accommodation.  
17
 Bessel R Germany after the First World War (1993) 168-169. The role of the state with regard to 
the housing problem was embedded in Article 155 of the Weimar Constitution (1919), which provided 
that the state was committed “to secure a healthy dwelling for every German and a place of residence 
and work for every German family, especially those with many children, appropriate to their needs.” 
18
 Bessel R Germany after the First World War (1993) 170. 
19
 The Law for the Protection of Servicemen of 4 August 1914. 
20
 Bessel R Germany after the First World War (1993) 170. 
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the beginning of tenant protection through state intervention in the rental housing 
market.21  
In 1918 the government introduced new measures to address the housing 
shortage and to protect tenants. These measures empowered local authorities to 
prevent privately owned buildings (and parts of buildings) from being demolished; to 
order that an additional number of persons be accommodated in certain dwellings; to 
prohibit landowners from using dwellings for purposes other than housing; and to 
force landowners of vacant land (or buildings) to advertise their availability.22 The 
state became the “arbiter of landlord-tenant relations”23 and it took such an interest in 
the financing of new building construction that by the end of 1918 it made subsidies 
available to compensate landowners for increased building costs.24 Laws and 
decrees that regulated the relationship between landlord and tenant were enacted in 
the individual states throughout Germany. When the First World War ended the 
housing market, and more specifically the rental housing market, was characterized 
by municipal housing authorities imposing strict control over the availability of 
housing and the general price of residential property in their area. A number of socio-
economic conditions, including a persistent housing shortage, continued inflation, 
shortage of capital, the return of soldiers and a great number of marriages, led to 
wide-ranging state intervention, combined with rent controls, during the 
demobilization period.25 
The strict enforcement of rent controls had a number of detrimental 
consequences as a result of the disparity between the rapid inflation and the 
stagnation of rents. At a period when rents were restricted, Germany experienced 
drastic inflation which arguably “transferred wealth from landlords to tenants.”26 The 
costs of owning property, which included insurance, property tax, sewerage, cleaning 
and repair work continuously increased, while rents were restricted. As a result of the 
disproportion between landowners‟ increasing costs and tenants‟ reduced or 
stagnant rents, owners of residential property lost the incentive to make their 
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 Bessel R Germany after the First World War (1993) 170-171. See 171-174 for a discussion on the 
condition of housing and the availability of housing during the first stages of the war. 
22
 Bessel R Germany after the First World War (1993) 174. 
23
 Bessel R Germany after the First World War (1993) 174. 
24
 Bessel R Germany after the First World War (1993) 174. 
25
 Bessel R Germany after the First World War (1993) 174-175. See 175-181 for further detail on the 
socio-economic circumstances during the demobilization period.  
26
 Bessel R Germany after the First World War (1993) 181. 
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property available, which led to the state forcing landowners to put their dwellings on 
the rental market.27 Some landowners also allowed their properties to dilapidate 
instead of paying high costs for repairs.28 Apart from the adverse effect that rent 
control had on landowners, rent control generally discouraged the private building of 
new rental housing.29  
A number of post-war statutes were introduced that set the legal framework 
for state involvement in housing. These statutes restricted the rights of landowners to 
demolish their buildings, to convert residential property to commercial use and to 
discount vacant buildings by empowering local authorities to seize the vacant 
buildings and force landowners to let these dwellings to homeless families.30 Rent 
control was imposed on all residential property built prior to July 1918, which led to 
extremely high rent rates for new dwellings, as a result of increased building costs 
and high interest rates. Finally, the laws in effect prohibited landlords from evicting 
tenants.31  
Overall, the measures introduced by the state contributed towards a 
significant alteration in the German people‟s perception of the state‟s justifiable 
responsibility in solving the housing crisis. After these measures were introduced, 
the people of Germany more easily accepted the state‟s responsibility in addressing 
social problems, even though the interventions didn‟t actually solve the acute 
housing shortage.32 After the stabilization crisis of 1923-1924 rents increased and 
later, between 1925 and 1926, rents increased rapidly, even though the state 
remained in control of rents. It seemed as though, once the state intervened in the 
price of housing, extracting itself became exceedingly difficult. The anticipation of a 
return of the free-market economy was to a large extent idealistic, as demobilization 
and inflation resulted in state intervention in the housing market throughout 
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 See section 6.6.2 in Chapter 6 for a discussion of Seawall Associates v City of New York 74 NY 2d 
92 (1989) where the Court of Appeals of New York decided that a similar law amounted to an 
unconstitutional taking. 
28
 Bessel R Germany after the First World War (1993) 181. 
29
 Bessel R Germany after the First World War (1993) 182. 
30
 See section 6.6.2 in Chapter 6 for a discussion of Seawall Associates v City of New York 74 NY 2d 
92 (1989). 
31
 Bessel R Germany after the First World War (1993) 184. See also Wendt PF Housing Policy – The 
Search for Solutions: A Comparison of the United Kingdom, Sweden, West Germany, and the United 
States since World War II (1962) 115. 
32
 Bessel R Germany after the First World War (1993) 187. See 187-189 for statistics on housing 
production in Germany between 1919 and 1925 and some discussion on the increased housing 
shortage. 
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Germany, which eventually played a central role in housing construction.33 The 
underlying goal of the state‟s continued intervention in the housing market, through 
tenant protection and attempts to increase housing availability, was arguably 
“political – attempts by insecure governments to demonstrate to an unruly and 
embittered population that they were doing something.”34 Between 1924 and 1930 
the volume of new housing construction increased, in part as a result of government 
loans made available to builders at low interest rates, which amounted to roughly 
sixty percent in new housing investment. Private employers were also encouraged to 
construct new dwellings by offering them building loans at low interest rates. As a 
result of the depression, between 1930 and 1931 public funds for housing 
construction were withdrawn and the amount of credit made available through 
organized capital markets declined. During 1929-1932 residential construction 
consequently declined by more than fifty percent.35  
The Nazi regime came into power in 1933 and imposed strict control over the 
housing market. The regulations were implemented through two four-year plans.36 
The First Four-Year Plan (1933-1936) initially focused on the rebuilding of housing 
stock, which was followed by greater emphasis on new housing construction.37 
Despite the increase in housing construction, the housing shortage continued and it 
even increased when 300 000 dwellings were being built every year.38 The majority 
of the new construction was aimed at providing housing for low-income households, 
although some of these dwellings‟ rent was too high to accommodate tenants. By the 
end of 1932 more than one million households did not have a home, while there 
were 150 000 vacant apartments available for rent.39 The Second Four-Year Plan 
began in 1937 and was interrupted by the outbreak of the Second World War. 
                                                          
33
 Bessel R Germany after the First World War (1993) 192. At 193 Bessel mentions that state control 
in the housing market lasted longer in comparison to other forms of economic control, because 
political pressure and state control in the housing market could be imposed quite easily.  
34
 Bessel R Germany after the First World War (1993) 194. 
35
 Wendt PF Housing Policy – The Search for Solutions: A Comparison of the United Kingdom, 
Sweden, West Germany, and the United States since World War II (1962) 116. 
36
 Wendt PF Housing Policy – The Search for Solutions: A Comparison of the United Kingdom, 
Sweden, West Germany, and the United States since World War II (1962) 116. 
37
 Wendt PF Housing Policy – The Search for Solutions: A Comparison of the United Kingdom, 
Sweden, West Germany, and the United States since World War II (1962) 117-118. 
38
 The housing shortage increased as a result of the population growth: Wendt PF Housing Policy – 
The Search for Solutions: A Comparison of the United Kingdom, Sweden, West Germany, and the 
United States since World War II (1962) 119. 
39
 Wendt PF Housing Policy – The Search for Solutions: A Comparison of the United Kingdom, 
Sweden, West Germany, and the United States since World War II (1962) 119. 
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According to the plan, the entire rent policy was determined by a federal price 
controller (Reichskommissar für die Preisbildung), who controlled prices for goods, 
especially goods necessary for human living. All rents were frozen in order to keep 
rentals at a consistent low level.40 
During the Second World War 25 percent of residential property was 
destroyed by war action. Consequently, the housing shortage escalated to such an 
extent that by 1950 more than five million households were homeless. It was 
estimated that 425 000 residential units would have had to be built each year for 
fifteen years to eliminate this urgent housing shortage. Apart from that, a large 
number of existing dwellings were in a critical condition that necessitated an 
extensive slum-clearance programme.41 
 
7.2.2 State intervention combined with state assistance: Introduction of social 
housing (post-World War II)42 
 
The main housing effort that followed after the war was emergency repair work, 
because new construction was difficult due to a shortage of new materials.43 The 
new West German federal government came into power in 1949 and immediately 
had to address the housing crisis. The problem that existed in the rental housing 
market was to control rents at modest levels, while providing financing at low interest 
rates. This difficulty was solved by making available public funds to subsidize 
housing construction and providing income tax relief for private funds invested in 
housing.44  
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 Wendt PF Housing Policy – The Search for Solutions: A Comparison of the United Kingdom, 
Sweden, West Germany, and the United States since World War II (1962) 119. 
41
 Wendt PF Housing Policy – The Search for Solutions: A Comparison of the United Kingdom, 
Sweden, West Germany, and the United States since World War II (1962) 120. 
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 The following section is based on rental housing in West Germany. See fn 15 above for more detail 
on landlord-tenant law in East Germany. 
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 Wendt PF Housing Policy – The Search for Solutions: A Comparison of the United Kingdom, 
Sweden, West Germany, and the United States since World War II (1962) 121. 
44
 Wendt PF Housing Policy – The Search for Solutions: A Comparison of the United Kingdom, 
Sweden, West Germany, and the United States since World War II (1962) 123-124. 
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In 1950 the government created a social housing programme that was set out 
in the First Housing Act of 1950.45 The Act made provision for social housing that 
received subsidies and loans at low interest rates from public funds; increased 
housing construction that was assisted by tax exemptions; and private housing that 
received no government aid. The social housing project was aimed at providing 
housing for the majority of low-income households. The project was financed through 
subsidies and public loans, although it was subject to rent control and access control 
by placing a ceiling on tenants‟ income.46 The loans covered nearly fifty percent of 
the construction costs and were provided by the state to private investors and non-
profit associations at zero interest. The government controlled the allocation of 
housing, enforced a minimum standard of housing size and quality and made 
provision for tenant protection. However, these conditions were made compulsory for 
a limited period, because when the loan period terminated the dwelling ceased to 
form part of the social sector and became part of the private sector, unless the 
landlord was a municipally controlled association.47 
In the period 1950-1954 rents were considerably lower than building costs, 
because of a rise in buildings costs and an increase in the quality of housing. The 
government realised that rents were being kept at an uneconomic level and therefore 
enacted legislation that made provision for a ten percent increase in rents for all 
dwellings constructed prior to the currency reform. The rent of dwellings that had 
certain amenities and central heating were also increased between fifteen and 
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 Social housing in Germany is similar to “public housing” in the United States of America and 
“council housing” in England and Wales, as it is aimed at providing low-cost housing to poorer 
members of society: Kennedy D “West Germany” in Wynn M (ed) Housing in Europe (1984) 55-74 at 
56. Kleinman M Housing, Welfare and the State in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Britain, France 
and Germany (1996) 90 mentions that since 1945 the housing policy in Germany was committed to a 
social market economy, even though housing was not provided as a social service, but rather 
perceived as a social necessity that government was responsible for to the extent that housing 
standards had to be complied with and the needs of the poorest households had to be adhered to. At 
91 Kleinman also mentions that the term “social housing” in Germany describes “a method of 
financing housing together with a set of regulations and responsibilities about allocation of tenancies, 
rent levels and standards”. This resulted in less segregation between social and private housing. 
46
 Wendt PF Housing Policy – The Search for Solutions: A Comparison of the United Kingdom, 
Sweden, West Germany, and the United States since World War II (1962) 124. By 1956 1.8 million 
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social housing and access control. See also Kennedy D “West Germany” in Wynn M (ed) Housing in 
Europe (1984) 55-74 at 56. 
47
 Kleinman M Housing, Welfare and the State in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Britain, France 
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twenty percent.48 The result was that residential rents for the majority of income 
groups increased with 120 percent by 1958, although rents in state-assisted housing 
for low-income households remained fifteen percent below the average rents, which 
reflected the provision of public funds for social housing.49 The Second Housing Act 
1956 made provision for government-assisted interest subsidies to allow dwellings to 
be let at below-market rents, instead of direct government loans. The social rent for 
these dwellings was controlled, as was the income group that gained access to the 
dwellings.50 
Between 1950 and 1959 roughly 300 000 social housing units were built 
annually by private investors who received public grants. This number escalated to 
between 500 000 and 600 000 in the following years, as a result of the introduction 
of new incentives for private investors.51 One might assume that the dwellings were 
publicly owned, because of the amount of public funds that were being spent on 
social housing. However, the majority of social-housing dwellings were privately 
owned, because the “policy revolved around publicly subsidized loans to private 
investors who, in receiving these benefits, bind themselves to at least a 15 year 
social rent control”.52  
During the 1960s the role of the state in the provision of housing relaxed as a 
result of an increase in the supply of housing and increased employment. Rent 
control was partially phased out, while housing benefits were introduced in 1965. 
Supply subsidies were also extended to owner-occupation and social housing.53 
Nevertheless, state interference in the housing market resurfaced in the 1970s when 
the government‟s aim was to increase owner-occupation, improve housing benefit 
and expand social housing construction through a long-term programme.54 In the 
1980s the government introduced the “additional rent tax” that enabled states to 
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charge an additional amount on social tenants whose incomes exceeded the 
maximum income for social housing by at least twenty percent. These funds were 
used by local authorities to increase the construction of social housing.55 Conversely, 
between 1983 and 1989 the German housing policy changed towards deregulation, 
coupled with new emphasis on housing allowance, instead of housing subsidies. The 
new housing policy‟s goal was to relax rent controls, afford assistance to owner-
occupiers, reduce subsidies and cease the provision of tax exemptions for social 
housing. By 1986 federal subsidies for social rental housing was abolished.56 
 
7.2.3 Deregulation, a domestic housing shortage and amendments in social 
housing  
 
At the end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s the housing market experienced 
extreme pressure as a result of excess demand that led to housing shortages.57 The 
number of households increased, while individuals‟ real disposable income also 
increased. This resulted in a demand for improved and bigger living space per 
person in urban areas. As inner-city dwellings were renewed, redeveloped and 
converted into larger units, the supply of low-income housing decreased, even 
though a large number of poorer households, including students, young people and 
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smaller households required these dwellings.58 Therefore, the housing shortage 
developed as a result of domestic reasons.59 The government responded by 
encouraging private investment in the housing market through tax benefits. Federal 
subsidies were reintroduced for social housing, although this “third subsidy system” 
was less generous than previous federal subsidies.60 The housing policy in the 
1990s responded to the housing market by addressing the majority of housing 
needs, although “using state activity to support and supplement, not replace, the 
market.”61 
Social housing was made available by both private landlords and non-profit 
housing enterprises (gemeinnützige Wohnungsunternehmen), of which the majority 
received state subsidies throughout the 1990s. The subsidies were sponsored by the 
federal government, although the states and local authorities could supplement 
these funds with their own subsidies. The states also controlled the form of the 
subsidies. The subsidy was equal to an investor‟s cost minus a predetermined social 
rent.62 The rent for social housing was determined on a scheme-by-scheme basis, 
which led to different rents for social housing, depending on the time of construction. 
The rent for social housing and private housing is presently quite similar.63 The 
applicants for social housing, including owners and tenants, must have had an 
income below the determined income ceiling. Once vacancies arose, local 
authorities could allocate social tenants to non-profit social landlords whom they 
sponsored.64  
Kleinman notes that the income group who accessed social housing changed 
during the 1980s and 1990s from skilled workers to the poorest households. This 
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occurred as a result of the government‟s policy towards increasing owner-
occupation, which led to wealthier households exiting the social housing sector and 
becoming owner-occupiers. The relatively poor and fairly diverse households 
continued to rely on social housing.65 Furthermore, the private rented stock was 
continuously upgraded and renovated, which contributed to the poorest and most 
disadvantaged households having to occupy social housing that was controlled by 
local authorities.66 By the beginning of the 1990s the social housing sector consisted 
of four forms of rental housing, namely dwellings owned by private landlords, non-
profit housing owned by the local authorities, co-operatively owned social housing 
and the remaining non-profit dwellings owned by private landlords.67 
Social housing is currently to a large extent being phased out as a result of 
the government‟s financing system. In 2001, the government introduced a new 
approach to social housing and replaced the previous social housing legislation and 
programmes. The new laws provide support for private investors and municipal 
housing companies to accommodate households with access problems on the open 
market through affordable rental housing and owner-occupation. The federal 
government provides financial assistance to the states,68 while the states are 
responsible for their own housing policies and administration.69 Social housing has 
developed over time and currently one can identify three forms of social housing. 
The first form of social housing is where developers receive subsidies to construct 
the housing stock, although households prefer to purchase the stock rather than to 
rent it. Social housing that is federally regulated usually contains strict restrictions on 
rent increases and access control in relation to the tenant‟s income. Finally, social 
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housing could also be made available by a specific state, of which the state-owned 
dwellings are generally of better quality and with less strict rules.70    
Germany‟s private rented sector continues to represent a significant 
percentage of the housing market as a result of favourable tax benefits for private 
investors, aimed at increasing private rented housing.71 These investors are mostly 
commercial companies and wealthy private individuals. The rents for new tenancies 
are currently unregulated, although tenants enjoy substantive tenure security, as 
landlords can only evict tenants by relying on specified grounds. Even though rents 
are unregulated, landlords can only increase the rents by reference to rents of other 
leases in the vicinity during the preceding three years. An existing rent cannot be 
increased by more than thirty percent within three years.72 The private rental sector 
provides housing to a diverse group of households, including homeowners, and is 
still perceived as the most common form of tenure in Germany. Kleinman argues that 
this sector represents a social market economy, as it consists of reasonably strict 
state regulation, combined with enough space for entrepreneurial activity that 
provides for social needs. Kleinman argues that “[t]he price for consumers is 
moderated by a combination of state controls and competitive market pressures.”73  
The percentage of owner-occupation is relatively low in Germany when using 
a Western European standard, even though it has increased since the 1970s.74 The 
government‟s housing policies are aimed at increasing homeownership, although 
owner-occupation is not regarded as a right in Germany, but rather as a major 
responsibility that could only be pursued once one is firmly established in both the 
labour and housing markets.75 The social welfare policies and specifically the 
housing policies that developed during the twentieth century were accommodated in 
modern German private law. Currently, the statutory interventions in the rental 
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housing market that regulate the landlord-tenant relationship are to a large extent 
included in the Civil Code.76 
 
7.3 Private law 
7.3.1 Introduction 
 
Property law in Germany is known as Sachenrecht (“the law of things”),77 which is 
concerned with the rights that an individual can establish with regard to a corporeal 
thing, while the law of obligations (Schuldrecht) is concerned with the personal 
relationship between individuals.78  
Ownership is defined as the “all-embracing” right in rem,79 which is described 
in the German Civil Code (BGB)80 as the right to deal with the thing at the owner‟s 
discretion.81 Where the owner‟s property is in the possession of another person the 
owner is entitled to claim his property,82 except in the case where the possessor has 
a right to possession.83 The right of the possessor is usually either a contractual right 
or a limited right in rem.84 Limited rights in rem derive from property law and provide 
the holder with limited legal powers in relation to the thing. The right attaches to the 
thing and therefore, where the thing is transferred to a third person the holder would 
retain his right. This distinguishes rights in rem from contractual rights, such as 
leases.85 Sachenrecht includes a broad range of rights, including possession 
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(Besitz)86 and limited rights in rem.87 The right to use the thing and the right to 
defend possession against the landowner arise from either a right in rem or a 
contractual obligation. It is therefore necessary to distinguish between the factual 
possession of the possessor and her underlying right to possess the thing.88 The 
common law concept of a contract is defined in German law as a contractual 
relationship of obligation (vertragliches Schuldverhältnis).89 A contract therefore 
forms part of the law of obligations (Schuldrecht), which is regulated in BGB §§ 241-
853.90 Paragraph 535 of the BGB applies to both a contract of rent, which usually 
refers to the use of movable things in return for the payment of rent, and tenancy, 
which refers to the use of immovables for remuneration. 
The relationship between landlord and tenant with regard to immovable 
property is regulated in terms of the law of things (Sachenrecht), as the tenant 
becomes possessor once she acquires control over the property, as well as the law 
of obligations (Schuldrecht), as the parties enter into a contract. However, the 
distinction between rights in rem and contractual rights, as defined earlier, is unclear 
in the case of the legal rights arising from a tenancy that pertains to immovable 
property, because these rights “have the nature of a quasi right in rem.”91 Rights in 
rem, as previously mentioned, are enforceable against third parties and therefore 
attach to the thing, while contractual rights derive from contracts and are usually only 
enforceable against the other party. The rights of residential tenants originate from 
contract, but on the basis of certain provisions in the Civil Code these rights are 
enforceable against third parties.92 The provisions in the Civil Code that pertain to 
residential leases therefore override the general rules with regard to contractual 
rights. As mentioned earlier, contractual rights are generally only enforceable against 
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the other contracting party and cannot be enforced against third parties. The contract 
also usually regulates the relationship between the parties as well as the rights of the 
parties. The Civil Code overrides these contract-based rules in order to provide 
tenants with reasonable rents and substantive tenure protection. Rents are kept at 
reasonable levels by placing restrictions on rent increases and security of tenure is 
given effect to by prohibiting (or temporarily preventing) eviction.  
 
7.3.2 Provisions regulating lease 
7.3.2.1 General provisions 
 
The primary obligation of the lessor is to enable the lessee to use the leased 
property for the lease period, while the lessee is obliged to pay the agreed rent.93 
Where the lease period is indefinite, either the lessor or the lessee may give notice 
of termination to the other party in order to terminate the lease. A lease for a definite 
period generally terminates at the end of that period, unless the lease is extended or 
has already been legally terminated for cause.94 The lessor or the lessee may 
terminate the lease for cause without giving notice of termination to the other party, 
provided that there is a compelling reason.95 A compelling reason is deemed to exist 
if either party cannot reasonably be expected to continue with the lease until the 
lease expires or until the end of the notice period. A compelling reason also includes 
cases where the lessee is not permitted to use the leased property in accordance 
with the contract; where the lessee substantially violates the rights of the lessor by 
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endangering the property through acts of negligence; or where the lessee is in 
default on two consecutive dates of payment of rent or of a significant portion of 
rent.96 Upon termination of the lease, the lessee is obliged to restore the leased 
property to the lessor.97 The lessor is entitled to demand compensation equal to the 
agreed rent, or the rent customarily paid for similar items in the vicinity, for the 
duration of the period during which the lessee failed to return the property upon 
termination of the lease.98 If the lessee continues to use the property after 
termination of the lease, the lease is extended for an indefinite period, unless either 
one of the parties objects to such an extension within two weeks.99 
 
7.3.2.2 Provisions specific to rental housing 
 
The previous section applies to all leases, including residential leases to the extent 
not otherwise regulated by §§ 549 to 577a of the BGB. The provisions discussed 
below apply specifically to residential leases, although some of the provisions100 that 
regulate the rent and lessee protection do not apply to all residential leases; 
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excluded are residential space that is leased for a temporary period; residential 
space that is also inhabited by the landowner; residential space that is leased by a 
legal person or a welfare organisation to permit use by persons in urgent need of 
housing; and residential space in a student hostel or a hostel for young persons.101 
The Civil Code makes a clear distinction between general leases and 
residential leases, because the provisions that regulate residential leases include 
restrictions on rent increases and the termination of leases. However, the provisions 
in the Civil Code that restrict rent increases do not amount to rent control. The main 
obligation of the lessee is to pay the rent agreed upon at the commencement of the 
period of the lease,102 although the parties may agree to increase the rent during the 
period of the lease.103 The rent may be agreed upon in writing for varying amounts, 
applicable to specified periods in time, although the rent amount or the increase in 
rent must be indicated as a monetary amount. This form of rent increase is referred 
to as a stepped rent.104 The parties may also agree in writing that the rent must be 
determined through the price index for the cost of living of all private households in 
Germany, which is computed by the Federal Statistics Office. This is known as 
indexed rent.105  
Apart from the agreed rent increases, such as stepped rent or indexed rent, 
the lessor may demand approval for a rent increase “up to the reference rent 
customary in the locality”.106 The demand for a rent increase must be declared and 
justified to the lessee in a written format. In order to justify the rent increase, the 
lessor may specifically refer to a list of representative rents;107 information from a 
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rent database;108 an opinion by an expert; and examples of similar rent payments for 
comparable residential properties.109 Once the lessee approves the rent increase he 
becomes liable to pay the increased rent from the beginning of the third calendar 
month after receipt of the demand for an increase. If the lessee does not approve the 
demand for a rent increase, the lessor may sue for grant of approval.110  
Where the lessor carried out construction work that permanently increased 
the efficacy value of the leased premises, improved the general living conditions of 
the premises or changed certain conditions that led to savings in water or electricity, 
the lessor may increase the rent.111 Where the lessor demands a rent increase up to 
the reference rent in the locality112 or where the lessor carried out construction work 
that led to a rent increase,113 the lessee may terminate the lease for cause by 
serving a special notice on the lessor.114  
The rent of residential leases can therefore be increased during the term of 
the lease if the parties agreed on such an increase. If the parties did not agree on an 
increase the landlord can demand an increase, based on the mentioned 
circumstances. The lessee can agree or refuse such an increase, whereafter the 
landlord can sue grant of approval. Rent increases are therefore controlled to the 
extent that it must be proportionate to rents in the vicinity and therefore reflect 
market rent. 
The Civil Code provides protection for lessees and their families against 
termination of the lease in a number of cases, including where the lessor sells the 
property to a third party during the term of the lease; where the property is sold in 
execution or in case of liquidation or insolvency; upon the death of the lessee; when 
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 Carried out in terms of BGB § 559. 
114
 BGB § 561(1). Where the lessor aims to increase the rent in terms of BGB §§ 558 or 559, he is 
obliged to declare his intention to the lessee. The lessee may terminate the lease until the end of the 
second month after receipt of the lessor‟s intention. 
346 
 
the lessor cancels a lease for a indefinite period; and upon expiration of a lease for a 
definite period.115 
If the lessor alienates the leased property during the period of the lease, the 
new owner replaces the original lessor and takes over all the rights and obligations 
under the lease for as long as he remains the owner.116 Similar to most civil-law 
systems, German law therefore protects the lessee in the case where the property 
changes hands during the term of the lease. The lease automatically continues, 
provided that the lessee continues to pay the rent and to comply with the other terms 
of the lease.117 Where the leased property is sold in execution or in case of 
insolvency or liquidation, similar provisions in legislation protect lessees.118 However, 
where the property is sold in execution the purchaser may acquire a limited right to 
cancel the lease.119 
The death of the lessee120 does not necessarily end the lease either. If the 
lessee dies during the term of the lease, the lessee‟s spouse who maintained a joint 
household with the lessee succeeds to the lease.121 If the spouse does not succeed 
to the lease, the children of the lessee who lived in the joint household would 
succeed to the lease. If neither the spouse nor the children succeed to the lease, 
other family members who maintained a joint household with the lessee succeed to 
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 Van der Walt AJ Property in the Margins (2009) 86. 
116
 BGB § 566(1). See also BGB § 566(2) for the position where the new owner does not perform his 
duties. The Dutch position is regulated in article 7:226 of the BW. According to this article the lease 
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 Van der Walt AJ Property in the Margins (2009) 87. 
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 § 57 of the Sale in Execution Act and §§ 108 and 111of the Insolvency Act 2004. Van der Walt AJ 
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 The right to cancel the lease is granted by § 57a of the Sale in Execution Act, although this right is 
limited by BGB §§ 573 and 574. 
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Abas P Asser’s Handleiding tot de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht: Bijzondere 
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in het Huurrecht (5
th
 ed 2005) 173-176 for discussion on article 7:268. 
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 BGB § 563(1). The same applies to a civil partner. 
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the lease.122 The successor is not obliged to accept the lease and can end the lease 
by notifying the lessor within one month of obtaining knowledge of the lessee‟s 
death. In such a case the succession is deemed not to have occurred.123 The lessor 
may only refuse to accept the succession and end the lease for cause, within the 
statutory notice period, if there is a compelling reason related to the person of the 
successor.124 In the case of joint lessees, the lease continues upon death of one of 
the lessees, as the surviving lessees become the new lessees.125 The surviving 
lessees may terminate the lease for cause within the statutory notice period of one 
month after obtaining knowledge of the death of one of the lessees.126 
The above-mentioned persons who succeed to the lease, together with the 
lessee‟s heir, are liable as joint and several debtors for the lessee‟s obligations.127 
However, if the lessee made rent payments in advance then the persons who 
succeed to the lease in terms of BGB §§ 563-563a are obliged to surrender any 
savings they gained as a result of such payments to the lessee‟s heir.128 If the 
deceased lessee did not provide any security, the lessor may demand under BGB § 
551 that the lessee‟s successors give security.129  If the lease does not succeed to 
any of the above-mentioned persons, the lease continues with the lessee‟s heir. The 
lessor or the heir may terminate the lease for cause within the statutory notice period 
of one month after obtaining knowledge of the death of the lessee and of the fact that 
there has been no succession.130 
The Civil Code therefore makes provision for the continuation of the lease in 
the event of sale of the premises, insolvency of the landlord and death of the lessee. 
As a result of the mentioned provisions the lease is protected to such an extent that 
it continues for the agreed period despite the occurrence of these events that could 
possibly end the tenancy. The provisions in the Civil Code ensure that the lease 
continues for the remainder of the lease period, even if it requires substituting the 
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original lessee with his successor or heir.131 However, these provisions merely 
ensure that the agreed lease period is given effect to and does not provide tenants 
(or successors in title) with continued occupation rights upon termination of the 
lease.132  
With regard to termination of residential leases the Civil Code distinguishes 
between leases for indefinite periods of time (periodic leases) and leases for definite 
periods of time (fixed-term leases). In addition to the list of compelling reasons, as 
listed in § 543 of the BGB,133 the lessee of residential property, irrespective of 
whether the property is leased for a definite or for an indefinite period, would 
generally be able to terminate the lease where the property is in such a condition 
that it endangers her health. Either the lessor or the lessee would also be able to 
argue that there is a compelling reason to terminate the lease where the other party 
continuously disturbs the domestic peace.134 
The Civil Code protects lessees who rent residential property for an indefinite 
period by providing that the lease may only be cancelled in accordance with the Civil 
Code or subordinate legislation. The cancellation must also comply with the 
requirements in the legislation.135 A lease for an indefinite period of time may only be 
terminated by the lessor by giving notice136 if the lessor has a justified interest in 
terminating the lease.137 Such a justified interest exists where the lessee has 
culpably and significantly breached his contractual duties; where the lessor requires 
the leased premises for his own use, or the use of his family (or household) 
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 The South African common law provides similar protection for tenants to the extent that the lease 
is given effect to. See section 2.2. in Chapter 2 in this regard. 
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members; or where the lessor would be denied from making sufficient economic use 
of the premises if the lease was sustained, which would result in an excessive loss 
for the lessor.138 If the lessor terminates the lease for cause, a statutory notice period 
is prescribed.139 
If the lessor serves a notice of termination on the lessee, the lessee may 
object to the notice and require continuation of the lease if termination of the lease 
would cause a hardship to the lessee, a member of his family or a member of the 
household that is not justifiable, even when taking into account the justified 
interest140 of the lessor.141 Hardship suffered by the lessee includes where the 
lessee is unable to find suitable alternative accommodation on reasonable terms.142 
If the lessee‟s objection is successful the lease continues for an appropriate period, 
taking into account all relevant circumstances. The terms of the original contract 
would remain intact, except where the lessor cannot be reasonably expected to 
continue with the lease under the previous terms. In such a case the lessee may still 
demand continuation of the lease, although the terms may have to be amended.143 If 
the parties are unable to reach agreement with regard to the continuation of the 
lease, the duration or the terms of the continued lease are determined by judicial 
decision.144 Once it has been decided, either by the parties or judicially, that the 
lease should continue for a definite period of time, then the lessee may only demand 
an additional continuation if it is justified by a substantial change in circumstances.145 
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 BGB § 573(2). The lessor is required to state the reasons for a justified interest in the notice of 
termination: BGB § 573(3). The list is not exclusive. 
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 BGB § 573d. §§ 573-573a applies with certain modifications. The notice of termination must be 
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 BGB § 574c(1). 
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In the case where the court granted continuation of the lease for an indefinite period 
and the lessor subsequently terminates the lease, the lessee may object to the 
termination and demand continuation for an indefinite period.146 
The Civil Code therefore provides protection for lessees of residential 
property who lease premises for an indefinite period by requiring that the landlord 
serve a notice of termination stating the landlord‟s justified interest in cancelling the 
lease. The landlord must have a legitimate justified interest in termination in order to 
cancel the lease, which the lessee can resist by arguing that the landlord‟s justified 
interest in cancelling the lease is disproportionate to the hardship the lessee would 
suffer as a result of cancellation. 
When considering fixed-term tenancies the point of departure is that the 
lessor must state a valid reason for entering such a tenancy and the reason must be 
in accordance with the Civil Code. The lessor must prove that he would wish to end 
a lease after a fixed period with the aim to either acquire the dwelling for his own 
use, a member of his family or a member of his household; or to repair the dwelling 
and continuation of the lease would substantially obstruct this aim; or that he wants 
to lease the dwelling to a person rendering services to him. Only if the landlord can 
prove one of these grounds may a fixed-term lease be entered into; the lessor must 
notify the lessee in writing of the reason for the fixed term.147 Four months prior to 
termination of the fixed-term lease, the lessee may demand that the lessor should 
notify him whether the initial grounds for a fixed-term lease still exist. The lessee is 
not allowed to demand such a notification before this period. Once the lessor 
receives the demand, he has to respond and give reasons within one month. If the 
notification is late, the lessee may demand continuation of the lease for the period of 
the delay.148 If the initial reason for the fixed-term lease still exists, the lessee may 
demand an extension of the lease for an equal period of time. However, if the initial 
justification for a fixed-term lease no longer exists, the lessee may demand an 
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 BGB § 574c(2). 
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extension for an indefinite period.149 A lease for a fixed-term period may be 
terminated for cause within the statutory notice period.150  
The Civil Code therefore also protects lessees who rent residential property 
for a definite period by firstly requiring that the landlord provide a reason for entering 
into a fixed-term tenancy. At a later stage the landlord‟s reason for entering into a 
fixed-term tenancy is re-evaluated. The lease would therefore not necessarily 
terminate upon expiration of the fixed term. The lease can be extended according to 
the statutory requirements.151  
One can conclude that the Civil Code ensures substantive tenure rights for 
residential tenants in the private rental market by placing restrictions on the usual 
right of landowners to terminate leases. The right of the private landowner to cancel 
the lease is restricted to such an extent that the landlord must generally prove that 
he has a justifiable interest in cancelling the lease, whereafter the tenant can object 
to cancellation, based on the hardship that he would suffer as a result of 
cancellation. Apart from this general rule, the landowner can also cancel the lease in 
cases where the tenant breached the contract or acted in an inappropriate manner 
that constituted a compelling reason for cancellation. The point of departure is that 
the parties are assumed to enter into a lease for an indefinite period of time, because 
the landlord must give good reasons for entering into a lease for a definite period. 
The Civil Code makes provision for rent increases during the lease, which also 
supports this incentive of the Civil Code to initiate perpetual leases. Rent control is 
being phased out, especially when considering the codification of landlord-tenant 
law, although restrictions on rent increases and security of tenure are still imposed 
through the Civil Code. A lease is therefore not merely a contractual relationship 
between landlord and tenant; neither does it simply provide the tenant with a 
possessory right. Landlord-tenant law in Germany has developed as part of social 
law.  
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7.3.3 Conclusion 
 
Landlord-tenant law in Germany is currently regulated in the Civil Code, which 
affords tenure protection and restricts rent increases. The entire common law has 
been codified in the Civil Code. German landlord-tenant law is therefore different 
from England, Wales and the United States of America, as the common law is 
codified. It is different in the sense that regulation is not accomplished by way of ad 
hoc statutory intervention in the relationship between landlord and tenant. The 
provisions in the Civil Code that regulate the relationship and ensure substantive 
tenure protection for tenants is not perceived as temporary restrictions on the private 
law rights of landowners or exceptional to the “common law”, but rather as 
permanent determinations that are incidental to the private landlord-tenant 
relationship as tenure security is central to the tenant‟s interests.  
The landlord-tenant market in Germany is also different from England, Wales 
and the United States of America (or more specifically New York State),152 because 
it is not divided into different sectors. As mentioned at 7.2.3 above, the social rental 
market is basically phased out and the government does not provide state housing 
as a form of social housing for low-income households. Rental housing in Germany 
is made available by private landlords and the entire private rental market is subject 
to the residential housing provisions in the Civil Code. The tenant protection 
measures and the rent restrictions therefore apply to all households, irrespective of 
their income or specific needs. However, the fundamental nature of tenancies in 
Germany is that it is perpetual and that it provides homes to tenants. The most 
common tenancy is one for an indefinite period, because landlords must prove 
grounds for entering into a fixed-term tenancy. If the landlord wishes to end a lease 
for an indefinite period and states his justified interest in cancellation, the lessee can 
object to cancellation, based on the hardship that he might suffer as a result of 
termination. Section 574(1) of the BGB therefore makes provision for tenant 
protection based on the personal circumstances of the tenant. This provision 
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incorporates some measure of context-sensitivity as the courts can consider the 
impact of eviction on the specific tenant or his family and judge on grounds of 
personal circumstances whether the eviction order would be justified. 
The interests of tenants in the continued occupation of the leased property, as 
protected in the Civil Code, have been enforced by the Federal Constitutional Court 
by balancing them against landowners‟ constitutional property rights, as stated in 
article 14 of the Basic Law. In a number of cases the Federal Constitutional Court 
has found that the limitations placed upon the property interests of the landlord are 
constitutionally justifiable, provided that the interests of the landlord are duly 
recognised. Through this process the Federal Constitutional Court has developed a 
jurisprudence that clarifies how the interests of both landlord and tenant should be 
balanced “to give effect to the constitutional protection of property within a social 
obligations framework.”153 
 
7.4 Constitutional law 
7.4.1 Introduction 
 
The Grundgesetz (GG) for the Federal Republic of Germany 1949 is generally 
known as the Basic Law and it serves as a constitution. The bill of rights 
(Grundrechtskatalog) forms the first part of the Basic Law and the property clause in 
article 14 is included in the bill of rights.154 Article 14.1 states that “[p]roperty and the 
right of inheritance shall be [are] guaranteed. Their substance [content] and limits 
shall be [are] determined by law.”155 Article 14.2 states that “[p]roperty entails 
obligations [imposes duties]. Its use should serve the public interest.”156 Considered 
as a whole, article 14 is characterised by the liberal view of private property, which 
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 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 122. 
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entails that the right to property is justified by natural law and by the social function of 
private property, which means that the scope and limitations of property rights are 
determined by the social context.157  
Article 14.1 includes a property guarantee that is positively formulated,158 
although this guarantee is not absolute and has to be read with the qualifications in 
the rest of the clause. In terms of the case law the right to property, as defined in 
article 14, is a fundamental human right. The purpose of this right is to secure an 
“area of personal liberty” for the holder of the right within the “patrimonial sphere”.159 
This should enable the holder to take responsibility for the development of his life 
within the social (and legal) context.160 However, this fundamental property 
guarantee must be perceived within the constitutional sphere as a public right and 
not as a private right. Property as defined in article 14 is therefore a constitutional 
right, and must be distinguished from private-law property rights that are controlled 
by the German Civil Code (BGB).161 Even though the same term is used to define 
property in the German Civil Code and article 14 of the Basic Law, namely Eigentum, 
the Federal Constitutional Court has found162 that the scope and meaning of this 
term is not identical in the two areas of law. The Civil Code restricts property to 
tangible, corporeal things, while article 14 does not define property. The meaning 
and the scope of property in article 14 have to be determined from the constitutional 
property clause, while taking into account the purpose of the property guarantee in 
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light of the whole constitution, and not with reference to the Civil Code. The 
constitutional property concept is much wider than the civil-law concept.163 
Apart from the unambiguous and positive property guarantee in article 14.1.1, 
the rest of article 14, and especially article 14.1.2 that states that the content and 
limits of property must be determined by law, qualifies this right and makes provision 
for its restriction through statutory regulation. When read as a whole, section 14.1 
could be perceived as a mandate for the legislature164 to develop a property system 
that represents a fair balance between the social interest and the interests of the 
property holder.165 The purpose for limiting constitutional property rights is expanded 
and defined in article 14.2, as it states that property entails obligations and its use 
must serve the public interest. Article 14.2, read with article 14.1.2, confirms that 
constitutional property is limited, and more specifically subject to social limitations.166  
The legislature is required to ascertain and maintain a fair balance between 
the public interest and the interests of the property holder. When a regulatory 
measure is disproportionate to such an extent that it disturbs this balance, the 
regulation should be declared invalid. This usually occurs when the regulation 
disregards either the public interest or the property holder‟s interests.167 However, 
the nature of the property right in relation to the personal sphere of the holder of the 
right determines the extent to which the legislature can interfere with the right. Where 
the property right is directly concerned with providing security for the personal liberty 
of the property holder, the legislature‟s ability to interfere with that right is more 
rigorously restricted. Conversely, where the property right is less directly connected 
to the sphere within which the holder experiences personal liberty, the legislature 
can more easily regulate the restrictions on that right. The relationship between the 
nature of the right; the importance of the right in relation to the personal liberty of the 
holder; and the extent to which the legislature can interfere with the right, therefore 
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operates on a continuum to determine whether the interference was fair and 
proportionate.168 Certain properties are strictly regulated, because the social interest 
in regulating the property is greater than the interests of the individual owner in not 
regulating the property. Land, and more specifically housing, is subject to stricter 
social regulation, because it is a limited resource as well as socially important. The 
Federal Constitutional Court has confirmed in a number of decisions that the strict 
regulation of tenant protection and rent levels is constitutionally valid.169 
 
7.4.2 Case law 
 
In the 1974 Wohnraumkündigungsschutzgesetz case170 the Federal Constitutional 
Court had to consider a federal law171 that was introduced for a limited period of 
time, with the aim to provide tenant protection during a housing shortage. According 
to the law the landlord was prohibited from raising the rent and cancelling the lease, 
but the landlord could raise the rent to that of similar properties in the vicinity if the 
tenant gave permission. If the tenant refused to give permission, the landlord could 
seek permission in a responsible court. The landlord was required to submit a written 
request to the tenant, including information about rents in the vicinity.172 The two 
cases concerned the strict interpretation of this requirement. The court a quo found 
in favour of the tenants due to the fact that the requested information was insufficient 
to allow rent increases.173 The landowners claimed that their property rights have 
been violated through this process, that the act was unconstitutional and that it 
granted unlimited protection for tenants.174 
The Federal Constitutional Court had to review the decision of the court a quo 
in light of certain considerations. The Court considered the application of article 
14.1.2 of the Basic Law to the extent that the federal law restricted the landlord‟s 
right to raise the rent and cancel the lease, while determining the content and limits 
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of the claimants‟ property rights.175 Subsequently, the Court considered the limits of 
the legislature‟s power to establish the scope of property rights and found that the 
legislature‟s ability to determine the content of property rights is limited by its 
obligation to uphold the property guarantee, as stated in article 14.1.1 and its duty to 
create regulatory laws that abide by all other constitutional principles.176 In order to 
determine the content of property rights, the legislature is obliged to balance the 
constitutional recognition of private property as guaranteed in article 14.1.1 with its 
social duty in terms of article 14.2.177 Apart from the legislature‟s duty to consider the 
interests of both parties equally, the Court also acknowledged that the interests of 
the parties must be scrutinized within the context of laws that aim to protect tenants 
at that specific period in time.178 
Generally, a restriction on a landowner‟s right to raise the rent or cancel the 
lease is not invalid and in conflict with the above-mentioned considerations that the 
Court took into account. When considering the importance of the tenant‟s home and 
the housing shortage, the restrictions that were placed on the landowner seemed to 
be justified, provided that it did not amount to an unbalanced burden on the 
landowner.179 In light of the aforesaid considerations the Court found that the 
provisions of the law of 1971 protected the tenant‟s interest in the family home, while 
providing the landlord with an opportunity to raise the rent when necessary; and it 
therefore established a fair balance between the interests of the parties.180 
Nonetheless, the Court found that the court a quo‟s interpretation of the information 
requirement, which required that the landlord had to obtain detailed information 
which was not necessarily available, conflicted with the interests of the landlord, 
because it was interpreted too strictly and imposed an unwarranted burden on the 
landlord.181 The law of 1971 was found to be valid, although the strict interpretation 
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of the lower courts was in conflict with the constitutional property guarantee and 
consequently invalid.182  
In the 1975 Zweckentfremdung von Wohnraum case183 the Federal 
Constitutional Court had to consider whether a 1971 Act that strengthened tenants‟ 
rights in order to address housing shortages in the residential housing market was 
unconstitutional. In terms of the Act, the local authority promulgated certain bylaws 
with the effect that any change in the landowner‟s property first had to be approved 
by the local authority. The question was whether this bylaw was in conflict with article 
14 of the Basic Law.184 In both cases the owners changed the use of the property to 
such an extent that it could no longer provide housing. This was done without prior 
consent from the local authority.185 The Court found that the legislation was not in 
conflict with article 14, because article 14 mandates the legislature to determine the 
content and boundaries of property through enacting laws that give effect to the 
general social framework of the constitution. The legislature has to acknowledge and 
protect private property, while protecting the public interest. The state intervened in 
the rental housing market in order to make available private rental housing, 
especially in urban areas. This intervention was in the public interest, because a 
large percentage of the population was unable to acquire residential housing on the 
free market.186  
The Court found that the legislature was allowed to restrict the rights of 
landowners to unilaterally change the use of their property, because it was in the 
public interest, due to the urban housing shortage. However, throughout this process 
the landowner‟s rights should still be protected and therefore balanced with the 
strengthened tenure rights of the tenant. The Court found that in these 
circumstances the only protected interest guaranteed to the owner was the right to 
receive rent payments.187 
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In the Wohnungskündigungsgesetz case188 the question was whether the 
legislature was allowed in terms of article 14 to restrict the right of the landowner to 
cancel the lease to such an extent that the landowner had to become dependent on 
the property for her own use in order to cancel the lease, because this was the only 
justifiable interest that the landowner could rely on to cancel the lease. The landlord 
was the owner of an apartment with seven rooms that was leased to a family. The 
landlord wanted to cancel the lease and claim the property for her own use and the 
use of her son, but the tenants refused based on the fact that one of the members of 
the household was old and disabled. The court a quo turned down the application to 
cancel the lease, whereafter the case went on appeal. The appeals court also 
dismissed the application based on the fact that the apartment with seven rooms 
was too big for the landlord and her son. The court found that the landowner‟s 
interest in cancelling the lease was an excessive need in relation to that of the 
tenants and the landowner could therefore not require the tenants to give up the 
lease.189 The landowner appealed to the Federal Constitutional Court, but was once 
again turned down. This case was heard together with another case in which an 89 
year old landowner, who was the owner of a number of apartments, wanted to 
cancel the lease of an apartment on the ground floor, because she wanted to take 
occupation of the apartment herself. She argued that she wanted to occupy the 
ground floor apartment because she had difficulty in climbing the stairs to her current 
apartment and the ground floor apartment was big enough to accommodate her 
nurse as well.190 The second case succeeded, even though the two cases were 
decided on the same grounds.191 
The Federal Constitutional Court decided the two cases on the basis of § 564 
of the Civil Code,192 which provides that the lessor must have a justifiable interest in 
cancelling the lease. The Court considered the social responsibility of the legislator 
in protecting the private property rights of landowners, while protecting the public 
interest. This forms part of the overall responsibility of the legislator to create a social 
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framework in light of the constitution.193 The Court also drew attention to the nature 
of the property and its relation to the power of the legislature. The Court found that 
where the property is of such a nature that it serves an important social function, the 
legislature‟s ability to restrict the owner‟s property rights is strengthened. Where the 
property serves the public interest and other parties share an interest in the use of 
the property, the legislature‟s incentive to restrict the rights of the owner is increased. 
The rights of the property owner could therefore be strictly regulated, but the 
substance of the property may not be ruined. The duty of the legislature is therefore 
to identify the different interests, attach an appropriate weight to each of the interests 
and fairly balance them.194 The Court considered the tenants‟ interest in the home as 
a justifiable interest that could be balanced with property interests of the owner. The 
purpose of the Civil Code was to protect tenants from unreasonable cancellations, as 
tenants still had to function within an independent rental housing market.195 
The Court held that the aim of the Civil Code to protect tenure rights of 
residential tenants was constitutionally valid, as was the requirement that the 
landowner could cancel the lease if she had a personal interest in the cancellation. 
Restricting the landowner‟s right to cancel the lease was constitutionally legitimate, 
because residential property was socially important and relevant for tenants as well 
as for landlords.196 The Court also found that the prohibition against arbitrary 
cancellation is constitutionally valid, provided that the interests of the landowner that 
are worthy of protection should be considered by the legislature in order to fairly 
balance the interests of both parties.197 
The 1989 Eigenbedarfskündigung decision198 concerned a number of cases 
in which landowners sought cancellation of residential leases and their applications 
were denied. Provisions pertaining to rent control and tenant protection were 
included in the German Civil Code and it provided that a residential lease could be 
cancelled if the landlord required the property for his own use. The Federal Court of 
Justice in Civil Matters handed down a number of decisions and generally followed a 
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strict approach when adjudicating the tenant protection measures. It found that the 
landlord could only end the lease and require the premises for his own use, if there 
were reasonable grounds for reclaiming the property.199 The Federal Constitutional 
Court had to consider three claims on appeal. 
The first complainant owned a building with three apartments, while she lived 
with her parents in what was described as difficult circumstances. Two of the owner‟s 
apartments were rented out, the apartment on the ground floor to a family and the 
apartment on the first floor to a single woman. The apartment on the second floor 
was unoccupied, but its roof was only 2.2 meters high. The complainant wanted to 
cancel the lease of the apartment on the first floor in order to occupy the property 
herself. The trial court refused to allow cancellation of the lease on the ground that 
the complainant could either remain in her current home or could occupy the vacant 
apartment on the second floor. Cancellation of the lease was found to be 
unreasonable.200 
The second complainant was the owner of a building with twelve apartments, 
which were all subject to leases. The complainant‟s son lived with his mother, but the 
complainant wanted to cancel the lease of one of the apartments in order to 
establish a guest room for his son. The court denied the application on the grounds 
that the complainant had recently renovated and let a number of apartments that had 
become available in the building and that the son was already housed satisfactorily 
with his mother.201 
The third complainant was the owner of a building with four apartments. The 
complainant and her family, including her three sons, lived in the ground floor 
apartment while using the basement for additional living space, although it was only 
1.9 meters high and therefore unsuitable for living quarters. The complainant let the 
apartment on the first floor and one of the apartments on the second floor, while a 
small second apartment on the second floor was unoccupied. The complainant‟s 
three sons required more living space and she therefore wanted to cancel the lease 
of the apartment on the second floor in order to accommodate her sons. The court 
denied her application, based on the argument that the apartment on the ground 
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floor with the basement and the smaller vacant apartment on the second floor could 
adequately accommodate the complainant‟s three sons.202 
The three complainants argued that the strict application of the tenant 
protection measures infringed upon their property rights. The Federal Constitutional 
Court found that the first two complainants should have been allowed to cancel the 
leases, while the third complainant‟s action should have been denied on the basis 
that the landlord‟s current need to cancel the lease existed at the time when she had 
let the property. It would therefore be unreasonable to cancel the lease in such 
circumstances.203 The decision provides a number of important principles on rent 
control and tenant protection, especially in light of its effect on private property. As a 
result of the housing shortage, the regulation of rental housing had become socially 
important. Therefore, it had been accepted that rent control and measures protecting 
the tenure rights of tenants by restricting the right of landlords to cancel the lease, 
were constitutionally valid.204 This was based on the principle that the legislature 
could regulate and determine the content of property rights to such an extent that the 
regulation must be proportionate to the social utility of the property.205 However, 
housing remained an essential requirement for both parties and the Court noted that 
the landlord should be able to cancel the lease for her own needs. Cancellation of 
the lease is restricted in the case where the landlord is unable to give good reasons 
for the cancellation.206 The regulation of private property is limited in terms of article 
14.1.1 and both the courts and the legislature are obliged to respect this limitation. 
This requires the courts to respect the fundamental property guarantee, namely that 
the owner of private property must be able, through the protection of her property 
right, to responsibly develop and control her life according to her views.207 In light of 
the housing context, a landowner is entitled to use her residential property for her 
own living requirements. The fact that the landowner let the property does not mean 
that she has lost this fundamental right. Any interpretation of regulatory laws that 
ignores the views of the landowner is in conflict with the property guarantee.208 
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Based on the above-mentioned principles, the Court found that the courts are 
not allowed to institute unrestricted investigations into the landlord‟s reasons for 
cancelling the lease and reoccupying the property herself, as this would be 
unconstitutional.209 The courts must accept the landlord‟s reasons for reoccupying 
the property, because she should be able to take control of her own life and this 
includes making her own decisions. The role of the courts is to verify the alleged 
need of the landlord and the courts have a limited discretion to decide whether the 
landlord‟s needs are unreasonably high.210 In order to fairly balance the interests of 
both landlord and tenant, the tenant protection and rent control laws are placed 
within a more restricted framework, which is similar to restrictions that generally 
result from social considerations. 
In the Besitzrecht des Mieters case211 the respondent was the owner of a 
house and the complainant leased an apartment in the house. The respondent lived 
in an apartment in the same house, while her son lived in an apartment next to the 
house. The respondent, who was in poor health, needed to have her son nearby to 
assist her and therefore wanted to cancel the lease with the complainant in order for 
her son to live in the rented apartment.212 The tenant refused to vacate the 
apartment and the court a quo found in favour of the landlord. The court declared the 
cancellation permissible and granted the eviction order. In the Federal Constitutional 
Court, the tenant instituted a constitutional complaint and argued that the eviction 
order was unconstitutional, because it infringed his property right in terms of article 
14 of the Basic Law.213 
An important issue raised in the decision was whether the tenant had a 
separate property interest in the rental property and to what extent that interest was 
protected against the property interest of the landowner. More specifically, the Court 
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had to determine whether the tenant had a property right in the lease which was 
protected under article 14.214 The Court found that the tenant could not base his 
claim on article 14.2, because it does not provide the tenant with a substantive right, 
apart from the fact that it provides the legislature with a measure to determine the 
contents and limits of property. The Court confirmed that the property clause places 
an obligation on the legislature to promulgate laws that give effect to social 
obligations and promotes the public interest.215 Consequently, the Court did not find 
that the tenant acquired a right under article 14.2 that could be infringed upon.216  
Nevertheless, the Court found that the tenant had a constitutional property 
right that was protected under article 14.1.217 The Court considered the fundamental 
feature of property in terms of the property guarantee, as property enables the holder 
of the right to secure a sphere of freedom where she can take control and 
responsibility for her own life.218 The nature of the property in this case, being the 
family home, is important in light of this fundamental guarantee, as it can be defined 
as the core of human existence.219 The tenant‟s rights in terms of the lease, and the 
regulatory framework that affords substantive tenure protection for tenants, are 
similar to the rights that others obtain from tangible property to such an extent that 
the tenant has private use and the right of disposal. The right of disposal is restricted 
to a certain extent, although most real rights are similarly restricted. Rent control 
laws provide tenants with substantive tenure protection and security.220 The rights 
that tenants acquire under the legal framework can be enforced against all third 
parties, including the landowner. The tenant‟s rights could still be terminated upon 
expiration of the lease, although her rights are protected under article 14 as property 
rights, until cancellation of the lease.221 The Court therefore found that “the tenant‟s 
right fulfils the same purpose that all property serves for its owners”.222 The second 
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part of the Court‟s argument was that the tenant enjoyed the right of disposal, similar 
to that of the owner, and therefore qualified as an owner under article 14.223 The 
tenant‟s interest in continued possession was classified as private law property, 
because the tenant enjoyed the right of disposal.224 
Another important question in the case was how heavy the landlord‟s own 
needs should weigh in determining whether it would be justified to cancel the lease if 
the landlord wanted to occupy the premises. The Court found that the tenant and the 
landlord had a similar property right. In light of the constitutional property clause, the 
legislature is obliged to regulate the parties‟ positions and the relation between them 
in terms of the proportionality principle in order to establish a fair balance between 
their rights.225 In this regard the tenant‟s property protection derives from statutory 
measures, which is vertically rather than horizontally applied by the courts.226 Van 
der Walt states that the term Eigentum (property), which is used in the Civil Code 
and in article 14 of the Basic Law, has a wider meaning in constitutional law than in 
private law. In civil law the term refers to ownership of tangibles, while in 
constitutional law it refers to non-ownership interests and intangibles as well. In 
constitutional law Eigentum includes ownership and lesser rights. The tenant‟s 
interest in property could therefore be defined as property in the constitutional setting 
without necessarily being recognised as such in the civil law setting.227 
The Court found that the decision of the court a quo was correct. In terms of 
the existing tenant protection measures, the mere will of the landlord to cancel the 
lease for his own use could only justify cancellation if the landlord‟s purpose was 
reasonable and feasible.228 The Court confirmed the 1989 Eigenbedarfskündigung 
decision to the extent that the landlord‟s wishes must be respected by the courts; 
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although the landlord‟s bare declaration to use the property herself was insufficient to 
cancel the lease.229 The courts have some scope to launch an inquiry into the 
landlord‟s alleged reasons for cancelling the lease in order to determine whether the 
intention to use the property is reasonable and feasible. If the landlord‟s intention to 
use the property is reasonable, the owner‟s interest can trump the interests of the 
tenant, even when considering the public interest in protecting vulnerable occupiers 
in a social context where the provision of housing is a national priority and the fact 
that the tenant will suffer a hardship if eviction prevails.230 
In the 1993 Eigenbedarfskündigung case231 the Federal Constitutional Court 
had to consider two cases. The first case concerned the question whether a 
landowner of seventeen rented apartments could cancel the lease of five apartments 
with the aim to occupy the property himself. The landowner argued that he wanted to 
live closer to his work, because he was getting older and travelling to work, from 
where he then lived, was burdensome. His property that was subject to rental 
housing was closer to his work and he therefore wanted to cancel the lease and take 
possession of the apartments. The application was turned down by the court a 
quo.232 In the second case the landowner combined two adjacent properties and let 
the two premises as a single unit. The case concerned the question whether the 
landowner could at a later stage separate the single unit, while the lease continued, 
and take possession of the smaller section for personal use.233 
The Federal Constitutional Court decided that both complaints were invalid 
and failed to justify a legitimate reason for cancellation. The Court based its decision 
on a balancing test by weighing up the parties‟ respective interests in light of the 
social framework.234 With regard to the second case, the Court found that the 
landowner‟s right to cancel the lease where he required the premises for his own use 
does not include the right to divide the leased property and claim a section of the 
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property for personal use. If the landowner had a valid reason for cancelling the 
lease, then he would have required the whole of the premises.235 
In 1994 the Federal Constitutional Court236 had to consider whether a treaty 
that allowed the continued validation of rent control in East Germany after unification 
in 1991 was in conflict with article 14 of the Basic Law. The Act that made provision 
for rent control applied to the whole of East Germany and was therefore not only 
applicable to certain regions. The Court found that neither the treaty nor the Act was 
in conflict with article 14, because the social circumstances that initially justified the 
imposition of rent control in East Germany still existed.237 
 
7.4.3 Conclusion 
 
It is clear that article 14 of the Basic Law was crafted to protect property rights and to 
enable the legislature to enact legislation that would give effect to the public interest. 
The contents and limits of property must be developed by the legislature, while the 
use of property must serve the public interest. The rights of landowners must always 
be taken into account, but it is subject to social limitations. The nature of residential 
property is noteworthy when considering the power of the legislature, because it 
serves a social function and could therefore be regulated more strictly. Tenure 
security in residential property is important, because it enables tenants to reach a 
level of personal autonomy. The security of the home is central for the individual (or 
household) to make decisions and participate in society. Throughout the case law 
the fundamental feature of property is highlighted as enabling the holder of property 
to secure a sphere of freedom in which he can develop his own life. Within this 
framework the legislature must balance the constitutional rights of landowners with 
the property interests of tenants. However, the strengthened protection of residential 
tenants‟ tenure rights, as part of the public interest, has developed since the 
beginning of the twentieth century and has become socially protected to such an 
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extent that it has been recognised as constitutional property by the Federal 
Constitutional Court.  
The property rights of landowners, specifically owners of residential property 
that is subject to leases, and the rights of residential tenants are therefore shaped 
and determined according to various factors, but especially in relation to each other. 
The social importance in strengthening the rights of tenants has a detrimental effect 
on the restricted rights of landowners, but it is constitutionally valid as a result of the 
phraseology of article 14 and the social purpose of rental housing. Article 14 must be 
read as a whole, which means that the property rights of landowners are inherently 
subject to social limitations. The legislature must balance the interests of the 
property holder with the public interest and thereby determine both the contents of 
constitutional property, which is analogous to the rights of private landowners, and 
the rights of tenants.238 The rights of the parties are amended by the legislature in 
order to reflect the social context at that specific period in time,239 but the restrictions 
on landowners‟ rights must be justified and may not amount to an unbalanced 
burden on the landowner. The legislature can therefore regulate and determine the 
contents of property rights, provided that the regulations and restrictions are 
proportionate to the social utility of the property. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
 
Landlord-tenant law has developed in Germany from affording extreme tenant 
protection during the post-war period that resulted in housing shortages to providing 
moderate security of tenure combined with rent restrictions. Property, and more 
specifically private rental housing stock, serves the public interest as third parties 
have a share in that interest. The social purpose of property justifies increased 
statutory restrictions on the rights of private landowners. The legislature can 
therefore regulate and determine the contents of property rights, provided that it is 
proportionate to the social utility of the property. Apart from the extent of tenant 
protection and the development of state intervention in the rental housing market 
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through legislation, one can confirm that landlord-tenant law in Germany currently 
forms part of the social law, what Van der Walt would refer to as the “social 
obligations framework.”240 
In the United States of America the question whether state intervention in the 
rental housing market is constitutionally justifiable has been raised in the Supreme 
Court of Appeal and various other courts. The justifiability of rent regulation has been 
challenged on the basis that it amounts to an unconstitutional taking of private 
property. The US courts have held that rent regulation does not amount to an 
unjustifiable restriction on private landowners‟ rights, provided that it is in response to 
a housing emergency or in the public interest.241 In Germany the point of departure is 
that property serves the public interest and that the legislature must regulate and 
determine the contents of property rights. The justifiability of rent regulation in 
Germany is not a contested issue in the courts, as it has been accepted as part of 
German private law and codified in the Civil Code. Article 14 of the Basic Law is also 
phrased to allow, and oblige, the legislature to restrict private property in order to 
give effect to social obligations. In German law property must serve the public 
interest and rent regulations form part of the public interest.  However, the question 
in German law is whether the application of tenant protection measures and the 
courts‟ interpretation of the provisions are not excessive in light of the constitutionally 
guaranteed rights of landowners. The extent of protection must therefore be just in 
terms of the German Basic Law and the socio-economic circumstances. It has also 
been accepted that stricter regulation is justified with regard to property that is further 
removed from the owner‟s personal sphere.242 As a result, protection in favour of 
tenants that resembles interests closer to the personal sphere is more easily 
justified.  
Presently, residential tenant protection measures are codified in the Civil 
Code and therefore form part of private law. From the case law discussion one can 
conclude that the legislature must balance the interests of landowners and tenants in 
order to determine the content and limits of constitutional property. The tension 
between the tenant protection measures in the Civil Code and the protection of 
private property in article 14 provides a unique definition for the property rights of 
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landowners who subject their residential property to leases. The extent to which 
residential housing is regulated is also sensitive to the socio-economic 
circumstances, as the regulations are more strictly applied in the event of housing 
shortages. Rent regulations and the restrictions imposed on private landowners are 
therefore context-sensitive to the changing socio-economic circumstances, because 
the entire landlord-tenant system in flexible. The landlord-tenant framework is not 
diversified as the systems in the United States, England and Wales to provide 
different levels of tenure security to diverse occupiers with different needs, although 
the hardship provision243 in the German Civil Code makes provision for tenants to 
acquire continued occupation rights based on personal circumstances.  
The nature of the property justifies stringent regulation, because it serves a 
social function. The social function of residential property is highlighted in the case 
law when considering the fundamental feature of property, which is to enable 
individuals to take responsibility for their own lives and function within a secure 
sphere where they can obtain personal autonomy. This fundamental feature of 
property in German law is comparable to section 10 of the South African 
Constitution, which states that “[e]veryone has inherent dignity and the right to have 
their dignity respected and protected.” It is important to highlight that in German law 
the core function of property is to enable individuals to participate in society. The 
question in the South African context, and in light of section 26(1) of the 
Constitution,244 is to what extent the home (as property) should be protected in order 
to enable individuals to participate in society where they can foster human dignity. 
When considering the historical development of German landlord-tenant law, 
the enforcement of tenant protection measures in the Civil Code and the line of case 
law from the Federal Constitutional Court, one can conclude that substantive tenure 
security for residential tenants has been entrenched on a permanent basis as part of 
the essence of property in light of its moral and social function. The result of rent 
regulation, and specifically increased tenant protection, is more stringent restrictions 
on the rights of private landowners. These restrictions are generally justified, 
although the legislature must develop a fair balance between the interests of 
landowners and tenants in order to prevent an unbalanced burden on the landlord. In 
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the cases where the courts found that the restriction was unjustified the landowner‟s 
personal autonomy was too seriously interfered with, considering the reciprocal 
benefit for the tenant and for society. The restrictions imposed on the rights of 
landowners must be proportionate to the social utility of the property. Housing is an 
important necessity for private landowners and tenants, as it enables both parties to 
develop and control their lives. The fundamental feature of property (the rented 
premises) that enables a person to secure an area of personal liberty within the 
patrimonial sphere where he can take decisions and participate in society therefore 
applies to both landlord and tenant. In order to determine whether rent regulations 
restrict the rights of landowners unjustifiably, the courts measure the impact of the 
restriction by considering the extent of the interference on the personal autonomy of 
the landowner, although the justification for rent regulation is to allow the tenant to 
achieve personal autonomy. The measure used to balance the rights of the parties is 
therefore the same. In American law the justification for rent regulation is different as 
the protection of vulnerable poor households is in the public interest and the 
restriction of landowners‟ rights is justifiable, provided that it is in the public interest. 
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8.1 Constitutional failure of landlord-tenant laws 
8.1.1 The current tenure rights of urban tenants 
8.1.1.1 Background 
 
The First and Second World War influenced socio-economic circumstances, and 
specifically the housing market, in South Africa to the extent that the white minority 
experienced a housing shortage during and after the war period. The initial housing 
shortage did not directly affect the black245 majority, because the apartheid laws 
excluded these households from participating in the „normal‟ urban housing market. 
The occupation rights of black persons were regulated in terms of a different 
statutory regime, namely the racially discriminatory apartheid laws. A major feature 
of this regime was that these black occupiers of urban residential property were 
subjected to very insecure tenure. The legislature responded to the initial housing 
shortage experienced by the white minority group by enacting (and continually 
amending) the Rents Acts, which afforded white urban residential tenants better 
tenure security. The Rents Acts restricted private landlords‟ common law grounds for 
terminating the tenancy, in some cases forcing landlords to adhere to the lease even 
when the contract had already expired, while placing restrictions on rent 
increases.246 The initial rent control measures therefore provided white tenants with 
substantive tenure security and placed restrictions on rent increases. The laws did 
not promote access to rental housing in the private market. The essence of 
substantive tenure security is generally to allow the tenant (or any occupier) to 
continue occupying the leased premises as a lawful occupier, while procedural 
protection is aimed at providing tenants with due process during eviction 
proceedings.247 The racially discriminatory laws did not afford black occupiers any 
substantive tenure protection, because their rights were limited to insecure forms of 
tenure, generally consisting of personal rights. 
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The Rents Acts did not apply to black tenants because the occupation rights 
of these households were strictly regulated under the racially discriminatory 
apartheid statutes. The majority of apartheid statutes made provision for public 
sector tenancies. The occupation rights of black tenants were weak and insecure, 
because it was part of government policy to control the occupation rights of these 
households in order to regulate urbanisation and to entrench racial segregation, 
especially in urban areas. A significant number of urban black households were 
tenants renting accommodation in the public sector, although regulated in terms of 
the apartheid laws that provided weak tenure.248  
 
8.1.1.2 The common law 
 
The government started to phase out the Rents Acts at the beginning of the 1980s 
and the private rental market was completely deregulated in 2003,249 while the most 
important apartheid legislation was abolished during the 1980s.250 When the Rents 
Acts were abolished, the common law position with regard to the termination of 
urban tenancies resurfaced. Currently the common law position applies to all urban 
tenants, irrespective of race.251 In terms of the common law the landlord can evict 
the tenant upon termination of the lease, provided he obtained an eviction order. The 
lease therefore terminates according to the common law principles, which entails 
that the lease should terminate in terms of the contract. The common law is aimed at 
giving effect to the lease to the extent that it is agreed to between the original parties 
and does therefore not grant substantive tenure protection in the form of continued 
occupation rights for tenants.252 The personal circumstances of the tenant and the 
effect that eviction will have on her and her family play no role in the granting of the 
eviction order, since the common law does not grant the courts any discretion in 
deciding whether to allow eviction once the landowner has proved the formal 
requirements for an eviction order. The occupation rights of tenants are limited to the 
agreed lease and the common law is aimed at giving effect to this agreement. 
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The common law affords substantive tenure security in just three cases, 
namely the huur gaat voor koop principle, upon death of either party or where the 
landlord becomes insolvent. In all these cases the common law ensures continuation 
of the lease in order to give effect to the contractual agreement, even if this requires 
substituting one of the parties. In terms of the huur gaat voor koop rule the lease 
continues upon sale of the premises, because the new owner replaces the original 
owner as the new landlord. Where the landlord dies during the term of the lease the 
common law provides tenure security for tenants (and tenants‟ families) as the lease 
vests in the estate of the deceased landlord. Insolvency of the landlord can generally 
not bring the lease to an end either, but where a prior real right, such as a mortgage, 
vested in the property the amount of the bid could affect the occupation rights of 
tenants.253  
To the extent that the common law does not provide strong substantive 
protection to lessees, it is associated with weak tenure.254 Strengthened substantive 
tenure security is associated with measures that would allow tenants to continue 
occupying rental property for consecutive periods. This form of tenure protection is 
generally enacted in landlord-tenant legislation and is aimed at affording tenants with 
strong occupation rights. Substantive tenure rights can also be granted by the courts 
during eviction proceedings in light of the tenant‟s socio-economic circumstances, 
although this form of protection is based on the court‟s interpretation of anti-eviction 
legislation that give effect to section 26(3) of the Constitution. The courts are unable 
to afford substantive tenure protection for tenants in terms of the common law. 
Procedural safeguards are different from substantive tenure protection, because 
procedural safeguards are aimed at providing due process for tenants during eviction 
proceedings in order to ensure fair and just evictions. Procedural safeguards 
mandate the courts to fulfil certain requirements as part of the eviction proceedings, 
while substantive tenure rights can prevent the courts from granting the eviction 
order.  
The common law does not grant substantive tenure rights for tenants. The 
substantive tenure rights of urban tenants are based on the common law, which 
provides them with weak tenure security. In terms of the common law the landowner 
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is entitled to unilaterally terminate a periodic tenancy at any period for any reason 
and the effect is that the tenant would have to vacate the leased premises within 
months. A fixed-term tenancy also terminates upon expiration of the lease, 
whereafter the landowner can claim eviction in court. The common law is therefore 
associated with weak tenure rights, which is problematic considering the 
transformative purpose of the 1996 Constitution, especially with regard to the new 
values introduced in land law. The most important land reform provisions that relate 
to the tenure rights of urban tenants are discussed later in this chapter in order to 
explain the insufficiency of the common law tenure rights of these tenants.  
 
8.1.1.3 Landlord-tenant laws 
 
The Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 and the Social Housing Act 16 of 2008 regulate 
rental housing in urban areas, but they fail to afford secure occupation rights for all 
urban residential tenants, because they merely uphold the common law, which is 
associated with weak substantive tenure security.255 The Rental Housing Act and the 
Social Housing Act are the only laws that regulate the relationship between landlord 
and tenant in the urban rental housing market prior to eviction proceedings. The laws 
entrench common law tenure rights for urban tenants, which is problematic in light of 
the land reform provisions of the Constitution. The Prevention of Illegal Eviction from 
and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE) is also relevant in the 
landlord-tenant framework, as it ensures that all evictions take place in a fair and just 
manner. PIE is therefore aimed at ensuring due process during eviction proceedings, 
although recently the courts have refused to grant eviction orders, on the basis of 
PIE, if the order would render the household homeless, which is a form of 
substantive tenure protection.256 The insufficiency of the current landlord-tenant 
laws, more specifically the Rental Housing Act and the Social Housing Act, is 
explained in the following sections. 
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8.1.2 The Constitution: Substantive tenure protection and procedural safeguards 
 
The current tenure rights of urban residential tenants are problematic in light of 
sections 25(6) (read with section 25(9)) and 26(3) of the Constitution. 
Section 25(6) of the Constitution mandates tenure reform as it states that any 
person whose tenure is legally insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory 
laws is entitled to tenure that is legally secure. Section 25(9) states that parliament 
must enact legislation in order to give effect to the constitutional commitment in 
section 25(6). Section 25(6) is not aimed at promoting access to housing, but rather 
concerns the tenure rights of previously disadvantaged occupiers. The aim of section 
25(6) is to provide substantive tenure rights for black occupiers, which is a race-
related form of protection. All black urban occupiers, including tenants, are therefore 
entitled to secure occupation rights. The majority of urban black persons were public 
sector tenants during the apartheid era and occupied public rental housing with 
insecure tenure. The legislature has failed to introduce substantive tenure security 
for these black urban tenants in terms of section 25(6) of the Constitution. Urban 
black tenants therefore continue to occupy property with insecure tenure, despite the 
fact that they are entitled to legally secure tenure in terms of section 25(6) of the 
Constitution.257  
Urban black tenants occupy residential property in terms of the common law, 
which is associated with weak tenure rights, because it does not provide substantive 
tenure security. The landlord-tenant laws, including the Rental Housing Act and the 
Social Housing Act, merely entrench common law tenure security, which is 
problematic in light of section 25(6) if the tenant is part of the previously 
disadvantaged group. There is therefore a gap in the legislative scheme, because 
the insecure tenure rights of black urban residential tenants have not been 
addressed sufficiently in legislation. These households are therefore still entitled to 
redress in terms of section 25(6).258 The government has therefore so far failed to 
transform the current landlord-tenant regime in line with the constitutional mandate in 
section 25(6), because urban black tenants continue to occupy residential property 
with insecure tenure. 
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The current tenure reform process consists of two strategies, namely the 
transformation of weak tenure forms by implementing individual structural reforms 
(section 25(6)); and general anti-eviction provisions that prevent forced removals 
(section 26(3)).259 Section 25(6) is aimed at strengthening the occupation rights of 
black persons, which is a race-related form of tenure protection, while section 26(3) 
is aimed at providing a more general form of tenure protection. As was indicated 
above, urban residential tenants have not so far benefited from statutory tenure 
reform in terms of section 25(6). 
Section 26(3) of the Constitution ensures procedural safeguards for all 
persons facing eviction as it states that no person may be evicted from his home 
without an order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. 
Section 26(3) ensures that all persons, including the previously disadvantaged who 
are entitled to secure tenure in terms of section 25(6) and all other occupiers, 
irrespective of their race or socio-economic background, are afforded procedural 
safeguards when facing eviction. Section 26(3) is not concerned with access to 
housing, nor does it transform existing tenure into something more secure; it merely 
ensures that all evictions take place in a certain fashion, which could be described as 
a context-sensitive approach that the courts should follow. However, the courts can 
interpret section 26(3) to authorise a change in the common law to the extent that 
the courts should be allowed to refuse eviction orders on the basis of the tenant‟s 
personal circumstances. Such a discretion is currently not available at common law 
as a result of the Supreme Court of Appeal‟s narrow interpretation of section 26(3) in 
Brisley v Drotsky.260 From the case law261 it appears that the courts are unwilling to 
give substantive tenure protection in terms of PIE, which was promulgated to give 
effect to section 26(3), unless the socio-economic circumstances of the occupier are 
weak and therefore justifies substantive tenure protection. The socio-economic 
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weakness of the household facing eviction has motivated the courts to refuse 
eviction orders despite private landowners‟ right to an eviction order. In terms of 
section 26(3) the courts must consider all the relevant circumstances before granting 
an eviction order and the socio-economic circumstances of marginalised households 
have been found to justify an indirect kind of substantive tenure protection, without 
formally changing the tenure status. Section 26(3) is generally aimed at ensuring due 
process during eviction proceedings, which entails that the courts must fulfil certain 
requirements before granting the eviction order, but section 26(3) can also be 
interpreted by the courts to provide substantive tenure protection for occupiers in 
need thereof.  
In comparison to section 25(6), which mandates the legislature to grant legally 
secure occupation rights for black persons, which is a race-based form of tenure 
protection, section 26(3) is aimed at providing a more general form of tenure 
protection by means of a context-sensitive approach. The courts have recently relied 
on the weak socio-economic circumstances of the household to justify some form of 
indirect tenure protection and one can therefore assume that the courts will interpret 
the anti-eviction measures in section 26(3) so as to accommodate vulnerable 
occupiers. The anti-eviction measures in terms of section 26(3) differ from the tenure 
reform measures in section 25(6) in the sense that the former are class-related, 
while the latter are race-related. 
In terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution the courts must promote the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights when interpreting legislation. The courts 
therefore have the power to read the aim of section 26(3) into the landlord-tenant 
laws.  
The courts must interpret the landlord-tenant laws, including the Rental 
Housing Act and the Social Housing Act, in light of the transformative purpose of the 
Constitution to give effect to section 26(3) and provide tenants with strengthened 
tenure rights. Section 26(3) is apparently aimed at merely ensuring procedural anti-
eviction protection, although it can also have an indirect effect in strengthening 
tenure security, albeit on a class-related basis. The courts have a discretion to give 
effect to this broader tenure reform purpose of section 26(3). The initial focus of the 
urban landlord-tenant disputes has been on ensuring due process in the event of 
eviction proceedings instead of transforming the substantive rights of weak 
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tenants.262 The Constitution mandates the transformation of tenure rights as part of 
the land reform process, although it is clear that the interpretation of the courts and 
the extent to which the landlord-tenant laws initially provided tenant protection was 
not in line with section 26(3) and therefore problematic.263  
Recently the courts have started to refuse to grant eviction orders if the order 
would render the household homeless,264 relying on the Prevention of Illegal Eviction 
form Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE) as the basis for their 
decisions.265 PIE is aimed at ensuring fair evictions and does give effect to the 
procedural safeguards enshrined in section 26(3) of the Constitution. However, PIE 
was not promulgated with the aim to provide substantive tenure rights for tenants. 
The courts are currently interpreting PIE in order to protect vulnerable unlawful 
tenants who are facing eviction that might result in the household becoming 
homeless. This development should be supported because it tends towards 
substantive tenure protection, as opposed to merely procedural protection for 
vulnerable tenants. This interpretation of PIE is currently giving effect to the potential 
of section 26(3) as a mechanism that provides substantive tenure protection for 
marginalised occupiers, which is intrinsically class related tenure protection.  
 
8.1.3 The Constitution: Access to rental housing and tenure security 
 
Sections 25(6) and 26(3) are concerned with the occupation rights and eviction of 
occupiers and are not aimed at providing increased access to housing. 
Sections 26(1) and 26(2) of the Constitution ensures a right to housing as it 
states that everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing and that the 
state must take measures to achieve the realisation of this right. The government is 
constitutionally obliged to introduce measures that would give effect to the right to 
have access to adequate housing. This constitutional mandate is twofold, because it 
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concerns individuals‟ right to access housing and it ensures that the housing must be 
of a certain standard, namely adequate. The right to access housing should not be 
interpreted to be analogous to homeownership. Housing includes a broad range of 
tenure forms, including rental housing, and homeownership is only one of the forms 
of housing that could be made available by the state. In order to adhere to the 
constitutional obligation in sections 26(1) and 26(2) the government apparently 
decided to grant homeownership to all homeless persons in South Africa. By 
December 2008 the government had built 2.8 million houses, but the housing 
backlog nevertheless continues to grow.266 The state has not been successful in 
delivering housing to the urban poor and research has shown that ownership is not 
necessarily the form of tenure occupiers prefer. The primary focus of providing all 
homeless persons with ownership does not necessarily suit the needs of the urban 
poor.267 There is a preference amongst at least some of the urban poor to rent 
accommodation instead of acquiring ownership, because by renting accommodation 
individuals do not have to take on all the responsibilities of ownership. The 
government‟s involvement in the provision of housing has been ineffective partly 
because once a household acquires homeownership the government‟s role is 
satisfied. This is problematic as the government cannot ensure long-lasting tenure 
security for the new owners, because the new owners can dispose of their property 
at will or can lose the house because of circumstances beyond their control. 
Marginalised occupiers who hold land under private tenure could easily be surprised 
by hidden costs, which could lead to distress sales.268 
The government is currently placing more emphasis on rental housing as a 
form of tenure that could provide wider access to adequate housing and so fulfil the 
constitutional obligation in sections 26(1) and 26(2). The first question is whether the 
current landlord-tenant laws sufficiently promote access to rental housing. The Social 
Housing Act aims to give effect to the right of access to housing, because it states 
that government must fund the social housing programme to promote the supply of 
housing. The Rental Housing Act does not promote an increase in rental housing 
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that would contribute to the alleviation of housing shortages. The current landlord-
tenant regime therefore does not promote access to rental housing sufficiently. 
The second question is how rental housing would equate “adequate housing” 
as defined in section 26(1). As mentioned previously, individuals are entitled to 
access housing, but the housing must be adequate. The Constitution does not define 
“adequate housing”, nor have the courts construed a fixed meaning for this term. 
According to General Comment 4 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),269 security of tenure is a key component of the right to 
adequate housing. The current rental housing legislation, including the Rental 
Housing Act and the Social Housing Act, entrenches common law tenure security, 
which merely gives effect to the contractual agreement between the parties and does 
therefore not provide tenants with substantive tenure rights that override the 
landowner- and contractual freedom-orientation of the common law. The rental 
housing laws do not give effect to the constitutional obligation as stated in section 
26(2), because the laws fail to provide tenants with security of tenure and therefore 
fail to provide adequate housing. One can confirm that the current landlord-tenant 
regime is not in line with the transformative purpose of the Constitution. 
The rental housing laws are insufficient in light of sections 26(1) and 26(2) on 
both grounds, because they do not promote access to rental housing and, even to 
the extent that they do make available housing, the current tenure rights of urban 
tenants are insecure and therefore inadequate.270 The legislature has not sufficiently 
considered rental housing as a form of tenure that could assist the alleviation of 
housing shortages and give effect to the right to have access to adequate housing. 
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8.1.4 Concluding remarks 
 
The current urban landlord-tenant laws, including the Rental Housing Act and the 
Social Housing Act, fail to provide substantive tenure rights for urban tenants, 
because these laws entrench common law tenure security, which is associated with 
weak tenure rights. These laws therefore also fail to comply with the constitutional 
obligation in section 25(6), because black urban tenants continue to occupy 
residential property with insecure tenure. The Rental Housing Act and the Social 
Housing Act have not transformed urban rental tenure in line with section 26(3) of 
the Constitution in order to grant substantive tenure rights for vulnerable occupiers. 
The race related transformation of black urban tenants‟ occupation rights in terms of 
section 25(6) has not yet occurred in the current landlord-tenant regime. However, 
the indirect class related transformation of weak urban tenants‟ occupation rights in 
terms of PIE, which gives effect to section 26(3), have surfaced in recent case law, 
although the extent of this transformation is still limited and uncertain. 
There is a general need to strengthen the tenure rights of urban tenants, but 
the required extent of tenant protection is not the same for all occupiers. Section 
25(6) (and section 25(9)) of the Constitution mandates the legislature to enact 
legislation that would afford secure occupation rights for persons whose tenure is 
legally insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws. Urban black tenants 
are therefore entitled to strengthened occupation rights and the Constitution 
mandates the legislature to enact laws that would provide these households with 
substantive tenure security. The courts can provide indirect substantive tenure 
protection for all tenants, irrespective of their race, in terms of section 26(3) if the 
socio-economic circumstances of the tenant justify more stringent protection, but this 
protection is limited and does not formally transform the nature of urban rental 
tenure. If marginalised households could occupy rental housing with sufficient tenure 
security, the right to have access to adequate housing (section 26(1)) would be given 
effect to. The meaning of adequate housing should generally depend on the specific 
context and therefore be in line with the needs of the occupier. The extent of tenure 
security should correspond with the tenant‟s needs in order to be adequate rental 
housing.   
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Urban residential tenants are therefore constitutionally entitled to different 
levels of tenure security, because black tenants who were previously denied secure 
tenure are entitled to substantive tenure security (race related substantive tenure 
security in terms of section 25(6)), while all marginalised tenants are constitutionally 
entitled to strengthened substantive protection if it is justifiable in light of their socio-
economic circumstances (class related substantive tenure security in terms of 
section 26(3)). In order to give effect to section 26(1) in the landlord-tenant 
framework, the level of tenure security afforded to urban tenants should also be 
context-sensitive. The diversity of urban residential tenants in South Africa justifies 
different levels of tenure security, because these tenants‟ tenure needs are diverse 
and their constitutional rights are different.  
To give effect to the transformative goal of the Constitution and comply with 
the constitutional mandate as stated in sections 25(6), 26(1) and 26(3) it is essential 
to formulate new strengthened tenure rights for urban residential tenants, while 
promoting access to rental housing. If the tenure rights of urban residential tenants 
could be strengthened to such an extent that the occupiers are enabled to continue 
living in the premises for consecutive periods, the right to have access to adequate 
housing would be given effect to. The potential role of landlord-tenant law should be 
analysed in terms of sections 25(6), 26(3) and 26(1) as a form of tenure that could 
simultaneously give effect to the constitutional obligations of tenure reform and 
access to housing.  
A number of conclusions and summarising results from earlier detailed 
chapters that consider foreign landlord-tenant regimes and the previous South 
African rent control laws are analysed in the following section with the aim to identify 
statutory mechanisms that promoted rental housing delivery while providing 
substantive tenure security for diverse tenants during different economic, political 
and social periods in time. The pre-1994 rent control laws of South Africa form part 
of the comparative analysis, because they imposed statutory measures that provided 
tenure security similar to some of the foreign landlord-tenant legislative measures. 
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8.2 Comparative analysis 
8.2.1 The common law and the initial justification for rent control 
 
As a result of the First and Second World War the white minority of South Africa 
experienced a housing shortage during and after the war period. The Rents Acts 
were enacted and amended throughout the twentieth century with the aim to protect 
these tenants against exploitation by private landlords. In order to provide tenants 
with secure occupation rights the landlord-tenant statutes drastically interfered with 
the common law rights of landowners by providing continued occupation rights for 
tenants upon termination of the lease.271 The Rents Acts restricted private landlords‟ 
common law grounds for terminating the tenancy, in some cases forcing landlords to 
adhere to the lease even when the contract had already expired, while placing 
restrictions on rent increases.272 The initial rent control measures provided white 
tenants with substantive tenure security and placed restrictions on rent increases. 
The laws did not promote access to rental housing in the private market but focused 
on the protection of tenants who already had access to rental housing. The impact of 
the Rents Acts on the common law rights of landowners was regarded as justified, 
because it was in the public interest to protect tenants against the potential 
exploitation by private landlords. Because of racially discriminatory policies and 
legislation the fact that this protection was limited to the white minority was not seen 
as a fact that detracted from the justification for the Rents Acts. 
The housing shortages that developed in England as a result of the First and 
Second World War also motivated the English legislature to enact legislation with the 
aim to introduce better tenure rights for residential tenants in the private market. This 
statutory intervention was initially justified by dire socio-economic circumstances, 
although the security principles underlying the private landlord-tenant statutes 
remained on the statute book for most of the twentieth century. In due course Britain 
experienced greater economic prosperity, but the English legislature never abolished 
security of tenure or rent control in the private market in its entirety. The extent of 
tenure security was rather amended by the legislature according to the changing 
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needs of society.273 The aim (and justification) of the pre-1994 Rents Acts in South 
Africa was also to protect tenants against potential exploitation by private 
landowners during housing shortages, but the South African legislature deregulated 
the private rental market when the housing market stabilised and the white minority 
group protected by it could acquire rental housing in the private market. 
The English landlord-tenant laws are complex and are discussed in more 
detail later in the chapter, although it is important to briefly mention the impact of the 
English landlord-tenant statutes on the common law. In some cases, depending on 
the context, the legislation is so overpowering that it completely extinguishes the 
operation of the common law. In these cases the effect of the legislation is to replace 
the common law, and specifically its relevance in termination of the tenancy, 
completely, while in other cases the common law remains relevant to the extent that 
the legislation did not alter its operation. The common law would not have been able 
to respond to the different housing needs of all tenants as successfully as the 
legislation has and the complexity of the landlord-tenant statutes confirms the extent 
to which the legislature had to intervene in the common law relationship of landlord 
and tenant. However, since 1998 the English domestic law (common law and 
legislation) must be in compliance with the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (ECHR). To argue that the weak 
tenure rights that some tenants still have under the legislation are in need of 
rectification is unconvincing because of the complexity and extent of the legislative 
framework. Tenant protection is a central aspect of English housing policy and 
landlord-tenant law, which has received extensive consideration by parliament and 
by the legislature. It is therefore unlikely that the English landlord-tenant statutes 
would be in contravention of the Convention simply because some tenants still do 
not enjoy strong tenure. Instead, one has to assume that the relative strength and 
weakness of different tenure forms in terms of the legislation are based on 
considered housing policy choices made by parliament. However, the common law 
does not reflect housing policies and decisions made by parliament. The common 
law, and more specifically common law termination of the tenancy, is therefore more 
likely to be in contravention of the Convention. In the English landlord-tenant 
framework one could more easily argue that a common law eviction is in 
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contravention of the Convention, but it would be harder to argue that the legislature 
failed to provide sufficient protection to the tenant (household) in question.  
The South African position is comparable to the extent that the South African 
common law and legislation must also comply with the Constitution, although it must 
furthermore give effect to the Constitution, which entails certain positive obligations. 
However, in contrast with English law the tenure security of urban residential tenants 
in South Africa has not been addressed extensively in legislation and one can 
conclude that the provision of a diversified spectrum of tenure forms has not been 
taken into consideration by the South African government to the extent that it should 
have, especially in light of its constitutional obligation to do so. The substantive 
tenure rights of South African urban tenants are currently still weak and therefore not 
in line with the Constitution.  
In both the English and South African landlord-tenant schemes there could be 
areas of law that are in need of reform. However, the mere fact that a certain tenant 
is not provided with security of tenure does not mean that such a tenant is entitled to 
strengthened occupation rights. In the South African context the generally weak 
tenure rights of all urban residential tenants is a direct result of the inadequacy of the 
legislation, because the legislation does not override the common law sufficiently to 
provide substantive occupation rights for specifically marginalised tenants, nor does 
it amend the substantive occupation rights of tenants as developed in terms of the 
common law in order to give effect to the constitutional obligations. The landlord-
tenant legislation should be able to grant substantive tenure protection for 
marginalised tenants and therefore be context-sensitive to the needs of tenants in 
general. 
The initial justification for regulating the private landlord-tenant relationship in 
the United States of America, and more specifically New York City, was based on 
extreme housing shortages that led to landlords exploiting the dire socio-economic 
circumstances by increasing rents. The majority of states abolished rent regulation 
during periods of economic prosperity, whereafter the common law resurfaced. 
According to the common law the landlord could rely on summary eviction 
proceedings to evict the tenant once the lease had terminated.274 New York State 
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was one of a few states that did not abolish statutory intervention in the private 
landlord-tenant market. The continued imposition of rent control in New York State, 
and more specifically New York City, is noteworthy and discussed later in this 
chapter. 
The initial justification for regulating the private landlord-tenant market in New 
York City was similar to the pre-1994 South African (and early English) position. In 
all these jurisdictions the legislature intervened in private landlord-tenant relationship 
in order to protect urban tenants during housing shortages. This imposition was 
justified in light of the socio-economic circumstances. The private rental housing 
market in South Africa was deregulated during a period of economic prosperity, 
whereafter the common law resurfaced, similar to situation in the majority of 
American states. The South African common law currently provides just as weak 
tenure security for tenants as the American common law does. The English 
legislature chose not to abolish rent control completely, although the private rental 
market is currently being deregulated. This development in the English landlord-
tenant regime is justified and explained later in the chapter. 
German landlord-tenant law is different from England, Wales and the United 
States of America, as the common law is completely codified in the German Civil 
Code,275 which includes the statutory interventions in the rental housing market. This 
regulatory regime is different from the others in the sense that regulation is not 
accomplished by way of ad hoc statutory intervention in the relationship between 
landlord and tenant. The provisions in the Civil Code that regulate the relationship 
and afford tenure security for tenants are not perceived as temporary restrictions on 
the private law rights of landowners or exceptional to the “common law”, but rather 
as permanent determinations that are incidental to the private landlord-tenant 
relationship, as tenure security is central to the tenant‟s interests. Tenure security in 
residential property is important, because it enables tenants to reach a level of 
personal autonomy. The security of the home is central for the individual (or 
household) to make decisions and participate in society. 
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8.2.2 Rent control: Substantive tenure protection versus procedural safeguards 
 
The essence of the pre-1994 South African Rents Acts was to create a statutory 
lease at the end of the contractual lease. The landowner could not eject the tenant, 
based on the lease having expired either by effluxion of time (in the case of a fixed-
term tenancy), or in consequence of notice duly given (in the case of a periodic 
tenancy), as long as the tenant complied with the requirements set out in the 
different acts. The tenant could continue to occupy the premises if she chose to do 
so, without the landlord‟s approval. Urban residential tenants therefore enjoyed 
substantive tenure security, as termination of the lease was averted through the 
operation of the legislation. The landlord could only claim eviction of the tenant on 
grounds specifically provided for in the legislation. The legislature continually 
amended the grounds for possession, although the general aim of these grounds 
was to allow the landlord to evict the tenant in certain circumstances and thereby 
prevent an unjustifiably harsh impact on the landowner. The grounds for possession 
included conduct of the lessee (for instance where the lessee damaged the leased 
property or caused nuisance to the neighbouring occupiers); needs of the landlord 
(for instance where the lessor required the property for his own use); or where the 
landlord for instance required the property for reconstruction work. In due course the 
legislature included rent control and excluded certain dwellings.276 The Rents Acts 
were aimed at providing substantive tenure security for the white minority group, 
while placing restrictions on rent increases. These laws were not concerned with 
providing procedural safeguards during eviction proceedings. The Rents Acts were 
not aimed at promoting access to rental housing either. 
Where the tenant breached the contractual agreement the landowner could 
cancel the lease and claim an eviction order. The contractual lease only converted 
into a statutory lease where the tenant complied with the original lease and with the 
requirements as stated in the relevant statute. The legislation therefore protected a 
certain class of tenants who abided by the contract and the legislation.  
Through the statutory landlord-tenant measures the legislature provided a 
limited number of white households with substantive security of tenure in private 
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rental housing during periods of housing shortages, even though the government did 
not directly provide the housing. The correlation between continued housing 
shortages and government involvement through the creation of policy and enactment 
of legislation to improve security of tenure for tenants did exist in the white private 
landlord-tenant framework. However, the extent of the laws was limited, because it 
primarily afforded tenure security for tenants who already had lease agreements and 
were in occupation of private rental housing. The laws failed to promote access to 
housing during the housing shortage and the government was not actively involved 
in the process of housing delivery. The laws merely regulated the relationship 
between landlords and existing white tenants in the private rental market.  
As mentioned previously, the landlord-tenant system in England and Wales is 
complex and consists of a number of laws that generally regulate the rental housing 
market. At this stage one should note that the English landlord-tenant system is 
differentiated in terms of different rental housing sectors, namely the private sector 
and the social sector. The operation of these sectors is discussed in more detail later 
in this chapter. 
Currently the English private rental market is largely deregulated, but the Rent 
Act 1977 still regulates private sector tenancies granted before 15 January 1989. 
Even though the application of the Act is limited, certain provisions of the Act are 
worth highlighting. The Rent Act 1977 (and the Housing Act 1988) excludes certain 
dwellings, based on the rateable value of the property. This provision is noteworthy, 
because even though the policy was to regulate private landlord-tenant relationships 
in general, the Act excludes high value properties.277 The Act therefore excludes 
protection to high income tenants, while providing secure tenure rights for all other 
tenants. This exclusion is unique when considering the other landlord-tenant 
statutes. 
The essence of the Rent Act 1977 is similar to the pre-1994 South African 
Rents Acts, as it provides that if the protected tenant (the contracted tenant) remains 
in the property upon expiration of the protected tenancy, he becomes a statutory 
tenant. Once the contract ends according to the common law, the statutory code 
affords the tenant continued occupation rights. The aim of the Act is therefore to 
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provide tenants with substantive tenure security. The private landowner is unable to 
evict the statutory tenant until the tenancy can be terminated. The only way in which 
a landlord can terminate the statutory tenancy is to claim possession in court, based 
on one of the grounds for possession as stated in the Act.278  
The grounds for possession differ from the pre-1994 South African legislation 
to the extent that it makes a distinction between “discretionary grounds” and 
“mandatory grounds”. Where the court is faced with an eviction claim and the 
landlord is relying on one of the discretionary grounds, the court can only grant a 
possession order if the court considers it reasonable. This requirement grants 
additional substantive tenure protection for tenants. The English courts have held 
that, in order to establish whether a possession order is reasonable, the court has to 
consider “all relevant circumstances as they exist at the date of the hearing”, which 
gives the court a wide discretion in determining reasonableness. The court is at 
liberty to consider any factor, “in a broad-common sense way”, that might affect 
either the landlord or the tenant and it may attach the appropriate weight to the given 
factor. The court has to consider the unique circumstances of each case on a fact 
based approach. The courts consider various circumstances, including the personal 
circumstances of both parties.279 The factors taken into consideration by the English 
courts in order to determine whether an eviction order would be reasonable are 
expressed as “all relevant circumstances”. These factors are therefore comparable 
to the factors taken into account by the post-1994 South African courts when 
deciding eviction orders, because section 26(3) of the Constitution requires that the 
courts must consider all relevant circumstances before granting an eviction order. 
The post-1994 South African courts initially ignored the personal circumstances of 
tenants (and urban occupiers in general) when deciding eviction cases. In 2002 the 
South African Supreme Court of Appeal held that only those circumstances that are 
legally relevant should come under consideration in terms of section 26(3).280 The 
Court considered section 26(3) and not PIE. In 2010 the Supreme Court of Appeal 
interpreted PIE, which was enacted to give effect to section 26(3), and refused to 
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grant an eviction order based on the personal circumstances of the tenants and the 
fact that the order might render the households homeless.281 The Court‟s 
interpretation of PIE in the more recent South African jurisprudence is in line with the 
spirit, purport and objects of a transformative Constitution, because it allows the 
courts to consider the personal needs and circumstances of vulnerable tenants in a 
broad context-sensitive manner. The result of such an approach is more reasonable 
decision-making. However, the Court still interpreted PIE, and not section 26(3) of 
the Constitution, to provide the unlawful occupiers with substantive tenure protection.  
The aim of the grounds (for eviction) listed in the English Rent Act 1977 is 
similar to the pre-1994 South African statutes as it provides the landlord with a 
method to evict the tenant in specific circumstances. The grounds for eviction 
therefore prevent an unjustifiably harsh impact on the landlord. However, the English 
Rent Act made a distinction between the different grounds for eviction to oblige the 
courts to consider the reasonableness of the eviction as a deciding factor when 
faced with certain grounds. The assured tenancy, regulated by the Housing Act 1988 
(the Housing Act 1988 regulates private sector tenancies granted on and after 15 
January 1989), makes a similar distinction and also affords substantive tenure 
security for urban tenants. However, the Housing Act 1988 also introduced the 
assured shorthold tenancy as an option for private landowners, which has to a large 
extent deregulated the private landlord-tenant sector, because it does not provide 
substantive security of tenure.282 Private landlords can therefore choose to grant 
either an assured tenancy (associated with substantive tenure security) or an 
assured shorthold tenancy (associated with weak tenure security).  
In English landlord-tenant law local authority lettings and housing association 
lettings form the social sector. The local authority makes available council housing 
for low income tenants (regulated in terms of the Housing Act 1985), while housing 
associations also provide rental housing for lower income households, but housing 
association lettings are regulated in terms of the Housing Act 1988. Housing 
associations form part of the private sector. Basically all housing association tenants 
are assured tenants in terms of the Housing Act 1988 and therefore enjoy 
substantive tenure security. Local authority lettings are regulated in terms of the 
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Housing Act 1985, which affords substantive tenure security for local council tenants, 
as the landlord can only terminate the secure tenancy by proving a ground for 
possession in court. The court can only make a possession order if the landlord can 
prove one of the grounds listed in the Act. However, the landlord must first stipulate 
sufficient particulars of the ground he intends to rely on in the notice seeking 
possession before claiming an eviction order in court, which provides the tenant with 
an opportunity to rectify any breaches under the tenancy and thereby avoid 
possession proceedings.283 This is an additional substantive protection mechanism 
for local authority tenants. 
The grounds for possession are divided into categories, which is similar to the 
Rent Act 1977 and the Housing Act 1988 assured tenancy provisions. When the 
court considers one of the discretionary grounds the court may only grant the 
possession order if it considers it reasonable to do so, while in some cases the court 
may only grant the eviction order if it would be reasonable, if the landlord proved one 
of the grounds for possession and if there is suitable alternative accommodation for 
the tenant when the order takes effect. In terms of the Rent Act 1977 (and the 
Housing Act 1988 when considering assured tenancies), the landlord can also claim 
eviction in court upon termination of the lease if there is suitable alternative 
accommodation and the court considers the eviction order reasonable, but local 
authority tenants are afforded better tenure security in the cases where the local 
authority landlord has to prove the ground for eviction and the fact that there is 
alternative accommodation.284 
The Rent Act285 provides that the alternative accommodation will only be 
suitable if it either offers full Rent Act protection or security of tenure that is 
reasonably equal to the extent of protection granted by the Act. The accommodation 
must be “reasonably suitable to the needs of the tenant and his family as regards 
proximity to place of work”.286 The accommodation must be reasonably suitable to 
the “housing needs” of the tenant and his family. The definition of suitable alternative 
accommodation is similar in the Housing Act 1985, but the personal needs of the 
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tenant and his family form part of the criteria used to determine whether the 
alternative accommodation would be suitable. Where the court is required to 
consider suitable alternative accommodation as a ground for eviction in both the 
private and social sector (local authority lettings and housing association lettings) it is 
apparent that the tenure security of the new tenancy and the personal needs of the 
tenants are the fundamental considerations. The result is that the majority of “good” 
tenants will enjoy a life-long secure tenancy that suits their personal housing needs, 
except where an estate management reason for eviction exists.287 One can conclude 
that the English landlord-tenant laws provide substantive tenure rights for local 
authority tenants (generally the lowest income group of tenants) and housing 
association tenants (also low income tenants), while the private sector is being 
deregulated and the majority of private sector tenants currently occupy rental 
housing with weak tenure rights (assured shorthold tenancy). The justification for this 
development is explained later in this chapter. 
The landlord-tenant regime in New York City is also differentiated in terms of 
different sectors, namely the private sector (private rental housing), the social sector 
and the public sector. Where the government provides funds for not-for-profit 
corporations with the aim to increase low cost housing, such a form of housing is 
known as social housing. Public rental housing in New York is federally regulated in 
instances where the government is involved in the provision of housing for low to 
moderate income households, through the provision of either government housing or 
rental subsidies. The combined operation of these sectors is discussed later in this 
chapter. 
In New York City the Rent Stabilization Law and the Rent Control Law 
regulates the private rental market. Generally, all rent-regulated tenants who occupy 
units that are governed by the Rent Stabilization Law or the Rent Control Law, and 
who continue to pay their rent upon termination of the lease, may only be evicted if 
the landlord is able to establish a clear basis for eviction as stated in the relevant 
laws and regulations. These laws are aimed at providing substantive tenure security 
for existing private sector tenants and do not primarily promote access to housing. 
The various grounds for eviction are similar to those listed in the pre-1994 South 
African and English landlord-tenant laws. In some cases, depending on the ground 
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for eviction, the landlord of a rent-controlled or rent-stabilized unit may institute 
eviction proceedings directly in court, although for other grounds the landlord is 
required to obtain the approval of the New York State Division of Housing and 
Community Renewal (DHCR).288 The responsibility of the DHCR reflects the central 
role of the government in eviction proceedings and one can confirm that the local 
authority is progressively involved in the private rental market. This direct 
involvement of the local government in the private rental market is unique to the New 
York rent regulation laws. The DHCR is proactively involved in the process of 
evicting tenants to such an extent that the government can refuse to grant approval, 
whereafter the landlord would be unable to evict the tenant. The government is 
therefore not only involved in developing private rental housing policies, programmes 
or even legislation with regard to housing delivery and tenure security, but on a basic 
everyday basis, having to deal with the context-sensitive circumstances of each case 
individually. 
In the public sector where the government provides the rental housing the 
rents are low and the public sector tenancy may not be terminated, nor may the 
tenant be evicted, without adequate procedural safeguards. The essence of public 
sector tenants‟ tenure rights is therefore due process during eviction proceedings 
and not substantive tenure security. This form of tenure protection for public sector 
tenants is unique in comparison to the other jurisdictions, because public sector 
tenants usually enjoy strengthened substantive tenure security. Where the tenant 
breached one of the housing authority‟s rules or regulations, the housing authority 
may rely on this breach as a ground for eviction, although the tenant must be given 
an opportunity to meet with one of the housing authority‟s members to discuss the 
problem and cure the breach. This opportunity for public sector tenants to cure the 
breach is a form of substantive tenure protection; it is also available for English local 
authority tenants. Public sector tenants in New York City are therefore afforded 
tenure security to the extent regulated in the housing authority‟s rules and 
regulations, although the essence of these tenants‟ tenure security rests in the 
procedural safeguards when facing eviction,289 which is different from the 
substantive tenure protection provided for English local authority tenants. 
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New York State also subsidizes and regulates the provision of housing under 
a number of other regulatory systems that afford some tenure security. The Section 
8 Program enables low-income tenants to rent private housing through federally 
funded subsidies, although tenure security is limited, as the landowner may institute 
eviction proceedings once the Section 8 tenancy expires.290 In New York City funds 
are also made available to not-for-profit companies to construct and in due course 
provide rental housing for low-income households. The provision of low-income 
rental housing is a form of social housing, which represents a type of social sector. 
One of these subsidized systems of housing is the Mitchell-Lama housing 
programme in which the tenant selection; rent charged; occupancy; and eviction are 
all government-supervised.291  
In Germany landlord-tenant law is codified in the German Civil Code,292 which 
includes the statutory interventions in the rental housing market. Even though rents 
are largely unregulated, landlords can only increase the rents by reference to rent 
levels of other leases in the vicinity during the preceding three years. The Civil Code 
provides substantive security of tenure for tenants by placing restrictions on the 
usual right of landowners to terminate leases. The right of the private landowner to 
cancel the lease is restricted to such an extent that the landlord must generally prove 
that he has a justifiable interest in cancelling the lease, whereafter the tenant can 
object to cancellation, based on the hardship that he would suffer as a result of 
cancellation. This provision provides protection for vulnerable households as the 
court must consider the impact that an eviction order would have on the tenant and 
his family. If the eviction order might render the household homeless the court would 
find it difficult to grant the eviction.293 The landowner can also cancel the lease in 
cases where the tenant breached the contract or acted in an inappropriate manner 
that constituted a compelling reason for cancellation. The point of departure is that 
the parties are assumed to enter into a lease for an indefinite period of time, because 
the landlord must give good reasons for entering into a lease for a definite period.294 
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Tenants in the private sector therefore enjoy substantive tenure security, while the 
provision of rental housing is also encouraged by the government through favourable 
tax incentives. 
 
8.2.3 Increased access to rental housing: The role of public assistance and tenure 
security 
 
The aim to provide tenants with substantive tenure security during housing shortages 
is worthy of support, but increased tenure security is only efficient to the extent that it 
can protect tenants who already occupy rental housing. Where there is insufficient 
rental housing stock the government should either introduce measures that would 
encourage private actors to become involved in the provision of rental housing or the 
government itself should provide public rental housing. In a number of jurisdictions 
the government had to introduce certain measures to increase the development of 
rental housing stock, while providing tenants with substantive tenure security. 
In New York City the aim of the government in the public rental sector is to 
promote access to public rental housing, although it is also aimed at providing 
secure occupation rights for low income households. In the private sector the aim of 
the legislation is different, as it does not promote access to housing. New York State 
also subsidizes and regulates the provision of housing under a number of other 
regulatory systems, including the Section 8 Program, that promote access to 
housing, while providing some tenure security. In New York City funds are also made 
available to not-for-profit companies to construct and in due course make available 
rental housing for low-income households. One of these subsidized systems of 
housing is the Mitchell-Lama housing programme.  
In New York State the cooperation between the government and private 
landowners, or private associations, in the provision of housing is necessary as a 
result of the fact that the public sector is currently unable to make housing available 
for all low-income households in need thereof. The social housing sector is therefore 
extended through this cooperation between the government and private actors with 
the aim to accommodate lower income households through the provision of 
affordable housing. This incentive is similar to the housing associations that were 
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developed in English landlord-tenant law. Housing associations started off as non-
profit organisations, providing a limited amount of housing, but recently these 
associations have doubled in size and are functioning like a business.  
 Throughout the twentieth century the German state has intervened in the 
private rental housing market with the aim to address housing shortages and protect 
tenants. Initially the laws imposed rent control and provided security of tenure for 
tenants, but it also empowered local authorities to prevent privately owned buildings 
from being demolished; to prohibit landowners from using dwellings for purposes 
other than housing; and to force landowners to put their dwellings on the rental 
market.295 The aim of these laws was therefore to increase access to housing, while 
providing tenants with substantive tenure security. The aim and justification for 
regulating the market was similar to the pre-1994 South African, initial English and 
initial American positions, but the measures introduced by the German government 
placed more emphasis on making housing stock available, which had a drastic effect 
on private landowners‟ right of use and disposal. This was justified in light of the dire 
housing shortage, whereas the Court of Appeals of New York held that a law forcing 
private landowners to place their property on the rental market was unconstitutional, 
because it amounted to a physical taking without compensation. The court found that 
it was unconstitutional, even during a period of housing shortages, as it imposed 
societal obligations upon certain landowners beyond the scope of their just share.296 
In South Africa neither the legislature nor the courts has forced private landowners to 
make their property available for rent during housing shortages. 
However, in President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v 
Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and Others, Amici Curiae)297 the 
Constitutional Court confirmed the decision in the Supreme Court of Appeal298 where 
the Court held that unlawful occupiers could remain on private land, even though the 
owner never agreed to their occupation in the first place, until the state made 
alternative accommodation available, provided that the state pay compensation to 
the landowner for the period during which he was denied use of his land. In Blue 
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Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue & Another299 the 
high court decided that tenants holding over could remain on private land for a period 
of two months, whereafter they were evicted. During this period the state had to pay 
the private landowner “an amount equivalent to the fair and reasonable monthly 
rental of the said premises”.300 In both cases the courts effectively forced a private 
landowner to temporarily accommodate unlawful occupiers on his land, but the state 
had to pay some form of compensation. The effect of these decisions is therefore 
similar to a law forcing private landowners to rent their property. 
In due course the German government placed more emphasis on the 
development of new housing stock that would contribute to the alleviation of housing 
shortages. To encourage the building of new rental housing the government granted 
loans to builders at low interest rates. The government also made available public 
funds to subsidize housing construction and provided income tax relief for private 
funds invested in housing, while keeping rents at modest levels.301 The measures 
introduced by the German government during periods of extreme housing shortages 
consisted of rent regulations (mostly in the form of rent control and tenure security) in 
the private rental market with the aim to protect existing private tenants, combined 
with incentives for private actors to invest in the provision of housing. The building of 
new housing stock was just as important as providing tenure security for occupying 
tenants in order to alleviate housing shortages. 
The German government‟s social housing project was aimed at providing 
housing for the majority of low-income households. The project was financed through 
subsidies and public loans, but it was subject to rent control and access control. The 
loans covered nearly fifty percent of the construction costs and were provided by the 
state to private investors and non-profit associations at zero interest. The 
government controlled the allocation of housing and made provision for tenant 
protection. The majority of social-housing dwellings were privately owned, because 
the policy was to use state activity to support and supplement, not replace the 
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market. The role of the German state in the provision of housing was subsequently 
relaxed as a result of an increase in the supply of housing.302 
The German state therefore addressed housing shortages by integrating 
private development in the housing market and not by providing housing to all 
homeless persons directly. In due course, when the housing shortages were largely 
addressed, the government became less involved in the provision of housing. The 
German state‟s involvement in the provision of housing is very different from the 
English government‟s direct role as local authority landlord. The focus of the German 
government was rather to enable private actors to enter the rental housing market 
and address housing shortages through the provision of public funds than to make 
housing available directly.  
The South African legislature has not introduced sufficient incentives for 
private actors to become involved in the provision of housing, which is problematic in 
light of the current housing backlog. The cooperation between the government and 
private actors is essential in order to alleviate housing shortages. Social housing is a 
form of housing that should be encouraged by the government during housing 
shortages, because it provides access to housing, which usually consists of secure 
occupation rights. The combination of incentives that aim to increase access to 
rental housing and regulatory measures that grant substantive tenure security for 
tenants is crucial during housing shortages if the government is aimed at alleviating 
housing shortages through the use of landlord-tenant laws. 
 
8.2.4 Differentiated rental housing sectors and a context-sensitive approach 
 
For the majority of the twentieth century, the private rental market in England and 
Wales provided housing to the majority of tenants, which included low-income 
tenants. The market was regulated in order to ensure protection for all tenants. The 
housing policy changed to increase private rental housing, whereafter the market 
was deregulated, but during this period the social housing market increased and 
started to make housing available for low-income households. Currently the majority 
of low-income tenants in England and Wales occupy social housing. The private 
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market can uphold deregulation, because the social housing market is providing a 
type of “safety net” for vulnerable occupiers. The social housing market is regulated 
quite extensively in order to protect vulnerable occupiers through the provision of 
affordable secure rental housing.303  
The English legislative framework regulating landlord-tenant law is complex 
because the rental market is divided into various sectors, each providing different 
levels of tenure security to different categories of tenants in society. The substance 
of the security provided for constantly changes in these various sectors, according to 
changing social needs and housing policy.304 Local authority tenants enjoy the 
strongest form of tenant protection, because these tenants are usually the most 
vulnerable households. Housing association tenants also enjoy strong tenant 
protection, as these households are also marginalised members of society and 
unable to acquire private rental housing. 
Social housing can usually be associated with supply-side subsidies from the 
state; below-market rents imposed by legislation; provision of housing for low income 
candidates and enhanced tenure security when facing eviction.305 The function of the 
government is central in social housing because this sector of housing provision is a 
form of “governance”.306 Social housing serves a fundamental role in society in which 
the provision of affordable, decent housing is central.307 Social rental housing is 
therefore a key form of housing for marginalised occupiers, because the state is 
proactively involved in the provision of housing. The state is at liberty to assess the 
market, amend the legislation where it is not functioning efficiently and afford secure 
homes to low-income households. The general role of social housing and its 
potential in alleviating housing shortages, while providing tenure security for 
marginalised occupiers, is evident from the preceding sections. It follows that the 
post-1994 South African government should place more focus on social housing, 
especially in the urban landlord-tenant framework. The efficiency of social housing is 
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twofold, namely that it provides access to housing for marginalised occupiers and it 
usually ensures substantive tenure security for such households. 
The residential landlord-tenant system in New York City could also be 
categorized into different sectors with different levels of tenure security. The laws 
that regulate the private and public rental market form a body of tenant protection 
that collectively protects different households with diverse income levels. The entire 
landlord-tenant framework is therefore similar to the English landlord-tenant system 
to the extent that it is differentiated in terms of different sectors, but the income 
categories in relation to these sectors are not the same, nor is the level of tenure 
security in correlation with the sectors the same. The private rental market in New 
York City makes housing available to a high number of households, including low-
income households, while the extent of tenure security in the public sector is not as 
high as in the private sector. In English law the higher income group occupies private 
rental housing, which is generally associated with weaker tenure rights. The lower 
income group occupies social housing, which is aimed at affording substantive 
tenure security. In English law the income group, extent of tenure security, imposition 
of rent control and involvement of the state are therefore closely connected to the 
applicable rental housing sector. 
The landlord-tenant market in Germany is different from England, Wales and 
the United States of America (or more specifically New York State),308 because it is 
not formally divided into different sectors, although it is possible to distinguish purely 
private from social rental housing. After the Second World War Germany 
experienced severe housing shortages. Germany introduced a social housing project 
that made housing available for the majority of low-income households. Social 
housing has developed over time and currently one can identify three forms of social 
housing, namely where developers receive subsidies to construct the housing stock; 
where social housing is federally regulated (usually associated with strict restrictions 
on rent increases and access control in relation to the tenant‟s income); and where 
the state provides social housing.309 However, Germany‟s private rented sector 
continues to represent a significant percentage of the housing market as a result of 
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favourable tax benefits for private investors, aimed at increasing private rented 
housing.  
The differentiated landlord-tenant systems of England, Wales and New York 
City differs substantially from the current, and pre-1994, South African landlord-
tenant system, because the rental market in South Africa is not clearly differentiated 
in terms of different sectors. During the apartheid era the government made public 
sector tenancies available to black households. However, when the apartheid laws 
were abolished these tenancies generally ceased to exist and either converted to 
private ownership or left the remaining occupiers with uncertainty regarding their 
rights in the land. The remaining “public sector” tenants‟ tenure rights are still 
uncertain, because the sector is not regulated. The government failed to introduce 
some form of social housing for the majority of black marginalised South African 
tenants who were left with uncertainty regarding their rights in the land. 
Currently the South African private rental housing market is regulated in terms 
of the Rental Housing Act, while the Social Housing Act regulates social rental 
housing. The social rental market was introduced only in 2008 and is not functioning 
optimally yet. The private rental market in urban areas is not accessible to the 
majority of poor households, because it is exclusive to the minority of households 
who can afford high rents. The post-1994 government has not introduced a housing 
option, such as a public rental housing sector where the government acts as 
landlord, for the most vulnerable households who are in dire need of secure urban 
housing. The Social Housing Act aims to provide social rental housing for low to 
medium income households, which is a development that should be encouraged. 
However, the Act does not afford sufficient tenure security, because it merely 
upholds the common law, which is associated with weak substantive tenure 
security.310 Tenure security is fundamental to any form of social housing, which is 
evident from the English social sector. The urban rental market in South Africa is 
diverse. Black urban tenants are entitled to legally secure tenure (section 25(6) of 
the Constitution), while the courts can interpret section 26(3) of the Constitution to 
ensure substantive tenure security for marginalised tenants based on their socio-
economic weakness. The landlord-tenant regime in South Africa should aim to 
accommodate all urban tenants and provide each household with the necessary 
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level of tenure security. The landlord-tenant laws in South Africa should therefore 
also be context-sensitive and preferably be divided in terms of different sectors.311 
 
8.2.5 The constitutional validity of rent control: Rethinking justification 
 
The social importance of residential property is recognised in most jurisdictions, 
especially when facing housing shortages, but the tension between the rights of 
landowners and tenants is perceived and analysed from different perspectives, 
which results in different landlord-tenant regimes. In order to strengthen the 
occupation rights of tenants the rights of private landowners have to be restricted in 
a just and equitable manner. 
The property clause (article V) of the Constitution of the United States of 
America 1787312 states that “[n]o person shall … be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property”. The South African Constitution has a similar property provision in section 
25(1), which states that “[n]o person may be deprived of property except in terms of 
law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property.” 
New York State guarantees that homeless persons have a right to shelter,313 which 
is similar to the right to have access to adequate housing as stated in section 26(1) 
of the South African Constitution.314 The initial justification for rent regulation in New 
York was similar to previous rent regulations in pre-1994 South Africa to the extent 
that the rent control measures protected tenants from exploitation by landlords 
during housing shortages. However, the progressive justification and continuous 
imposition of statutory intervention in landlord-tenant law in New York, and New York 
City as an urban setting, is different from the South African private rental market, 
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which was deregulated during a period of economic prosperity. In New York City the 
private rental sector is currently still regulated quite extensively, with the aim to place 
restrictions on rent increases while providing security of tenure for a diverse group of 
tenants who occupy certain buildings.315 
The private rental market in New York City is currently providing housing to a 
large number of households, including low-income households, because the public 
rental sector is not providing the required number of housing units for low-income 
households. The private rental market is therefore burdened with the indirect duty to 
accommodate low-income households. If the private rental market is functioning 
efficiently, there would not necessarily be a need to regulate the market, if there is 
some mechanism to ensure affordable and secure housing for the more vulnerable 
members of society. By contrast, in England and Wales the private rental market can 
uphold deregulation, because the majority of low-income tenants occupy social 
housing. The social housing market is providing a type of “safety net” for vulnerable 
occupiers. 
Initially the American courts held that rent regulation measures were 
constitutionally justifiable in light of the housing crisis, because landlords could 
exploit tenants.316 Currently a number of private housing dwellings are regulated and 
the justification for rent regulation subsequently shifted to the provision of affordable 
rental housing for a small, specified group of low-income individuals. If the leases of 
low-income tenants who occupy regulated rental housing in the private market 
expire, their chances of acquiring public rental housing would be very slim, because 
public housing stock is limited. Low-income households would also struggle to find 
deregulated accommodation in the private market, because the rent is unaffordable. 
The aim of the regulations is therefore to avoid an increase in homelessness, 
because the immediate effect of deregulation would be an increase in rents. The 
more recent justification for rent regulation in New York City is therefore based on 
the public interest in preventing an increase in homelessness. In recent South Africa 
case law the justification for not granting an eviction order against unlawful tenants 
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was also to prevent homelessness as the immediate effect of the order would have 
been to render the vulnerable tenants homeless.317 
The point of departure in American landlord-tenant case law regarding the 
constitutional justifiability of rent regulations is that it is valid, because it is in the 
public interest. However, the extent of the regulation could render it unconstitutional, 
especially when a small section of society must bear the public burden alone and 
when the regulations are disproportionate. The courts have found that rent 
regulations are constitutionally justifiable if the landlord allowed the tenancy in the 
first place. In Seawall318 the court declared a law unconstitutional because the 
impact of the law was to force landowners to open their property to the public, which 
amounted to an unconstitutional physical taking.319 The law was obviously aimed at 
providing access to housing, although the extent to which it restricted the rights of 
private landowners was found to be unconstitutional. 
In German landlord-tenant law the justifiability of rent control measures is 
completely different form the United States of America, because the interests of 
tenants are perceived as socially recognisable interests that justify protection by the 
legislature. In the case of housing shortages the social importance of residential 
housing increases to the extent that it becomes a limited resource, which is a vital 
commodity for society. The social importance of strengthening the rights of tenants 
has a detrimental effect on the restricted rights of landowners, but it is 
constitutionally valid as a result of the phraseology of article 14 of the German Basic 
Law and the social purpose of rental housing.320 Article 14 of the Basic Law was 
crafted to protect property rights and to enable the legislature to enact legislation that 
would give effect to the public interest. In the landlord-tenant context the property 
rights of landowners are therefore constitutionally balanced with the socially 
protected interests of residential tenants. 
In order to determine whether rent regulations restrict the rights of landowners 
unjustifiably, the courts measure the impact of the restriction by considering the 
extent of the interference on the personal autonomy of the landowner, although the 
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justification for rent regulation is also to allow the tenant to achieve personal 
autonomy. The measure used to balance the rights of the parties is therefore the 
same. In the cases where the courts found that the restriction was unjustified the 
landowner‟s personal autonomy was too seriously interfered with, considering the 
reciprocal benefit for the tenant and for society.321  
The German Federal Constitutional Court has considered landlord-tenant 
disputes regarding rent regulations,322 although the disputes have always concerned 
the extent of the regulations rather than the constitutional justifiability of these laws. 
The US courts have held that rent regulation does not amount to an unjustifiable 
restriction on private landowners‟ rights, provided that it is in response to a housing 
emergency or in the public interest.323 In Germany the point of departure is that 
property serves the public interest and that the legislature must regulate and 
determine the contents of property rights.  
In American law (and pre-1994 South African law)324 rent regulations are 
perceived as temporary measures that interfere with the strong common law rights of 
landowners with the aim to afford strengthened tenure rights for weak, poor, 
vulnerable, and marginalised occupiers in times of extreme need or hardship. The 
justification for limiting private landowners‟ common law property rights in order to 
provide better tenure rights for tenants is therefore based on the general public 
consensus that there is a great disparity between the common law rights of 
landowners and tenants. During housing shortages this disparity increases to such 
an extent that rent regulations are justified. In German law the justification for rent 
regulations is based on the importance of tenure security that enables tenants to 
participate in society, make their own decisions and achieve personal autonomy, 
which is a general rather than a temporary, emergency justification.  
  
                                                          
321
 See section 7.4 in Chapter 7. 
322
 See section 7.4.2 in Chapter 7. 
323
 See section 6.6 in Chapter 6. 
324
 See section 2.3 in Chapter 2 for a discussion of rent regulations in pre-1994 South Africa. 
409 
 
8.3 Theoretical inquiry 
 
In order to understand the imposition of and justification for rent control it is important 
to undertake a theoretical analysis of rent control. However, the imposition of rent 
control, or the deregulation of the private landlord-tenant market, often results in a 
transformation of the landlord-tenant regime in question and it is therefore also 
essential to consider theories regarding changes in legal structures. Landlord-tenant 
law is closely connected to the broader societal function of property, because it is 
usually concerned with housing shortages. The role of the community is fundamental 
in giving effect to societal needs, because individual needs are dependent on social 
relations that function within communities. Theoretical approaches regarding rent 
control; changes in a regime (specifically a landlord-tenant regime); the function of 
property in terms of social relations; and the responsibility of the community at large 
are discussed in the following section for two reasons. The purpose of this 
theoretical inquiry is firstly to illustrate the limited efficiency of rent control in the 
private residential market and secondly to initiate a theoretical basis in support of a 
new landlord-tenant regime in South Africa. 
Radin‟s theoretical perspective on rent control is imperative. It highlights the 
importance of rent control from a moral “all-things-considered”325 viewpoint and 
places emphasis on the personal connection between residential property, as 
personal property, and occupiers (more specifically tenants). According to Radin, 
rent control is usually imposed when there is a shortage of affordable rental 
housing,326 although in terms of the classic price theory rent control might lead to 
even worse housing shortages.327 Radin argues that the justifiability of rent control is 
a context-sensitive inquiry and can therefore not be determined by reference to a 
single all-inclusive principle. Rent control usually includes security of tenure through 
the provision of continued occupation rights for tenants and the imposition of 
restrictions on rent increases. The justifiability of these interventions depends on the 
specific circumstances.328  
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The essence of Radin‟s argument is that in some circumstances the tenant‟s 
non-commercial personal use of her apartment as her home carries more weight, on 
a moral basis, than the landlord‟s commercial interest in reclaiming the apartment.329 
“Personal” property is “bound up” with a persons‟ personhood to the extent that self-
investment in the specific object takes place,330 while “fungible” property is held by 
persons for commercial reasons and is exchangeable.331 The connection between 
the personal property and the individual contributes to self-development and enables 
the person to participate in society as a fulfilled person.332 Radin argues that the 
tenant‟s rented property is her home,333 which is a justifiable form of personal 
property, because self-investment has taken place. The preservation of the tenant‟s 
interest in the home therefore becomes “a priority claim over curtailment of merely 
fungible interests of others.”334 The landlord‟s interest is fungible and therefore 
weighs less than the tenant‟s interest in continuing to stay in the rented property. It 
follows from a personhood perspective that property for personhood necessitates 
more stringent legal protection than fungible property, because personal property is 
deemed more important by social consensus.335  
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The personhood argument is most appealing in cases where the occupying 
tenants are poor and deregulation would render the household homeless,336 
because the household would not be able to afford the market rent.337 However, from 
a welfare rights perspective and supposing that the right to housing is a welfare right, 
the tenant would have a right to an apartment, but not to a particular apartment. The 
obligation of private landowners to accommodate such households is unclear from 
Radin‟s analysis.338 The personhood argument is unhelpful when analysing 
homeless persons‟ right of access to housing, because homeless persons are in 
need of accommodation and there is no established connection between the 
individual and the object in question that necessitates statutory protection.339 It 
follows that there has been no self-investment in the specific apartment and the 
tenant has not become bound up with the property, because occupation has not 
taken place. In such circumstances the government does have an obligation to make 
adequate housing available,340 but the personhood argument is unconvincing as 
basis for justifying landlord-tenant regulations that aim to increase rental housing in 
the private market in order to accommodate homeless persons. Radin‟s argument 
therefore supports rent control to the extent that it provides continued occupation 
rights for tenants and it restricts rent increases. The personhood argument is not 
concerned with primary access to housing, because the essence of the argument is 
to prolong existing occupation rights for a household within a certain dwelling that 
constitutes the household‟s home. 
Radin also acknowledges that in certain circumstances local rent control 
might be unjustified if the effect of the measures is to exclude would-be tenants from 
the regulated rental market.341  
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“When rent control is imposed, the benefit of the wealth redistribution goes not 
to tenants generally but rather to the tenants who already live in a given political 
subdivision … The immediate costs fall not only upon the landlords, but also 
upon would-be tenants who wish to move into the community”.342  
 
Radin‟s argument for rent control is therefore credible for a specific community of 
occupying tenants who are relatively poor, especially where the landlords have a 
purely commercial interest in the rented property.343 The justifiability of rent control 
depends on the group of tenants (and their personal connection with the property);344 
the commercial interests of the landlords in the rented property (described by Radin 
as fungible property); and the efficiency of the legislation to distinguish between 
these issues in order to differentiate between categories of tenants with different 
levels of tenure security.345 
A number of authors, including Epstein, have criticised rent control for various 
reasons, specifically economic reasons. Epstein argues that all rent control statutes 
are unconstitutional under Article V of the Constitution of the United States of 
America,346 also known as the takings clause, because the compulsory renewed 
lease is an interest in property that is transferred from the landlord to the tenant and 
therefore deprives the landlord of his interest in the reversion, which equals a “taking 
of private property”.347 Historically, rent control cases were decided under the “mere 
regulation” standard, while other regulatory measures were decided under the 
“physical invasion” test.348 According to Epstein, all deprivations of property should 
be adjudicated in terms of the same enquiry.349 Epstein argues that the result of all 
rent control statutes is a “forced and complete occupation of the landlord‟s premises 
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by an unwanted tenant,”350 and therefore amounts to a physical invasion of the 
landowner‟s property.  
From an economic perspective Epstein argues that rent control is inefficient 
and bad public policy. Rent regulation disregards the rules of supply and demand 
with the effect that it creates housing market distortions, which negatively affects 
both landlords and low income households.351 The political effect of rent control is to 
increase social losses and therefore Epstein argues that rent control is socially 
ineffective in both the long and the short run.352 With reference to Radin‟s 
personhood argument, Epstein mentions that the essence of Radin‟s analysis is to 
provide preferential treatment to some individuals, which is in conflict with the idea of 
an open society based on equal opportunities.353 Epstein also considers rent control 
from a welfare perspective and concludes that “[m]y „intuitions‟ favor an open society 
in which persons must purchase what they want from the owner of resources, and 
not plan and scheme to get the state to operate on their behalf.”354 Epstein finally 
mentions that “[t]he claim for special communities is simply a disguised appeal for 
special monopoly privileges that should be rejected across the board. There is 
simply no standard of social welfare that justifies the operation of the rent control 
statutes in any form.”355  
The American landlord-tenant regime developed during the 1980s and early 
1990s from providing tenants with limited tenure security (tenants had no right to 
continued occupation upon termination of the lease as the landlord could terminate 
the tenancy without stating any reasons) and placing no restrictions on rent 
increases (the landlord could set the rent at any level) to affording tenants with 
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strengthened occupation rights and imposing rent control in various urban areas.356 
In response to these developments Radin states that the role of the government is to 
either maintain a certain regime or to initiate some development in that regime, 
although the aim of the government depends on its interest, which includes the 
public interest, in that specific regime.357 The author mentions that the mere 
enactment of housing codes is too simplistic to initiate such a radical change and 
that there was an overall change in the culture of property, specifically with regard to 
tenants‟ entitlement to decent housing.358 The decisions of government are therefore 
connected with “cultural commitments about property” and certain policies or 
ordinances can either initiate changes in the legal regime or respond to changes in 
the regime. Radin argues that government action that changes property regimes is 
generally made implicitly, and could be perceived by the public as common sense, 
but these decisions depend on a communal understanding of a specific regime.359 
A similar argument is raised by Singer, where he questions society‟s 
understanding of entitlement and the importance of protecting tenants‟ interests in 
their home (the rented property) through regulation. Singer argues that if the aim is 
to protect tenants‟ interest in their home, one should reconsider property law (and 
the very concept of property) in order to deviate from the “romance of ownership”. 
One should rather pay attention to the interests “asserted by those who claim they 
should be entitled to control various aspects of the property, and determine, on the 
basis of normative criteria, who should have presumptive control of the entitlement in 
question”.360 Instead of using rights theory or efficiency theory, Singer argues that 
one should use a normative framework to determine the function of property. The 
importance of property in light of its broader societal function, specifically with regard 
to its role in social relationships, is emphasised throughout Singer‟s argument.361 
Rights, and more specifically property rights, should be perceived within a social 
context that consists of relationships and mutual obligations. In terms of societal 
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obligations owners are in some cases required to “exercise their property rights with 
due respect for the interests of others, including non-owners.”362  
The societal function of property, and more specifically the importance of 
property for human flourishing, is also highlighted by Alexander and Peñalver. 
However, the role of the community and the web of social relations it presents is a 
fundamental consideration in their theory.363 This web of social relations is essential 
for human flourishing, as individuals are socially dependant and unable to acquire 
resources by themselves.364 Communities in general, which includes the state, 
cultivate just relations amongst members of the community and thereby shape 
certain norms for society at large, although the community also enables individuals 
to acquire resources essential for human development.365 Human (and communal) 
dependence creates a moral obligation to encourage social networks and structures 
that enable members of the community to flourish,366 which could lead to 
redistribution (the state could compel wealthier individuals to share their surplus with 
the poor). However, where the community itself can distribute resources that are 
essential for human flourishing the state should refrain from interfering, provided that 
such distribution is efficient and fair. Where the state is involved in the process of 
redistribution the law should prohibit arbitrary state action and protect rights holders 
in order for these individuals to also achieve human flourishing.367  
As an example of their theory where the state is constitutionally obliged to 
enable households to flourish, Alexander and Peñalver correctly refer to some 
provisions in the South African Constitution,368 and more specifically the case of 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) 
Ltd (Agri SA and Others, Amici Curiae).369 The authors argue that the right to have 
access to adequate housing is the core commitment in the Constitution that would 
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enable persons to participate in society and attain human development. Successful 
housing delivery is therefore vital to give effect to human flourishing.370 In Modderklip 
the Court‟s unwillingness to remove squatters from privately owned land illustrates 
the Court‟s willingness to compel private landowners to accommodate non-owners, 
which resembles the mutual obligation, and inherent dependence, between 
members of society.371 In South Africa the market economy is built on a distribution 
of resources that currently still resembles past injustices, where a marginalised 
group were excluded from resources vital for human development. In these 
circumstances state intervention in the economy is justified, but state action must be 
non-arbitrary.372 
Underkuffler‟s theoretical approach to changes in property structures provides 
a useful perspective to assess and understand the transformation of occupiers‟ (and 
more specifically tenants‟) rights under the South African Constitution. Underkuffler 
mentions that the bases upon which previous property regimes were constructed 
developed according to changes in human needs and conditions, because the 
composition of property rights in one era could be undesirable in the next. If one 
agrees that property expresses “an area of individual autonomy and control” then it 
follows that changes in human needs require the transformation of property, and 
more specifically the protection of property.373 
Underkuffler proposes a distinction between the common conception of 
property and the operative conception of property. According to the common 
conception of property, individual interests, held by legal rights holders, are protected 
by property and these rights are presumptively superior to competing public 
interests. Individual rights can be limited (or overridden) by public interest of a 
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compelling nature, but limitations must be justified because property rights have 
presumptive power.374 In terms of the operative conception of property, change is 
imbedded in the concept of property and property rights change according to, and in 
line with, general social needs.375 Furthermore, all rights are not protected equally 
and the tensions that evolve between the individual (and his rights) and society at 
large form part of the very meaning of property.376 
Despite her use of the concept of property to define the rights and interests of 
individuals and society at large, Underkuffler emphasises that property remains a 
social institution that reflects decisions made by society.377 Within this societal 
context the public interest is generally portrayed as “derived aggregative social 
concerns that provide reasons for coercive legal action,” which necessitates the 
imposition of certain obligations to vindicate these interests, while individual rights 
are contrasted with the demands of the public interest.378 Underkuffler argues that if 
the core values of the claimed property right and the core values of the competing 
public interest are the same, then there is no basis for concluding that rights have 
normatively superior value, despite the fact that the protection of property is a core 
value and an interest to which society grants enhanced protection. It follows that in 
such circumstances there would be no basis for affording rights presumptive 
power.379 “It is the nature of the interests and the values that they assert – not the 
identities or numbers of the holders – that should determine normative (and 
presumptive) power.”380 
As a result of the housing shortages in South Africa a number of households 
are either living in informal settlements or are homeless; in light of the theoretical 
discussion one can conclude that such households are socially dependent on the 
state, and to a certain extent on private actors, to enable them to acquire housing, 
which is a vital resource for human development. This social relationship between 
marginalised households and the state (or private actors) forms part of a nexus of 
mutual relationships that are community-based. The role of the community is 
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therefore vital to give effect to the right to have access to adequate housing, 
because all members of society are socially dependent. During housing shortages 
the relationship between landlord and tenant is one of the most important social 
relations, because tenants (especially marginalised tenants) are dependent on both 
the relationship, which represents the right to occupy the property, and the specific 
resource involved, namely residential property. During housing shortages this 
dependence increases, because the tenant might not be able to acquire housing 
elsewhere. The function of the residential property is to enable the tenant and his 
family to achieve human development and participate in society, although secure 
tenure in the form of continued occupation rights is essential to give effect to this 
ideal. From a normative approach the tenant‟s interest to continue occupying the 
premises requires legal protection in the form of rent control, which would result in a 
restriction on the landowner‟s right to dispose of his property. During housing 
shortages this restriction is generally justified, but the question is whether rent 
control should be imposed temporarily or whether it should form part of a permanent 
landlord-tenant regime. From a theoretical perspective I argue that the South African 
government should initiate a change in the landlord-tenant regime that would place 
more emphasis on the strengthened rights of tenants, because South Africa is 
already experiencing a change in the culture of property that places more weight on 
the rights of marginalised occupiers. The current landlord-tenant regime has not 
transformed in line with the constitutional obligations and therefore requires further 
change. The new landlord-tenant regime should impose rent control in various rental 
sectors and the justification for rent control would depend on the specific 
circumstances in question. 
 
8.4 A new landlord-tenant regime 
8.4.1 Introduction 
 
From the discussion in section 8.1 of this chapter one can conclude that the current 
landlord-tenant scheme in South Africa is constitutionally inadequate on a number of 
grounds. The problems identified in section 8.1 could be addressed through the 
enactment of new legislation with the aim, firstly, to promote access to rental housing 
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as a form of tenure that could help alleviate housing shortages and, secondly, to 
provide all urban tenants with the necessary level of tenure security. This could take 
the form of either substantive or procedural protection, or a combination of both. New 
legislation would be able to address the different areas of landlord-tenant law that 
are currently not giving effect to the constitutional obligations as stated in sections 
25(6), 26(1) and 26(3) of the Constitution. It is doubtful whether amendments to the 
current landlord-tenant laws would be able to give effect to the constitutional 
obligations, because it entrenches common law tenure security, which is essentially 
weak tenure protection.381 New legislation is a better solution to address the 
constitutional obligations because it can provide diverse tenants with different tenure 
rights through the introduction of differentiated rental housing sectors. 
In the following section I propose different sectors as part of a new urban 
landlord-tenant regime. The different sectors consist of three forms of rental housing, 
namely public rental housing (the public sector), social rental housing (the social 
sector) and private rental housing (the private sector).382 The sectors differ in relation 
to the nature and identity of the landlord; the nature and identity of the tenant; the 
obligation and need to ensure access to rental housing; the nature and extent of 
tenure security; and the imposition of rent restrictions. Urban tenants‟ substantive 
tenure rights and procedural protection would therefore differ in each of the proposed 
sectors.  
 
8.4.2 Public sector 
 
In order to address the housing shortages in South Africa and give effect to section 
26(1) of the Constitution, the government is currently building houses for homeless 
persons. The aim is to provide these households with homeownership. It was 
previously argued that homeownership is not necessarily the form of tenure these 
households prefer and that more emphasis should be placed on rental housing as an 
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alternative form of tenure that could help alleviate housing shortages.383 However, in 
order to promote rental housing as a practical tenure option, the government should 
first increase the rental housing stock. The government should therefore also build 
houses (or other forms of formal housing stock) with the aim to increase public rental 
housing stock. The development of diverse forms of tenure for different income 
groups (and especially low income groups) is part of the housing policy and the 
government has recently placed more emphasis on rental housing as a form of 
tenure that could help alleviate housing shortages. My proposition is that public 
rental housing (as a form of social housing) is a form of housing that should be made 
available by the state in order to accommodate low income households. The 
government should be actively involved in the provision of public rental housing. This 
would entail that the government should construct the public rental stock, maintain 
the stock and rent the stock to low income households. When facing housing 
shortages the government is obliged to respond and introduce measures that would 
alleviate such shortages. An efficient way to address housing shortages is to provide 
rental housing, because the state is actively involved in the provision of a basic 
human need.384 Where the state is acting as public landlord it is able to assess, 
evaluate and monitor the provision of housing in order to ensure that this basic right 
is given effect to. Public rental housing should make housing available to low income 
households and give effect to the right to have access to adequate housing as stated 
in section 26(1) of the Constitution. 
The public sector should provide rental housing to the lowest income group in 
dire need of housing. The government, acting as local authority (or local 
municipality), should fulfil its constitutional duty in section 26(2) of the Constitution as 
public sector landlord. It is important to note that section 26(2) mandates the state to 
“take reasonable legislative and other measures” to give effect to the right to have 
access to adequate housing. Landlord-tenant law is an ideal legal institution in terms 
of which the government can make affordable housing available to the lowest 
income group in dire need of housing, because the government can maintain control 
over the housing stock and be actively involved as landlord. Even though this sector 
would fulfil a social function in the provision of housing for the most vulnerable 
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occupiers, it should be referred to as a public sector because the residential stock 
would be owned by the state and the local authority would be acting as public 
landlord. The public sector should be considered as part of public law, because its 
aim should be to give effect to the constitutional obligations in sections 26(1) and 
26(2) of the Constitution (the right to have access to adequate housing), while 
providing substantive tenure security for marginalised occupiers. 
An essential feature of a possible public rental sector is the extent of tenure 
security provided. It was previously argued that a key aspect of adequate housing 
(section 26(1)) is security of tenure. Public rental housing would not give effect to the 
right to have access to adequate housing if it does not afford tenure security. The 
aim of the government should be to provide the lowest income households with the 
most secure form of tenure.385 The essence of this form of housing should be to 
allow marginalised households to establish themselves in their community in order to 
participate in society and achieve human development.386  
My proposition is that the local authority landlord should provide public sector 
tenants with periodic tenancies combined with secure tenure. The local authority and 
public sector tenants should conclude a common law periodic tenancy rather than a 
fixed-term tenancy.387 The point of departure should be that the parties may agree 
on the terms of the periodic tenancy. The local authority should inform the tenant of 
his rights and duties in terms of the agreed contract with the aim to assist the 
household. The basis for this proposition is that a periodic tenancy would allow the 
tenant to easily serve notice to the local authority and terminate the lease. Low 
income households often require the necessary mobility to move to a different city or 
different metropolitan area in search for new job opportunities. A public sector 
tenancy should not restrain such an individual, because she is bound to a fixed term 
lease.  
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However, the essence of a periodic tenancy should be that the lease is in 
principle perpetual.388 If the tenant should wish to continue occupying the premises, 
then the local authority landlord would only be able to terminate the lease upon the 
occurrence of either one of two events, namely where the tenant breached the lease 
or where there is a ground for termination of the tenancy as provided for in the lease. 
Both these grounds should be strictly regulated in the applicable legislation. The 
local authority landlord should be able to terminate the lease where the public sector 
tenant seriously breached the contractual periodic lease.389 The breach cannot be 
trivial. Where the tenant failed to pay the rent, the public sector landlord should be 
able to claim eviction, because the tenant breached the contract. However, in the 
case where the tenant breached the contract the legislation should enable the tenant 
to meet with the local authority in order for the tenant to cure the breach.390 This 
could be done by compelling the local authority to first issue a notice to the tenant 
seeking possession, whereafter the tenant would be able to cure the breach. The 
tenant‟s opportunity to cure the breach is a form of purely substantive tenure 
protection, because the local authority landlord would not be able to end the tenancy 
and claim eviction on the ground that the tenant breached the lease. If the tenant 
fails to cure the breach, the periodic tenancy would terminate and the local authority 
landlord would be able to claim eviction in court. The procedural safeguards 
discussed in the following paragraphs would apply to all public sector tenants facing 
eviction. The court must therefore first consider the reasonableness of the decision. 
In principle, the local authority should also be able to terminate public sector 
tenancies on specified grounds and the legislation should include detail regarding 
the grounds that would allow the local authority to end the tenancy. The grounds for 
eviction should generally relate to certain acts of the tenant, although it should also 
include other grounds, including circumstances completely unrelated to the parties 
involved. The proposed grounds for eviction, as discussed in the following 
paragraph, are part of a broad guideline that requires more detail.  
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The local authority landlord should be able to initiate eviction proceedings 
where the public sector tenant damaged the property through acts of waste or where 
the tenant caused a serious nuisance to neighbouring occupiers and disturbed the 
domestic peace. Where the tenant used the property for other purposes than 
housing, especially illegal purposes (for instance drug related activities) the local 
authority should be able to claim eviction.391 The local authority landlord should also 
be able to claim eviction where the tenant sublet the property, received a lump sum 
for exchanging her tenancy or where she failed to use the property as her primary 
residence.392 Where the public sector household occupies a family-size dwelling and 
the one partner (with all her children) leaves the dwelling as a result of domestic 
violence, the local authority should be able to evict the remaining partner, because 
the family-size dwelling is no longer used optimally. In such a case the local authority 
should generally be required to provide the remaining partner with a smaller 
dwelling. The local authority should usually be allowed to claim eviction in the case 
where the dwelling is overcrowded, but the court should be hesitant to grant the 
order, especially during housing shortages. Finally, unrelated to the conduct of the 
tenant or landlord, the public sector landlord should be required to evict tenants 
where the dwellings are unsafe and endanger tenants‟ health. The local authority 
should also be able to claim eviction where the building requires reconstruction, 
rebuilding or repair. In these cases the local authority should afford households 
temporary alternative accommodation until the renovations are completed. The 
eviction is therefore temporary and the households should generally be able to return 
to their homes.393 
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If there is a ground for reclaiming possession the local authority should be 
able to initiate eviction proceedings in court and firstly prove the ground for 
possession. The grounds for possession function as a form of substantive tenure 
protection, because the local authority landlord would not be able to end the periodic 
tenancy without successfully proving a ground for possession in court. 
However, due to the vulnerability of these households it is essential that the 
courts must also consider the eviction order reasonable under the circumstances, 
once the tenancy has been terminated lawfully. The legislation should compel the 
courts to consider the reasonableness of the decision, with reference to all 
contextual circumstances, before granting the eviction order.394 The reasonableness 
of the decision should depend on the specific circumstances of the household, 
including the household‟s personal circumstances. The court must adopt a broad, 
context-sensitive approach in adjudicating such a decision and attach the 
appropriate weight to the various factors in order to make a reasonable decision. If 
the court concludes that the local authority landlord did prove the ground for 
possession, but an eviction order would be unreasonable under the circumstances, 
the court should refuse to grant the order and the tenant‟s periodic tenancy would 
continue. Even though the reasonableness requirement forms part of a procedural 
process, as the court must consider the eviction order reasonable, the effect of this 
requirement should be to grant the tenant substantive tenure security. The 
reasonableness requirement would apply to all public sector tenants facing eviction. 
If the local authority proves a ground for possession and the court considers 
the eviction order reasonable, the court should grant the eviction order, provided that 
the court should also consider the availability of suitable alternative accommodation 
to the tenant and her family.395 In light of South Africa‟s housing shortage, especially 
for the lowest income group, the legislation must compel the local authority to aim 
and make available suitable alternative housing as soon as the eviction takes place, 
especially if the household is unable to acquire alternative accommodation by 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
relocate people it must consider the needs of each household in order to understand the extent of the 
disruption: para 241. As part of the relocation inquiry the Court decided that it must consider the 
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themselves. In terms of sections 26(1) and 26(2) the state is obliged to develop 
statutory and other measures to give effect to the right to have access to adequate 
housing. In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers396 Sachs J held that 
there is no unqualified principle that local authorities may evict unlawful occupiers 
only if alternative accommodation is available, although “a court should be reluctant 
to grant an eviction against relatively settled occupiers unless it is satisfied that a 
reasonable alternative is available”.397 The public sector should function as a type of 
safety net for low income households and it therefore follows that the local 
municipality landlord should only be able to evict a public sector household in 
exceptional circumstances if there is no alternative accommodation available. 
Alternative accommodation would only be suitable if it offers complete 
statutory protection, similar to that which the household had, and the accommodation 
must be suitable to the personal needs of the tenant and his family as regards 
proximity to place of work, schools and so forth. If the household is unable to find 
alternative accommodation and the local authority is unable to make available 
suitable alternative accommodation once the eviction order is granted, the tenant 
should generally be allowed to continue occupying the dwelling until alternative 
accommodation is made available. In such a case the eviction order should be 
suspended for the necessary period as determined by the court. The alternative 
accommodation requirement therefore functions as a form of procedural protection, 
because the eviction order would generally be suspended in the case where 
alternative accommodation is not immediately available, although the effect of this 
requirement is to grant the tenant a substantive right against homelessness. The 
alternative accommodation requirement would apply to all public sector tenants 
facing eviction. 
The legislation should therefore provide public sector tenants with substantive 
occupation rights to the extent that the local authority would only be able to end the 
tenancy if there is a valid and justifiable ground for termination of the lease. If there is 
a ground for termination of the lease and the local authority claims eviction in court, 
which is a purely procedural requirement in terms of the common law and section 
26(3) of the Constitution, the court is obliged to consider all the relevant 
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circumstances (section 26(3)) before an eviction order can be made. In terms of the 
proposed legislation, additional substantive protection should be included as part of 
the eviction procedure to the extent that the court may generally only grant the 
eviction order if it is reasonable and if suitable alternative accommodation is 
available. These additional protective measures could be regarded as procedural 
measures, because they form part of the eviction proceedings and require the courts 
to consider the contextual circumstances, but their effect would be substantive 
tenure protection, because evictions would only be granted in exceptional 
circumstances. 
The legislation should also restrict rent levels in the public sector to the bare 
minimum that would cover basic services and housing maintenance. It is doubtful 
whether the terminology of rent control would be appropriate in the public sector, 
because rent control is usually imposed in the private rental sector, or even the 
social rental sector where private actors provide low cost housing, and it would 
therefore be more accurate to describe the inclusion (rather than the imposition) of 
strict rent level restrictions in the public sector as a critical form of tenant protection.  
 
8.4.3 Social sector 
 
The social sector I propose is in line with the aim of the current Social Housing Act 
16 of 2008 to the extent that social housing institutions (or associations) should be 
developed to operate as private actors in the provision of social rental housing for 
low to medium income households, although combined with state assistance and 
strict regulation.398  
The state should firstly promote the private development of rental housing 
stock more actively by granting loans to private investors at low interest rates; by 
offering state funds to subsidize housing construction; and by introducing tax 
incentives for private developers. The South African government has not been 
successful in significantly alleviating housing shortages and the cooperation between 
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the state and private actors is therefore vital to address the housing crisis.399 The 
government should encourage private actors (and private not-for-profit corporations), 
by making available public funds and state assistance, to develop residential housing 
stock and thereafter become involved in the provision of rental housing for low- to 
medium-income households. However, the state should still be involved in the 
provision of housing for this higher income group, because housing remains a 
government responsibility, even though the private corporations would become the 
landowners of the developments. The state should remain involved in the social 
sector, but its role should not be as direct as in the public sector. My proposition is 
that the state should be involved in the social sector as regulator rather than owner 
of rental housing. The social sector should therefore also help alleviate housing 
shortages by providing increased access to rental housing, although the rental 
housing stock should be built by private corporations. 
The social housing institution, acting as landlord, should be able to let the 
residential premises to low- and medium-income households on either fixed-term or 
periodic tenancies. The housing institution and the tenant should be able to freely 
conclude a lease that would suit their needs and the lease should be concluded and 
enforced in terms of the common law, until the statutory regulations become 
applicable (discussed in the following paragraphs).400 In the case where the tenant 
breaches one of the terms of the lease the landlord should be able to terminate the 
lease and claim an eviction order, whereafter the procedural safeguards, as 
discussed in the following paragraphs, would provide the necessary procedural 
protection for the tenant and his family. Similar to the public sector, where the tenant 
breached one of the terms of the lease the social institution should be able to claim 
eviction, although the breach should not be trivial. Breach of the lease includes 
failure to pay the rent. The common law should therefore remain applicable in 
relation to the contractual agreement, including termination of the lease.401 However, 
the legislation should provide social tenants with secure occupation rights through 
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the creation of a statutory tenancy upon termination of the contractual lease. A 
statutory tenancy entails that where the tenant continues to pay the agreed rent and 
fulfils the other terms of the lease upon termination of the contractual lease, the 
contractual lease would automatically convert into a statutory tenancy. The essence 
of this statutory tenancy would be to provide social tenants with substantive security 
of tenure, as the tenant‟s right to continue occupation would not come to an end and 
the social landlord would not be able to claim eviction upon termination of the 
contractual lease.402 Similar to the public sector, the core of the social sector is to 
allow the tenant to choose when she would like to end the tenancy. The aim of the 
proposed legislation is to afford tenants the option to continue occupying the leased 
premises.  
The statutory tenancy would continue on a periodic basis until the tenant 
serves a notice to terminate the lease or until the landlord can prove one of the 
grounds for possession (listed in the legislation) in court.  
Similar to the public sector, the grounds for eviction should mostly relate to 
certain acts of the tenant and include a couple of other grounds related to the 
landlords‟ conduct (or needs) or circumstances unrelated to the parties. The 
following grounds for eviction are mere indications of what might be required. Where 
the tenant damaged the property, caused a serious nuisance to neighbouring 
occupiers or used the property for illegal purposes the social housing institution 
should be able to claim eviction.403 Social sector tenancies should prohibit subletting 
and social housing institutions should therefore be able to claim eviction where the 
tenant sublet the property, received a lump sum for exchanging his tenancy or where 
he failed to use the property as his primary residence.404 Where the social housing 
stock is not used efficiently (for instance where the household occupied a family-size 
dwelling and one of the partners, with all her children, left the dwelling as a result of 
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domestic violence) the social housing institution should be able to evict the tenants 
who fail to use the property optimally. On the other hand, the social housing 
institution should also be allowed to claim eviction in the case where the dwelling is 
overcrowded.405 Different from the public sector, where the social housing institution 
offered a renewed lease upon termination of a fixed-term tenancy and the social 
tenant declined this offer, the social housing institution should be able to claim 
eviction, despite the tenant‟s acceptance at a later stage. The social landlord should 
also be able to claim eviction in the case where the tenant served a notice to end the 
periodic tenancy, but later refuse to vacate. Unrelated to the conduct of the parties, 
the social landlord should be required to evict social tenants where the dwellings are 
unsafe and dangers to the tenants‟ health. Where the buildings require 
reconstruction, rebuilding or repair the housing institution should also be able to 
claim eviction.406 In these cases the social housing institution is not obliged to 
provide alternative accommodation to the households, because social housing 
institutions are private landowners and therefore not constitutionally obliged to 
ensure a right to housing. However, the court should consider the possibility of 
providing the tenants with a right to return to the premises once the renovations are 
complete.407 This possibility would depend on the specific circumstances in each 
case. 
Similar to the public sector, the effect of these grounds should be to provide 
the tenant with substantive tenure protection, as cancellation should be impossible in 
the absence of one of the listed grounds. If the landlord can prove a ground for 
possession in court, then the statutory tenancy would come to an end and the social 
landlord would be able to claim eviction. The level of substantive tenure protection in 
the social sector is therefore not as extensive as in the public sector. This is 
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justifiable because social housing institutions are private landowners and their 
property rights should not be restricted too extensively. The social sector should 
ensure security of tenure for tenants, but the social housing institutions‟ property 
rights should not be burdened in an unjustifiably harsh manner. 
Once the landlord has proven a ground for possession in court, which would 
generally include the case where the tenant breached one of the terms of the lease, 
the court must consider all the relevant circumstances (section 26(3)) before granting 
the eviction order, which forms part of the procedural safeguards. Similar to the 
public sector, the court must consider all the relevant circumstances, including the 
personal and socio-economic circumstances of the tenant. However, the availability 
of alternative accommodation forms part of these circumstances. To incorporate 
governmental oversight in the activities of the social sector, as a form of procedural 
protection, the proposed legislation should require prior government approval 
(preferably from the local authority in the jurisdiction) before a social tenant could be 
evicted.408 In essence, the only basis upon which the government should disapprove 
the eviction order is if there is no rental housing available in the public sector. Where 
the government disapproves the eviction order on the basis that there is no rental 
housing available in the public sector, the court should consider this fact as part of 
the relevant circumstances, but the government‟s disapproval should not be the 
deciding factor, as there could be alternative accommodation available in the social 
sector. In terms of section 26(3) of the Constitution the court should consider all 
relevant circumstances before granting the eviction order, which provides the tenant 
with procedural safeguards. It is safe to assume that the courts would only refuse an 
eviction order in exceptional circumstances. The absence of alternative 
accommodation is an example of where the courts should be reluctant to grant the 
eviction order. If there is no public rental housing available and the household is 
unable to acquire housing in either the social or private sector, then the court should 
be reluctant to grant the eviction order. In such a case the court should generally be 
able to grant the eviction order but suspend its implementation for a reasonable 
period until the state can provide the household with alternative accommodation. The 
court should have the discretion to decide whether to grant the eviction order, and 
suspend the implementation thereof, or to grant the eviction order and render the 
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person homeless. In the first-mentioned case the social housing institution would be 
burdened with the duty to continue providing housing for the household on a 
temporary basis, until alternative housing is made available. During this period the 
tenant should continue to pay the agreed rent. If the tenant is unable to pay the 
agreed rent (for instance where the landlord is relying on non-payment as a ground 
for possession) then the tenant should pay whichever amount possible and the state 
should pay the balance of the rent. If the tenant is unable to pay any rent, then the 
state should pay the entire amount until the state can make alternative 
accommodation available in the public sector.409 
 In order to prevent tenant exploitation the legislation should place restrictions 
on rent increases, although the imposition of strict rent control might be too harsh 
and a more flexible system of rent restrictions should therefore be imposed. The 
legislation could for instance allow rent increases every three years with reference to 
rents of comparable dwellings in the vicinity. The government should be involved in 
allowing rent increases and a governmental body should appointed to oversee (and 
regulate) rent increases and the eviction of tenants, as mentioned earlier. 
 
8.4.4 Private sector 
 
In terms of the proposed legislation the private sector should consist of private 
landowners and tenants with medium to high income. The point of departure is 
therefore that this sector should accommodate the higher income households who 
prefer to rent privately and who require the necessary mobility associated with rental 
housing, without the constraints coupled with homeownership. If the proposed public 
and social sectors could provide affordable secure rental housing for low to medium 
income occupiers and function as a type of safety net for vulnerable occupiers, then 
the private sector would generally make housing available for higher income tenants. 
The private sector should remain largely unregulated and function mostly according 
to the dictates of the free-market, because it should generally not be necessary to 
afford the higher income households increased tenure protection in the form of 
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substantive occupation rights. In the private sector private landowners should be 
able to rent their property to tenants in terms of the common law, which includes 
common law principles regarding termination of the lease and rent setting. Landlords 
in the private sector should be able to set their own rent levels. Weak tenure rights 
form part of landlord-tenant regimes and are therefore not necessarily 
unconstitutional, if the tenants are not particularly vulnerable. It was previously 
argued that all urban tenants are not entitled to substantive tenure security and the 
Constitution does also not guarantee substantive tenure security for all occupiers. 
The aim of rent regulation and the imposition of substantive tenure security are to 
enable lower income households to continue occupying a certain dwelling that 
resembles their home. The justification for rent control, namely to accommodate and 
protect vulnerable occupiers during housing shortages, does not apply to the 
proposed private sector, because this sector should accommodate higher income 
households. 
However, in terms of section 26(3) of the Constitution no person may be 
evicted without a court order made after considering all the relevant circumstances. 
In the private sector the court must consider all the relevant circumstances before 
granting the eviction order and private sector tenants therefore enjoy the procedural 
safeguards in section 26(3) when facing eviction proceedings. The court‟s 
interpretation of this requirement could indirectly provide tenants with substantive 
tenure security, although it would depend on the specific circumstances. Section 
26(3) can imply some substantive protection, even for higher income private tenants 
in a free-market environment. Private sector tenants, like social sector tenants, 
should be able to resist eviction, even upon termination of the lease, by arguing in 
court that an eviction order would have an unjustifiably harsh impact on the tenant or 
his family that outweighs the commercial interest of the landlord in reclaiming the 
property.410 It is safe to assume that the courts would only refuse an eviction order in 
exceptional circumstances. An example of where the court should be able to refuse 
eviction is where the eviction order would render the household homeless. If the 
household is unable to find alternative accommodation in the private sector or the 
social sector, then the public sector should function as a last resort where the 
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household would be able to acquire alternative accommodation. The duty to make 
available access to adequate housing, which includes the duty to prevent 
households from becoming homeless, is a state duty and the state should be joined 
in eviction proceedings where the eviction order might render the household 
homeless. In such a case the occupiers should apply for a joinder and the state 
should aim to provide suitable alternative accommodation to the occupiers in the 
form of public rental housing. If the state is unable to immediately provide public 
rental housing when the eviction order is granted, then the court should generally 
suspend the eviction order until the state can make housing available. Similar to the 
social sector, the court should have the discretion to decide whether to grant the 
eviction order, combined with the suspension of the order, or just the eviction order 
that would have immediate effect. If the court decides to suspend the eviction order, 
the private landowner would be burdened with the duty to temporarily accommodate 
the vulnerable household until the state can fulfil its constitutional duty and provide 
alternative accommodation. Similar to the social sector, the tenant should continue to 
pay the agreed rent, unless she is unable to. In such a case the state should assist 
the tenant and make the rental payments on her behalf. The state should either pay 
a percentage of the agreed rent or the whole amount, depending on the financial 
circumstances of the tenant.411 
The courts have also recently held that the state should be joined in 
proceedings where private landowners claim eviction of unlawful occupiers (who 
previously rented the property) and where the eviction order would result in the 
occupiers being homeless.412 The court held that the interests of the occupiers, 
private landowner and state (municipality) would be protected if the state was joined, 
because the state has a duty to provide the evicted tenants with adequate 
housing.413  
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8.5 Constitutional compliance  
 
The following paragraphs firstly provide a brief introduction of the recent case law 
where the courts had to decide whether to grant an eviction order if the result would 
have been to render the unlawful occupiers homeless. The effect of the decisions is 
important in light of the proposed legislation, because the proposed legislation would 
entrench the essence of these decisions, which is an overall effort to combat 
homelessness. In order to give effect to the constitutional obligations in sections 
25(6), 26(1) and 26(3) of the Constitution, and to combat homelessness, the rights of 
private landowners have to be restricted. The second part of this section assesses 
the proposed legislation, which brings about a deprivation in terms of section 25(1) of 
the Constitution, to determine whether it would be in compliance with the 
Constitution. 
The South African private rental market is currently providing housing to a 
range of households with various income levels, including the poorest of the poor. 
The courts have recently suspended the right of private landowners to evict tenants 
holding over if eviction would result in the household being homeless, although the 
courts applied the Prevention of Illegal Eviction form Unlawful Occupation of Land 
Act 19 of 1998 (PIE) as basis for its decision.414 My proposition in terms of the 
proposed legislation, which was highlighted in the discussion of the social and 
private sectors above, is that the courts should only be able to evict tenants in 
exceptional circumstances if it would result in the tenant and his family becoming 
homeless, although the private sector should not be burdened with the duty to make 
housing available for the poorest households. The state is obliged to provide housing 
and the public sector should function as a type of safety net where persons facing 
eviction in both the social and private sectors should be able to acquire secure rental 
housing. 
The more problematic question is what the role of the private sector should be 
in the case where the state is unable to make suitable alternative accommodation 
available in the form of public rental housing once the eviction order is granted.  
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In President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip 
Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and Others, Amici Curiae)415 the Constitutional Court 
confirmed the decision in the Supreme Court of Appeal,416 where the Court held that 
unlawful occupiers could remain on private land until the state made alternative 
accommodation available, but the state had to pay compensation to the landowner 
for the period during which he was denied use of his land. In Blue Moonlight 
Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue & Another417 the high court 
decided that unlawful occupiers could remain on private land for a period of two 
months, whereafter they were evicted. During this period the state had to pay the 
private landowner “an amount equivalent to the fair and reasonable monthly rental of 
the said premises”.418  
One should note that the courts have a discretion to refuse eviction orders in 
terms of PIE (promulgated in terms of section 26(3)), which mandates the courts to 
consider all relevant circumstances. The courts can therefore still grant the eviction 
order even if no alternative accommodation is available.419 From the case law it 
appears that the courts have recently interpreted PIE to refuse eviction orders in the 
case where such an order would render the occupiers, including urban tenants, 
homeless. The state has also been joined in these proceedings, because the state 
has a duty to provide measures that would enable all persons to gain access to 
adequate housing. However, the courts allow the continued occupation of unlawful 
occupiers on private land until the state can make alternative accommodation 
available, provided that some form of compensation is paid to the private landowner. 
The effect of these decisions is to force private landowners to make their property 
available to unlawful occupiers in desperate need of housing, while this burden is 
accompanied by compensation.  
The aim of the proposed legislation is to strengthen the occupation rights of 
tenants. In terms of the proposed legislation private landowners could be burdened 
with the duty to afford continued occupation rights for tenants, although the private 
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landowner is entitled to the agreed rent. Social housing institutions should allow 
social sector tenants to remain in the premises upon termination of the contractual 
lease as statutory tenants. Statutory tenants are still obliged to continue paying rent, 
but the right of the social housing institution to terminate the lease and claim eviction 
is restricted. In both the social and private sectors the courts should generally allow 
the tenant to remain in the premises if the eviction order would render the household 
homeless, provided that the tenant‟s right to continue occupying the premises is 
provisional until the state can make alternative accommodation available. In this 
case the private landowner remains entitled to the agreed rent. If the tenant is unable 
to pay the rent, then the state should assist the tenant and either pay the whole 
amount or a portion of the rent, depending on the financial circumstances of the 
tenant.  
The result of the proposed legislation would be to restrict the property rights of 
private landowners, which would amount to a deprivation420 in terms of section 25(1) 
of the Constitution. Section 25(1) deals with limitations on property and it states that 
“[n]o person may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general 
application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property.”  The proposed 
legislation must comply with the Constitution and if it contravenes section 25(1) it 
would be invalid, while section 39(2) of the Constitution states that the courts must 
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights when interpreting any 
legislation. The anti-eviction measures in the proposed social and private sectors 
must comply with section 25(1) of the Constitution, because the effect of the 
measures is to limit the private landowners‟ property rights. 
In order to determine whether the proposed legislation would comply with 
section 25(1) one should first establish that the affected interest is property, as 
section 25(1) states that no one may be deprived of property. According to Van der 
Walt one could assume that private landowners‟ property, and more specifically 
residential property that is rented out in terms of the proposed legislation, would be 
included as property in terms of section 25(1), because it is a real right in land 
(immovable tangible property) and therefore one of the categories of property that is 
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undoubtedly constitutional property.421 The proposed legislation would only affect 
one of the private landowner‟s property entitlements, namely the right to dispose of 
the property, which includes the right of use.422  
In the proposed social sector the tenant would be allowed to remain in the 
leased premises upon termination of the lease as a statutory tenant. The social 
housing institution‟s right to evict the tenant upon termination of the lease is 
suspended, because the lease continues through the operation of the proposed 
legislation. The tenant would generally also be able to temporarily remain in the 
premises upon termination of the statutory lease in exceptional circumstances. The 
example used in following paragraphs is where an eviction order would render the 
household homeless. In such a case the court should be able to suspend eviction 
until the state can find alternative accommodation. In the proposed private sector the 
private landowner‟s right to evict the tenant could be suspended in certain 
circumstances, depending on the socio-economic circumstances of the tenant. An 
example of where the courts are inclined to suspend eviction orders is where the 
order would render the household homeless. This ground for suspension is used in 
the following paragraphs to illustrate the constitutional validity of such a suspension, 
but it is important to note that in terms of the proposed private sector the courts 
should be able to suspend eviction orders on the basis of other grounds as well. If 
the eviction order would render the household homeless the tenant should generally 
be able to remain in the leased premises, although on a temporary basis until the 
state can provide alternative accommodation. In both sectors the private landowner‟s 
right to dispose of the property is limited as a result of the proposed legislation. The 
right to dispose of the property forms part of private landowners‟ range of property 
entitlements, including the right to use and exclude. 
The next question is whether the proposed legislation and more specifically 
the tenant‟s statutory right to continue occupation upon expiration of the lease, 
amounts to a deprivation. In terms of the proposed social sector the tenant would be 
able to continue occupying the leased premises upon expiration of the contractual 
lease as a statutory tenant without the landowner‟s consent. The court would also be 
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able to suspend the eviction order upon termination of the statutory lease in 
exceptional circumstances, including where the eviction order would render the 
household homeless. In the proposed private sector the private landowner‟s right to 
evict the tenant could also be limited on a temporary basis if the eviction order would 
render the household homeless. The unlawful tenant would therefore be able to 
continue occupying the property until the state can make alternative accommodation 
available.  
In First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance423 
the Constitutional Court defined a deprivation as “any interference with the use, 
enjoyment or exploitation of private property”.424 Van der Walt makes a distinction 
between deprivations and expropriations,425 whereafter he concludes that a 
“deprivation could be defined as properly authorized and fairly imposed limitation on 
the use, enjoyment, exploitation or disposal of property for the sake of protecting and 
promoting public health and safety, normally without compensation.”426 The effect of 
the anti-eviction measures in both the social and private sectors is to limit private 
landowners‟ right to evict tenants and one can conclude that it interferes with 
landowners‟ right to use and dispose of their property, even if only on a temporary 
basis. The anti-eviction measures in both sectors are therefore clearly deprivations 
of property. In both the social and private sectors private landowners‟ right to dispose 
of their property is restricted in order to provide some tenure protection for tenants. 
In the case where the private landowner is unable to evict the tenant as a result of 
the possibility of rendering the household homeless, the aim of the temporary 
restriction is clearly to avoid an unjustifiable result. 
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A valid deprivation in terms of section 25(1) must be imposed by law of 
general application, which exemplifies the general rule of law that the limitation must 
form part of properly authorized and valid law.427 It is unlikely that statutory 
deprivation of property would fall foul of this requirement unless it burdens a small 
group of individuals in an unfair manner, although most deprivations only affect some 
persons.428 Van der Walt mentions that “the fact that a law affects one class of 
people or one class of property to the exclusion of others will generally not mean that 
this requirement is not met.”429 The proposed legislation would affect all private 
landowners who choose to lease their residential premises to tenants, either as a 
social institution (regulated in terms of the social sector) or a private landowner 
(regulated in terms of the private sector). The automatic creation of a statutory lease 
upon termination of the contractual lease in the proposed social sector would be 
available to all social sector tenants as a form of substantive tenure security. This 
imposition would therefore be generally applied in all social sector tenancies. The 
restriction on the institution‟s right to evict the tenant upon termination of the 
statutory lease where eviction could result in the household becoming homeless 
should be interpreted as an exceptional form of protection. The application of this 
form of exceptional protection is however still general, because it should be generally 
applied in all eviction cases where the eviction order might render the household 
homeless. In the proposed private sector private landowners‟ right to evict tenants is 
generally also restricted in exceptional circumstances, including where the eviction 
order might render the household homeless, and this rule is applicable to all private 
landlords. The rule is therefore generally applicable and all private landlords in the 
private sector are subject to this rule, although it would only be applied in a number 
of cases. This does not mean that the law is not generally applicable. 
The limitations in the proposed legislation must be non-arbitrary in order to 
comply with section 25(1) of the Constitution. In terms of the general application 
requirement it is already established that the law cannot burden a small group of 
individuals, although such a deprivation would also be arbitrary. A regulatory 
deprivation would be arbitrary if it is disproportionate in relation to the public benefit it 
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serves and the private harm it causes.430 In First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a 
Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of 
SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance431 the Constitutional Court opted for a 
thick, proportionality-type approach when interpreting the non-arbitrariness 
requirement.432 In FNB Ackermann J adopted a substantive interpretation of the non-
arbitrariness requirement and the point of departure is that a deprivation is arbitrary if 
there is insufficient reason for it or if it is procedurally unfair.433  
In order to determine whether there is sufficient reason for the deprivation 
Ackermann J lists a number of relations that have to be considered by the court. The 
list includes the relationship between means employed (the deprivation) and ends 
sought to be achieved (the aim of the deprivation); the relationship between the 
purpose of the deprivation and the person affected; and the relationship between the 
purpose of the deprivation and the nature of the property (including the extent of the 
deprivation in relation to the property).434 Ackermann J also mentions that where the 
deprivation affects ownership of land (or a corporeal moveable) or where the 
deprivation “embraces all the incidents of ownership” a more compelling reason 
would have to be established in order for the deprivation to constitute sufficient 
reason.435 The arbitrariness test, as developed by Ackermann J, has to be applied to 
the specific facts of each case and is therefore a contextual inquiry.436 
One should first establish whether there is a relationship between the 
deprivation and the aim of the deprivation. In terms of the proposed legislation the 
deprivation is the anti-eviction measures that impose a limitation on the private 
landowners‟ right to dispose. As mentioned previously, two anti-eviction measures 
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are included in the proposed social sector, where the legislation creates a statutory 
tenancy upon termination of the lease and in the exceptional cases where the 
eviction order would for instance render the household homeless. The aim of the 
statutory tenancy is to provide continued occupation rights for low to medium income 
households, while the aim of prohibiting eviction in the case where the eviction order 
would render the household homeless is to combat homelessness. Limiting the 
landowner‟s right to evict the tenant (the deprivation) is directly related to the tenant‟s 
right to continue occupying the property (the aim of the deprivation). Stated 
differently, the tenant‟s statutory right to continue occupying the property cannot be 
realised without limiting the landowner‟s right to evict the tenant (the right to 
dispose). In the proposed private sector the deprivation occurs in exceptional cases, 
one being where eviction would render the household homeless. The essence of the 
deprivation is to limit the landowner‟s right to evict the tenant upon termination of the 
lease where eviction would result in homelessness. The aim of the deprivation is to 
prevent homelessness, because in the absence of the deprivation the household 
would have become homeless. There is therefore a sufficient relationship between 
the deprivation and the aim of the deprivation. 
According to the arbitrariness test there must also be a sufficient relationship 
between the purpose of the deprivation and the person affected. In the proposed 
social sector one can easily recognize the relationship between strengthened 
occupation rights for low to medium income households and social housing 
institutions, because the essence of the proposed social sector is to provide secure 
occupation rights for these households. There is also a clear link between the 
prevention of homelessness (where the eviction order would render the household 
homeless) and the nature of social housing institutions. The social sector should be 
strictly regulated and the social housing institutions should preferably come into 
being with state assistance. In the context of the aim and function of the entire social 
sector it is evident that there is a relationship between strengthened occupation 
rights for social tenants, measures that prevent homelessness, and the nature of 
social housing institutions.  
The more difficult relationship to identify in the private sector is the 
relationship between the aim to prevent homelessness, in the case where the 
eviction order would render the household homeless, and the private landlord. 
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Private landowners should generally not be burdened with the duty to make housing 
available for persons in desperate need of housing, this is a state duty. However, in 
the exceptional case where the eviction of a tenant (and her family) would render the 
household homeless, because the lease expired and the state is unable to provide 
immediate alternative accommodation, one could argue that there is a relationship 
between the private landowner and the aim to prevent homelessness.437 In such a 
case the private landowner already made his property available on the rental market 
and is voluntarily in the business of providing housing. In the context of housing 
shortages one could argue that there is a relationship between a private landowner 
who voluntarily makes his property available for rental housing and the general aim 
to prevent homelessness, especially in the case where the specific landlord already 
made his property available to a household facing homelessness. In the exceptional 
case where the eviction order would render the private sector tenant homeless one 
could argue that there is a relationship between aim of the deprivation and the 
private landowner, although this relationship could be more difficult to establish in 
different circumstances. The example of the possibility of homelessness succeeds 
as a non-arbitrary deprivation on this point, because it is related to the nature of the 
landlord, but a different example might not be that easy to prove. 
In terms of the arbitrariness test one should also consider the relationship 
between the purpose of the deprivation and the nature of the property. In both the 
social and private sectors it is clear that there is a sufficient relationship between the 
purpose of anti-eviction measures (in the form of statutory continued occupation 
rights and measures that prevent homelessness) and the nature of the landowners‟ 
right to dispose, because the right to dispose enables landowners to make decisions 
about their property, including the right to evict tenants upon termination of the lease, 
while the purpose of anti-eviction measures is to provide tenure security and prevent 
evictions where it would cause homelessness.  
According to Radin‟s personhood theory the private landowner‟s interest in 
the property is fungible, because the landowner has a mere commercial interest in 
the property, which is evident due to the fact that it is placed on the rental market as 
an investment. The tenant‟s interest in the rented property is personal, because self-
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investment has taken place. The effect of the proposed anti-eviction measures is to 
place more weight on the interest of the tenant. The tenant‟s home interest, as a 
form of personal property, is deemed more important by social consensus than the 
landlord‟s fungible property and therefore requires more stringent protection.438 In 
German law tenure security in residential property is important, because it enables 
tenants to reach a level of personal autonomy. The security of the home is central for 
the individual (or household) to make decisions and participate in society. German 
constitutional law distinguish between the personal autonomy interest of the tenant 
and the commercial interest of the landlord. The further the interest is from the 
person, the stricter the regulation may be, while the social purpose of property 
justifies increased statutory restrictions on the rights of private landowners.  In terms 
of Radin‟s personhood argument and the German perception of tenants‟ tenure 
security, the interest of the tenant is deemed more important than the right of the 
landowner to dispose of the property. In the South African context I argue that this is 
the case where an eviction order would render the household homeless. 
In terms of the arbitrariness test, as developed by Ackermann J in FNB, one 
can conclude that the proposed legislation would be constitutionally valid if it 
complies with the section 25(1) requirements (the proposed legislation must be 
generally applicable and non-arbitrary), because the reasons for the deprivation 
would be sufficient in light of the contextual factors. Even though private landowners‟ 
ownership rights would be affected by the proposed legislation, the right to dispose 
of property is the only property entitlement affected by the legislation. The right to 
dispose of the property would also be restricted temporarily, while the landowner 
would remain entitled to monthly payments. The nature of the right affected is the 
entitlement to dispose of the property and the extent of the deprivation is limited, 
because it is temporary.439 In light of the preceding paragraphs one can conclude 
that the proposed anti-eviction measures would be non-arbitrary, as long as there 
would be a sufficient relationship between the affected landowners, the affected 
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property and the purpose of the deprivation.440 The example used in both the social 
and private sector, namely where the eviction order would render the household 
homeless, is a valid deprivation, although in terms of the proposed social and private 
sectors the courts should be able to suspend evictions orders in other exceptional 
circumstances as well. The circumstances of each case should be considered by the 
courts to determine whether the deprivation is non-arbitrary and therefore 
constitutionally valid. 
If one of the deprivations in terms of the proposed legislation is found to be 
inconsistent with section 25(1), then the court should first determine whether the 
deprivation could not be justified under section 36 of the Constitution.441 Section 36 
is the general limitations clause in the Constitution and all rights in the Bill of Rights 
can be restricted in terms of this provision. An arbitrary deprivation can therefore be 
justified in terms of section 36, although it is unlikely.442 If the deprivation is valid 
under section 25(1), or justified in terms of section 36, then the court must determine 
whether the deprivation amounts to an expropriation,443 because expropriations are 
a subset of deprivations.444 If the deprivation is invalid under section 25(1) and 
unjustifiable in terms of section 36, the deprivation would be unconstitutional.445 The 
deprivations in terms of the proposed legislation would not amount to expropriations, 
because the proposed law is not aimed at authorizing expropriations. All 
expropriations must be authorized in terms of law of general application and the 
proposed legislation does not authorize expropriations.446 
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8.6 Concluding remarks 
 
The current landlord-tenant laws have not transformed urban residential tenancy in 
line with the Constitution. The Rental Housing Act and the Social Housing Act 
entrench common law tenure rights for urban tenants, which is associated with weak 
substantive tenure protection. The Prevention of Illegal Eviction from Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act (PIE) has recently been interpreted by the courts to provide 
urban unlawful tenants with substantive tenure protection in order to prevent the 
occupiers from becoming homeless. However, this form of protection remains 
temporary until the state can accommodate the occupiers with alternative 
accommodation and is therefore limited in its application and effect. The continued 
weak substantive tenure rights of urban tenants fail to give effect to sections 25(6) 
and 26 of the Constitution. Section 25(6) mandates race related tenure reform, while 
section 26(3) could be interpreted by the courts as a general class related reform 
measure. The socio-economic weakness of urban tenants could justify better 
substantive tenure rights in terms of section 26(3). The government has also not 
sufficiently considered rental housing as a form of tenure that could assist the 
alleviation of housing shortages and the current landlord-tenant laws have therefore 
not transformed the institution of residential tenancy in line with sections 26(1) and 
26(2) of the Constitution. 
In order to develop the South African landlord-tenant law in line with the 
constitutional obligations the legislature should enact new legislation. The legislation 
should ensure strengthened substantive tenure rights for urban tenants, but the 
legislation must be able to afford different levels of tenure security for different 
tenants. The legislature should therefore introduce regulatory measures with a 
context-sensitive approach that would provide the required level of tenure security in 
each individual case. The state should be involved in the provision of rental housing 
in order to alleviate housing shortages, while ensuring that marginalised occupiers 
enjoy the required level of tenure security. Private landowners should also be 
involved in the provision of rental housing, albeit on a limited scale. The legislation 
must ensure that the strengthened rights of tenants and the rights of private 
landowners are balanced in a just and equitable manner. 
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South Africa is currently experiencing a change in the culture of property to 
the extent that the common law right of private landowners to evict marginalised 
occupiers who unlawfully occupy land is no longer absolute. This is evident from the 
recent case law, including Modderklip and Blue Moonlight. The culture of property, 
and the function of immovable property as a limited housing resource, is 
transforming to enable the majority of vulnerable South Africans to obtain housing, 
which is an essential resource for human development. The current landlord-tenant 
regime has not transformed in line with this constitutional mandate, neither has the 
perception of regulatory law changed to emphasise the importance of tenure 
security, which enables marginalised households to participate in society, make their 
own decisions and achieve personal autonomy. Regulatory laws should be 
perceived as a mechanism that empowers low income households to achieve human 
flourishing rather than an intrusion on private landowners‟ rights that constantly 
requires justification. The relationship between landlord and tenant forms part of a 
social obligations framework that functions within a community based sphere of 
relationships, where individuals are dependent on each other for limited resources 
that are essential for human development. The landlord-tenant regime in South 
Africa should transform to reflect the broader change in the culture of property, but 
this change requires a new conception of ownership and the entitlements it consists 
of. 
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